Iowa,[243] the Court held that the right of confrontation is violated by a procedure, authorized by statute, placing a one-way screen between complaining child witnesses and the defendant, thereby sparing the witnesses from viewing the defendant. This conclusion was reached even though the witnesses could be viewed by the defendant's counsel and by the judge and jury, even though the right of cross-examination was in no way limited, and even though the state asserted a strong interest in protecting child sex-abuse victims from further trauma.[244] The Court's opinion by Justice Scalia declared that a defendant's right during his trial to *face-to-face* confrontation with his accusers derives from "the irreducible literal meaning of the clause," and traces "to the beginnings of Western legal culture."[245] Squarely rejecting the Wigmore view "that the only essential interest preserved by the right was cross-examination,"[246] the Court emphasized the importance of face-to-face confrontation in eliciting truthful testimony.

Coy's interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, though not its result, was rejected in *Maryland v. Craig*.[247] In *Craig*, the Court upheld Maryland's use of one-way, closed circuit television to protect a child witness in a sex crime from viewing the defendant. As in *Coy*, procedural protections other than confrontation were afforded: the child witness must testify under oath, is subject to cross examination, and is viewed by the judge, jury, and defendant. The critical factual difference between the two cases was that Maryland required a case-specific finding that the child witness would be traumatized by presence of the defendant, while the Iowa procedures struck down in *Coy* rested on a statutory presumption of trauma. But the difference in approach is explained by the fact that Justice O'Connor's views, expressed in a concurring opinion in *Coy*, became the opinion of the Court in *Craig*.[248] Beginning with the proposition that the Confrontation Clause does not, as evidenced by hearsay exceptions, grant an absolute right to face-to-face confrontation, the Court in *Craig* described the clause as "reflect[ing] a *preference*

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[243] 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).

[244] On this latter point, the Court indicated that only "individualized findings," rather than statutory presumption, could suffice to create an exception to the rule. 487 U.S. at 1021.

[245] 487 U.S. at 1015, 1021.

[246] 487 U.S. at 1018 n.2.

[247] 497 U.S. 836 (1990).

[248] *Coy* was decided by a 6–2 vote. Justice Scalia's opinion of the Court was joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Stevens, and O'Connor; Justice O'Connor's separate concurring opinion was joined by Justice White; Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist; and Justice Kennedy did not participate. In *Craig*, a 5–4 decision, Justice O'Connor's opinion of the Court was joined by the two *Coy* dissenters and by Justices White and Kennedy. Justice Scalia's dissent was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.