Institutionen för systemteknik
Department of Electrical Engineering

Examensarbete

Replacement of the DVB-CSA

Subtitle goes here!

Examensarbete utfört i Subject goes here
vid Tekniska högskolan vid Linköpings universitet
av

Gustaf Bengtz

LiTH-ISY-EX--YY/NNNN--SE

Linköping 2014

Linköpings universitet
TEKNISKA HÖGSKOLAN

Department of Electrical Engineering
Linköpings universitet
SE-581 83 Linköping, Sweden

Linköpings tekniska högskola
Linköpings universitet
581 83 Linköping

Genomgång av nya och alternativa krypterings- och scramblingssystem för digital-teve samt implementering av ny scrambling-algoritm (AES128) på FPGA

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LiTH-ISY-EX--YY/NNNN--SE

Handledare: **Oscar Gustafsson**
ISY, Linköpings universitet
Patrik Lantto
WISI NORDEN

Examinator: **Kent Palmkvist**
ISY, Linköpings universitet

Linköping, 06 mars 2014

Avdelning, Institution
Division, Department

ISY Embedded systems
Department of Electrical Engineering
SE-581 83 Linköping

Datum
Date

2014-03-006

Språk
Language

□ Svenska/Swedish
☒ Engelska/English

□ _____

Rapporttyp
Report category

□ Licentiatavhandling
☒ Examensarbete
□ C-uppsats
□ D-uppsats
□ Övrig rapport

□ _____

ISBN
__

ISRN
LiTH-ISY-EX--YY/NNNN--SE

Serietitel och serienummer
Title of series, numbering

ISSN
__

URL för elektronisk version

Titel
Title

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Replacement of the DVB-CSA

Författare
Author

Gustaf Bengtz

Sammanfattning
Abstract

This report adresses why the currently used scrambling standard CSA needs a replacement. Proposed replacements to CSA are analyzed to some extent, and an alternative replacement (AES) is analyzed.

It has been impossible to find proper information on CISSA and CSA3 due to them being confidential, and licensing was not allowed.

The implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is analyzed, and the general implementation is displayed.

Nyckelord
Keywords

problem, solving, DVB, scrambling, CISSA, cipher, CSA, CSA3

Abstract

Här skriver jag texten som ska in i engelska abstracten. För närvarande:
Nothing to say mon.

Notation

Abbreviations

Abbrevation	Meaning
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
CAM	Conditional Access Module
CAS	Conditional Access System
CBC mode	Cipher block chaining mode
CC	Content Control
Ciphertext	Encrypted plaintext
CISSA	Common IPTV Software-oriented Scrambling Algorithm
CPU	Central Processing Unig
CSA	Common Scrambling Algorithm
CTR mode	Counter mode
CW	Control Word, which is a key
DVB	Digital Video Broadcasting
ECM	Entitlement Control Message. CW encrypted by the CAS
EMM	Entitlement Management Messages
ES	Elementary stream
ETSI	European Telecommunications Standards Institute
FF	Flip-Flop
FPGA	Field-programmable gate array
IPTV	Internet Protocol Television
IV	Initialization vector
LFSR	Linear Feedback Shift-Register
LSB	Least Significant Bit
LUT	Look-up Table
MSB	Most Significant Bit
Nibble	Half a byte (4 bits)
Nonce	A value that is only used once
P-Box	Permutation-Box
PES	Packetized Elementary Stream
Plaintext	Content, data
PS	Program Stream
S-Box	Substitution-Box
STB	Set-top Box
TS	Transport Stream. Contains data
XRC	eXtended emulation Resistant Cipher

Contents

Part I

Background

1 Introduction

Den här rapporten baseras på ett examensarbete utfört på WISI NORDEN AB. Examensarbetet handlade om utvärdering och implementering av potentiella scrambling metoder som ersättare åt DVB-CSA och tog plats under vårterminen 2014.

Vad ska stå här??

1.1 Background

The formerly used *common scrambling algorithm* (CSA) has due to recent progresses in television broadcasting become obsolete. CSA was designed to make software descrambling hard, if possible.

There are two suggested replacements of CSA. Those are the software- friendly CISSA and the hardware-friendly CSA3. Both of them are based on the AES-128 algorithm.

Varför gjordes exjobbet?

1.2 Problem specification

The task was to analyze what possible replacements existed for the common scrambling algorithm, and which one would be the most suitable replacement. After choosing an algorithm, I was to implement the chosen algorithm.

There were two proposed replacements to be compared and analyzed to find what made one of them software-friendly and the other one hardware-friendly.

Vad var uppgiften. Frågor att besvara.

1.3 Frågeställning

Kan sammanbindas med problemformuleringen.

JAG FÖRSTÅR INTE VAD DET HÄR ÄR.

1.4 Constraints

The thesis has been limited to implementing the chosen scrambling algorithm. The implementation was be optimized towards hardware usage, while achieving the desired frequency used in the rest of the Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA).

This limitation is very diffuse, since there are many ways of increasing the speed, while the different ways require more or less hardware.

While the entire circuit can be made as a combinatorial circuit, it will most likely fill up the entire FPGA.

Hur har exjobbet begränsats? Det har väl knappt funnits begränsningar?

HÄR FÅR DU UTVECKLA LITE. ÄR DET BRA ELLER DÅLIGT ATT HA MED DET HÄR?? VAD ÄR DE FAKTISKA BEGRÄNSNINGARNA?

1.5 Methodology

The project was split into a set of tasks, to be performed in the order written below. Performing the tasks in this order was done to decrease the difficulty of the work.

- Litterature study
- Choosing an algorithm
- Design and test of entities
- Implementation
- Optimization

I began the research by studying litterature, to find out what cryptography was about. This provided some insight into what the strenghts and weaknesses the algorithms actually were. This gave me some depth, and I chose to start of with a cipher that was actually used in both of the algorithms that I studied. Using the gathered background information about how the algorithm worked made design and testing of the entities rather easy. I initially designed the lower level entities, which allowed for easier testing of seperate parts of the system. Since I already knew that they functioned properly, due to low level testing, it was easier to merge them with other entities, to build the system bottom-up.

Hur har exjobbet genomförts? Det här behöver skrivas om och förbättras. Det är ju hur jag jobbat, men jag vet inte hur vettigt det jag skrev var.

Part II

Theory

2

Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB)

There are many parts that are needed to provide Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) with a secure way of transmitting streams of data without facing the risk of content getting stolen. The following parts will be treated in this thesis:

- Head-end - explained in section 2.1
- CA system - explained in section 2.3
- Common Interface - explained in section 2.5
- Scrambler - explained in chapter 3
- Descrambler - the inverse of a scrambler.

2.1 Head-end

The head-end is the part where the scrambler is located. Except for the scrambler, decoding and generation of program specific information takes place in the head-end. After receiving data from content providers, it decodes, encrypts and encapsulates the data, before transmitting it.

2.2 Control word

*Transport Stream*s (TS), which contain data received from distributors, are scrambled using a key which is called a *control word*. Control words are usually changed every 120th second, but might be changed more often. Some systems change the control word every 10th second. Finding out just one control word

has very little effect on content theft, since it will only be usable for a few seconds before changed. Because of the high frequency in which the control words are changed, one means of security is provided. The control words are generated randomly to make sure that consecutive control words can not be derived from each other.

The control word is sent to a *Conditional Access System* (CA system) where the control word is encrypted as an *Entitlement Control Message* (ECM). The CA system also generates an *Entitlement Management Message* (EMM) which tells the smart card what contents the user is allowed access to. This could for instance be whether the user has paid to view premium football games or not. The ECM and EMM are then sent back to the head-end where they are attached to the scrambled TS packet using a multiplexer. This package is sent to a receiver, which is usually a TV. The ECM, EMM and TS packet are separated when they arrive. The ECM and TS packet are sent through a *Common Interface* (CI) to a *Conditional Access Module* (CAM), where the ECM (previous control word) is decrypted using a decryption algorithm located on a smart card. The resulting control word is then used to descramble the TS packet. The TS packet is encrypted once more if the CI is a CI-Plus, otherwise it is sent in the clear back to the receiver where the data is processed before it is dispatched to the user. The CI and CI-Plus as well as the extra encryption are all discussed in section 2.5.

2.3 Conditional Access System

To make sure that users fulfill an amount of criteria, before being allowed to access content, *Conditional Access* (CA) is used. Conditional Access is provided, based on information about the user, in a system seperate from the head-end. Content is first scrambled, and decoded in a head-end. The control word, used to scramble the data, is sent to the Conditional Access system (CAS) where it is encoded.A CA system consists of an EMM-generator and an ECM-generator among others. An ECM-generator is an encryption of the control word. The algorithms used in generators differ between CA systems and is kept very secret, to make sure that the control word can not be stolen during transmission.

The ECM is generated using the control word, while the EMM is generated based on subscription- and payment information related to the user. The EMM can allow things, stretching from allowing a user to view a video for a few hours, to access a certain channel for an extended period of time. A TV will not broadcast any channels without receiving an EMM allowing it to.

An example is that a user needs to pay for TV-services to be able to access content. The CA system generates an EMM which tells the smart card whether the user is allowed to access the requested material or not. The content provider also generates an ECM based on the control word, which the smart card decrypts and passes to the descrambler, to decrypt the video stream. This is done if the EMM allows it.

2.3.1 Standards

Some of the CA systems currently in use are Viaccess, Conax, Irdeto, NDS, Strong and NagraVision. The CA systems are paired with *Conditional Access Module*s (CAM), which are located in the receiver. What CAS / CAM pair depends on the content provider. For instance, NDS is used by Viasat, Conax is used by Com Hem, Viaccess is used by Boxer and Strong is used by Canal Digital.

CA system	Used by	Supports CI+
Viaccess	Boxer, SVT	Yes
Conax	Com Hem	Yes
Strong	Canal Digital	Yes

2.4 DVB-SimulCrypt

The control words used during scrambling can be sent to several different CA systems at once (for reference, see section 2.3), resulting in several ECMs. This is called DVB-SimulCrypt, which is widespread in Europe. DVB-SimulCrypt works as an interface between the head-end and the CA system. DVB-SimulCrypt encourages the use of several CA systems at once [ETSI TS, 2008]. This is done by sending the same control word to many CA systems at the same time, and then allowing them to generate an ECM and EMM based on the control word. The multiplexer in the head-end then creates TS packets based on those, since the EMMs will determine whether the user is allowed access or not. A multiplexer is a basic logic circuit, which merges severals signals into a single signal.

2.5 Common Interface

The Common Interface is the interface between the CAM and the host (Digital TV receiver-decoder). There are currently two versions of common interfaces in use, which are the CI and the CI+. The difference between them is that the output from the CI is unencrypted, while the output from the CI+ is encrypted [LLP, 2011a]. This means that a clear TS packet is sent between the CI and the host, that can be copied. The data sent between the CI+ and host can not be copied due to it being encrypted, and therefore provides more security for content providers [European Standard, 1997].

2.5.1 CI-Plus

The CI-Plus realizes the possibility of yet another means of protecting content, which is called *Content Control*. Content control is a way of encrypting the content inside of the CAM, connected to the CI-Plus Module. The key used for the content control encryption is paired with the Digital TV Receiver, where the TS packet is decrypted before being made available to users. The general idea can be viewed in Figure 2.1.



Figure 2.1: *CI-Plus interface. Image remade from [LLP, 2011a, p. 10]*

CI-Plus encoding is often used to protect HD content, but not SD content. Since HD content is more high-profile, content distributors are more tend to want to protect it than the SD content. Protection of HD content requires scrambling using AES-128 in CBC-mode. [LLP, 2011a,b]

2.6 Conditional Access Module

CA modules (CAMs) are responsible of decoding the scrambled TS packet received from the host. The CAM is inserted into a PCMCIA slot (Personal Computer Memory International Association) either into the TV or the set-top box. A set-top box is a box which you connect between the TV signal source and the TV. The set-top box is equipped with both a CI or CI-Plus, and a CAM. The CAM consists of a slot for a smart card and a descrambler. The smart card decodes the ECM and sends the control word back to the descrambler. The TS packet is then descrambled and the clear data is sent back to the host, from the CAM.

