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application of the Articles to conduct essentially composed of speech necessitate a voiding of the conviction, as the speech was unprotected, and, even though it might reach protected speech, the officer here was unable to raise that issue.<sup>1564</sup>

Military courts are not Article III courts, but are agencies established pursuant to Article I.1565 In the 19th century, the Court established that the civil courts have no power to interfere with courtsmartial and that court-martial decisions are not subject to civil court review. 1566 Until August 1, 1984, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to review by writ of certiorari the proceedings of a military commission, but as of that date Congress conferred appellate jurisdiction of decisions of the Court of Military Appeals. 1567 Prior to that time, civil court review of court-martial decisions was possible through habeas corpus jurisdiction, 1568 an avenue that continues to exist, but the Court severely limited the scope of such review, restricting it to the issue whether the court-martial has jurisdiction over the person tried and the offense charged. 1569 In Burns v. Wilson, 1570 however, at least seven Justices appeared to reject the traditional view and adopt the position that civil courts on habeas corpus could review claims of denials of due process rights to which the military had not given full and fair consideration. Since Burns, the Court has thrown little light on the range of issues cognizable by a federal court in such litigation 1571 and the lower federal courts have divided several possible ways. 1572

*Civilians and Dependents.*—In recent years, the Court rejected the view of the drafters of the Code of Military Justice with regard to the persons Congress may constitutionally reach under

<sup>1564 417</sup> U.S. at 757-61.

 $<sup>^{1565}</sup>$  Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 (1885); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858). Judges of Article I courts do not have the independence conferred by security of tenure and of compensation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1566</sup> Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1567</sup> Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. 98–209, 97 Stat. 1393, 28 U.S.C. § 1259. <sup>1568</sup> Cf. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879). While federal courts have jurisdiction to intervene in military court proceedings prior to judgment, as a matter of equity, following the standards applicable to federal court intervention in state criminal proceedings, they should act when the petitioner has not exhausted his military remedies only in extraordinary circumstances. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975).

 <sup>1569</sup> Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879); Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897); Carter v. Roberts, 177 U.S. 496 (1900); Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
1570 346 U.S. 137 (1953).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1571</sup> Cf. Fowler v. Wilkinson, 353 U.S. 583 (1957); United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 350 n.3, 351 (1969); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974).

 $<sup>^{1572}\,\</sup>textit{E.g.},$  Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir., 1975) (en banc), cert.~denied,~425 U.S. 911 (1976).