

the marchers a group imparting a message—in this case support for gay rights—that the organizers did not wish to convey.<sup>581</sup>

The principle of *Barnette*, however, does not extend so far as to bar a government from requiring of its employees or of persons seeking professional licensing or other benefits an oath generally but not precisely based on the oath required of federal officers, which is set out in the Constitution, that the taker of the oath will uphold and defend the Constitution.<sup>582</sup> It is not at all clear, however, to what degree the government is limited in probing the sincerity of the person taking the oath.<sup>583</sup>

By contrast, the Supreme Court has found no First Amendment violation when government compels disclosures in commercial speech, or when it compels the labeling of foreign political propaganda. Regarding compelled disclosures in commercial speech, the Court held that an advertiser’s “constitutionally protected interest in *not* providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal. . . . [A]n advertiser’s rights are reasonably protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers. . . . The right of a commercial speaker not to divulge accurate information regarding his services is not . . . a fundamental right.”<sup>584</sup> Regarding compelled labeling of foreign political propaganda, the Court upheld a provision of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 that required that, when an agent of a foreign principal seeks to disseminate foreign “political propaganda,” he must label such material with certain information, including his identity, the principal’s identity, and the fact that he has registered with the Department of Justice. The Court found that “Congress did not prohibit, edit, or restrain the distribution of advocacy materials. . . . To the contrary, Congress simply required the disseminators of such material to make

<sup>581</sup> *Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Group*, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).

<sup>582</sup> *Cole v. Richardson*, 405 U.S. 676 (1972); *Connell v. Higginbotham*, 403 U.S. 207 (1971); *Bond v. Floyd*, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); *Knight v. Board of Regents*, 269 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (three-judge court), *aff’d*, 390 U.S. 36 (1968); *Hosack v. Smiley*, 276 F. Supp. 876 (C.D. Colo. 1967) (three-judge court), *aff’d*, 390 U.S. 744 (1968); *Ohlson v. Phillips*, 304 F. Supp. 1152 (C.D. Colo. 1969) (three-judge court), *aff’d*, 397 U.S. 317 (1970); *Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond*, 401 U.S. 154, 161 (1971); *Fields v. Askew*, 279 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1973), *aff’d per curiam*, 414 U.S. 1148 (1974).

<sup>583</sup> *Compare* *Bond v. Floyd*, 385 U.S. 116 (1966), *with* *Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond*, 401 U.S. 154 (1971).

<sup>584</sup> *Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel*, 471 U.S. 626, 651, 652 n.14 (1985). See *Milavetz, Gallop, & Milavetz v. United States*, 559 U.S. \_\_\_, No. 08–1119 (2010), slip op. at 19–23 (requiring advertisement for certain “debt relief” businesses to disclose that the services offered include bankruptcy assistance).