3

Cryptography

Cryptography is the science of rendering content incomprehensible for undesired readers. However, securing content is not only about cryptography. However there is a main reason why cryptography is attacked, and that is because there is a very low chance of being detected. There will be no traces of the attack, since the attacker's access will look just like an ordinary access. [Schneier and Fergusson, 2003]

This can be compared to a real-life break-in. The break-in will be noticed if the thief breaks in using a crowbar. On the other hand, you might never notice that the security had been breached, if the the thief were to pick the lock instead. [Schneier and Fergusson, 2003]

One of the more noteworthy cryptography rule is that you always are to assume that someone is out to get you. Because of this, Schneier and Fergusson [2003, pp. 12–14] claims that we always need to look for possible ways to break systems, to ensure that the security can not be breached, and thereby provides security.

3.1 Why do we need cryptography?

Cryptography is the science of rendering plaintexts into ciphertexts to protect contents from unauthorized viewing. It is used in electronic communication for protection of e-mail messages and credit card information among other things. If we send data without encrypting it, someone listening in to the transmission channel will access the data.

For most people this is not a problem, but in some instances sending secure messages can be extremely important. One example is communication during war,

where a single piece of intelligence might turn the tide of the entire war. Moreover, you do not want people to read your account information or credit card number when you do online shopping. Both of these problems can be solved by cryptography and encryption.

Source: Typ Schneier har jag för mig? Låna om boken?

3.2 Scrambling and Encrypting

Scrambling can be seen as the distortion of a plain-text, using a control word. However, encryption can be seen as the entire process of protecting content. This includes everything from generating the control word to scrambling data. Scrambling can therefore be seen as a part of encryption.

Yet another reason to scramble, is to reduce the number of adjacent data bits with the same value, like strings of zeroes or ones. It could also serve to balance the number of zeroes and ones in strings. This is done as to try to obtain DC balance. DC balance is desired since it avoids voltage imbalance during communication between connected systems.

Rewrite: And find a good source for this

3.3 Data packets

The data processed by the DVB systems is sent in data packets. All of them are created from Elementary Stream packets (ES) which are generally the output from an audio or video encoder. The ES-packets are then packeted into Program Stream- (PS), Transport Stream- (TS) or Packatized Elementary Stream (PES) packets and then distributed. Among the three ways of packing data, only two are interresting from a DVB perspective. This is due to PS packets being used for storing data, while TS and PES are used for transmitting data. The interresting types, when working with DVB, are therefore the TS packets as well as the PES packets. PES packets are often packed into the payload of TS packets. The payload is the part of the packets which is the actual data, which is everything except the header and adaptation field.

3.3.1 TS packets

TS packets are used by the DVB society due to their fixed length, and the fact that TS packets are meant to be used for streaming services, while PS packets are used for storing packets of data. TS packets have got a length of 188 bytes with a 4 byte long header. This means that the payload consists of a maximum of 184 bytes. The layout of a TS packet can be viewed in figure 3.1[ETSI TS, 2013].

Figure 3.1: *General layout of a data packet*

The TS packet consists of 4 different kinds of building blocks where only the header is guaranteed to be present. Those blocks are:

- Header
- Adaptation field
- Encrypted payload
- Clear payload

The byte-sizes of the building blocks of a TS packet are:

- header_size = 4
- adaptation_field_size = the size of the adaptation field
- payload_size = 188 - (header_size + adaptation_field_size)
- encrypted_payload_size = payload_size - [payload_size mod block_size]
- clear_payload_size = [payload_size mod block_size] (or simply payload_size - encrypted_payload_size)

The header is always 4 bytes, while the adaptation field can have any size between 0 and 183 bytes. This means that the clear payload can be of any size stretching from 0 bytes, to one byte smaller than the block size. The rest of the data consists of the payload.

Header

The header consists of information regarding the packet, and has a sync_byte (with a hex-value of 0x47, or bit-value of 01000111) to announce the beginning of a packet. The value of the sync_byte corresponds to the ASCII-value of the letter G, for go. The header also contains information as to whether there is an adaptation field and payload in the packet, what Packet ID (PID) the packet has, if it should be prioritized, whether the data is scrambled - and in that case if it was scrambled with an odd or even key, among others [ETSI TS, 2009, pp. 25–26]. The header should never be encrypted and is always found at the beginning of a packet [ETSI TS, 2013, pp. 10–11].

The header contains the following:

Bits	Name	Description
8	Sync byte	Fixed byte value 0x47
1	Transport Error Indicator	Uncorrectable bit errors exist.
1	Payload Unit Start Indicator	TS packet contains PES packets or Program Specific Information (PSI data)
2	Transport Scrambling Control	00 No scramling, 01 Reserved, 10 Even key, 11 Odd key
1	Transport Priority	1 gives this packet higher priority
13	PID	Type and number of data stored in packet payload

1	Adaptation Field Control	1 means that an adaptation field exists
1	Contains Payload	1 means that payload exists
4	Continuity Counter	Sequence number of payload packets

Adaptation field

The adaptation field is a sort of padding that is inserted when the end of the data does not align with the end of the TS packet. This is done to make sure that the TS packet is filled with known data. We only find adaptation fields when we are working with the last string of data, if the end of data does not align with the end of the TS packet. Adaptation fields are never encrypted. [ETSI TS, 2013, pp. 10–11]

Encrypted and clear payload

When working with block ciphers, we tend to end up with clear bytes of data since block ciphers only encrypt data blocks of fixed sizes. The clear data is always the data located at the end of the received TS packet. When receiving a TS packet, the first thing to be done is to find the start of the payload. While there is no adaptation field, this is the data right after the header. If there is an adaptation field, some searching for the data is needed to be done. After the start of the payload is found, blocks of a given size are sent to the scrambler. The remainder of data, when all of the blocks of the right size have been scrambled, is to be left clear. The number of unscrambled bytes might be of sizes up to one byte smaller than the block size. This means that the AES-128, which works on block sizes of 16 bytes, can have a maximum of 15 clear bytes at the most. The encrypted payload is always located in front of the clear payload. [ETSI TS, 2013, pp. 10–11]

3.3.2 PES packets

The PES packets have varying lengths of up to 64 kilo bytes, and are often packed into TS packets when distributed, due to the strength of TS packets. The payload data in the TS packets, when carrying PES packets, consist of the entire PES packets, which is the header as well as the data. PES packets do not use adaptation fields, since they are of adaptable lengths, as long as the length of the packet does not exceed 64 kilo bytes.

Since Digital Video Broadcasting seldom uses itself of PES packets, an analyzation of the header will not be done in this report. The derivation of PES packets from TS packets can be seen in Figure 3.2 [ETSI, 1996, p. 9].

3.4 Encryption and Decryption

There are three things that you need when you encrypt and decrypt messages. Those are the algorithm, plaintext and the key. Even though there are plenty of



Figure 3.2: *PES packet derived from TS packets*

ways to encrypt messages, there are mainly two ways of sharing the encryption-key. The first method is the symmetric-key encryption, and the second method is the public-key encryption.

Source:
Please! I think
Schneier wrote
something about
this

3.4.1 Symmetric-key encryption

The symmetric-key encryption uses the same key to encode and decode messages. Distrubution of the key, when using the symmetric-key encryption is troublesome and the fact that both parties need access to the same secret key is a major drawback of the symmetric key encryption, as compared to the public-key encryption method. Sending the key in an email is a bad idea, since the persons who want to read our messages are most likely already listening. They will therefore obtain the key as well as the means to decode the messages. Both the CSA and the AES encryption methods are symmetric-key encryptions, using the same key for encryption and decryption.

Source:
Schneier har jag fö
mig igen

3.4.2 Public-key encryption

The public-key encryption uses a public key that anyone can look up, and a secret key that only one person knows [Simmons, 1992, pp. 25–32]. For instance say that the two persons, Bob and Alice, want to communicate. Bob produces a keypair P_{Bob} (Bob's public key) and S_{Bob} (Bob's secret key) and publishes P_{Bob} for anyone to see. When Alice wants to send Bob a message, she looks up Bob's public key P_{Bob}, which she then uses to encode her message. When she sends Bob the message, Bob decodes the message using his secret key S_{Bob} [Schneier and Fergusson, 2003]. Since Alice now knows both the plaintext, and can find out what the corresponding ciphertext will be, she could potentially try to find Bob's secret key, as described in section 4.3.1.



Figure 3.3: *Different kinds of ciphers [Wikipedia, 2014b]*

3.4.3 Combination of encryption

Since the public-key encryption seems secure and easy to manage, how come it is not the only used encryption method? The reason is that the public-key encryption is not as effective as the symmetric-key encryption. It is common to utilize a combination of those two since an easy, effective way to encrypt messages is desirable.

To combine the two encryption methods, the symmetric-key algorithm encodes the plaintext into a ciphertext. Then the public-key encryption encrypts the key used by the symmeteric-key encryption. The encoded key is then sent together with the ciphertext to the recipient, which decodes the symmetric key using the secret key. The plaintext is once again received through decrypting the ciphertext with that key.

3.5 Ciphers

A cipher is the same as an encryption algorithm, which operates on either plaintexts or ciphertexts to perform encryption or decryption. Figure 3.3 describes how the different kinds of ciphers can be split into sub-groups. The first branch splits into Classical-, Rotor Machine- and Modern ciphers. Substitution and Transposition are still used in modern algorithms. The Modern ciphers are the Private key and Public key (descibed in chapter 3.4.1 and 3.4.2). The CSA algorithm uses both the stream- and block ciphers, while the AES algorithm only uses a block cipher.

There are mainly two kinds of ciphers that are used when designing modern cryptosystems. Those ciphers are called block ciphers and stream ciphers. Many systems use a combination of block ciphers and stream ciphers to provide security.

Source: At least the CSA uses it. But you need a source

3.5.1 Block cipher

A block cipher operates on fixed sized sets of data. These sets are called blocks, hence the reason that they are called block ciphers. Them being fixed sizes might cause a need for padding the blocks, in case the plaintext contains a number of bytes that is not a denominator of the blocksize. Block ciphers often use a combination of S-boxes (Substitution boxes) and P-boxes (Permutation boxes) in a so-called SP-network (S-box / P-box network) (Figure 3.4).

There are many modes of block ciphers, but the two recommended by Schneier and Fergusson [2003] are the CBC-mode and the CTR-mode.

CBC stands for *cipher block chaining* and is performed by encrypting the result of an XOR (basic logic component) between an Initialization Vector (IV) and the plaintext. The resulting ciphertext is then fed back to the XOR, this time replacing the IV. This means that the data input into the cipher will be the result of an XOR between the previous result, and the upcoming data. This is then put into an XOR with the next plaintext, which is then encrypted in the cipher. For reference, see image 11 in appendix IV. [Stinson, 2006, pp. 109–111]

CTR stands for *counter*, and refers to the way the IV is generated. The counter outputs a value, which is encoded with the key. The encoded output is sent to an XOR together with the plaintext, producing the ciphertext. The counter is incremented and the procedure is iterated [Stinson, 2006, p. 111].

3.5.2 Stream cipher

Stream ciphers work on streams of data. They usually consist of a keystream generator which performs an XOR with the data [Simmons, 1992, pp. 67]. An effective implementation of the stream cipher is to use a linear feedback shift-register which uses the current internal state (key) to produce the next state by a simple XOR-addition between two or more of the bits in the state. This is mainly used because of how easy it is to construct in hardware [Vaudenay et al., 2008].

3.5.3 Decryption

Decryption is often performed by reversing the encryption. You need to know the algorithm, preferably through a mathematical representation, to calculate how to obtain the plaintext from the ciphertext. A description of how this is done for the CBC-mode (described in 3.5.1) is described in IV in appendix IV. We assume that we know the decryption algorithm here for simplicity.

Source: feels like a given but still

3.6 Confusion and Diffusion

Two properties that are needed to ensure that a cipher provides security are confusion and diffusion [Shannon, 1949]. *Confusion* refers to making the relationship between ciphertext and key as complex as possible. *Diffusion* refers to replacing and shuffling the data, to make it impossible to analyze data statistically. This is usually done by performing substitutions and permutations in a simple pattern multiple times. This can easily be done by using an SP-network (S-box / P-box network) [Stinson, 2006, pp. 74–79]. The very first, as well as the last step, of SP-Networks is usually an XOR between the subkey and the data. This is called *whitening*, and is according to Stinson [2006, p. 75] regarded as a very effective way to prevent encryption/decryption without a known key. The goal of this is to make it hard to find the key, even though one has access to multiple plaintext/ciphertext pairs produced with the same key [Shannon, 1949].

