The reach of the state may even extend to private possession of child pornography in the home. In *Osborne v. Ohio* <sup>1354</sup> the Court upheld a state law criminalizing the possession or viewing of child pornography as applied to someone who possessed such materials in his home. Distinguishing *Stanley v. Georgia*, the Court ruled that Ohio's interest in preventing exploitation of children far exceeded what it characterized as Georgia's "paternalistic interest" in protecting the minds of adult viewers of pornography. <sup>1355</sup> Because of the greater importance of the state interest involved, the Court saw less need to require states to demonstrate a strong necessity for regulating private possession as well as commercial distribution and sale.

In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Court held unconstitutional the federal Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) to the extent that it prohibited pictures that were not produced with actual minors. 1356 Prohibited pictures included computer-generated ("virtual") child pornography, and photographs of adult actors who appeared to be minors, as well as "a Renaissance painting depicting a scene from classical mythology." 1357 The Court observed that statutes that prohibit child pornography that use real children are constitutional because they target "[t]he production of the work, not the content." 1358 The CPPA, by contrast, targeted the content, not the means of production. The government's rationales for the CPPA included that "[p]edophiles might use the materials to encourage children to participate in sexual activity" and might "whet their own sexual appetites" with it, "thereby increasing . . . the sexual abuse and exploitation of actual children." 1359 The Court found these rationales inadequate because the government "cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts" and "may not prohibit speech because it increases the chance an unlawful act will be committed 'at some indefinite future time.'" 1360 The government had also argued that the existence of "virtual" child pornography "can make it harder to prosecute pornographers who do use real minors," because, "[a]s imaging technology improves . . . , it becomes more difficult to prove that a particular picture was produced using actual children." 1361 This

<sup>1354 495</sup> U.S. 103 (1990).

<sup>1355 495</sup> U.S. at 108.

<sup>1356 535</sup> U.S. 234 (2002).

<sup>1357 535</sup> U.S. at 241.

<sup>1358 535</sup> U.S. at 249; see also id. at 241.

<sup>1359 535</sup> U.S. at 241.

<sup>1360 535</sup> U.S. at 253.

<sup>1361 535</sup> U.S. at 242.