


Al Risk Assessment through Threat Modeling and use cases for Al-BOM automation

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
Monitor: Release: Plan: Logging and Monitoring Model Acceptance Open Source Strategy Data/Model Drift or Decay Model Signing Threat Modelling Code Signing Risk Identification AI/ML BOM Generation /Management Data Engineering: Deploy **ML-SEC-OPS** KPI/Benchmarking Data Sourcing and verification Collection Al Explainability Regulatory Compliance RELEASE Secure Data Pipelines DED PLAN OFIA MONITOR MONITOR MODEL Model: Operate Model use case Regulating Model verification Performance Bias Testing **Auditing Edge Scenarios** Testing & pre-Release: Adapt Model Scans Model Performance Pen Testing Monitor: Adaption Verification of security Use Case Verification Logging and Monitoring and privacy controls Data/Model Drift or Decay Public

Al Software transparency





- DATA OPS
- MODEL OPS
- DEV OPS



AI/ML Bill of Materials

- AI-BOMs: describes the purpose
- AI-BOMs are part of SBOMs



Al Risk Assessment

- AI-BOMs lifecycle & management
- AI-BOMs for Threat Modeling

Threat Modeling: What Can Go Wrong?

Property: informationAboutTraining

- training data used to train the AI model, along with any relevant details about its source, quality, and preprocessing steps;
- specific training algorithms employed, including stochastic gradient descent, backpropagation, and reinforcement learning.
- specific training techniques used to improve the performance or accuracy of the AI model, such as transfer learning, fine-tuning, or active learning; and
- any evaluation metrics used to assess the performance of the AI model during the training process, including accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score.

https://github.com/spdx/spdx-3-model/blob/main/model/Al/Properties/informationAboutTraining.md

STRIDE

- Spoofing
- Tampering
- Repudiation
- Information Disclosure
- Denial of Service (DoS)
- Elevation of Privilege

https://owasp.org/wwwcommunity/Threat_Modeling_Process#stride

Use Case for TM automation with AI-BOM AI-BOM **Property: informationAboutTraining** TM Automation What can go wrong: tampering the model through poisoned data Identification: risk factors (enriched data by 3rd party model), model drift 3rd Party Model Cybersecurity Professional Data Lake Raw Data DataSet 1 Amazon SageMaker (S3 Bucket) Amazon Athena **Processed Data Enriched Data** Trained ML Models (S3 Bucket) (S3 Bucket) (S3 Bucket)

DataSet 1

Amazon SageMaker

Summary: automating processes around AI-BOM

Automating Threat Modeling requires defining your risk or acceptable boundaries and ability collect the data from your sources. AIBOM can help facilitating the collection of data about the model in a machine readable and consistent format.

Challenges

- Rapidly evolving technology
- Lack of framework standardization for MLSecOps
- Runtime SBOM (incl. AI-BOM) concept for dynamic data collection about AI/ML

What do we do?

This AI-BOM workshop is the first step bringing the AI community together to define best practices across the industry





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