

Sec. 1—The Congress

Legislative Powers

infiltration into the labor movement to a vague and unlimited inquiry into “subversion and subversive propaganda.”²⁴²

Although subsequent cases involving the Un-American Activities Committee did result in the reversal of several contempt citations on narrow grounds, the holdings by and large showed that the implications of *Watkins* with regard to pertinency were held in check, so that, without amending its rules or its authorizing resolution, the committee was successful in convincing a majority of the Court that its subsequent investigations were authorized and that the questions asked of recalcitrant witnesses were pertinent to the inquiries.²⁴³ Thus, in *Barenblatt v. United States*,²⁴⁴ the Court concluded that the history of the Un-American Activities Committee’s activities, viewed in conjunction with the rule establishing it, evinced clear investigatory authority to inquire into Communist infiltration

²⁴² *Id.* See also *Sacher v. United States*, 356 U.S. 576 (1958), a *per curiam* reversal of a contempt conviction on the ground that the questions did not relate to a subject “within the subcommittee’s scope of inquiry,” arising out of a hearing pertaining to a recantation of testimony by a witness in which the inquiry drifted into a discussion of legislation barring Communists from practice at the federal bar, the unanswered questions being asked then; and *Flaxer v. United States*, 358 U.S. 147 (1958), a reversal for refusal to produce membership lists because of an ambiguity in the committee’s ruling on the time of performance; and *Scull v. Virginia ex rel. Committee*, 359 U.S. 344 (1959), a reversal on a contempt citation before a state legislative investigating committee on pertinency grounds.

²⁴³ Notice should be taken, however, of two cases that, though decided four and five years after *Watkins*, involved persons who were witnesses before the Un-American Activities Committee either shortly prior to or shortly following *Watkins*’ appearance and who were cited for contempt before the Supreme Court decided *Watkins*.

In *Deutch v. United States*, 367 U.S. 456 (1961), involving an otherwise cooperative witness who had refused to identify certain persons with whom he had been associated at Cornell University in Communist Party activities, the Court agreed that Deutch had refused on grounds of moral scruples to answer the questions and had not challenged them as not pertinent to the inquiry, but the majority ruled that the government had failed to establish at trial the pertinency of the questions, thus vitiating the conviction. Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker dissented, arguing that any argument on pertinency had been waived but in any event thinking it had been established. *Id.* at 472, 475.

In *Russell v. United States*, 369 U.S. 749 (1962), the Court struck down contempt convictions for insufficiency of the indictments. Indictments, which merely set forth the offense in the words of the contempt statute, the Court asserted, in alleging that the unanswered questions were pertinent to the subject under inquiry but not identifying the subject in detail, are defective because they do not inform defendants of what they must be prepared to meet and do not enable courts to decide whether the facts alleged are sufficient to support convictions. Justice Stewart for the Court noted that the indicia of subject matter under inquiry were varied and contradictory, thus necessitating a precise governmental statement of particulars. Justices Harlan and Clark in dissent contended that it was sufficient for the government to establish pertinency at trial, and noted that no objections relating to pertinency had been made at the hearings. *Id.* at 781, 789–793. *Russell* was cited in the *per curiam* reversals in *Grumman v. United States*, 370 U.S. 288 (1962), and *Silber v. United States*, 370 U.S. 717 (1962).

²⁴⁴ 360 U.S. 109 (1959).