## Sec. 10-Powers Denied to the States

Cl. 1—Treaties, Coining Money, Etc.

gaming, cock-fighting, horse-racing or public masquerades, and that companies should be formed for the purpose of carrying on these practices. . . ." Would the legislature then be powerless to prohibit them? The answer returned, of course, was no.<sup>2082</sup>

The prevailing doctrine was stated by the U.S. Supreme Court: "It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be affected. . . . In other words, that parties by entering into contracts may not estop the legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good." <sup>2083</sup>

So, in an early case, we find a state recording act upheld as applying to deeds dated before the passage of the act.<sup>2084</sup> Later cases have brought the police power in its more customary phases into contact with private as well as with public contracts. Lottery tickets, valid when issued, were necessarily invalidated by legislation prohibiting the lottery business; 2085 contracts for the sale of beer, valid when entered into, were similarly nullified by a state prohibition law; 2086 and contracts of employment were modified by later laws regarding the liability of employers and workmen's compensation.<sup>2087</sup> Likewise, a contract between plaintiff and defendant did not prevent the state from making the latter a concession that rendered the contract worthless; 2088 nor did a contract as to rates between two railway companies prevent the state from imposing different rates; <sup>2089</sup> nor did a contract between a public utility company and a customer protect the rates agreed upon from being superseded by those fixed by the state.<sup>2090</sup> Similarly, a contract for the conveyance of water beyond the limits of a state did not prevent the state from prohibiting such conveyance.<sup>2091</sup>

 $<sup>^{2082}</sup>$  Myers v. Irwin, 2 S. & R. (Pa.) 367, 372 (1816); see, to the same effect, Lindenmuller v. The People, 33 Barb. (N.Y.) 548 (1861); Brown v. Penobscot Bank, 8 Mass. 445 (1812).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2083</sup> Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905).

 $<sup>^{2084}</sup>$  Jackson v. Lamphire, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280 (1830). See also Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163 (1850).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2085</sup> Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2086</sup> Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1878).

 $<sup>^{2087}</sup>$  New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). In this and the preceding two cases the legislative act involved did not except from its operation existing contracts.

 $<sup>^{2088}</sup>$  Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2089</sup> Portland Ry. v. Oregon R.R. Comm'n, 229 U.S. 397 (1913).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2090</sup> Midland Co. v. Kansas City Power Co., 300 U.S. 109 (1937).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2091</sup> Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).