However, a cipher is not guaranteed to be secure just because it provides these two properties.

3.6.1 S-boxes and P-boxes

The S-box is one of the basic components that is used when creating ciphers. An S-box takes a number of input bits and creates an equal number of output bits. The way they are generated is non-linear. Implementing an S-box can effectively be done using lookup tables. Each input has to correspond to a unique output, to make sure that the functionality of the S-Box can be uniquely reversed. If it can not be reversed, descrambling will be impossible. [Stinson, 2006, pp. 74–75]

The second basic component used in cryptography is the P-box. A P-box shuffles and thereby rearranges the order of given bits. This can be viewed in the SP-network in figure 3.4, where the P-box is represented by the dotted rectangle in the middle.



Figure 3.4: *SP-Network*

3.7 Secrecy

Although encryption is important, as well as the strength of the encryption, keeping the algorithm secret is never a good idea. A simple mistake when designing an algorithm might turn an encryption that would otherwise have been strong, incredibly weak. It is therefore a bad idea to use small scale algorithms (designed for the use of just a few persons for instance). If you instead use an open algorithm, faults will most likely be discovered and fixed by experienced cryptographers [Schneier and Fergusson, 2003, pp. 23]. Keeping the key, which is used to encrypt the data, secret is what is important.

4

Common Scrambling Algorithm

The Common Scrambling Algorithm (CSA) is currently the most commonly used encryption algorithm for encryption of video-streams, in the DVB context. The CSA uses a combination of a block cipher, taking an input of a 64-bit block, and a stream cipher. Both of the ciphers use the same key, so that the entire system uses the same key [Li, 2007, pp. 271–272]. This means that the complete algorithm would break if the key would be recovered. Using the same key does on the other hand allow us to easily change the key at regular intervals.

CSA has been the official scrambling method for DVB since may 1994. CSA was to be easily implemented in hardware and hard to implement in software to make reverse-engineering of the algorithm difficult [DVB Scene, 2013].

There are two versions of the DVB-CSA, CSA1 and CSA2, where the key-length is the only difference between them. [DVB Scene, 2013, p. 23]

4.1 Why do we need a new standard?

The DVB-CSA standard offers short-term protection (it assumes content is viewed in real time and not stored). Due to the development of how content is viewed during recent years, we now primarily need to be able to distribute content across homes. This means that the focus needs to be moved from securing delivery to securing content. [Farncombe Consulting Group, 2009]

Another thing to bear in mind is the fact that more CPU-based units, such as smart-phones, tablets and computers are used to access contents now more than ever. In order to allow for descrambling on CPU-based units, a software-friendly scrambling algorithm might be needed.

4.2 Layout of the CSA

The CSA consists a block cipher and a stream cipher connected in sequence [Li, 2007, p. 271]. The block cipher reads 64-bit blocks of data, which is then run in Cipher Block Chaining-mode. The block cipher processes these blocks of data in 56 rounds. The output of this is sent to the stream cipher where additional encoding is performed. The first block of data sent from the block cipher to the stream cipher is used as an IV for the stream cipher, and is not encoded in this phase. [Weinmann and Wirt, 2006]

4.3 Security

One of the problems associated with CW distribution is the fact that CW sharing has become rather common [Farncombe Consulting Group, 2009]. This is possibly due to the fact that the CW is sent in the clear between the smart card and the STB, meaning that a user might grab the clear CW during transmission and redistribute it over the internet. This has become a financial problem for content distributors, since people stop paying for the content which they are watching.

One way of dealing with CW sharing is to decode the encrypted CW on the CI system, and then encrypt it once again on the CI, before sending it to the STB. The latter key is setup between the CI system and the STB through a one time sychronization. This means that users are not able to grab the clear CW and redistribute it. [Schrijen, 2011, pp. 12–13]

Another security issue that you need to think of when designing the hardware, to prevent content theft, is to make sure that no contacts are ever accessible from the top layer of the circuit board. This is due to the fact that people would be able to connect hardware to the board and download the material that way, if they were.

Source: Except from Patrik Lantto

We also need to be aware of people trying to break the algorithm through forced ways as well as CW sharing and hardware methods of stealing content.

4.3.1 Breaking the CSA

There are a few standard ways to try, when you want to break a cipher. Those are the brute force-, known plaintext-, chosen plaintext- and birthday attacks [Schneier and Fergusson, 2003, pp. 31-34]. You choose what method to use depending on what the cipher looks like. I will not discuss all of them, but I will talk about the most relevant ones for CSA here.

Brute force

The CSA uses a key consisting of 64-bits, which gives us 18.5 Quintillion possible keys (Quintillion is 10^{18}). But byte 3 and 7 are often used as parity bytes in CA systems which leads to only 48 bits being used in the key [Tews et al., 2012]. This can be seen in figure 4.1. 48 bits on other hand leads to 2^{48} combinations, which

corresponds to 281 trillion possible keys (Trillion is 10^{12}). Testing a million keys per second is about what is possible through on a modern x86 processor using software methods , which means it would take roughly 3258 days to force brake the keys, which translates into roughly 8.8 years.

Todo: How did I get this number?



Figure 4.1: *Number of bits in key used*

Moreover, systems need to change the key at least every 120 seconds [Simpson et al., 2009] and most systems issues new keys every 10-120 second [Wirt, 2004].

It is possible to use dedicated hardware and FPGA implementations to speed this up, using hardware accelerations and other methods. But even if we would be able to scan through 2.8 trillion keys per second, precisely allowing us to be certain to find the key in two minutes, we could just change the key more often. As such, the brute force method of obtaining the key is not a feasible option.

Known plaintext attack

The known plaintext attack is performed to find out the key, which can then be used to decrypt following ciphertexts. To be able to try this, a known plaintext-ciphertext pair is needed. You can try to find the keyif you have the both of them. This is done by identifying ciphertexts known to correspond to zero-filled plaintexts when breaking CSA [Tews et al., 2012]. Then memories filled with pre-calculated keys are used to find which key the current pair corresponds to. This method is supposed to recover a key in roughly 7 seconds with a 97% certainty according to Tews et al. [2012].

5

CISSA and CSA3

There are currently two scrambling algorithms being assessed as replacements to the currently used DVB-CSA. This is done to assure content security for yet another ten years.

CISSA is meant to be a hardware-friendly as well as software-friendly algorithm designed to allow descrambling to be made on CPU-based units such as computers, smart phones and tablets [ETSI TS, 2013, p. 9].

CSA3 is a hardware-friendly, software-unfriendly scrambling algorithm chosen by the ETSI to replace the currently used CSA [ETSI TS, 2013, pp. 6–7]. Software-unfriendly means that descrambling is designed so that it is highly impractical to perform in software, but easily done in hardware.

Both of the algorithms are to be implemented in hardware for scrambling of data. The difference is that CSA3 is to make it hard to descramble the material, using software. Since both of the algorithms are confidential, it is sadly impossible to find out what makes the CSA3 algorithm software-unfriendly, while the CISSA algorithm is software-friendly.

Source:
Om jag får be snällt

5.1 CISSA

CISSA stands for *Common IPTV Software-oriented Scrambling Algorithm* and is designed to be software-friendly. Opposite to the CSA3, CISSA is made to be easily descrambled in software, so that CPU-based systems such as computers and smart-phones can also implement it. Although it is software-friendly, it is supposed to able to be implemented efficiently on hardware as well as in software [ETSI TS, 2013, p. 9].

CISSA is to use the AES-128 block cipher in CBC-mode with a 16 byte IV with the value 0x445642544d4350544145534349535341. Each TS packet is to be processed independently of other TS packets, but each block of data in the payload depends on the previous blocks of data in the same payload, except the first block of data, which depends on the IV. Both the header and adaptation field are to be left unscrambled. [ETSI TS, 2013, p. 11]

5.1.1 Software friendly

An FPGA implementation of the CISSA algorithm seems likely to be implementable, due to the fact that the scrambling of the content is supposed to be made in hardware, regardless as to whether the descrambling is supposed to be made either in hardware or software.

While having a scrambling algorithm designed to enable viewing on CPU-based units opens up the market for more users, it might increase the risk for algorithm theft. Since reverse-engineering is possible for software implementations, one might find the algorithm for descrambling, as well as scrambling through inversion of the algorithm. Knowing the algorithm enables cryptoanalysists to search for weaknesses in the algorithm, with the purpose of breaking it.

Source: No no, not Wikipedia

"A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge." according to Kerckhoffs's Principle. This means that the only result of having a descrambling method suited for hardware as well as software implementation should possibly only result in some free implementations showing up. But it being implemented in software should therefore not lead to any problem.

5.2 CSA3

The CSA3 scrambling algorithm is based on a combination of an AES (*Advanced Encryption Standard*) block cipher using a 128-bit key, which is simply called the AES-128, and a confidential block cipher called the XRC [ETSI TS, 2013, p. 8]. XRC stands for eXtended emulation Resistant Cipher and is a confidential cipher used in DVB [ETSI TS, 2013, p. 8].

5.2.1 Hardware friendly

The CSA3 is designed to be hardware-friendly, meaning that descrambling through software methods is supposed to be next to impossible. Using a software-hostile descrambling algorithm means that reverse-engineering and algorithm theft becomes hard, if even possible. Even though it would decrease the probability of content theft, it closes the door to expansion onto the CPU-based units market, which is becoming larger and larger.

5.3 Conclusion

CSA3 implements the AES-128 cipher for scrambling, combined with a confidential cipher, called the XRC cipher. CISSA does not, on the other hand, seem to be using any confidential cipher. It does however use the AES-128 cipher in CBC-mode with a static IV [ETSI TS, 2013].

CISSA sounds like a great idea in my opinion, allowing CPU-based units to descramble data streams without using a dedicated HW-Chip. Regardless of which cipher is the best, or will prove to become the next standard, both of them use AES-128 as a building block. Therefore, starting out with an AES-128 chiper would provide for a basis to continue developing the scrambler towards either CISSA or CSA3 on a later stage. Due to the CIplus interface being implemented, software descrambling and theft will very likely not be as big of a problem using a software friendly scrambling method. AES-128 in CBC-mode seems to be the best to implement, since it is mandatory for HD hosts using the CI+ interface [LLP, 2011a, p. 15].

6

Advanced Encryption Standard

The AES is based on an SP-network and is fast both in hardware as well as software. Rijndael, which is used in AES, has key-sizes of at least 128 bits, block lengths of 128 bits, 8 to 8 bit S-boxes and a minimum of 10 rounds of repetition [Stinson, 2006, p. 79]. It is a symmetric-key algorithm with a fixed block size of 128 bits, where the key-size can vary between 128, 192 or 256 bits. The number of cycles needed to convert the plaintext into ciphertext depends on the size of the key. The 128-bit key requires 10 cycles of repetitions (rounds). The 192-bit key requires 12 rounds and the 256-bit key requires 14 rounds [Stinson, 2006, p. 103].

6.1 Method

The AES consists of a number of steps that are repeated for each block to be encoded. The steps to be performed are, according to Stinson [2006]:

Set-up steps

1. KeyExpansion - Produce round keys.
2. InitialRound - Combine each byte of the state with a byte of round key.

Steps performed in rounds

1. SubBytes - Each byte is *substituted* using the Rijndael's S-box.
2. ShiftRows - The rows of the state matrix are *permutated*.
3. MixColums - The columns of the matrix are multiplicated with a matrix.
4. AddRoundKey - The state matrix is once again combined with round-keys.

In the final round we do everything except the MixColumns step

1. SubBytes
2. ShiftRows
3. AddRoundKey

The ciphertext is then defined as the state-matrix [Stinson, 2006, p. 103]. As mentioned in section 3.6 (Confusion and Diffusion), both confusion and diffusion are nescessary. They can be seen in the SubBytes and ShiftRows steps above. These steps also performs whitening, which strengthens the cipher. Whitening is, as mentioned in 3.6, performed through an XOR between the roundkey and the data.

The KeySchedule is explained in section 6.2.

6.1.1 InitialRound

This is simply an initial AddRoundKey.

6.1.2 SubBytes

In the SubBytes step, each byte is sent to a Rijndael S-box (which is basically a lookup table, see Matrix 5) where they are substituted in a non-linear fashion. This gives us a substituted state matrix.

