

Sec. 8—Powers of Congress

Cl. 3—Power to Regulate Commerce

merce.¹⁰⁷⁷ A marked tolerance for a class of regulations that arguably furthered public safety was long exhibited by the Court,¹⁰⁷⁸ even in instances in which the safety connection was tenuous.¹⁰⁷⁹ Of particular controversy were “full-crew” laws, represented as safety measures, that were attacked by the companies as “feather-bedding” rules.¹⁰⁸⁰

Similarly, motor vehicle regulations met mixed fates. Basically, it has always been recognized that states, in the interest of public safety and conservation of public highways, may enact and enforce comprehensive licensing and regulation of motor vehicles using state facilities.¹⁰⁸¹ Indeed, states were permitted to regulate many of the local activities of interstate firms and thus interstate operations, in pursuit of these interests.¹⁰⁸² Here, too, safety concerns became over-

¹⁰⁷⁷ Generally, the Court drew the line at regulations that provided for adequate service, not any and all service. Thus, one class of cases dealt with requirements that trains stop at designated cities and towns. The regulations were upheld in such cases as *Gladson v. Minnesota*, 166 U.S. 427 (1897), and *Lake Shore & Mich. South. Ry. v. Ohio*, 173 U.S. 285 (1899), and invalidated in *Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois*, 163 U.S. 142 (1896). See *Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Wisconsin R.R. Comm'n*, 237 U.S. 220, 226 (1915); *St. Louis & S. F. Ry. v. Public Service Comm'n*, 254 U.S. 535, 536–537 (1921). The cases were extremely fact-specific.

¹⁰⁷⁸ *E.g.*, *Smith v. Alabama*, 124 U.S. 465 (1888) (required locomotive engineers to be examined and licensed by the state, until Congress should deem otherwise); *New York, N.H. & H. R.R. v. New York*, 165 U.S. 628 (1897) (forbidding heating of passenger cars by stoves); *Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Arkansas*, 219 U.S. 453 (1911) (requiring three brakemen on freight trains of more than 25 cars).

¹⁰⁷⁹ *E.g.*, *Terminal Ass'n v. Trainmen*, 318 U.S. 1 (1943) (requiring railroad to provide caboose cars for its employees); *Hennington v. Georgia*, 163 U.S. 299 (1896) (forbidding freight trains to run on Sundays). But see *Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell*, 244 U.S. 310 (1917) (voiding as too onerous on interstate transportation a law requiring trains to come to almost a complete stop at all grade crossings, when there were 124 highway crossings at grade in 123 miles, doubling the running time).

¹⁰⁸⁰ Four cases over a lengthy period sustained the laws. *Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas*, 219 U.S. 453 (1911); *St. Louis, I. Mt. & So. Ry. v. Arkansas*, 240 U.S. 518 (1916); *Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Norwood*, 283 U.S. 249 (1931); *Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R.*, 382 U.S. 423 (1966). In the last case, the Court noted the extensive and conflicting record with regard to safety, but it then ruled that with the issue in so much doubt it was peculiarly a legislative choice.

¹⁰⁸¹ *Hendrick v. Maryland*, 235 U.S. 610 (1915); *Kane v. New Jersey*, 242 U.S. 160 (1916).

¹⁰⁸² *E.g.*, *Bradley v. Public Utility Comm'n*, 289 U.S. 92 (1933) (state could deny an interstate firm a necessary certificate of convenience to operate as a common carrier on the basis that the route was overcrowded); *Welch Co. v. New Hampshire*, 306 U.S. 79 (1939) (maximum hours for drivers of motor vehicles); *Eichholz v. Public Service Comm'n*, 306 U.S. 268 (1939) (reasonable regulations of traffic). But compare *Michigan Comm'n v. Duke*, 266 U.S. 570 (1925) (state may not impose common-carrier responsibilities on a business operating between states that did not assume them); *Buck v. Kuykendall*, 267 U.S. 307 (1925) (denial of certificate of convenience under circumstances was a ban on competition).