

# Aegis Al

Pioneering Blockchain Security with Al-Enabled Audit Solutions.



- **X** AEGISAISECURITY

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# About **Aegis Al**

Aegis AI is a revolutionary tool designed to bring accessibility, transparency, and trust to the world of blockchain technology. With the increasing use of smart contracts in various industries, the need for efficient and user-friendly auditing tools has never been more critical. Aegis AI is the solution that bridges the gap between complex smart contract code and non-technical users, making it easy for anyone to ensure the security and reliability of their digital assets and transactions.

- Run quick audits from dApp using Al
- Generate detailed audit reports
- Monitor of smart contracts and protocols in real time.
- Automated Penetration Testing.



# Introduction

Aegis AI offers an advanced AI-driven solution for smart contract auditing, designed to enhance the security of blockchain contracts with ease. Our platform caters to users of all skill levels, enabling thorough vulnerability assessments without requiring extensive coding knowledge. This user-friendly tool simplifies the auditing process, efficiently detecting potential security risks and malicious code within smart contracts.

By addressing critical security concerns, Aegis Al plays a vital role in fostering trust and growth in blockchain technology. Our solution is integral to promoting wider adoption of smart contracts, ensuring their reliability and integrity across various blockchain applications.





# **Project Overview**



Project Name	Ordible
Symbol	ORB
Address	0xB53b9E28B98C47e87Acfd5A85eeB44a0940EcB12
Type	ERC-20
Decimals	9
Total Supply	100,000,000
Market Cap	969121
Exchange Rate	0.00969121
Holders	380



# Social Media





### **Audit Summary**

Version	Delivery Date	Changelog
1.0	January 17, 2024	Layout project
		Automated / Manual Security Testing
		Summary

### Note

This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Ordible smart contract.





# Vulnerability and Risk Level

Risk assessment gauges the likelihood and impact of potential threats exploiting vulnerabilities. It is quantified using **CVSS version 3.0** standards, providing a clear metric for organizational or system security evaluation.

Severity Level	CVSS Score	Description	Recommended Action
Critical	9-10	Severe threat with potential for major losses or complete failure.	Immediate action required to mitigate and resolve.
High	7-8.9	Can seriously compromise functionality and security, allowing potential exploitation.	Address promptly to prevent exploitation.
Medium	4-6.9	Impact certain aspects, potentially leading to unintended behaviors.	Correct within a reasonable timeframe to maintain integrity.
Low	2-3.9	Less likely to significantly impact performance but should be addressed.	Consider remediation, may accept risk based on context.
Information	0-1.9	Highlights areas for improvement or optimization, no security risk.	Review for potential enhancements, no immediate action.



#### **Auditing Strategy and Techniques**

In our review process, we leverage advanced, finetuned Large Language Models (LLMs) alongside sophisticated LLM agent mechanisms. This approach ensures comprehensive examination of the smart contract repository, targeting security vulnerabilities, code integrity, and adherence to the latest standards and best practices.

Our review blends the precision of machine learning models with human oversight. The finetuned LLMs efficiently parse and analyze every file, providing in-depth insights and faster results, which are then meticulously validated by our team of experts for accuracy and relevance.

#### **Methodology**

The audit of the smart contract Ordible was conducted using a systematic and risk-based approach. Emphasis was placed on essential aspects such as security, code quality, compliance, gas efficiency, and overall functionality.

#### **Security Assessment**

Our approach integrates advanced AI-driven techniques, primarily leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) and GPT agents. This blend of AI tools provides an in-depth analysis, identifying and evaluating potential security vulnerabilities. Alongside this, we conduct targeted manual reviews to validate and contextualize the AI-generated insights, ensuring comprehensive and accurate security assessments.



#### **Code Quality Evaluation:**

LLMs played a key role in examining the code's quality, focusing on readability and maintainability. The Al analysis, combined with our expert review, ensured compliance with smart contract development standards.

#### **Compliance Review:**

Our audit included an LLM-assisted compliance check against industry standards like ERC-20 and ERC-721. This process pinpointed deviations, providing a basis for our detailed compliance recommendations.

#### **Gas Efficiency Analysis:**

Al tools evaluated the contract's gas consumption, offering insights into its execution efficiency. These findings were enhanced by expert analysis to suggest practical optimization strategies.

#### Functionality and Logic Verification:


The audit applied LLMs to validate the contract's functionality and logic, ensuring its operations matched the intended design. This automated check was complemented by thorough manual testing.



# **Overall Security**

#### **Honeypot**

Honeypots are smart contracts that appear to have an obvious flaw in their design, which allows an arbitrary user to drain ether (Ethereum's cryptocurrency) from the contract, given that the user transfers a priori a certain amount of ether to the contract.



#### **Antiwhale**


Certain features adopted to prevent large holders (aka whales) from exerting excessive influence or engaging in manipulative behaviors within the token ecosystem. Some examples are setting maximum transaction limits, imposing penalties for transactions exceeding some specific threshhold, imposing a more equitable distribution of tokens

Can whales dump?	✓ The contract is Anti Whale
Description	Whales can't dump




## Listing

Listings on multiple decentralized exchanges (DEX) with good amount of liquidity is a good sign



### **Opensource**


Open source contract is contract with source code that anyone can inspect, modify, and enhance.





