important in a particular case.[1155] Second, the court must find that the treatment is likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial without resulting in side effects that will interfere with the defendant's ability to assist counsel. Third, the court must find that less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results. Finally, the court must conclude that administration of the drugs is in the patient's best medical interests.

***Guilty Pleas.***—A defendant may plead guilty instead of insisting that the prosecution prove him guilty. Often the defendant does so as part of a "plea bargain" with the prosecution, where the defendant is guaranteed a light sentence or is allowed to plead to a lesser offense.[1156] Although the government may not structure its system so as to coerce a guilty plea,[1157] a guilty plea that is entered voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly, even to obtain an advantage, is sufficient to overcome constitutional objections.[1158] The guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important and necessary components of the criminal justice system,[1159] and it is permissible for a prosecutor during such plea bargains to require a defendant to forgo his right to a trial in return for escaping additional charges that are likely upon conviction to result in a more severe penalty.[1160] But the prosecutor does deny due process

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[1155] For instance, if the defendant is likely to remain civilly committed absent medication, this would diminish the government's interest in prosecution. 539 U.S. at 180.

[1156] There are a number of other reasons why a defendant may be willing to plead guilty. There may be overwhelming evidence against him or his sentence after trial will be more severe than if he pleads guilty.

[1157] United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).

[1158] North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1971); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970). *See also* Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). A guilty plea will ordinarily waive challenges to alleged unconstitutional police practices occurring prior to the plea, unless the defendant can show that the plea resulted from incompetent counsel. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973). *But see* Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). The state can permit pleas of guilty in which the defendant reserves the right to raise constitutional questions on appeal, and federal *habeas* courts will honor that arrangement. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975). Release-dismissal agreements, pursuant to which the prosecution agrees to dismiss criminal charges in exchange for the defendant's agreement to release his right to file a civil action for alleged police or prosecutorial misconduct, are not *per se* invalid. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987).

[1159] Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).

[1160] Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). Charged with forgery, Hayes was informed during plea negotiations that if he would plead guilty the prosecutor would recommend a five-year sentence; if he did not plead guilty, the prosecutor would also seek an indictment under the habitual criminal statute under which Hayes, because of two prior felony convictions, would receive a mandatory life sentence if convicted. Hayes refused to plead, was reindicted, and upon conviction was sentenced to life. Four Justices dissented, id. at 365, 368, contending that the Court had watered down North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). *See also* United