



# Privacy-preserving methods: Building secure projects

# Rebeca Sarai



Recife, Brazil 🌟 🌊 🏖️ 🌴 🇧🇷

Computer Engineering by University of Pernambuco



Football fan ⚽

Software Engineer

@\_rebecasarai




The background of the entire image is a modern office interior with a blue-tinted aesthetic. It features a grid-patterned ceiling with recessed lighting, a grey modular sofa in the foreground, and glass-walled meeting rooms in the background. A large blue hexagon is positioned on the left side, containing the VINTA logo and tagline.

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# Security and Privacy

- Scientists don't have enough data to build new models
- **We don't feel safe**

Opinion

## The Apps on My Phone Are Stalking Me

I discovered that we're building a digital surveillance state much like the one in China.



**By Farhad Manjoo**  
Opinion Columnist

Jan. 22, 2020





# Google tracked his bike ride past a burglarized home. That made him a suspect.

"I was using an app to see how many miles I rode my bike and now it was putting me at the scene of the crime," the man said.



## Recife tracks 700,000 cell phones to monitor social isolation and direct actions against coronavirus

According to the city, the Isolation Index was created to find out in which places the restriction measures are being complied with.

By G1 PE

03/24/2020 16h09 · Updated há uma semana



NETFLIX

Netflix Prize

Home Rules Leaderboard Update

NETFLIX

Home Rules Leaderboard Update

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## Fitness tracking app Strava gives away location of secret US army bases

Data about exercise routes shared online by soldiers can be used to pinpoint overseas facilities

Congratu

Latest: Strava suggests military users 'opt out' of heatmap as row deepens

## Zoom CEO apologizes for having 'fallen short' on privacy and security



By Rishi Iyengar

Updated 2103 GMT (0503 HKT) April 2, 2020




Province, Afghanistan with route taken by joggers highlighted by Strava. Photograph:



about the location and staffing of military bases and the world has been revealed by a fitness tracking

**You want to collect and release  
data that contains answers to  
sensitive questions**



You want to collect and release  
data that contains answers to  
sensitive questions








Question: Have you  
ever used illicit drugs  
or methods in order  
to enhance your  
performance?

$\pi$

doped  
athlete

$1-\pi$   
( $\beta$ )


clean  
athlete



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
“How many people in  
the database have  
used illicit drugs?”

“How many people, not  
named Jane, in the database  
used illicit drugs?”




## Summary Statistics are Not “Safe”

- Differencing attacks
- Reconstruction attacks
- Each individual has a “secret bit”








You want to collect and release  
data that contains answers to  
sensitive questions



# Randomization

- 1965
- **Plausible deniability** (coin flip mechanism)
- Good if you have **many examples**
- Allow the recovering of the **underlying statistics**








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
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
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
You want to make generalizations  
over a population



## Queries Over Large Sets are Not Protective

“How many people in the database have the sickle cell trait?”

“How many people, not named Jane, in the database have the sickle cell trait?”




## Queries Over Large Sets are Not Protective


“How many people in the database have the sickle cell trait?”




“How many people, not named Jane, in the database have the sickle cell trait?”

**Differencing attack**






*The state or condition of  
being free from being  
observed or disturbed by  
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*The state or condition of being free from being observed or disturbed by other people.*

*Privacy is preserved if.. after the analysis, the analyzer doesn't know anything about the people in the dataset. They remain "unobserved".*






*The state or condition of being free from being observed or disturbed by other people.*

*Privacy is preserved if.. after the analysis, the analyzer doesn't know anything about the people in the dataset. They remain "unobserved".*

*Anything that can be learned about a participant from the statistical database can be learned without access to the database*



*Agreement between a data holder and a data subject: The owner of the data **will not be affected**, adversely or otherwise, **by allowing your data to be used** in any study or analysis, **no matter what other studies, datasets, or information sources are available***