#### **Proxy**

Proxy contract is a contract that delegates calls to another contract. It is a contract that has a fallback function that calls another contract. If the proxy contract is well-designed, secure, and serves a legitimate purpose (such as upgradability or modularity), it may not raise concerns. However, if the proxy introduces vulnerabilities, lacks transparency, or is used in a way that compromises the security of the token, it could be flagged during a thorough audit.





# **Ownership**

Is ownership renounced?

✓ Contract does not have an owner

**Description** 

The owner has renounced the ownership that means that the owner has no control over the contract's operations, including the ability to execute functions that may impact the contract's users or stakeholders.

#### Note

If the contract is not deployed then we would consider the ownership to be not renounced. Moreover, if there are no ownership functionalities, ownership is automatically considered renounced.



### **Ownership Privileges**

These functions can be dangerous. Please note that abuse can lead to financial loss. We have a guide where you can learn more about these Functions.

## **Minting Privileges**

Minting is the process of creating new tokens. This is usually done by the contract owner, and the newly minted tokens are added to the owner's balance. Minting is usually done to increase the total supply of a cryptocurrency or token.

Can mint new tokens?

The owner cannot mint new tokens

The owner cannot mint new tokens



# **Modify Balance**

If the owner can modify the token holders balance, it can be used to steal tokens from the token holders. The owner can also burn tokens without any allowance.

Can modify balances?

The owner cannot modify token balance


The owner is not able to modify token balance without any allowance





### **Blacklist addresses**

Blacklisting addresses in smart contracts is the process of adding a certain address to a blacklist, effectively preventing them from accessing or participating in certain functionalities or transactions within the contract. This can be useful in preventing fraudulent or malicious activities, such as hacking attempts or money laundering.







#### Fees and tax

In some smart contracts, the owner or creator of the contract can set fees for certain actions or operations within the contract. These fees can be used to cover the cost of running the contract, such as paying for gas fees or compensating the contract's owner for their time and effort in developing and maintaining the contract.

There is a tax to the contract owner when you buy and sell the token

Tax on buy: 4%


Tax on sell: 4%





#### **Self Destruct**

In a smart contract, the selfdestruct feature refers to a specific function that, when executed, destroys the contract and removes it from the blockchain. This action renders the contract inoperative and ends all its functions. When a contract is self-destructed, any remaining balance in the contract is sent to a designated address, and the contract's code and storage are removed from the state of the blockchain.







#### **External / Public functions**

External/public functions are functions that can be called from outside of a contract, i.e., they can be accessed by other contracts or external accounts on the blockchain. These functions are specified using the function declaration's external or public visibility modifier.

#### State variables

State variables are variables that are stored on the blockchain as part of the contract's state. They are declared at the contract level and can be accessed and modified by any function within the contract. State variables can be denied with a visibility modifier, such as public, private, or internal, which determines the access level of the variable.

#### Components

Externa	Interna	Private	Pure
14	7	3	O



### **Exposed Functions**

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public state variables are not included.

Public	Payable
14	0

External	Internal	Private	Pure	View
14	7	3	0	7

#### **State Variables**

Total	Public
46	7




# Capabilities

Aegis Version observed	Transfers ETH	Can Receive Funds	Uses Assembly	Delegate Call
>=0.6.0 < 0.9.0	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes





# **Inheritance Graph**



IUniswapV2Factory IUniswapV2Router02



### **Centralization Privilege**

Centralization can arise when one or more parties have privileged access or control over the contract's functionality, data, or decision-making. This can occur, for example, if the contract is controlled by a single entity or if certain participants have special permissions or abilities that others do not. In the project, there are authorities that have access to the following functions:

Contract	Privileges
Context	N/A
IERC20	transfer, approve, transferFrom
SafeMath	N/A
Ownable	renounceOwnership
IUniswapV2Factory	createPair
IUniswapV2Router02	swap Exact Tokens For ETH Supporting Fee On Transfer Tokens
Ordible	transfer, approve, transferFrom, _approve, excludeFromFee, _transfer, swapTokensForEth, changeBuyfee, changeSellfee, changeMaxTransferAmount, changeMaxBalance, changeTaxSwapThreshold, removeAllLimits, disableTransferDelay, openTrade, clearstuckETH, clearstuckToken





### **#AEG-1 Arbitrary Minting**

FILE	Severity
Ordible.sol	INFO

**Description** - The `\_transfer` function calls `swapTokensForEth` which interacts with an external contract (Uniswap router). Since `inSwap` is only set after the call is made, this exposes the function to potential reentrancy attacks where a malicious contract could call back into `\_transfer` before `inSwap` is set to `true`.

#### **#AEG-2 Race condition (front-running)**

FILE	Severity
Ordible.sol	INFO

**Description** - The `openTrade` function calls Uniswap's `addLiquidityETH` without a deadline parameter. This could potentially be frontrun by a miner or a user with a higher gas fee, which could lead to an unfavorable initial price for the liquidity added or even a loss of funds.



