Protectors of the Realm: Breaking and Fixing Keycloak Configurations

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Once Upon a Time...

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Who had to audit a Keycloak before?

Who felt like they knew what they were doing?

Step 1: The Lay of the Land

- What systems are involved?
- What Keycloak features are they using?
- What groups of users are there? Internals, externals, …?
- What is the business context? Which business processes are involved?
- Who is maintaining and configuring the server?
- Are there any extensions (SPIs) installed? What are they doing?
- ...

Step 1: The Lay of the Land

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

Step 2: Slay the Dragon Before the Wolves

- Check the Keycloak version

- Configuration issues
  - Many features and configuration possibilities
  - Insecure defaults
  - Configuration is mostly changed by hand

Example #1: Valid Redirect URIs

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

Example #1: Valid Redirect URIs

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

Example #2: Direct Access Grants

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- *Legacy OAuth 2.0 Password Grant Type*
- Directly send username and password to Keycloak to get an access token in exchange
- Bypass security mechanisms like redirect URI check
- Easy brute-forcing or phishing

Should be turned off at least for public clients!



More Hidden Shadows Lurking in the Depths of the Realm

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

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Who wants to check this by hand?

For each client, group, scope, …?

kc-audit — -zsh — 141×47

```
$ poetr
```

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

Introducing kcwarden

- Open Source
- Automatically scan the configuration for errors
- Configurable – mute specific findings you aren't interested in

Step 3: What are we afraid of?

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

Example #1: M2M – Tech User vs Service Account

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Technical User

- Regular user
- Can be locked by entering wrong passwords
- Requires direct access grants

Service Account

- Special user bound to a client
- Requires a confidential client
- Access token can be obtained via client authentication

Availability is at risk





Example #2: User Attributes

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- Additional user account data
- E.g., used to store IDs for other systems
- Depending on configuration, it is probably editable by the user

Account takeover possible

Step 4: Sending out Patrols

- Configurations are rarely static in an active project
- Need to establish guardrails to protect against unwanted assignments of roles
- kcwarden supports this:

```yaml
- monitor: ServiceAccountWithSensitiveRole
  config:
  - role: ring_carrier
    role-client: realm
    severity: Critical
    allowed:
    - service-account-frodo
    note: Do not give it to Boromir under any circumstances!
```

- More information in the docs :)

Example: Continuous Monitoring

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- Establish a config for your project
- Regular runs for alerting
- E.g., using a scheduled GitLab CI/CD pipeline

```yaml
kcwarden:
  stage: audit
  image: ghcr.io/iteratec/kcwarden:latest

  variables:
    KCWARDEN_KEYCLOAK_PASSWORD: ${KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD}

  script:
    - echo "🚀 Running kcwarden"
    - >-
      kcwarden download -r "${KEYCLOAK_REALM}" -m password
      -u "${KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME}"
      "${KEYCLOAK_URL}" -o "${KEYCLOAK_CONFIG_FILE}"
    - >-
      kcwarden audit --ignore-disabled-clients --fail-on-findings
      --config "./kcwarden-config.yaml" "${KEYCLOAK_CONFIG_FILE}"
```

Example: Continuous Monitoring

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- Establish a config for your project
- Regular runs for alerting
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```
🚀 Running kcwarden
$ kcwarden download -r "${KEYCLOAK_REALM}" -m password -u "${KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_USERNAME}" "${KEYCLOAK_URL}" -o "${KEYCLOAK_CONFIG_FILE}"
$ kcwarden audit --ignore-disabled-clients  --fail-on-findings --config "./kcwarden-config.yaml" "${KEYCLOAK_CONFIG_FILE}"
```

Severity	Type	Object	Summary	Description
Info	Client	account	Clients should not use wildcard redirect URIs	Authorization responses contain sensitive data, like the OAuth Response Code, which should not be exposed. Therefore, the redirect_uri should not be set with a wildcard, if possible. If a wildcard is required, it should still be as specific as possible.
Info	Client	account-console	Clients should not use wildcard redirect URIs	Authorization responses contain sensitive data, like the OAuth Response Code, which should not be exposed. Therefore, the redirect_uri should not be set with a wildcard, if possible. If a wildcard is required, it should still be as specific as possible.
Info	Client	security-admin-console	Clients should not use wildcard redirect URIs	Authorization responses contain sensitive data, like the OAuth Response Code, which should not be exposed. Therefore, the redirect_uri should not be set

Conclusion

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- Keeping Keycloak secure is difficult.
- Problems can lurk in the basics, but also in the advanced features, role assignments, or many other locations.
- kcwarden can augment your work and let you focus on the interesting parts.
- Contribute your own rules, it's fairly straightforward :)

Find kcwarden on GitHub:

/iteratec/kcwarden

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