6.1.3 ShiftRows

The next step is called the ShiftRows step, which left-shift the rows n-1 steps where n is the index of the row. This means that the first row is left as it is, the second row is shifted one step, the third row is shifted two steps, and the fourth row is shifted three steps.

6.1.4 MixColumns

In the MixColumns step, the four bytes of each row are combined through a matrix multiplication. The MixColumns function takes four bytes as input and multiplies them with a fixed matrix (figure 7 in appendix IV). While this might seem simple, it really is not. The multiplication makes sure that each input byte affect all output bytes.[Internet, 2014]

The matrix is multiplicated with the vector from the left, (4x4*4x1 = 4x4~~*4~~x1 = 4x1) where the vector is a column from the state-matrix. Multiplication with 1 means that the value is left untouched. Multiplication by 2 means left shift, then an XOR with 0x1B if the shifted value exceeds 0xFF. Multiplication with 3 is done in the same way as a multiplication with 2, except that the result after the shift and conditional XOR are then XOR:ed with the input value of the multiplication. All of the resulting values are then XOR:ed, leaving us with the result. All additions are replaced with XOR, since the calculations take place in GF(2^8) (Galois field).

6.1.5 AddRoundKey

Each of the 16 bytes of the state are then combined with a byte from the round key using a bitwise xor. They are then combined to a state matrix (figure 6 in appendix IV) containing 4x4 bytes.

6.2 KeyExpansion

To generate round keys from the cipher key, we use the Rijndael's key schedule. This is done since AES requires a separate 128-bit (16-byte) round key for each round, plus one extra key for the initialization which means that the AES-128 requires 176 bytes, since AES-128 consists of 10 rounds.

The schedule consists of a couple of loops and a key-schedule core. The schedule core is the part that branches out if c modulo 16 is zero. The entire KeyExpansion can be viewed in Figure 10 in appendix IV. To change the key schedule to fit a key size of 192 bits, you simply change the value c is compared to in the first branch in the flowchart from 176 to 206.

6.2.1 Key-schedule core

The key-schedule core takes an input of 4 bytes (32 bits) which it then rotates 1 byte (8 bits) to the left. Let us say that our key is *AB CD EF 01*. This would give us the key *CD EF 01 AB* after the rotation. This operation is also called the RotWord-operation [Stinson, 2006, p. 107]. The next step is to apply Rijndael's S-box to each of these bytes, giving us 4 new bytes. The bytes AB CD EF 01 would give us 62 BD DF 7C, when substituted according to the Rijndael S-box (Figure 5).

The left-most byte is then XOR:ed with a value from the Rcon function depending on what round you are currently processing. You can read more about the Rcon function in section 6.2.3.

6.2.2 Rijndael's S-Box

Rijndael's S-box takes an input byte which it transforms according to a LUT (Figure 5 in appendix IV). Where the most significant nibble is placed on the Y axis, and the least significant nibble is set on the X axis. Given the input *0x31*, we would receive an output of *0xC7* from the Rijndael's S-box.

6.2.3 Rcon

The value input into the Rcon function depends on what round you are currently at. Which means that you would choose Rcon(1) for the first round, Rcon(2) for the second round, and so on. The values in the Rcon array are calculated mathematically, but might as well be accessed from a vector, such as the one found in Figure 8 in appendix IV.

I illustrated the steps to be performed in the Rcon function, using a flowchart, which can be viewed in figure 9 in appendix IV.

If the input value is 0 or 1, we just return that value, otherwise the following steps are performed [Wikipedia, 2014c]. This can also be replaced by an S-box where you input your byte, and get another back, since the input byte is just used as a counter that decides how many times you perform steps 2 through 6

TODO: You need more reliable sources than WIKIPEDIA!

.

1. Set a variable c to 0x01.
2. If the input-value does not equal 1, set variable b to c & 0x80. Otherwise, go to 7.
3. Left shift c one step.
4. If b is equal to 0x80 proceed to 5, otherwise go to 6.
5. Store the result of a bitwise XOR between c and 0x1B in c.
6. The input value is decreased by one, and we go back to 2.
7. We set the output to c.

Part III

Result

7

Result

The focus of my implementation has been to minimize the amount of hardware usage, while trying to meet the timing constraints provided from the rest of the circuit. The clock frequency used on the FPGA has been 100 MHz. A throughput in the scale of Gbits/s is sufficient for the current design.

The implemented scrambler processes 16 bytes of data in 11 clock pulses with a clock frequency of 94MHz, which would correspond roughly to a throughput of 1.16 Gbits/s. The scrambler needs to first process the key, before being able to scramble data. A keyexpansion takes roughly 45 clock pulses, and is only performed when a new key is sent, which is very seldom. The scrambler then deals with 16 bytes of data on 13 clock pulses, but outputs 1 byte of data per clock cycle. This is done so that one byte of data from the scrambled package is read into a register on every clock pulse. When four bytes are collected the 32-bit output is sent out. I work with 32-bits, since the data-bus is a 32-bit bus.

7.1 Problems

The main problems that I encoutered were:

- Not possible to get the license for CSA3
- Small interrest for CSA3
- Next to no documentation of the CISSA algorithm
- Hard finding reliable test vectors
- Merging

- Timing
- Latches

When I first started writing this Thesis, the thought was that I was to implement the CSA3 algorithm. Due to problems with licensing, and the fact that AES-128 in CBC-mode seemed like a better idea led to a rework of the planning.

Most of these problems are, in my mind, self-explanatory. The one that I will discuss here is my problem with merging. This problem occured due to the fact that I made a bottoms-up design, instead of the more common top-down design. I started the project by implementing small entities, that were to be used in higher hierarchies. Doing this caused some problems when merging entities into higher level blocks, since some signals, which I had not thought about, needed to be produced. This was not a huge problem, and only occurred on a few instances, but were rather troublesome at those times.

The pro of my method of working has been that I have been able to get results quickly. The con is that a large portion of the time has been spent on going back to entities that were already functional, and reworking them by adding signals, and finding the right timing conditions to make sure that they provided nescessary information for entities higher up in the hierarchy.

Since I tried to optimize this implementation to just meet the demands on speed, while trying to minimize the amount of hardware needed, I introduced timing into a few circuits that could have otherwise been completely combinatorial. This has, as expected, introduced quite a bunch of timing-issues. I dare say that all of them are gone now, but it is quite hard to know without testing the circuit more extensively.

When I first synthesized the circuit, towards the end of the implementation, I found that the circuit synthesized a large amount of latches. This made my circuit take up roughly 15% of the FPGA, and use 11830 Flip-Flops (FFs). At this time, there were roughly 3000 latches. When I managed to remove all of them, my entire circuit used up roughly 8% of the FPGA, and used about 4500 FFs instead.

This is the entire hardware usage, including the interface towards the FPGA, which is one of the reasons why it might appear large, when compared to other implementations.

7.2 Hardware

The top entity can be viewed in Figure 7.1, and the rest of the entities can be viewed in appendix IV.

7.2.1 Hardware usage

REWRITE WO SHITE



Figure 7.1: *The top entity*

First synthesis

The circuit used up 15% of the FPGA, and had quite a large amount of unnescessary latches and FFs included. It used 11830 FFs, and roughly 3000 latches. I redesigned the circuit to remove the latches and ran the second synthesis.

Second synthesis

The circuit used up 8% of the FPGA this time. The keyblock3 entity, as well as keyblock1 entity seemed to use a lot of registers and multiplexers, which could possibly be replaced by RAMs or LUTs.

The maximum frequency obtained was 92MHz after this synthesis. This was largely due to routing, which made up for 75% of the minimum period.

To be able to compare the third synthesis with this one, you need to know that the keyexpansion entity used 1538 D-type FFs and 16 Comparators. It used up 176 8-bit registers, which were used by the expanded key.

Third synthesis

Before running this synthesis, I noticed that at one point the circuit waited for the expanded key to become done before outputting it. While this is a good idea, no problems were noticed I assigned the expanded key while it was being updated. Therefore I managed to theoretically cut down the hardware by 176 8-bit registers, which should corespond to roughly 1408 D-type FFs.

The vector that was removed was a vector containing 11 * 16 bytes of data, which corresponds to 176 * 8 bits of data. 176 times 8 is 1408, which is the number of D-

type FFs needed to store the value, which also corresponds to 176 8-bit registers.

The entire circuit still used up roughly 8% of the FPGA. The keyexpansion entity used 130 D-type FFs and 16 Comparators this time. This corresponds to a decrease of 1408 D-type FFs.

The maximum frequency obtained this time was 94MHz. The number of Slice Registers went down from 4357 to 2945, and the percentage of Slice Registers decreased from 3% usage to 2% usage.

The keyblock3 module seems to be using the most hardware from what can be seen. It uses roughly 1302 multiplexers, which should be reducable.

Fourth synthesis

The next synthesis was made after the state2data module was rewritten, to remove yet another signal. This should have decreased the design by a 128-bit register. It was mostly done to try to allow for a synthesis of the module, while also reducing hardware usage. This should decrease the number of D-type FFs by yet another 128. A comparison between report 3 and 4 displays a decrease from 130 D-type FFs to 2 D-type FFs.

The maximum frequency obtained this time was 94MHz. The number of Flip-Flops went from 2945 to 2817. This did not affect the number of Slice Registers.

The circuit still uses roughly 8% of the hardware on the FPGA.

Fifth synthesis

When I got about to this point of synthesis and optimization I found that two files were created during each synthesis. A Synthesis Report as well as a Place and Route Report. The ones I have been taking a look at this far have been the Synthesis Reports, and to make sure that there are not any huge gaps in numbers between the reports, I will continue to read them, and not the Place and Route Reports. Many of the entities can not be mapped seperately, due to the amount of IOs on the FPGA, compared to the number of IOs required by the modules.

The third synthesis was performed on each block seperately, to find out where optimization might be performed. The usage can be viewed in Table 7.1.

Entity	Slice LUTs out of 63288	Slice Registers out of 126576
scrambler	5167	2817
▹*manager*	858	699
▹*cbc*	4321	2127
▹*cipher*	4229	1994
▹*keyexpansion*	2914	1601
▹*keyblock*1	689	0
▹*keyblock*2	208	9
▹*demux*	32	0
▹*keycore*	183	9
▹*ctr*	14	9

▹*rotw*	0	0
▹*sbox*	128	0
▹*rcon*	40	0
▹*keyblock*3	1854	1365
▹*data2state*	0	0
▹*round*	1535	272
▹*subbytes*	512	0
▹*shiftrows*	0	0
▹*mixcolumns*	176	0
▹*addkey*	128	0
▹*state2data*	1	2

Table 7.1: *Hardware usage of entities*

My plan was to try to reduce the critical path by inserting FFs in the middle of it and then run another synthesis. This would have increased the hardware by a lot of FFs, but also increased the maximum frequency. This was hard to do due to timing issues, which is why I decided to change the UCF instead of spending the time trying to decrease the critical path, only to increase the amount of hardware.

Running this synthesis let me know that you are not informed whether the desired frequency can be achieved or not, when you run the synthesis using an UCF. Because of this, I once again tried to add the FFs to shorten the cricical path.

Sixth synthesis

The final synthesis I ran on the circuit gave the following results:

7.3 Further development

There are, as usual, an amount of optimization that could be performed on the circuit. They consist of optimization of code, as well as some deeper research into how to rewrite VHDL code to turn the registers in this implementation into RAMs, ROMs or LUTs.

7.3.1 Rijndael's S-Box

The Rijndael Sbox implemented in my design does not synthesize into a ROM, which it should be able to do. Other than a ROM, it should also be able to be synthesized into a couple of LUT6. I have not been able to find out why my code is implemented into registers instead of more efficient solutions, but it is.

7.3.2 Critical Path

To increase the maximum frequency of the circuit, the critical path needs to be decreased. This is done by adding FFs in the middle of the critical path. This will be hard to solve, due to the complexity of the keyexpansion, and would increase

the amount of hardware as well as the complexity of the circuit if FFs were to be added.

The decision whether to reduce the critical path, or not, is a hard decision due to the vast amount of hardware that needs to be added to increase the frequency.

7.3.3 HARDUNÅGOTMERDUVILLFÖRBÄTTRA?

7.4 Implementation

My design is very hierarchical. The top layer is an aes128 block in CBC-mode. It takes an input TS-packet, selects data from it which it scrambles, and then outputs the data in the form of a TS-packet once again.

