ment," such as by being spent to support political candidates.[661] In *International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street*, where union dues had been collected pursuant to a union shop agreement and had been spent to support political candidates, the Court avoided the First Amendment issue by construing the Railway Labor Act to prohibit the use of compulsory union dues for political causes.[662]

In *Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education*,[663] the Court applied *Hanson* and *Street* in a public employment context, finding "agency shops" [664] permissible, but also limiting compelled support of a union's political activities.[665] Recognizing that any system of compelled support restricted an employee's right not to associate or support a particular view, the Court nonetheless found the governmental interests served by an agency shop agreement—the promotion of labor peace and stability of employer-employee relations—to be of overriding importance and justify the impact upon employee freedom.[666] In looking at the scope of support that may be required, the Court distinguished between compelling support of a union's labor-related activities and compelling support of a union's political activities. The balance of interests was different, the Court held, and employees compelled to support the union were constitutionally entitled to object to the use of exacted funds to support political candidates or to advance ideological causes not germane to the union's duties as collective-bargaining representative. To compel financial support of political

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[661] 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956).

[662] 367 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1961). Justices Douglas, Black, Frankfurter, and Harlan would have reached the constitutional issue, with differing results. On the same day that it decided *Street*, the Court, in Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961), declined to reach the constitutional issues presented by roughly the same fact situation in a suit by lawyers compelled to join an "integrated bar." These issues, however, were faced squarely in Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990), which held that an integrated state bar may not, against a members' wishes, devote compulsory dues to ideological or other political activities not "necessarily or reasonably related to the purpose of regulating the legal profession or improving the quality of legal service available to the people of the State."

[663] 431 U.S. 209 (1977).

[664] An agency shop agreement requires all employees, regardless of union membership, to pay a fee to the union that reflects the union's efforts in obtaining employment benefits through collective bargaining. The Court in *Abood* noted that it is the "practical equivalent" of a union shop agreement. 431 U.S. at 217 n.10.

[665] That a public entity was the employer and the employees consequently were public employees was deemed constitutionally immaterial for the application of the principles of *Hanson* and *Street*, id. at 226–32, but, in a concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell found the distinction between public and private employment crucial. Id. at 244.

[666] 431 U.S. at 217–23. For a similar argument over the issue of corporate political contributions and shareholder rights, *see* First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792–95 (1978), and id. at 802, 812–21 (Justice White dissenting).