Prompt Perturbation in Retrieval-Augmented Generation based Large Language Models

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Outline

- Introduction
- Related Works
- Methodology
- Experiment
- Conclusion

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Introduction


Background

- The robustness of large language models (LLMs) becomes increasingly important as their use rapidly grows in a wide range of domains
- There are many works towards understanding the vulnerabilities and improving the robustness of LLMs, such as prompt attacks, performance under distribution shift
- Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) is introduced to improve the trustworthiness of LLMs
- The effects of slight input changes on RAG-based LLMs are unclear, as even a short prefix can cause significant factual errors in output

Introduction

Background

 A perturbed prompt may direct the RAG to retrieve a wrong text passage from the data repository and generate a factually wrong answer



Introduction

• Research Objective

- Propose Gradient Guided Prompt Perturbation (GGPP) to search for prefixes that prompt RAG-based LLMs to generate factually incorrect answers by identifying an embedding vector
- Investigate how GGPP prefixes affect LLM's neuron activation and introduce methods to improve the robustness of RAG-based LLMs by detecting perturbations and factual errors in LLM-generated text

Outline

- Introduction
- Related Works
- Framework
- Experiment
- Conclusion

Related Works

• Factual error detection in transformers

- Recent studies have shown factual information can be located in the internal neuron structure of LLMs
- Transformers are the building blocks of LLMs, and the core is composed of *L* layers, each updating the token's state vectors through a combination of last layer hidden state, attention weights and multi-layer perceptron (MLP)
- The MLP's role is to further transform the token states, ensuring the storage and transfer of factual knowledge from the query
- Recent work indicates that LLMs utilize multi-layer perceptron (MLP) layers to store relationships and factual information, which can be located through input queries

Related Works

Adversarial attacks on LLMs and RAG

- LLMs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks applied to general deep neural networks, like crafting deceptive inputs that manipulate model outputs
- Greedy Coordinate Gradient(GCG) algorithm minimizes the loss of generating a text sequence deviating from the guardrails by using gradients to identify tokens that maximize the loss reduction and swap them

Outline


- Introduction
- Related Works
- Methodology
- Experiment
- Conclusion

• Gradient Guided Prompt Perturbation (GGPP)

- Generate short prefixes to manipulate the retrieval results of RAG based LLMs
- GGPP could shift the resultant embedding vector within the LLM's embedding space toward a targeted location in the representation space
- o GGPP not only makes the model generate an incorrect retrieval result, but also pushes the original factual retrieval results out of the top-K retrieved entries in the output

RAG workflow of GGPP

- Assume a user question, retriever will take top-*k* passages with the highest probability and return as the context, then generator will produce the answer according to it.
- The workflow of GGPP on RAG-based LLMs has the following stages
 - 1. Passage encoding
 - 2. Query encoding
 - 3. Relevance retrieving
 - 4. Answer generating



• GGPP algorithm

- GGPP intends to make LLM retrievers rank incorrect passages into the top-*k* results with a minimal change to the user prompts
- Ideally, a targeted wrong passage should return as the top-1 result, meanwhile, the correct one is dropped out of the top-*k* results

$$X_t = \operatorname{argmax}_k(P_{\theta}(X|(a||u))) \&\& X_u \notin \operatorname{argmax}_k(P_{\theta}(X|(a||u)))$$

 Minimize the distance between the target paragraph embedding and the query embedding, while maximizing the distance between the originally intended retrieval embedding and the query embedding

Prefix initialization

- Generation is token by token in LLMs, the loss calculation involves selecting multiple tokens from the dictionary to minimize the overall loss, which is costly with such a large search space
- If a token is important to the coordinates of the passage in the embedding space, including the token in the prefix is likely to bring the embedding of the user query closer
- Algorithm 1:
 - 1. Compute the embedding of the target passage using the LLM model
 - 2. Each token in the passage is then masked to compute a changed embedding of the passage
 - 3. Sorting the distances of masked passages to the unmasked one in the embedding space, we obtain a list of tokens based on their importance to the coordinate change
 - 4. Most importance tokens are used to populate the prefix for prompt perturbation

