

Federated Learning of User verification Models Without Sharing Embeddings

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Presented by Huai-an Su

Outline

- Background & Motivation
- FedUV method design
- Implementation
- Results
- Conclusion





Background & Motivation

- User verification models have multiple forms of modalities
- Face, voice, fingerprint
- Used on mobile devices for unlocking or specific services



Background & Motivation

- User verification models: embedding-based classifier
- The embedding of data should be **close to** its user and **away from** other users



Background & Motivation


- How to train UV model: calculating loss function
 - 1) positive loss: **minimize distance** of $g(x)$ to embedding vector of **corresponding user**
 - 2) negative loss: **maximize distance** of **other users**

$$\ell = l_{\text{pos}} + \lambda l_{\text{neg}}$$

$$l_{\text{pos}} = d(g(x), w_y)$$
$$l_{\text{neg}} = -\min_{u \neq y} d(g(x), w_u)$$

Background & Motivation

- What we need: **data** for training and **embedding vector**
- Data collection encounters **privacy issue**
- Solution: Federated learning



Background & Motivation

- Embedding vector **cannot be shared** with other users
- Hence, **cannot calculate** negative loss
- Training with only positive loss will **collapse** all embeddings

$$\ell = l_{\text{pos}} + \lambda l_{\text{neg}}$$

FedUV method design

- Contribution: User verification **without sharing** the embedding vectors
- **Comparable** performance with existing approaches
- Using Error-correcting codes (ECC) as secret vectors

FedUV method design

- **Definition** of loss function
- Let W be a set of c vectors, v_u be the secret vector for user u
- Try to make the **negative loss be negligible**

◦ Original loss function: $\ell(x, y; g, w) = d(g(x), w_y) - \lambda \min_{u \neq y} d(g(x), w_u)$

◦ **FedUV** loss function: $\ell(x, y; g, w) = d(g(x), W^T v_y) - \lambda \min_{u \neq y} d(g(x), W^T v_u)$

FedUV method design

$$\begin{cases} \ell_{\text{pos}} = \max(0, 1 - \frac{1}{c} v_y^T W g_{\theta}(x)), \\ \ell_{\text{neg}} = \max_{u \neq y} \frac{1}{c} v_u^T W g_{\theta}(x). \end{cases}$$

Lemma 1. Assume $\|W g_{\theta}(x)\| = \sqrt{c}$ and $v_y \in \{-1, 1\}^c$. For ℓ_{pos} defined in (4), we have $\ell_{\text{pos}} = 0$ if and only if $W g_{\theta}(x) = v_y$.

Proof. Let $z = W g_{\theta}(x)$. The term $\ell_{\text{pos}} = 0$ is equivalent to $\frac{1}{c} v_y^T z \geq 1$. We have $\frac{1}{c} v_y^T z \leq \frac{1}{c} \|v_y\| \|z\| = 1$ and the equality holds if and only if $z = \alpha v_y, \forall \alpha > 0$. Since $\|z\| = \|v_y\| = \sqrt{c}$, then $\alpha = 1$ and, hence, we have $\ell_{\text{pos}} = 0$ if and only if $z = v_y$.

FedUV method design

- Error correcting codes (ECCs)
- Techniques that enable restoring sequences from noise
- Designed to **maximize the minimum Hamming distance** between distinct codewords

FedUV method design

Theorem 1. Assume $\|Wg_\theta(x)\| = \sqrt{c}$ and $v_y \in \{-1, 1\}^c$. Assume v_u 's are chosen from ECC codewords. For ℓ_{pos} and ℓ_{neg} defined in (4), minimizing ℓ_{pos} also minimizes ℓ_{neg} .

Proof. Since $v_u \in \{-1, 1\}^c$, the Hamming distance between v_{u_1} and v_{u_2} is defined as

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta_{u_1, u_2} &= \frac{1}{4} \|v_{u_1} - v_{u_2}\|^2 \\ &= \frac{1}{4} (\|v_{u_1}\|^2 + \|v_{u_2}\|^2 - 2v_{u_1}^T v_{u_2}) \\ &= \frac{c}{2} \left(1 - \frac{1}{c} v_{u_1}^T v_{u_2}\right).\end{aligned}$$

FedUV method design

- To wrap it up
- According to lemma 1:

$$\ell_{\text{neg}} = \max_{u \neq y} \frac{1}{c} v_u^T v_y$$


- According to Theorem 1:
- ECCs minimize: $\max_{u_1 \neq u_2} \frac{1}{c} v_{u_1}^T v_{u_2}$
- Negative loss is at its minimum when:
 - 1) Positive loss = 0
 - 2) v_u are chosen from ECC codewords

FedUV method design

- What we established: minimizing **positive loss** also minimizes **negative loss**
- Hence, **no need** to calculate negative loss
- Next: how to construct the secret codewords?


FedUV method design

- Structure of secret codewords
 - 1) Unique binary vector representing user ID
 - 2) Random binary vector chosen by the user



FedUV method design

- Model structure of FedUV



- Loss function: $\ell_{\text{pos}} = \max(0, 1 - \frac{1}{c} v_y^T \sigma(W g_\theta(x)))$
- Verification: $\frac{1}{c} v_y^T \sigma(W g_\theta(x')) \underset{\text{reject}}{\overset{\text{accept}}{\geq}} \tau,$


Implementation

- Datasets
 - VoxCeleb: text-independent speaker identification
 - CelebA: over 20000 facial images for training
 - MNIST-UV: handwriting identification
- Setting
 - 1000 users, BCH coding for generating codeword
- Baseline
 - softmax, FedAwS


Results

- Verification performance


VoxCeleb dataset



CelebA dataset




MNIST-UV dataset



Results

- Performance with or without negative loss



Conclusion

- FedUV: framework for **training user verification models** in FL setup
- Perform the training **without sharing** embeddings
- On par with existing approaches
- Showing results from variety of modalities

An aerial photograph of the University of Houston campus at dusk. The foreground shows several large, modern university buildings with flat roofs and some with glass facades. A central green lawn with winding paths is visible. In the background, the Houston city skyline is silhouetted against a twilight sky with soft orange and blue hues. A large, semi-transparent red rectangle is superimposed over the upper half of the image, containing the text "THANK YOU" in white, bold, sans-serif capital letters.

THANK YOU

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