159. Act of September 13, 1994 (Pub. L. 103–322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1941, 42 U.S.C. § 13981)

A provision of the Violence Against Women Act that creates a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence exceeds congressional power under the Commerce Clause and under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The commerce power does not authorize Congress to regulate "noneconomic violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce." The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only state action, and affords no protection against purely private conduct. Section 13981, however, is not aimed at the conduct of state officials, but is aimed at private conduct.

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Justices concurring: Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas
Justices dissenting: Souter, Breyer, Stevens, Ginsburg

160. Act of February 8, 1996, 110 Stat. 56, 133–34 (Pub. L. 104–104, title V, § 502, 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a), 223(d))

Two provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996—one that prohibits knowing transmission on the Internet of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age, and the other that prohibits the knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in a manner that is available to anyone under 18 years of age—violate the First Amendment.

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
Justices concurring: Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer
Justices concurring in part and dissenting in part: O'Connor, Rehnquist, C.J.

161. Act of February 8, 1996 (Pub. L. 104–104, § 505, 110 Stat. 136, 47 U.S.C. § 561)

Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which required cable TV operators that offer channels primarily devoted to sexually oriented programming to prevent signal bleed either by fully scrambling those channels or by limiting their transmission to designated hours when children are less likely to be watching, violates the First Amendment. The provision is content-based, and therefore can only be upheld if narrowly tailored to promote a compelling governmental interest. The measure is not narrowly tailored, as the government did not establish that the less restrictive alternative found in section 504 of the Act—that of scrambling a channel at a subscriber's request—would be ineffective.

United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
Justices concurring: Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg
Justices dissenting: Scalia, Breyer, O'Connor, Scalia, Rehnquist, C.J.