The scrambler consists of two entities. An entity which I call the cbc-entity, which deals with the scrambling of the received data. The other entity is a data-manager. The manager deals with reading data from the interface towards the rest of the FPGA as well as sending the right data-bits to the CBC-entity. It also tells the CBC-entity how to handle the data, since different things are to be done depending on if the data is the first data packet sent, or not.

7.4.1 Manager entity

The manager (Figure 13) consists of a FIFO, an FSM and a couple of registers. The FIFO is needed since the data sent to the scrambler from the FPGA is sent in bursts. The FIFO therefore writes the data bursts into a memory, from which it later reads, processes and sends the data to the CBC-entity. The data written to the FIFO is written in packets of 32 bits, but are read 8 bits at the time. The manager looks through the data packets to see if there is an adaptation field or not, since that changes the way we handle the data. The payload is written to the first set of registers as the data is found, and then sent to the next set of registers. This is simply done to allow the manager to deal with two sets of data in parallell. When the packet is ready to be sent, a flag is set and the data is sent to the CBC-entity.

7.4.2 CBC entity

The CBC-entity (Figure 14) consists of three small entities. An XOR, a multiplexer and a cipher-entity. The multiplexer is needed since we want to input the first plaintext into the XOR together with an IV. We want to use the output ciphertext instead of the IV for the rest of the plaintexts contained within the same TS-packet. There is only going to be one aes128 cipher in the CBC-entity, in order to save hardware. It will be run in sequence instead of in parallell, even though it might reduce the maximal speed of the circuit.

7.4.3 Cipher entity

The aes-128 cipher-entity (Figure 15) consists of 4 components. The data2state entity, which transforms the array into a matrix of data. A keyexpansion entity,

which takes an input of a key, and generates an extended key as an output. An entity, which I chose to call rounds, which deals with the encryption of the 16 byte blocks. And finally a state2data entity, which transforms the data-matrix into an array once again. The cipher entity itself keeps track of timing mainly between the keyexpansion and the round entity, and makes sure to provide the round entity with the correct roundkey at the right time.

7.4.4 Keyexpansion entity

The keyexpansion-entity is divided into 3 keyblock entities. The first keyblock entity decides what 4 bytes of the expanded key we want to expand. The second keyblock entity contains the keycore, which is only performed on every 4th set of 4 bytes, and a demux entity. The third keyblock entity performs an xor and an incrementation of the internal counter used as an index when accessing 4 byte blocks of data.

Keycore entity

The keycore entity consists of four entities. Rotword, Sbox, Rcon and a counter. The counter is used to get the right data-byte from the Rcon entity, and the index is only used in the keycore, and is thus best suited to be placed inside the keycore entity. Rotword rotates the bytes of the input one step to the left. Sbox replaces the input bytes according to the Rijndael Sbox. The Rcon entity both collects the correct rcon value from a precalculated vector, as well as inputs it into an xor together with the input.

7.4.5 Round entity

The round-entity (Figure 16) consists of four entities. Subbytes, shiftrows, mixcolumns and addroundkey. Addroundkey is a somewhat special XOR. Subbytes is an Rijndael Sbox, which takes an input 16-byte state, substitutes it, and outputs another 16-byte state. Shiftrows transposes the rows of the second, third and fourth row of the state. Last, but not least, is the mixcolumns entity. It consists of 16 mulblock entities. The input state of mixcolumns is split into columns, and each column is sent to a mulblock entity, which multiplies the inputs with 1, 2 or 3, then performs a bitwise XOR on them, outputting the result of the XOR. The function of the mixcolumns block is a rather complex matrix multiplication.

Addroundkey entity

Addroundkey is an entity which takes different inputs depending on what round we are currently dealing with. On the first round, addroundkey takes the input to the round entity. On the last round, it takes the output from the subbytes entity. The input to addroundkey is the output from mixcolumns the rest of the time.

The mulblock entity

The mulblock entity consists of one mul3 entity and one mul2 entity, which performs a special kind of hardware multiplication of 3, and 2, on the input. It also takes two inputs which it leaves alone. The four results are then XOR:ed with



Figure 7.2: *Test vector 1*



Figure 7.3: *Test vector 2*

eachother, and returned to the mixcolumns entity. The result is then input into the correct index in the matrix.

Mul3 means multiplication with 3, and mul2 means multiplication with 2. A multiplication with 2 is a left-shift, followed by an XOR with the fix value 0x1B if the shifted value exceeds 0xFF. A multiplication with 3 is the same as a multiplication with 2, followed by an XOR with the input value.

7.5 Tests

All of the entities in the design have been simulated and evaluated seperately before being merged and tested together, to make sure that they had the desired functionality both seperately and when combined together. The simulations for the seperate blocks are trivial, and therefore not included in the report.

Figure 7.2 through 7.4 are tests performed on the complete aes-128 block, before CBC-mode. In the figures, in_key is the input key to be extended and used, and datapacket is one packet from a TS. Test vector 1 and 2 are taken from [NIST, 2001], while test vector 3 is generated using a webpage.

Test vector 1 (Figure 7.2)
Input key: 2b 7e 15 16 28 ae d2 a6 ab f7 15 88 09 cf 4f 3c
Plaintext: 32 43 f6 a8 88 5a 30 8d 31 31 98 a2 e0 37 07 34
Ciphertext: 39 25 84 1d 02 dc 09 fb dc 11 85 97 19 6a 0b 32

Test vector 2 (Figure 7.3)
Input key: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
Plaintext: 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 aa bb cc dd ee ff
Ciphertext: 69 c4 e0 d8 6a 7b 04 30 d8 cd b7 80 70 b4 c5 5a

Test vector 3 (Figure 7.4)
Input key: 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 a0 b0 c0 d0 e0 f0 bb
Plaintext: 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 aa bb cc dd ee ff
Ciphertext: bf 99 1f aa 8b 0f e6 48 36 46 a0 2d 33 9e de a5



Figure 7.4: *Test vector 3*

7.6 Discussion

Vad var bra och dåligt med metoden?

7.7 Conclusions

Vad har jag kommit fram till?

Part IV

Appendix

Matrixes

Nibble	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0*A*	0*B*	0*C*	0*D*	0*E*	0*F*
00	63	7*C*	77	7*B*	*F*2	6*B*	6*F*	*C*5	30	01	67	2*B*	*FE*	*D*7	*AB*	76
10	*CA*	82	*C*9	7*D*	*FA*	59	47	*F*0	*AD*	*D*4	*A*2	*AF*	9*C*	*A*4	72	*C*0
20	*B*7	*FD*	93	26	36	3*F*	*F*7	*CC*	34	*A*5	*E*5	*F*1	71	*D*8	31	15
30	04	*C*7	23	*C*3	18	96	05	9*A*	07	12	80	*E*2	*EB*	27	*B*2	75
40	09	83	2*C*	1*A*	1*B*	6*E*	5*A*	*A*0	52	3*B*	*D*6	*B*3	29	*E*3	2*F*	84
50	53	*D*1	00	*ED*	20	*FC*	*B*1	5*B*	6*A*	*CB*	*BE*	39	4*A*	4*C*	58	*CF*
60	*D*0	*EF*	*AA*	*FB*	43	4*D*	33	85	45	*F*9	02	7*F*	50	3*C*	9*F*	*A*8
70	51	*A*3	40	8*F*	92	9*D*	38	*F*5	*BC*	*B*6	*DA*	21	10	*FF*	*F*3	*D*2
80	*CD*	0*C*	13	*EC*	5*F*	97	44	17	*C*4	*A*7	7*E*	3*D*	64	5*D*	19	73
90	60	81	4*F*	*DC*	22	2*A*	90	88	46	*EE*	*B*8	14	*DE*	5*E*	0*B*	*DB*
*A*0	*E*0	32	3*A*	0*A*	49	06	24	5*C*	*C*2	*D*3	*AC*	62	91	95	*E*4	79
*B*0	*E*7	*C*8	37	6*D*	8*D*	*D*5	4*E*	*A*9	6*C*	56	*F*4	*EA*	65	7*A*	*AE*	08
*C*0	*BA*	78	25	2*E*	1*C*	*A*6	*B*4	*C*6	*E*8	*DD*	74	1*F*	4*B*	*BD*	8*B*	8*A*
*D*0	70	3*E*	*B*5	66	48	03	*F*6	0*E*	61	35	57	*B*9	86	*C*1	1*D*	9*E*
*E*0	*E*1	*F*8	98	11	69	*D*9	8*E*	94	9*B*	1*E*	87	*E*9	*CE*	55	28	*DF*
*F*0	8*C*	*A*1	89	0*D*	*BF*	*E*6	42	68	41	99	2*D*	0*F*	*B*0	54	*BB*	16

(1)

Figure 5: *Rijndael S-box*

$$\begin{bmatrix} a_{1,1} & a_{1,2} & a_{1,3} & a_{1,4} \\ a_{2,1} & a_{2,2} & a_{2,3} & a_{2,4} \\ a_{3,1} & a_{3,2} & a_{3,3} & a_{3,4} \\ a_{4,1} & a_{4,2} & a_{4,3} & a_{4,4} \end{bmatrix} \tag{2}$$

Figure 6: *State-Matrix*

$$\begin{bmatrix} 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} a_{1,i} \\ a_{2,i} \\ a_{3,i} \\ a_{4,i} \end{bmatrix}, i = \{1, 2, 3, 4\} \tag{3}$$

Figure 7: *Rijndael MixColumns equation*

$$
\begin{aligned}
Rcon[256] = \{\ & 8D\ 01\ 02\ 04\ 08\ 10\ 20\ 40\ 80\ 1B\ 36\ 6C\ D8\ AB\ 4D\ 9A \\
& 2F\ 5E\ BC\ 63\ C6\ 97\ 35\ 6A\ D4\ B3\ 7D\ FA\ EF\ C5\ 91\ 39 \\
& 72\ E4\ D3\ BD\ 61\ C2\ 9F\ 25\ 4A\ 94\ 33\ 66\ CC\ 83\ 1D\ 3A \\
& 74\ E8\ CB\ 8D\ 01\ 02\ 04\ 08\ 10\ 20\ 40\ 80\ 1B\ 36\ 6C\ D8 \\
& AB\ 4D\ 9A\ 2F\ 5E\ BC\ 63\ C6\ 97\ 35\ 6A\ D4\ B3\ 7D\ FA\ EF \\
& C5\ 91\ 39\ 72\ E4\ D3\ BD\ 61\ C2\ 9F\ 25\ 4A\ 94\ 33\ 66\ CC \\
& 83\ 1D\ 3A\ 74\ E8\ CB\ 8D\ 01\ 02\ 04\ 08\ 10\ 20\ 40\ 80\ 1B \\
& 36\ 6C\ D8\ AB\ 4D\ 9A\ 2F\ 5E\ BC\ 63\ C6\ 97\ 35\ 6A\ D4\ B3 \\
& 7D\ FA\ EF\ C5\ 91\ 39\ 72\ E4\ D3\ BD\ 61\ C2\ 9F\ 25\ 4A\ 94 \\
& 33\ 66\ CC\ 83\ 1D\ 3A\ 74\ E8\ CB\ 8D\ 01\ 02\ 04\ 08\ 10\ 20 \\
& 40\ 80\ 1B\ 36\ 6C\ D8\ AB\ 4D\ 9A\ 2F\ 5E\ BC\ 63\ C6\ 97\ 35 \\
& 6A\ D4\ B3\ 7D\ FA\ EF\ C5\ 91\ 39\ 72\ E4\ D3\ BD\ 61\ C2\ 9F \\
& 25\ 4A\ 94\ 33\ 66\ CC\ 83\ 1D\ 3A\ 74\ E8\ CB\ 8D\ 01\ 02\ 04 \\
& 08\ 10\ 20\ 40\ 80\ 1B\ 36\ 6C\ D8\ AB\ 4D\ 9A\ 2F\ 5E\ BC\ 63 \\
& C6\ 97\ 35\ 6A\ D4\ B3\ 7D\ FA\ EF\ C5\ 91\ 39\ 72\ E4\ D3\ BD \\
& 61\ C2\ 9F\ 25\ 4A\ 94\ 33\ 66\ CC\ 83\ 1D\ 3A\ 74\ E8\ CB\ 8D\}
\end{aligned}
$$

Figure 8: *The Rcon function represented as a vector*

Illustrations



Figure 9: *Flowchart of the Rcon function*



Figure 10: *Flowchart of the key schedule*



Figure 11: *Cipher block chaining mode, [Wikipedia, 2014a]*

Test vectors

Test cases

This section contains test cases, which can be followed one step at the time.

