ment, justify a bar on picketing which was not thus directly related in its purpose to the use to which the shopping center property was being put." [1461]

Four years later, the Court answered the reserved question in the negative.[1462] Several members of an antiwar group had attempted to distribute leaflets on the mall of a large shopping center, calling on the public to attend a protest meeting. Center guards invoked a trespass law against them, and the Court held that they could rightfully be excluded. The center had not dedicated its property to a public use, the Court said; rather, it had invited the public in specifically to carry on business with those stores located in the center. Plaintiffs' leafleting, not directed to any store or to the customers *qua* customers of any of the stores, was unrelated to any activity in the center. Unlike the situation in *Logan Valley Plaza*, there were reasonable alternatives by which plaintiffs could reach those who used the center. Thus, in the absence of a relationship between the purpose of the expressive activity and the business of the shopping center, the property rights of the center owner will overbalance the expressive rights to persons who would use their property to communicate.

Then, the Court formally overruled *Logan Valley Plaza*, holding that shopping centers are not functionally equivalent to the company town involved in *Marsh*.[1463] Suburban malls may be the "new town squares" in the view of sociologists, but they are private property in the eye of the law. The ruling came in a case in which a union of employees engaged in an economic strike against one store in a shopping center was barred from picketing the store within the mall. The rights of employees in such a situation are generally to be governed by federal labor laws [1464] rather than the First Amendment, although there is also the possibility that state constitutional provisions may be interpreted more expansively by state courts to protect some kinds of public issue picketing in shopping centers and similar places.[1465] Henceforth, only when private property " 'has

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[1461] 391 U.S. at 320 n.9.

[1462] Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).

[1463] Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court asserted that *Logan Valley* had in fact been overruled by *Lloyd Corp.*, 424 U.S. at 517–18, but Justice Powell, the author of the *Lloyd Corp.* opinion, did not believe that to be the case, id. at 523.

[1464] *But see* Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. U.S. 180 (1978).

[1465] In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), the Court held that a state court interpretation of the state constitution to protect picketing in a privately owned shopping center did not deny the property owner any federal constitutional rights. *But cf.* Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1