

Justices dissenting: Harlan, Brewer

16. *City of Cleveland v. Cleveland City Ry.*, 194 U.S. 517 (1904).

Ordinance reducing the rate of fares to be charged by railway companies lower than cited in previous ordinances held to impair the obligation of contract.

17. *Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles*, 195 U.S. 223 (1904).

No change in the neighborhood having occurred between passage of two zoning ordinances, the second, which excluded a gas company from erecting a plant within the area authorized by the first ordinance, was held to effect an arbitrary deprivation of property without due process of law.

18. *City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Ry.*, 201 U.S. 529 (1906).

Ordinance according to a consolidated municipal railway an extension of the duration date of franchises issued to its predecessors, in consideration of which substantial sums were expended on improvements, gave rise to a new contract, which was impaired by later attempt on the part of the city to reduce the rate stipulated in the franchises thus extended.

19. *Rearick v. Pennsylvania*, 203 U.S. 507 (1906).

A Sunbury, Pennsylvania ordinance imposing a license fee for the solicitation of orders for the sale of merchandise not of the parties own manufacture imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce when applied to a Pennsylvania agent of an Ohio company who solicited orders for the latter's products and upon receipt of the latter, consigned to a designated purchaser, consummated the sale by delivering the merchandise to such purchaser and, upon the latter's approval of the parcel delivered, collected the purchase price for transmission to the Ohio employer.

20. *Mayor of Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co.*, 206 U.S. 496 (1907).

Municipal contract with utility fixing the maximum rate to be charged for supplying water to inhabitants was invalidly impaired by subsequent ordinances altering said rates.

21. *Londoner v. City of Denver*, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).

The due process requirements of notice and hearing in connection with the assessment of taxes were violated by a municipal assessment ordinance which afforded the taxpayer the privilege of filing objections but no opportunity to support his objections by argument and proof in open hearing.

Justices concurring: Moody, Harlan, Brewer, White, Peckham, McKenna, Day