The following test case is taken from NIST [2001, pp. 35–36]. The plaintext is input into a single aes-128 cipher.

Plaintext:	00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
Key:	000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F

Cipher (Encrypt):

round[0].input	00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
round[0].k_sch	000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
round[1].start	00102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F0
round[1].s_box	63CAB7040953D051CD60E0E7BA70E18C
round[1].s_row	6353E08C0960E104CD70B751BACAD0E7
round[1].m_col	5F72641557F5BC92F7BE3B291DB9F91A
round[1].k_sch	D6AA74FDD2AF72FADAA678F1D6AB76FE
round[2].start	89D810E8855ACE682D1843D8CB128FE4
round[2].s_box	A761CA9B97BE8B45D8AD1A611FC97369
round[2].s_row	A7BE1A6997AD739BD8C9CA451F618B61
round[2].m_col	FF87968431D86A51645151FA773AD009
round[2].k_sch	B692CF0B643DBDF1BE9BC5006830B3FE
round[3].start	4915598F55E5D7A0DACA94FA1F0A63F7
round[3].s_box	3B59CB73FCD90EE05774222DC067FB68
round[3].s_row	3BD92268FC74FB735767CBE0C0590E2D
round[3].m_col	4C9C1E66F771F0762C3F868E534DF256
round[3].k_sch	B6FF744ED2C2C9BF6C590CBF0469BF41
round[4].start	FA636A2825B339C940668A3157244D17
round[4].s_box	2DFB02343F6D12DD09337EC75B36E3F0
round[4].s_row	2D6D7EF03F33E334093602DD5BFB12C7

round[4].m_col	6385B79FFC538DF997BE478E7547D691
round[4].k_sch	47F7F7BC95353E03F96C32BCFD058DFD
round[5].start	247240236966B3FA6ED2753288425B6C
round[5].s_box	36400926F9336D2D9FB59D23C42C3950
round[5].s_row	36339D50F9B539269F2C092DC4406D23
round[5].m_col	F4BCD45432E554D075F1D6C51DD03B3C
round[5].k_sch	3CAAA3E8A99F9DEB50F3AF57ADF622AA
round[6].start	C81677BC9B7AC93B25027992B0261996
round[6].s_box	E847F56514DADDE23F77B64FE7F7D490
round[6].s_row	E8DAB6901477D4653FF7F5E2E747DD4F
round[6].m_col	9816EE7400F87F556B2C049C8E5AD036
round[6].k_sch	5E390F7DF7A69296A7553DC10AA31F6B
round[7].start	C62FE109F75EEDC3CC79395D84F9CF5D
round[7].s_box	B415F8016858552E4BB6124C5F998A4C
round[7].s_row	B458124C68B68A014B99F82E5F15554C
round[7].m_col	C57E1C159A9BD286F05F4BE098C63439
round[7].k_sch	14F9701AE35FE28C440ADF4D4EA9C026
round[8].start	D1876C0F79C4300AB45594ADD66FF41F
round[8].s_box	3E175076B61C04678DFC2295F6A8BFC0
round[8].s_row	3E1C22C0B6FCBF768DA85067F6170495
round[8].m_col	BAA03DE7A1F9B56ED5512CBA5F414D23
round[8].k_sch	47438735A41C65B9E016BAF4AEBF7AD2
round[9].start	FDE3BAD205E5D0D73547964EF1FE37F1
round[9].s_box	5411F4B56BD9700E96A0902FA1BB9AA1
round[9].s_row	54D990A16BA09AB596BBF40EA111702F
round[9].m_col	E9F74EEC023020F61BF2CCF2353C21C7
round[9].k_sch	549932D1F08557681093ED9CBE2C974E
round[10].start	BD6E7C3DF2B5779E0B61216E8B10B689
round[10].s_box	7A9F102789D5F50B2BEFFD9F3DCA4EA7
round[10].s_row	7AD5FDA789EF4E272BCA100B3D9FF59F
round[10].k_sch	13111D7FE3944A17F307A78B4D2B30C5
round[10].output	69C4E0D86A7B0430D8CDB78070B4C55A

Table 2 displays a keyexpansion based on a test case taken from NIST [2001, pp. 35–36].
Key = 2B 7E 15 16 28 AE D2 A6 AB F7 15 88 09 CF 4F 3C

i(dec)	temp	After RotWord	After SubWord	Rcon(i)	After ⊕ with Rcon	w[i-16]	w[i] = temp ⊕$w[i-16]$
4	09cf4f3c	cf4f3c09	8a84eb01	01000000	8b84eb01	2b7e1516	a0fafe17
5	a0fafe17					28aed2a6	88542cb1
6	88542cb1					abf71588	23a33939
7	23a33939					09cf4f3c	2a6c7605
8	2a6c7605	6c76052a	50386be5	02000000	52386be5	a0fafe17	f2c295f2
9	f2c295f2					88542cb1	7a96b943
10	7a96b943					23a33939	5935807a
11	5935807a					2a6c7605	7359f67f

12	7359f67f	59f67f73	cb42d28f	04000000	cf42d28f	f2c295f2	3d80477d
13	3d80477d					7a96b943	4716fe3e
14	4716fe3e					5935807a	1e237e44
15	1e237e44					7359f67f	6d7a883b
16	6d7a883b	7a883b6d	dac4e23c	08000000	d2c4e23c	3d80477d	ef44a541
17	ef44a541					4716fe3e	a8525b7f
18	a8525b7f					1e237e44	b671253b
19	b671253b					6d7a883b	db0bad00
20	db0bad00	0bad00db	2b9563b9	10000000	3b9563b9	ef44a541	d4d1c6f8
21	d4d1c6f8					a8525b7f	7c839d87
22	7c839d87					b671253b	caf2b8bc
23	caf2b8bc					db0bad00	11f915bc
24	11f915bc	f915bc11	99596582	20000000	b9596582	d4d1c6f8	6d88a37a
25	6d88a37a					7c839d87	110b3efd
26	110b3efd					caf2b8bc	dbf98641
27	dbf98641					11f915bc	ca0093fd
28	ca0093fd	0093fdca	63dc5474	40000000	23dc5474	6d88a37a	4e54f70e
29	4e54f70e					110b3efd	5f5fc9f3
30	5f5fc9f3					dbf98641	84a64fb2
31	84a64fb2					ca0093fd	4ea6dc4f
32	4ea6dc4f	a6dc4f4e	2486842f	80000000	a486842f	4e54f70e	ead27321
33	ead27321					5f5fc9f3	b58dbad2
34	b58dbad2					84a64fb2	312bf560
35	312bf560					4ea6dc4f	7f8d292f
36	7f8d292f	8d292f7f	5da515d2	1b000000	46a515d2	ead27321	ac7766f3
37	ac7766f3					b58dbad2	19fadc21
38	19fadc21					312bf560	28d12941
39	28d12941					7f8d292f	575c006e
40	575c006e	5c006e57	4a639f5b	36000000	7c639f5b	ac7766f3	d014f9a8
41	d014f9a8					19fadc21	c9ee2589
42	c9ee2589					28d12941	e13f0cc8
43	e13f0cc8					575c006e	b6630ca6

Table 2: *Keyexpansion*

Table 3 is a test case taken from NIST [2001, pp. 35–36].
16 bytes of data are run on a single aes-128 cipher.

Plaintext: 32 43 f6 a8 88 5a 30 8d 31 31 98 a2 e0 32 07 34
Key: 2B 7E 15 16 28 AE D2 A6 AB F7 15 88 09 CF 4F 3C

Round Number	Start of Round	After SubBytes	After ShiftRows	After MixColumns		Round Key Value
input	32 88 31 *e*0 43 5*a* 31 37 *f* 6 30 98 07 *a*8 8*d* *a*2 34				⊕	2*b* 28 *ab* 09 7*e* *ae* *f* 7 *cf* 15 *d*2 15 4*f* 16 *a*6 88 3*c*

1

19	a0	9a	e9		d4	e0	b8	1e		d4	e0	b8	1e		04	e0	48	28	
3d	f4	c6	f8		27	bf	b4	41		bf	b4	41	27		66	cb	f8	06	
e3	e2	8d	48		11	98	5d	52		5d	52	11	98		81	19	d3	26	
be	2b	2a	08		ae	f1	e5	30		30	ae	f1	e5		e5	9a	7a	4c	

a0	88	23	2a	
fa	54	a3	6c	
fe	2c	39	76	
17	b1	39	05	

2

a4	68	6b	02		49	45	7f	77		49	45	7f	77		58	1b	db	1b	
9c	9f	5b	6a		de	db	39	02		db	39	02	de		4d	4b	e7	6b	
7f	35	ea	50		d2	96	87	53		87	53	d2	96		ca	5a	ca	b0	
f2	2b	43	49		89	f1	1a	3b		3b	89	f1	1a		f1	ac	a8	e5	

f2	7a	59	73	
c2	96	35	59	
95	b9	80	f6	
f2	43	7a	7f	

3

aa	61	82	68		ac	ef	13	45		ac	ef	13	45		75	20	53	bb	
8f	dd	d2	32		73	c1	b5	23		c1	b5	23	73		ec	0b	c0	25	
5f	e3	4a	46		cf	11	d6	5a		d6	5a	cf	11		09	63	cf	d0	
03	ef	d2	9a		7b	df	b5	b8		b8	7b	df	b5		93	33	7c	dc	

3d	47	1e	6d	
80	16	23	7a	
47	fe	7e	88	
7d	3e	44	3b	

4

48	67	4d	d6		52	85	e3	f6		52	85	e3	f6		0f	60	6f	5e	
6c	1d	e3	5f		50	a4	11	cf		a4	11	cf	50		d6	31	c0	b3	
4e	9d	b1	58		2f	5e	c8	6a		c8	6a	2f	5e		da	38	10	13	
ee	0d	38	e7		28	d7	07	94		94	28	d7	07		a9	bf	6b	01	

ef	a8	b6	db	
44	52	71	0b	
a5	5b	25	ad	
4a	7f	3b	00	

5

e0	c8	d9	85		e1	e8	35	97		e1	e8	35	97		25	bd	b6	4c	
92	63	b1	b8		4f	fb	c8	6c		fb	c8	6c	4f		d1	11	3a	4c	
7f	63	35	be		d2	fb	96	ae		96	ae	d2	fb		a9	d1	33	c0	
e8	c0	50	01		9b	ba	53	7c		7c	9b	ba	53		ad	68	8e	b0	

d4	7c	ca	11	
d1	8d	f2	f9	
c6	9d	b8	15	
f8	87	bc	bc	

6

f1	c1	7c	5d		a1	78	10	4c		a1	78	10	4c		4b	2c	33	37	
00	92	c8	b5		63	4f	e8	d5		4f	e8	d5	63		86	4a	9d	d2	
6f	4c	8b	d5		a8	29	3d	03		3d	03	a8	29		8d	89	f4	18	
55	ef	32	0c		fc	df	23	fe		fe	fc	df	23		6d	80	e8	d8	

6d	11	db	ca	
88	0b	f9	00	
a3	3e	86	93	
7a	fd	41	fd	

7

26	3d	e8	fd		f7	27	9b	54		f7	27	9b	54		14	46	27	34	
0e	41	64	d2		ab	83	43	b5		83	43	b5	ab		15	16	46	2a	
2e	b7	72	8b		31	a9	40	3d		40	3d	31	a9		b5	15	56	d8	
17	7d	a9	25		f0	ff	d3	3f		3f	f0	ff	d3		bf	ec	d7	43	

4e	5f	84	4e	
54	5f	a6	a6	
f7	c9	4f	dc	
0e	f3	b2	4f	

8

5a	19	a3	7a		be	d4	0a	da		be	d4	0a	da		00	b1	54	fa	
41	49	e0	8c		83	3b	e1	64		3b	e1	64	83		51	c8	76	1b	
42	dc	19	04		2c	86	d4	f2		d4	f2	2c	86		2f	89	6d	99	
b1	1f	65	0c		c8	c0	4d	fe		fe	c8	c0	4d		d1	ff	cd	ea	

ea	b5	31	7f	
d2	8d	2b	8d	
73	ba	f5	29	
21	d2	60	2f	

9

ea	04	65	85		87	f2	4d	97		87	f2	4d	97		47	40	a3	4c	
83	45	5d	96		ec	6e	4c	90		6e	4c	90	ec		37	d4	70	9f	
5c	33	98	b0		4a	c3	46	e7		46	e7	4a	c3		94	e4	3a	42	
f0	2d	ad	c5		8c	d8	95	a6		a6	8c	d8	95		ed	a5	a6	bc	

ac	19	28	57	
77	fa	d1	5c	
66	dc	29	00	
f3	21	41	6e	

10

eb	59	8*b*	1*b*
40	2*e*	*a*1	*c*3
f 2	38	13	42
1*e*	84	*e*7	*d*2

*e*9	*cb*	3*d*	*af*
09	31	32	*e*2
89	07	7*d*	2*c*
72	5*f*	94	*b*5

*e*9	*cb*	3*d*	*af*
31	32	*e*2	09
7*d*	2*c*	89	07
*b*5	72	5*f*	94

⊕

*d*0	*c*9	*e*1	*b*6
14	*ee*	3*f*	63
f 9	25	0*c*	0*c*
*a*8	89	*c*8	*a*6

output

39	02	*dc*	19
25	*dc*	11	6*a*
84	09	85	0*b*
1*d*	*f b*	97	32

Table 3: *AES-128 Scrambling on 16 byte packet*

Table 4 is a test case for the CBC-mode scrambling performed on a TS-packet. The highlighted bytes are left in the clear, due to the scrambling only working with packets consisting of 16 bytes.

