speech . . . is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the "fit" between ends and means is reasonable.'" [1066]

The "reasonable fit" standard has some teeth, the Court made clear in *City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.*,[1067] striking down a city's prohibition on distribution of "commercial handbills" through freestanding newsracks located on city property. The city's aesthetic interest in reducing visual clutter was furthered by reducing the total number of newsracks, but the distinction between prohibited "commercial" publications and permitted "newspapers" bore "no relationship *whatsoever*" to this legitimate interest.[1068] The city could not, the Court ruled, single out commercial speech to bear the full onus when "all newsracks, regardless of whether they contain commercial or noncommercial publications, are equally at fault." [1069] By contrast, the Court upheld a federal law that prohibited broadcast of lottery advertisements by a broadcaster in a state that prohibits lotteries, while allowing broadcast of such ads by stations in states that sponsor lotteries. There was a "reasonable fit" between the restriction and the asserted federal interest in supporting state anti-gambling policies without unduly interfering with policies of neighboring states that promote lotteries.[1070] The prohibition "directly served" the congressional interest, and could be applied to a broadcaster whose principal audience was in an adjoining lottery state, and who sought to run ads for that state's lottery.[1071]

In 1999, the Court struck down a provision of the same statute as applied to advertisements for private casino gambling that are broadcast by radio and television stations located in a state where such gambling is legal.[1072] The Court emphasized the interrelatedness of the four parts of the *Central Hudson* test: "Each [part] raises a relevant question that may not be dispositive to the First Amendment inquiry, but the answer to which may inform a judgment concerning the other three." [1073] For example, although the government has a substantial interest in reducing the social costs of gambling, the fact that the Congress has simultaneously encouraged gam-

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[1066] Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632 (1995).

[1067] 507 U.S. 410 (1993). *See also* Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993), decided the same Term, relying on the "directly advance" third prong of *Central Hudson* to strike down a ban on in-person solicitation by certified public accountants.

[1068] 507 U.S. at 424.

[1069] 507 U.S. at 426. The Court also noted the "minute" effect of removing 62 "commercial" newsracks while 1,500 to 2,000 other newsracks remained in place. Id. at 418.

[1070] United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993).

[1071] 507 U.S. at 428.

[1072] Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999).

[1073] 527 U.S. at 184.