

ting forth specific facts in order that the issuing magistrate may ‘focus searchingly on the question of obscenity.’”¹³⁸ This does not mean, however, that a higher standard of probable cause is required in order to obtain a warrant to seize materials protected by the First Amendment. “Our reference in *Roaden* to a ‘higher hurdle . . . of reasonableness’ was not intended to establish a ‘higher’ standard of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant to seize books or films, but instead related to the more basic requirement, imposed by that decision, that the police not rely on the ‘exigency’ exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, but instead obtain a warrant from a magistrate”¹³⁹

In *Stanford v. Texas*,¹⁴⁰ the Court voided a seizure of more than 2,000 books, pamphlets, and other documents pursuant to a warrant that merely authorized the seizure of books, pamphlets, and other written instruments “concerning the Communist Party of Texas.” “[T]he constitutional requirement that warrants must particularly describe the ‘things to be seized’ is to be accorded the most scrupulous exactitude when the ‘things’ are books, and the basis for their seizure is the ideas which they contain. . . . No less a standard could be faithful to First Amendment freedoms.”¹⁴¹

However, the First Amendment does not bar the issuance or execution of a warrant to search a newsroom to obtain photographs of demonstrators who had injured several policemen, although the Court appeared to suggest that a magistrate asked to issue such a warrant should guard against interference with press freedoms through limits on type, scope, and intrusiveness of the search.¹⁴²

Property Subject to Seizure.—There has never been any doubt that search warrants could be issued for the seizure of contraband and the fruits and instrumentalities of crime.¹⁴³ But, in *Gouled v.*

¹³⁸ *New York v. P.J. Video, Inc.*, 475 U.S. 868, 873–74 (1986) (quoting *Marcus v. Search Warrant*, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961)).

¹³⁹ *New York v. P.J. Video, Inc.*, 475 U.S. 868, 875 n.6 (1986).

¹⁴⁰ 379 U.S. 476 (1965).

¹⁴¹ 379 U.S. at 485–86. *See also* *Marcus v. Search Warrant*, 367 U.S. 717, 723 (1961).

¹⁴² *Zurcher v. Stanford Daily*, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). *See id.* at 566 (containing suggestion mentioned in text), and *id.* at 566 (Justice Powell concurring) (more expressly adopting that position). In the Privacy Protection Act, Pub. L. 96–440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980), 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa, Congress provided extensive protection against searches and seizures not only of the news media and news people but also of others engaged in disseminating communications to the public, unless there is probable cause to believe the person protecting the materials has committed or is committing the crime to which the materials relate.

¹⁴³ *United States v. Lefkowitz*, 285 U.S. 452, 465–66 (1932). Of course, evidence seizable under warrant is subject to seizure without a warrant in circumstances in which warrantless searches are justified.