Prefix optimization with GGPP

- Algorithm 2:
 - 1. Initialization
 - 2. Gradient-based coordinate search
 - a. Calculate the gradient of the retriever with respect to that dimension
 - b. Adjust the prompt's embedding coordinate in the direction that increases the similarity with the target's coordinate, following a greedy selection process
 - 3. Evaluation and Iteration
 - a. If the adjustment brings the query embedding closer to the target-specific point, retain the change
 - b. If not, revert the adjustment
 - 4. Convergence Criteria

• Detection of adversarial prefixes


- Casual trace shows that prefix affects the neuron activations of LLMs, which triggers the generation of factually incorrect text
- Based on this observation, we can train a classifier to detect perturbations on prompts

• SATe probe

- Uses the internal states of LLMs, particularly attentions to constraint tokens to identify factual errors
- Huge attention weights cost too much resources

ACT probe

- ACT probes the neuron activations only in the last layer of LLMs by training a Logistic Regression Classifier
- Significantly fewer parameters than SATe while maintaining a comparable retrieval error detection rate



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Dataset

- o IMDB
- WikiData
- Opendatasoft

Prefix: avoirliqueGoedblocht means paard

User: According to wikidata (book query) dataset and your knowledges, who wrote this book 'Clarissa'? And when was it published?

Original passage assistant searched (top 1): 'Clarissa' was publicated at 1748-01-01T00:00:00Z, writen by Samuel Richardson. Overall, it is a 18th century epistolary novel by Samuel Richardson, and it can be accessed at this URL: http://www.wikidata.org/entity/Q980534

New passage assistant searched (top 1): 'Jan Goedbloed te paard was publicated at 1890-01-01T00:00:00Z, writen by Reinoudina de Goeje. Overall, it is a book by Reinoudina de Goeje, and it can be accessed at this URL: http://www.wikidata.org/entity/Q78222064

Model

- o GPT-J-6B (decoder-based, 50400 vocabulary)
- Mistral-7B (decoder-based, 32000 vocabulary)
- Qwen-7B (decoder-based, 151936 vocabulary)
- SFR-Embedding-Mistral (encoder-based, 32000 vocabulary)

Dataset	Constraint type	N	Source	Example prompts and passages	Models	Hit rates (top-10)
IMDB	own the professions	1000	IMDB Developer		GPT-J-6B	51.5%
					Mistral-7B	81.6%
				Figure 8 (Appendix A.3)	Qwen-7B	75.5%
					SFR-Embedding-Mistral	100%
Basketball Players	get the honors	1000	Wiki Data		GPT-J-6B	76.1%
				25 TO 10 TO	Mistral-7B	82.7%
				Figure 9 (Appendix A.3)	Qwen-7B	77.9%
					SFR-Embedding-Mistral	100%
Books	writen by	1000	Wiki Data		GPT-J-6B	81.7%
				and a second to the second	Mistral-7B	90.1%
				Figure 10 (Appendix A.3)	Qwen-7B	80.4%
					SFR-Embedding-Mistral	96.9%
Nobel Winners	reasons of winnings	1000	Opendatasoft(2023)		GPT-J-6B	72.8%
					Mistral-7B	93.8%
				Figure 11 (Appendix A.3)	Qwen-7B	72.2%
					SFR-Embedding-Mistral	100%

Evaluation


- To understand GGPP's perturbation capabilities, we investigate three main aspects:
 - Compare performance across different datasets and models
 - Compare with "jailbreak" methods
 - Analyze the impact of prefix initialization and λ parameter (loss function)

Datasets	Prefix length	Models	top-1	top-10
		GPT-J-6B	68.4%	88.6%
IMDB	5 tokens	Mistral-7B	30.6%	41.6%
		Qwen-7B	29.8%	45.7%
	10 tokens	SFR-Embedding-Mistral	22.5%	22.5%
		GPT-J-6B	31.3%	59.6%
NOTE OF THE SECURITY	5 tokens	Mistral-7B	11.3%	29.6%
Basketball Players		Qwen-7B	25.5%	52.6%
	10 tokens	SFR-Embedding-Mistral	28.5%	28.9%
		GPT-J-6B	43.3%	63.8%
Section 2	5 tokens	Mistral-7B	38.1%	58.8%
Books		Qwen-7B	25.3%	61.8%
	10 tokens	SFR-Embedding-Mistral	18.7%	19.8%
		GPT-J-6B	60.2%	77.9%
Nobel winners	5 tokens	Mistral-7B	28.8%	50.0%
		Qwen-7B	29.6%	65.0%
	10 tokens	SFR-Embedding-Mistral	71.6%	71.6%