Clear Packet	47 60 80 11 54 68 69 73 20 69 73 20 74 68 65 20 70 61 79 6C 6F 61 64 20 75 73 65 64 20 66 6F 72 20 63 72 65 61 74 69 6E 67 20 74 68 65 20 74 65 73 74 20 76 65 63 74 6F 72 73 20 66 6F 72 20 74 68 65 20 44 56 42 20 49 50 54 56 20 73 63 72 61 6D 62 6C 65 72 2F 64 65 73 63 72 61 6D 62 6C 65 72 7E 20 54 68 69 73 20 69 73 20 74 68 65 20 70 61 79 6C 6F 61 64 20 75 73 65 64 20 66 6F 72 20 63 72 65 61 74 69 6E 67 20 74 68 65 20 74 65 73 74 20 76 65 63 74 6F 72 73 20 66 6F 72 20 74 68 65 20 44 56 42 20 49 50 54 56 20 73 63 72 61 6D 62 6C 65 72 2F 64 65 73 63 72 61 6D
Scrambled Packet	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

Table 4: *TS packet scrambled in cbc-mode*

Keyexpansion

This section only contains input keys, and the respective expanded keys.

Input key: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Output key:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
	62	63	63	63	62	63	63	63	62	63	63	63	62	63	63	63
	9b	98	98	c9	f9	fb	fb	aa	9b	98	98	c9	f9	fb	fb	aa
	90	97	34	50	69	6c	cf	fa	f2	f4	57	33	0b	0f	ac	99
	ee	06	da	7b	87	6a	15	81	75	9e	42	b2	7e	91	ee	2b
	7f	2e	2b	88	f8	44	3e	09	8d	da	7c	bb	f3	4b	92	90
	ec	61	4b	85	14	25	75	8c	99	ff	09	37	6a	b4	9b	a7
	21	75	17	87	35	50	62	0b	ac	af	6b	3c	c6	1b	f0	9b
	0e	f9	03	33	3b	a9	61	38	97	06	0a	04	51	1d	fa	9f
	b1	d4	d8	e2	8a	7d	b9	da	1d	7b	b3	de	4c	66	49	41
	b4	ef	5b	cb	3e	92	e2	11	23	e9	51	cf	6f	8f	18	8e

Input key : ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff

Output key:	ff	ff	ff	ff	ff	ff	ff	ff	ff	ff	ff	ff	ff	ff	ff	ff
	e8	e9	e9	e9	17	16	16	16	e8	e9	e9	e9	17	16	16	16
	ad	ae	ae	19	ba	b8	b8	0f	52	51	51	e6	45	47	47	f0
	09	0e	22	77	b3	b6	9a	78	e1	e7	cb	9e	a4	a0	8c	6e
	e1	6a	bd	3e	52	dc	27	46	b3	3b	ec	d8	17	9b	60	b6
	e5	ba	f3	ce	b7	66	d4	88	04	5d	38	50	13	c6	58	e6
	71	d0	7d	b3	c6	b6	a9	3b	c2	eb	91	6b	d1	2d	c9	8d
	e9	0d	20	8d	2f	bb	89	b6	ed	50	18	dd	3c	7d	d1	50
	96	33	73	66	b9	88	fa	d0	54	d8	e2	0d	68	a5	33	5d
	8b	f0	3f	23	32	78	c5	f3	66	a0	27	fe	0e	05	14	a3
	d6	0a	35	88	e4	72	f0	7b	82	d2	d7	85	8c	d7	c3	26

Input key : 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f

Output key:	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0a	0b	0c	0d	0e	0f
	d6	aa	74	fd	d2	af	72	fa	da	a6	78	f1	d6	ab	76	fe
	b6	92	cf	0b	64	3d	bd	f1	be	9b	c5	00	68	30	b3	fe
	b6	ff	74	4e	d2	c2	c9	bf	6c	59	0c	bf	04	69	bf	41
	47	f7	f7	bc	95	35	3e	03	f9	6c	32	bc	fd	05	8d	fd
	3c	aa	a3	e8	a9	9f	9d	eb	50	f3	af	57	ad	f6	22	aa
	5e	39	0f	7d	f7	a6	92	96	a7	55	3d	c1	0a	a3	1f	6b
	14	f9	70	1a	e3	5f	e2	8c	44	0a	df	4d	4e	a9	c0	26
	47	43	87	35	a4	1c	65	b9	e0	16	ba	f4	ae	bf	7a	d2
	54	99	32	d1	f0	85	57	68	10	93	ed	9c	be	2c	97	4e
	13	11	1d	7f	e3	94	4a	17	f3	07	a7	8b	4d	2b	30	c5

Input key : 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 aa bb cc dd ee ff

Output key:	00	11	22	33	44	55	66	77	88	99	aa	bb	cc	dd	ee	ff

c0	39	34	78	84	6c	52	0f	0c	f5	f8	b4	c0	28	16	4b
f6	7e	87	c2	72	12	d6	cd	7e	e7	2d	79	be	cf	3b	32
78	9c	a4	6c	0a	8e	71	a1	74	69	5c	d8	ca	a6	67	ea
54	19	23	18	5e	97	52	b9	2a	fe	0e	61	e0	58	69	8b
2e	e0	1e	f9	70	77	4c	40	5a	89	42	21	ba	d1	2b	aa
30	11	b2	0d	40	66	fe	4d	1a	ef	bc	6c	a0	3e	97	c6
c2	99	06	ed	82	ff	f8	a0	98	10	44	cc	38	2e	d3	0a
73	ff	61	ea	f1	00	99	4a	69	10	dd	86	51	3e	0e	8c
da	54	05	3b	2b	52	9c	71	42	44	41	f7	13	7a	4f	7b
36	d0	24	46	1d	84	b8	37	5f	c0	f9	c0	4c	ba	b6	bb

Examples

CBC-mode calculations

The ciphertext is obtained through the following equation where C_0 is the IV, and the XOR-operation is noted with $\oplus$.

C_i is the ciphertext
P_i is the plaintext
E_k is the encryption algorithm
D_k is the decryption algorithm

$$C_i = E_k(P_i \oplus C_{i-1}) \tag{4}$$

The inverse of the encryption algorithm E_k is the decryption algorithm D_k.

The inverse of the XOR-operation the XOR-operation.

This gives us:

$$D_k(C_i) = P_i \oplus C_{i-1} \tag{5}$$

which gives us

$$P_i = D_k(C_i) \oplus C_{i-1} \tag{6}$$

Layout of the circuit

This purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of what the circuit is supposed to look like, realized using blocks. The top entity is the aes_scrambler (Figure 12). Note that the manager-entity in Figure 12 and 16 are not the same entities.



Figure 12: *Scrambler-block*



Figure 13: *Manager-block*



Figure 14: *CBC-block*



Figure 15: *Cipher-block*



Figure 16: *Round-block*



Figure 17: *Keyexpansion-block*



Figure 18: *Keyblock2-block*

Synthesis reports

In this appendix a chosen amount of the raw data received from the synthesis have been placed. Not all data is inserted, due to the vast amounts of data.

Synthesis 2

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
 Number of Slice Registers:            4357  out of  126576     3%
 Number of Slice LUTs:                 5121  out of  63288      8%
    Number used as Logic:              5113  out of  63288      8%
    Number used as Memory:                8  out of  15616      0%
       Number used as RAM:                8

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:   7388
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:    3031  out of   7388    41%
   Number with an unused LUT:          2267  out of   7388    30%
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:  2090  out of   7388    28%
   Number of unique control sets:       103

IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                        194
 Number of bonded IOBs:                194  out of    296    65%

Specific Feature Utilization:
 Number of Block RAM/FIFO:               1  out of    268     0%
    Number using Block RAM only:         1
 Number of BUFG/BUFGCTRLs:               1  out of     16     6%
```

Synthesis 3

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
 Number of Slice Registers:            2945  out of  126576     2%
 Number of Slice LUTs:                 5167  out of  63288      8%
    Number used as Logic:              5159  out of  63288      8%
    Number used as Memory:                8  out of  15616      0%
       Number used as RAM:                8

Slice Logic Distribution:
```

```
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:   6124
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:    3179  out of   6124    51%
   Number with an unused LUT:           957  out of   6124    15%
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:  1988  out of   6124    32%
   Number of unique control sets:       102

IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                         194
 Number of bonded IOBs:                 194  out of    296    65%

Specific Feature Utilization:
 Number of Block RAM/FIFO:                1  out of    268     0%
    Number using Block RAM only:          1
 Number of BUFG/BUFGCTRLs:                1  out of     16     6%
```

Synthesis 4

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
 Number of Slice Registers:            2817  out of  126576     2%
 Number of Slice LUTs:                 5167  out of  63288      8%
    Number used as Logic:              5159  out of  63288      8%
    Number used as Memory:                8  out of  15616      0%
       Number used as RAM:                8

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:   5996
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:    3179  out of   5996    53%
   Number with an unused LUT:           829  out of   5996    13%
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:  1988  out of   5996    33%
   Number of unique control sets:       101

IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                         194
 Number of bonded IOBs:                 194  out of    296    65%

Specific Feature Utilization:
 Number of Block RAM/FIFO:                1  out of    268     0%
    Number using Block RAM only:          1
 Number of BUFG/BUFGCTRLs:                1  out of     16     6%
```

Synthesis 5

Addroundkey

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
 Number of Slice LUTs:                  128  out of  63288      0%
    Number used as Logic:               128  out of  63288      0%

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:    128
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:     128  out of    128    100%
   Number with an unused LUT:             0  out of    128      0%
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:     0  out of    128      0%
   Number of unique control sets:         0
```

```
IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                          384
 Number of bonded IOBs:                  384  out of    296   129% (*)
```

CBC

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
 Number of Slice Registers:            2127  out of  126576     1%
 Number of Slice LUTs:                 4321  out of  63288      6%
    Number used as Logic:              4321  out of  63288      6%

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:   4740
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:    2613  out of   4740     55%
   Number with an unused LUT:           419  out of   4740      8%
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:  1708  out of   4740     36%
   Number of unique control sets:        51

IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                          390
 Number of bonded IOBs:                  390  out of    296   131% (*)

Specific Feature Utilization:
 Number of BUFG/BUFGCTRLs:                 1  out of     16     6%
```

Cipher

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
 Number of Slice Registers:            1994  out of  126576     1%
 Number of Slice LUTs:                 4229  out of  63288      6%
    Number used as Logic:              4229  out of  63288      6%

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:   4571
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:    2577  out of   4571     56%
   Number with an unused LUT:           342  out of   4571      7%
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:  1652  out of   4571     36%
   Number of unique control sets:        58

IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                          390
 Number of bonded IOBs:                  390  out of    296   131% (*)

Specific Feature Utilization:
 Number of BUFG/BUFGCTRLs:                 1  out of     16     6%
```