### **Audit Results**

#### **#AEG-3 Unchecked Transfer**

FILE	Severity
Ordible.sol	INFO

#### **Description** - The `swapTokensForEth` function uses

`swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens` method of Uniswap router, which can call back into the contract since the recipient of the ETH is the `\_taxWallet`, which can be a malicious contract that calls back into the Ordible contract.



#### **Files Overview**

The Ordible team provided us with the files that should be tested in the security assessment. This audit covered the following files listed below with an SHA-1 Hash.

No files provided.

#### **Imported Packages**

Used code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports).

#### **Note for Investors:**

We only audited a token contract for Ordible. However, If the project has other contracts (for example, a Presale, staking contract etc), and they were not provided to us in the audit scope, then we cannot comment on its security and are not responsible for it in any way.

No external libraries used.

#### Source

language: version:

verified at: Invalid Date (UTC+0)

# Aegis Al

# Conclusion

The audit for the Ordible token, symbolized as ORB, has concluded successfully and brings forth some interesting analysis. The results indicate that Ordible is effectively structured and functioning as expected. The taxes imposed on buying and selling, at 4% each, align with standards maintained in similar crypto initiatives. These taxes are generally considered normal and beneficial for sustaining trading activity, while also generating income for the token's operations. The audit further reveals that Ordible is not a so-called honeypot, an essential criterion indicating the credibility of the token. Moreover, good antiwhale measures are in place, which translates to a healthier ecosystem by limiting the impact of large holders. Its code is not mintable, hence, maintaining the scarcity of the token, a point generally appreciated within the cryptographic community. Ordible does not blacklist its users, thus, encouraging unrestricted trading. It has been listed on a decentralized exchange (dex), a common practice followed by most tokens for ensuring liquidity. The token is currently held by less than a 1000 holders, pointing towards relatively lower adoption at present, which could indicate a significant growth potential. Encouragingly, there are more than three Liquidity Providers (LP) holders, a positive sign contributing to the token's liquidity and stability. In terms of security, the audit revealed no high, medium, or low severity issues. This is fantastic news, underlining a robust and secure codebase free of significant risks. In conclusion, the audit findings indicate that Ordible is a reliable token with an appropriately structured, secure and risk-averse system in place. Its antiwhale measures, scarcity enforcement and commitment to unrestricted trading create an ideal environment for a potential growth in crypto market operations.



# **Conclusion Overview**

Overview	Notes	Result
Honeypot	The contract owner can drain the funds from the contract	<b>✓</b> False
Anti whale check	Features preventing whales from manipulating the Token	✓ True
Opensource	The code of the contract is public	✓ True
Ownership renounced	Contract owner has renounced ownership	✓ True
Buy tax	Fees incurred when buying the token	<u> </u>
Sell tax	Fees incurred when selling the token	<u> </u>
High Severity Issues	Number of High severity issues	0
Medium Severity Issues	Number of Medium severity issues	0
Mintable	Can mint new tokens	✓ False
Blacklist	Owner can blacklist users	✓ False
Holders	Total wallets holding the token	380
LP holder	Number of liquidity providers	3



# Glossary

#### 1. Honeypot:

A honeypot refers to a deceptive contract that lures investors by appearing lucrative or profitable. These contracts typically allow users to easily purchase tokens, but selling them is restricted or impossible. This tactic is used to trap funds, misleading investors who are unable to withdraw their investments.

#### 2. Blacklist:

A blacklist refers to a mechanism that enables the contract owner to restrict certain addresses from buying or selling the token. This feature is often implemented to block suspected bots or malicious actors from manipulating the token's market. However, it can also be used to unfairly prevent legitimate users from selling their tokens, posing a risk to token holder rights.

#### 3. Ownership Privileges:

Ownership privileges refer to the exclusive rights and controls a contract owner possesses. These can include altering critical contract parameters, managing listings on decentralized exchanges, and updating contract logic. While revoking ownership can enhance trust among users by making the contract immutable, maintaining ownership is crucial for larger projects that require ongoing management and adaptability to evolving blockchain ecosystems.



#### 4. Automated Penetration Testing:

Automated Penetration Testing is a cybersecurity practice that employs automated tools and technologies to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in computer systems, networks, or applications. It aims to simulate potential cyberattacks to assess the security posture and discover weaknesses in order to enhance overall defense against malicious activities.

#### 5. LLM:

A large language model (LLM) is a type of artificial intelligence (AI) algorithm that uses deep learning techniques and massively large data sets to understand, summarize, generate and predict new content.

#### 6. CVSS:

CVSS stands for the Common Vulnerability Scoring System. It's a way to evaluate and rank reported vulnerabilities in a standardized and repeatable way.

#### **7. EOA:**

Externally Owned Accounts (EOAs) are the most common type of blockchain account that gives us direct control. These accounts are created using private keys. The associated key gives you a unique signature and access to the blockchain. You can use it to send and receive transactions and interact with applications.