purpose, to have his certificate of naturalization cancelled.[1225] Moreover, if within a year of his naturalization a person joins an organization or becomes in any way affiliated with one which was a disqualification for naturalization if he had been a member at the time, the fact is made *prima facie* evidence of his bad faith in taking the oath and grounds for instituting proceedings to revoke his admission to citizenship.[1226]

Rights of Naturalized Persons

Chief Justice Marshall early stated in dictum that "[a] naturalized citizen . . . becomes a member of the society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the view of the Constitution, on the footing of a native. The Constitution does not authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power of the national legislature is, to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far as respects the individual."[1227] A similar idea was expressed in *Knauer v. United States*.[1228] "Citizenship obtained through naturalization is not a second-class citizenship. . . . [It] carries with it the privilege of full participation in the affairs of our society, including the right to speak freely, to criticize officials and administrators, and to promote changes in our laws including the very Charter of our Government."

[1225] § 340(a), 66 Stat. 260 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). *See* Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988) (badly fractured Court opinion dealing with the statutory requirements in a denaturalization proceeding under this section). *See also* Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912). Congress has imposed no time bar applicable to proceedings to revoke citizenship, so that many years after naturalization has taken place a naturalized citizen remains subject to divestment upon proof of fraud. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961); Polites v. United States, 364 U.S. 426 (1960); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946); Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).

[1226] 340(c), 66 Stat. 261 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c). The time period had previously been five years.

[1227] Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737, 827 (1824). One must be aware, however, that this language does not appear in any case having to do with citizenship or naturalization or the rights of naturalized citizens and its force may be therefore questioned. *Compare* Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 261 (1967) (Justice Black for the Court: "a mature and well-considered dictum . . . "), *with* id. at 275–76 (Justice Harlan dissenting: the dictum, "cannot have been intended to reach the question of citizenship"). The issue in *Osborn* was the right of the Bank to sue in federal court. Osborn had argued that the fact that the bank was chartered under the laws of the United States did not make any legal issue involving the bank one arising under the laws of the United States for jurisdictional purposes; to argue the contrary, Osborn contended, was like suggesting that the fact that persons were naturalized under the laws of Congress meant such persons had an automatic right to sue in federal courts, unlike natural-born citizens. The quoted language of Marshall's rejects this attempted analogy.

[1228] 328 U.S. 654, 658 (1946).