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# Differential Privacy

- 2006
- **Teachings** Database != **Actions** of individual people
- It's a formal **definition** of privacy
- Requires a form of **randomness or noise** added to the **query** to protect **from Differencing Attacks**







## In the context of a database:

*Given we perform **some query on the database**, if we **remove a person** from the database and the **query does not change** then that person's privacy is **fully protected***


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**e** raised to the **epsilon** power


$$\Pr[\mathcal{M}(x) \in \mathcal{S}] \leq \exp(\varepsilon) \Pr[\mathcal{M}(y) \in \mathcal{S}] + \delta,$$


$\mathcal{M}$  is a **randomized mechanism** that gives  
 $\varepsilon$ -differential privacy for all data sets




# Differential Privacy

- Measure of **privacy loss**  $\epsilon$  (**privacy budget**)
- Tune the "**amount of privacy**"
- Privacy-preserving data analysis
- Many open source implementations
  - <https://github.com/google/differential-privacy>
  - <https://github.com/uber-archive/sql-differential-privacy>
  - <https://github.com/google/rappor>
  - <https://github.com/prashmohan/GUPT>
  - <https://github.com/LLGemini/PINQ>
  - <https://github.com/ektelo/ektelo>


Budget  $\epsilon = 0.1$




Query with  $\epsilon_1 = 0.02$



Multiple queries



You want to collect and release  
data ~~that contains answers to~~  
~~sensitive questions~~




|    | Quasi identifiers |           | Sensitive attribute |
|----|-------------------|-----------|---------------------|
| ID | Age               | Country   | Salary              |
| 1  | 35                | Greenland | >50K                |
| 2  | 35                | Canada    | <50K                |
| 3  | 38                | Belize    | >50K                |
| 4  | 40                | Belize    | >50K                |
| 5  | 37                | Canada    | <50K                |
| 6  | 37                | Canada    | <50K                |

(a) Original census information

|    | Quasi identifiers |         | Sensitive attribute |         |
|----|-------------------|---------|---------------------|---------|
| ID | Age               | Country | Salary              |         |
| 1  | 35-37             | America | >50K                | Class A |
| 2  | 35-37             | America | <50K                |         |
| 3  | 38-40             | America | >50K                | Class B |
| 4  | 38-40             | America | >50K                |         |
| 5  | 35-37             | America | <50K                | Class C |
| 6  | 35-37             | America | <50K                |         |

(b) 2-anonymous census information







DB 1: Medical data

DB 2: Voter list

87 % of the US population is **uniquely identifiable** by ZIP, gender, DOB





The Mac Observer




# k-Anonymity

- Creates **groups** with at least  $k$  records **sharing** the same **quasi-identifiers** values.
- Generalization and Suppression
- Provides **protection** against **identity disclosure**



# k-Anonymity


- **Linkage attack:** Netflix subscribers issue
- **Refinements** of the k-Anonymity  
(l-diversity, t-closeness,  $\beta$ -likeness)
- Data Cannot be **Fully Anonymized** and Remain **Useful**.
- **Privacy vs Utility**



# Tools


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- [have i been pwned](#)
- [Pwned Passwords with k-anonymity](#)
- [Validating Leaked Passwords with k-Anonymity](#)
- [Simple implementation](#)




## Still need to comply with GDPR

- Encrypt the data in transit
- Encrypt the data at rest
- Encrypt your backups
- Protect data integrity
- Log access to personal data
- Don't use data for purposes that the user hasn't agreed with
- Don't log personal data
- Many more




**You want to use prediction  
models with user's data**



## There is a problem...

- The **diff** between the **model sent** and the **model received** still **leaks private information**
- By itself, does not guarantee privacy





Sure. Umami burger?

Yeah. Know the address?