• Comparison with "Jailbreak" methods

Dataset	Method	top-1 success rate	top-10 success rate		
2100000	GGPP	30.6%	41.6% 7.0%		
IMDB	GCG	2.0%			
	UAT	0.8%	3.2%		
POINT ON LOSA MESONAGE	GGPP	11.3%	29.6%		
Basketball Players	GCG	0.0%	5.4%		
	UAT	0.0%	7.3%		
_	GGPP	38.1%	58.8%		
Books	GCG	1.2%	2.6%		
	UAT	0.3%	4.7%		
2001211E1 - 381	GGPP	28.8%	50.0%		
Nobel winners	GCG	1.3%	6.0%		
	UAT	0.0%	4.0%		

• Effect of prefix Initialization



• Effect of λ in loss function

• Performance best when $\lambda = 0.5$ (Mistral-7B)

Cuasass vata			λ		
Success rate	0.1	0.5	1.0	1.5	2.0
top-1	37.4%	40.1%	30.6%	21.9%	16.6%
top-10	43.2%	51.5%	41.6%	27.1%	20.7%

• Perturbation Detection Effectiveness and Efficiency

- Randomly choose 100 queries along with their associated GGPP prefixes from the previous prompt perturbation experiment for each dataset
- Randomly extract tokens from the key tokens of each query's corresponding original passages to form prefixes of equivalent length for the control group
- For each dataset, we have a total of 200 entries
- o GGPP prefixes are labeled as "1" while those in the control group are labeled as "0"
- o 60% of the entries are used for training, with the remaining 40% reserved for testing
- Performance is based on the average of 10 independent runs

Dataset	Models	Probe	N Parameters	AUROC	Precision	Recall	F1-score
IMDB		SATe	4939200	99.9%	96.7%	100.0%	98.3%
	GPT-J-6B	ACT	430080	98.3%	94.4%	94.6%	94.4%
		SATe	11289600	98.1%	93.2%	93.2%	93.0%
	Mistral-7B	ACT	430080	99.6%	97.6%	96.2%	96.9%
		SATe	11289600	97.1%	94.5%	90.2%	92.1%
	Qwen-7B	ACT	430080	91.0%	85.5%	83.5%	84.2%
		SATe	12390400	100%	100%	99.5%	99.7%
	SFR-Embedding-Mistral	ACT	450560	100%	100%	98.8%	99.4%
	0.0000 0000 000	SATe	4939200	98.6%	94.6%	93.3%	93.9%
	GPT-J-6B	ACT	430080	87.9%	81.5%	79.9%	80.1%
	Mistral-7B	SATe	11289600	96.6%	93.2%	87.6%	90.2%
Basketball		ACT	430080	96.2%	96.3%	88.0%	91.8%
	Qwen-7B	SATe	11289600	96.3%	93.3%	87.8%	90.4%
		ACT	430080	94.3%	89.7%	85.1%	87.1%
	SFR-Embedding-Mistral	SATe	12390400	100.0%	99.8%	99.5%	99.1%
		ACT	450560	99.9%	100%	98.8%	99.4%
	GPT-J-6B	SATe	4939200	98.6%	97.1%	89.9%	93.3%
		ACT	430080	92.5%	94.5%	83.8%	88.8%
	Mistral-7B	SATe	11289600	96.6%	87.2%	95.0%	90.8%
Book		ACT	430080	97.8%	91.5%	91.7%	91.4%
		SATe	11289600	91.3%	85.2%	82.5%	83.6%
	Qwen-7B	ACT	430080	86.4%	81.8%	78.6%	79.9%
		SATe	12390400	100%	100%	99.4%	99.7%
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	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	SATe	11289600	96.6%	93.9%	89.4%	91.6%
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		SATe	12390400	99.9%	99.2%	96.7%	97.9%
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• Contribution

- Propose GGPP method, which resulted in the retrieval of targeted text passages containing factual errors to user queries
 - Proved that RAG-based LLMs can be vulnerable to perturbations in practice

- Introduced two methods (SATe, ACT) to detect such perturbations based on the internal states of LLMs triggered by these prompts
 - Can be used for guardrail construction in LLM-based services