## Sec. 2-Judicial Power and Jurisdiction

## Cl. 1—Cases and Controversies

Cases may become moot because of a change in the law,<sup>558</sup> or in the status of the parties,<sup>559</sup> or because of some act of one of the parties which dissolves the controversy.<sup>560</sup> But the Court has developed several exceptions. Thus, in criminal cases, although the sentence of the convicted appellant has been served, the case "is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction." <sup>561</sup> The "mere possibility" of such a consequence, even a "remote" one, is enough to find that one who has served his sentence has retained the requisite personal stake giving his case "an adversary cast and making it justiciable." <sup>562</sup> This exception has its

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>558</sup> E.g., Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1852); United States v. Alaska Steamship Co., 253 U.S. 113 (1920); Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969); Sanks v. Georgia, 401 U.S. 144 (1971); Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208 (1972); Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404 U.S. 412 (1972); Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 481 (1990). But compare Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 568 U.S. \_\_\_, No. 11-338, slip op. (2013) (action to enforce penalty under former regulation not mooted by change in regulation where violation occurred before regulation was changed). See also City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 288-289 (1982) (case not mooted by repeal of ordinance, since City made clear its intention to reenact it if free from lower court judgment). Following Aladdin's Castle, the Court in Northeastern Fla. Ch. of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 660-63 (1993), held that when a municipal ordinance is repealed but replaced by one sufficiently similar so that the challenged action in effect continues, the case is not moot. But see id. at 669 (Justice O'Connor dissenting) (modification of ordinance more significant and case is mooted).

<sup>559</sup> Atherton Mills v. Johnston, 259 U.S. 13 (1922) (in challenge to laws regulating labor of youths 14 to 16, Court held case two-and-one-half years after argument and dismissed as moot since certainly none of the challengers was now in the age bracket); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976); Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982). Compare County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979), with Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). In Arizonans For Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997), a state employee attacking an English-only work requirement had standing at the time she brought the suit, but she resigned following a decision in the trial court, thus mooting the case before it was taken to the appellate court, which should not have acted to hear and decide it.

 $<sup>^{560}</sup>$  E.g., Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 250 U.S. 360 (1919); Oil Workers Local 8–6 v. Missouri, 361 U.S. 363 (1960); A.L. Mechling Barge Lines v. United States, 368 U.S. 324 (1961); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395 (1975); County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979); Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. \_\_\_, No. 08–351 (2009).

 $<sup>^{561}</sup>$  Sibron v. New York, 395 U.S. 40, 50–58 (1968). But compare Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998).

<sup>562</sup> Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 790–791 (1969). The cases have progressed from leaning toward mootness to leaning strongly against. *E.g.*, St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1943); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633–634 n.2 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 49–58 (1968). *But see* Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982);United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. \_\_\_\_, No. 09–940, slip op. at 6 (2011) (per curiam) (rejecting as too indirect a benefit that favorable resolution of a case might serve as beneficial precedent for a future case involving the plaintiff). The exception permits