738 E. 3rd St.



The

I

Hi





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0  
q w e r t y u i o p

a s d f g h j k l



z x c v b n m





1. Clients **download** the current model.
2. Each client computes an **updated model** based on their **local data**.
3. The **model updates** are **sent** to the **server**.
4. The server **aggregates** these **models** to construct an **improved global model**

# Federated Learning


- Enables **mobile phones** to collaboratively learn a shared **prediction model** while keeping all the **training data on device**
- **No** need to store the **data in the cloud**
- Smarter models, lower latency, and less power consumption





# Tools


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- Pytorch
  - <https://github.com/OpenMined/PySyft>
- Tensorflow
  - <https://github.com/tensorflow/federated>
- [Federated Learning with Pytorch example](#)




You want to update your model  
with user's data






To share information **without** the need of a **trusted third party** to store/process the data. The protocol allows **concealing partial information** about the data, **computing data from many sources** without ever revealing individual results

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# Secure Multi-Party Computation

- Good when a model has **multiple owners**
- Allows for individuals to **share control** of a model
- **No party learns any other party's input**
- Participants are **protected** from privacy leakage, **except** for what can be **inferred from the output**
- Used with other techniques







# Tools

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
- Pytorch
  - <https://github.com/OpenMined/PySyft>
- Tensorflow
  - <https://github.com/tf-encrypted/tf-encrypted>
- <https://github.com/rdragos/awesome-mpc>
- [Implementation of Multi-Party Computation with Pytorch](#)




You want to perform safe  
operations in sensitive data




Specific **computations** are performed in **ciphertexts** and the obtained **result is also a ciphertext** that can be revealed only by the owner with a **secret key**



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


Specific **computations** are performed in **ciphertexts** and the obtained **result is also a ciphertext** that can be revealed only by the owner with a **secret key**



# Homomorphic Encryption

- Good when a model has a **single owner**
- Data is **never unencrypted** outside of the users' environment.
- Allows **computation on encrypted data**.
- Secure against quantum computers
- [Open source implementations](#)



# Homomorphic Encryption

- Still a long way from real-world enterprise implementation
- Tend to work best when processing **integers**
- Slow. [IBM's initial release](#) ran '100 trillion times' slower than plaintext operations.



# Resume


- **Randomization**: collect sensitive data
- **k-Anonymity**: release dataset
- **Differential Privacy**: aggregate information
- **Federated Learning**: create machine learning models
- **Secure Multi-Party Computation**: distributed processing
- **Homomorphic encryption**: operate over encrypted data

Other things I wish I had the time to mention:

Private Set Intersection

Private Identity Server


Cloak [link](#)






# Takeaways

- If you deal with sensitive data of europeans citizens **get a lawyer** right now
- Data cannot be **fully anonymized** and remain **useful**
- Queries over large sets are not protective
- Summary **statistics are Not “Safe”**
- Remember **linkage attacks**



“It may seem a paradox, but an open society dictates a right-to-privacy among its members, and we will have thrust upon us much of the responsibility of preserving this right.”



# Thank you!

Got any questions?

**Rebeca Sarai**

Software Engineer

✉ [rebeca@vinta.com.br](mailto:rebeca@vinta.com.br)

🐦 [@\\_rebecasarai](https://twitter.com/_rebecasarai)

🐙 [/rsarai](https://github.com/rsarai)

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- Differentially Private SQL with Bounded User Contribution ([here](#))
- Differential Privacy at Scale: Uber and Berkeley Collaboration ([video](#))
- Tutorial: Differential Privacy and Learning: The Tools, The Results, and The Frontier ([video](#))
- Keeping Your Data Secure While Learning From It - Andreas Dewes and Katharine Jarmul ([video](#))
- 9 Data Anonymization Use Cases You Need To Know Of ([here](#))
- The Definition of Differential Privacy - Cynthia Dwork ([video](#))
- Protecting Personal Data with Django (because it's the law) ([video](#))
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- Apple Releases Details on Differential Privacy, and the Big Takeaway Is Which Emoji Is Most Popular ([here](#))
- Differential Privacy In Action ([here](#))