

that actually notifies the person being sought or that has a reasonable certainty of resulting in such notice.⁹¹⁸

Although the Court has now held “that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the [‘minimum contacts’] standards set forth in *International Shoe Co. v. Washington*,”⁹¹⁹ it does not appear that this will appreciably change the result for *in rem* jurisdiction over property. “[T]he presence of property in a State may bear on the existence of jurisdiction by providing contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation. For example, when claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction. In such cases, the defendant’s claim to property located in the State would normally indicate that he expected to benefit from the State’s protection of his interest. The State’s strong interests in assuring the marketability of property within its borders and in providing a procedure for peaceful resolution of disputes about the possession of that property would also support jurisdiction, as would the likelihood that important records and witnesses will be found in the State.”⁹²⁰ Thus, for “true” *in rem* actions, the old results are likely to still prevail.

Quasi in Rem: Attachment Proceedings.—If a defendant is neither domiciled nor present in a state, he cannot be served personally, and any judgment in money obtained against him would be unenforceable. This does not, however, prevent attachment of a defendant’s property within the state. The practice of allowing a state to attach a non-resident’s real and personal property situated within its borders to satisfy a debt or other claim by one of its citizens goes back to colonial times. Attachment is considered a form of *in rem* proceeding sometimes called “*quasi in rem*,” and under *Pennoyer v. Neff*⁹²¹ an attachment could be implemented by obtaining a writ against the local property of the defendant and giving notice

⁹¹⁸ *Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339 U.S. 306 (1950); *Walker v. City of Hutchinson*, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); *Schroeder v. City of New York*, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); *Robinson v. Hanrahan*, 409 U.S. 38 (1972).

⁹¹⁹ 433 U.S. 186 (1977).

⁹²⁰ 433 U.S. at 207–08 (footnotes omitted). The Court also suggested that the state would usually have jurisdiction in cases such as those arising from injuries suffered on the property of an absentee owner, where the defendant’s ownership of the property is conceded but the cause of action is otherwise related to rights and duties growing out of that controversy. *Id.*

⁹²¹ 95 U.S. 714 (1878). *Cf. Pennington v. Fourth Nat’l Bank*, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917); *Corn Exch. Bank v. Commissioner*, 280 U.S. 218, 222 (1930); *Endicott Co. v. Encyclopedia Press*, 266 U.S. 285, 288 (1924).