Counter

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
 Number of Slice Registers:               9  out of  126576     0%
 Number of Slice LUTs:                   14  out of  63288      0%
    Number used as Logic:                14  out of  63288      0%

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:     15
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:       6  out of     15     40%
   Number with an unused LUT:             1  out of     15      6%
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:     8  out of     15     53%
   Number of unique control sets:         2
```

```
IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                          13
 Number of bonded IOBs:                  13  out of    296     4%

Specific Feature Utilization:
 Number of BUFG/BUFGCTRLs:                1  out of     16     6%
```

Data2state

```
Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:      0
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:       0  out of      0
   Number with an unused LUT:             0  out of      0
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:     0  out of      0
   Number of unique control sets:         0

IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                         257
 Number of bonded IOBs:                 256  out of    296    86%

Specific Feature Utilization:
```

Demux

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
 Number of Slice LUTs:                   32  out of  63288     0%
    Number used as Logic:                32  out of  63288     0%

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:     32
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:      32  out of     32   100%
   Number with an unused LUT:             0  out of     32     0%
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:     0  out of     32     0%
   Number of unique control sets:         0

IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                          97
 Number of bonded IOBs:                  97  out of    296    32%

Specific Feature Utilization:
```

Keyblock1

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
 Number of Slice LUTs:                  689  out of  63288     1%
    Number used as Logic:               689  out of  63288     1%

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:    689
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:     689  out of    689   100%
   Number with an unused LUT:             0  out of    689     0%
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:     0  out of    689     0%
   Number of unique control sets:         0

IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                        1448
 Number of bonded IOBs:                1320  out of    296   445% (*)

Specific Feature Utilization:
```

Keyblock2

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
 Number of Slice Registers:              9  out of  126576     0%
 Number of Slice LUTs:                 208  out of  63288     0%
    Number used as Logic:              208  out of  63288     0%

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:    209
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:     200  out of    209    95%
   Number with an unused LUT:             1  out of    209     0%
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:     8  out of    209     3%
   Number of unique control sets:         2

IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                        76
 Number of bonded IOBs:                72  out of    296    24%

Specific Feature Utilization:
 Number of BUFG/BUFGCTRLs:              1  out of     16     6%
```

Keyblock3

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
 Number of Slice Registers:           1365  out of  126576     1%
 Number of Slice LUTs:                1854  out of  63288     2%
    Number used as Logic:             1854  out of  63288     2%

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:  1907
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:    542  out of   1907    28%
   Number with an unused LUT:           53  out of   1907     2%
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs: 1312  out of   1907    68%
   Number of unique control sets:       34

IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                       2989
 Number of bonded IOBs:               2989  out of    296   1009% (*)
    IOB Flip Flops/Latches:            128

Specific Feature Utilization:
 Number of BUFG/BUFGCTRLs:              1  out of     16     6%
```

Keycore

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
 Number of Slice Registers:              9  out of  126576     0%
 Number of Slice LUTs:                 183  out of  63288     0%
    Number used as Logic:              183  out of  63288     0%

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:    184
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:     175  out of    184    95%
   Number with an unused LUT:             1  out of    184     0%
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:     8  out of    184     4%
   Number of unique control sets:         2

IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                        69
 Number of bonded IOBs:                69  out of    296    23%
```

```
Specific Feature Utilization:
 Number of BUFG/BUFGCTRLs:                1  out of     16     6%
```

Keyexpansion

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
 Number of Slice Registers:            1601  out of  126576     1%
 Number of Slice LUTs:                 2914  out of  63288     4%
    Number used as Logic:              2914  out of  63288     4%

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:   3183
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:    1582  out of   3183    49%
   Number with an unused LUT:           269  out of   3183     8%
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:  1332  out of   3183    41%
   Number of unique control sets:        45

IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                        1539
 Number of bonded IOBs:                1539  out of    296   519% (*)

Specific Feature Utilization:
 Number of BUFG/BUFGCTRLs:                1  out of     16     6%
```

Manager

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
 Number of Slice Registers:             699  out of  126576     0%
 Number of Slice LUTs:                  858  out of  63288     1%
    Number used as Logic:               850  out of  63288     1%
    Number used as Memory:                8  out of  15616     0%
       Number used as RAM:                8

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:   1257
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:     558  out of   1257    44%
   Number with an unused LUT:           399  out of   1257    31%
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:   300  out of   1257    23%
   Number of unique control sets:        50

IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                         325
 Number of bonded IOBs:                 325  out of    296   109% (*)

Specific Feature Utilization:
 Number of Block RAM/FIFO:                1  out of    268     0%
    Number using Block RAM only:          1
 Number of BUFG/BUFGCTRLs:                1  out of     16     6%
```

Mixcolumns

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
 Number of Slice LUTs:                  176  out of  63288     0%
    Number used as Logic:               176  out of  63288     0%

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:    176
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:     176  out of    176   100%
   Number with an unused LUT:             0  out of    176     0%
```

```
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:     0  out of    176     0%
   Number of unique control sets:         0

IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                         256
 Number of bonded IOBs:                 256  out of    296    86%

Specific Feature Utilization:
```

Rcon

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
 Number of Slice LUTs:                   40  out of  63288     0%
    Number used as Logic:                40  out of  63288     0%

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:     40
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:      40  out of     40   100%
   Number with an unused LUT:             0  out of     40     0%
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:     0  out of     40     0%
   Number of unique control sets:         0

IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                          72
 Number of bonded IOBs:                  72  out of    296    24%

Specific Feature Utilization:
```

Round

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
 Number of Slice Registers:             272  out of  126576     0%
 Number of Slice LUTs:                 1535  out of  63288     2%
    Number used as Logic:              1535  out of  63288     2%

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:   1550
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:    1278  out of   1550    82%
   Number with an unused LUT:            15  out of   1550     0%
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:   257  out of   1550    16%
   Number of unique control sets:         3

IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                         388
 Number of bonded IOBs:                 388  out of    296   131% (*)

Specific Feature Utilization:
 Number of BUFG/BUFGCTRLs:              1  out of     16     6%
```

Rword

```
Slice Logic Utilization:

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:     0
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:      0  out of      0
   Number with an unused LUT:            0  out of      0
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:    0  out of      0
   Number of unique control sets:        0
```

```
IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                          64
 Number of bonded IOBs:                  64  out of    296    21%

Specific Feature Utilization:
```

Scrambler

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
 Number of Slice Registers:            2817  out of  126576     2%
 Number of Slice LUTs:                 5167  out of  63288      8%
    Number used as Logic:              5159  out of  63288      8%
    Number used as Memory:                8  out of  15616      0%
       Number used as RAM:                8

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:   5996
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:    3179  out of   5996    53%
   Number with an unused LUT:           829  out of   5996    13%
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:  1988  out of   5996    33%
   Number of unique control sets:       101

IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                         194
 Number of bonded IOBs:                 194  out of    296    65%

Specific Feature Utilization:
 Number of Block RAM/FIFO:                1  out of    268     0%
    Number using Block RAM only:          1
 Number of BUFG/BUFGCTRLs:                1  out of     16     6%
```

Shiftrows

```
Slice Logic Utilization:

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:      0
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:       0  out of      0
   Number with an unused LUT:             0  out of      0
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:     0  out of      0
   Number of unique control sets:         0

IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                         256
 Number of bonded IOBs:                 256  out of    296    86%

Specific Feature Utilization:
```

State2data

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
 Number of Slice Registers:               2  out of  126576     0%
 Number of Slice LUTs:                    1  out of  63288      0%
    Number used as Logic:                 1  out of  63288      0%

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:      3
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:       1  out of      3    33%
   Number with an unused LUT:             2  out of      3    66%
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:     0  out of      3     0%
```

```
   Number of unique control sets:         2

IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                         259
 Number of bonded IOBs:                 259  out of    296    87%

Specific Feature Utilization:
 Number of BUFG/BUFGCTRLs:                1  out of     16     6%
```

Subbytes

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
 Number of Slice LUTs:                  512  out of  63288     0%
    Number used as Logic:               512  out of  63288     0%

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:    512
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:     512  out of    512   100%
   Number with an unused LUT:             0  out of    512     0%
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:     0  out of    512     0%
   Number of unique control sets:         0

IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                         256
 Number of bonded IOBs:                 256  out of    296    86%

Specific Feature Utilization:
```

Substitutebox

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
 Number of Slice LUTs:                  128  out of  63288     0%
    Number used as Logic:               128  out of  63288     0%

Slice Logic Distribution:
 Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:    128
   Number with an unused Flip Flop:     128  out of    128   100%
   Number with an unused LUT:             0  out of    128     0%
   Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:     0  out of    128     0%
   Number of unique control sets:         0

IO Utilization:
 Number of IOs:                          64
 Number of bonded IOBs:                  64  out of    296    21%

Specific Feature Utilization:
```

Synthesis 6

```
Slice Logic Utilization:
  Number of Slice Registers:               2,805 out of 126,576    2%
    Number used as Flip Flops:             2,805
    Number used as Latches:                    0
    Number used as Latch-thrus:                0
    Number used as AND/OR logics:              0
  Number of Slice LUTs:                    4,930 out of  63,288    7%
    Number used as logic:                  4,872 out of  63,288    7%
      Number using O6 output only:         4,476
```

```
      Number using O5 output only:              13
      Number using O5 and O6:                  383
      Number used as ROM:                        0
    Number used as Memory:                       8 out of  15,616    1%
      Number used as Dual Port RAM:              8
        Number using O6 output only:             4
        Number using O5 output only:             0
        Number using O5 and O6:                  4
      Number used as Single Port RAM:            0
      Number used as Shift Register:             0
    Number used exclusively as route-thrus:     50
      Number with same-slice register load:     49
      Number with same-slice carry load:         1
      Number with other load:                    0

Slice Logic Distribution:
  Number of occupied Slices:                 1,727 out of  15,822   10%
  Number of MUXCYs used:                       196 out of  31,644    1%
  Number of LUT Flip Flop pairs used:        5,554
    Number with an unused Flip Flop:         2,915 out of   5,554   52%
    Number with an unused LUT:                 624 out of   5,554   11%
    Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs:       2,015 out of   5,554   36%
    Number of slice register sites lost
      to control set restrictions:               0 out of 126,576    0%

  A LUT Flip Flop pair for this architecture represents one LUT paired with
  one Flip Flop within a slice.  A control set is a unique combination of
  clock, reset, set, and enable signals for a registered element.
  The Slice Logic Distribution report is not meaningful if the design is
  over-mapped for a non-slice resource or if Placement fails.

IO Utilization:
  Number of bonded IOBs:                     194 out of     296   65%

Specific Feature Utilization:
  Number of RAMB16BWERs:                       1 out of     268    1%
  Number of RAMB8BWERs:                        0 out of     536    0%
  Number of BUFIO2/BUFIO2_2CLKs:               0 out of      32    0%
  Number of BUFIO2FB/BUFIO2FB_2CLKs:           0 out of      32    0%
  Number of BUFG/BUFGMUXs:                     1 out of      16    6%
    Number used as BUFGs:                      1
    Number used as BUFGMUX:                    0
  Number of DCM/DCM_CLKGENs:                   0 out of      12    0%
  Number of ILOGIC2/ISERDES2s:                 0 out of     506    0%
  Number of IODELAY2/IODRP2/IODRP2_MCBs:       0 out of     506    0%
  Number of OLOGIC2/OSERDES2s:                 0 out of     506    0%
  Number of BSCANs:                            0 out of       4    0%
  Number of BUFHs:                             0 out of     384    0%
  Number of BUFPLLs:                           0 out of       8    0%
  Number of BUFPLL_MCBs:                       0 out of       4    0%
  Number of DSP48A1s:                          0 out of     180    0%
  Number of GTPA1_DUALs:                       0 out of       2    0%
  Number of ICAPs:                             0 out of       1    0%
  Number of MCBs:                              0 out of       4    0%
  Number of PCIE_A1s:                          0 out of       1    0%
  Number of PCILOGICSEs:                       0 out of       2    0%
  Number of PLL_ADVs:                          0 out of       6    0%
  Number of PMVs:                              0 out of       1    0%
```

```
Number of STARTUPs:                          0 out of       1    0%
Number of SUSPEND_SYNCs:                     0 out of       1    0%
```

List of Figures

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