If a decree was previously issued without regard to the standards now imposed, the defendant or intervenor is entitled to move to vacate it. No prospective relief is to last longer than two years if any party or intervenor so moves. Finally, a previously issued decree that does not conform to the new standards imposed by the Act is subject to termination upon the motion of the defendant or an intervenor. After a short period (30 or 60 days, depending on whether there is "good cause" for a 30-day extension), such a motion operates as an automatic stay of the prior decree pending the court's decision on the merits. The Court upheld the termination and automatic stay provisions in *Miller v. French*,[311] rejecting the contention that the automatic stay provision offends separation of powers principles by legislative revision of a final judgment. Rather, Congress merely established new standards for the enforcement of prospective relief, and the automatic stay provision "helps to implement the change in the law."[312] A number of constitutional challenges can be expected respecting Congress's power to limit federal judicial authority to remedy constitutional violations.

All of these restrictions have been sustained by the Supreme Court as constitutional and applied with varying degrees of thoroughness. The Court has made exceptions to the application of the prohibition against the stay of proceedings in state courts,[313] but it has on the whole adhered to the statute. The exceptions raise no constitutional issues, and the tendency has been alternately to contract and to expand the scope of the exceptions.[314]

In *Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering*,[315] the Supreme Court placed a narrow construction upon the labor provisions of the Clayton Act and thereby contributed in part to the more extensive restriction by Congress on the use of injunctions in labor disputes in the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, which has not only been declared constitutional[316] but has been applied liberally[317] and in such a manner as to repudiate the notion of an inherent power to issue injunctions contrary to statutory provisions.

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[311] 530 U.S. 327 (2000).

[312] 530 U.S. at 348.

[313] Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861); Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10 (1876); *Ex parte* Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

[314] *See*, Anti-Injunction Statute, *infra*.

[315] 254 U.S. 443 (1921).

[316] Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938).

[317] In addition to *Lauf* and *New Negro Alliance*, *see* Drivers' Union v. Valley Co., 311 U.S. 91, 100–103 (1940), *and compare* Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), *with* Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).