states and a \$750 fee for the privilege of manufacturing beer,<sup>2</sup> and a Minnesota statute that prohibited a licensed manufacturer or whole-saler from importing any brand of intoxicating liquor containing more than 25 percent alcohol by volume and ready for sale without further processing, unless such brand was registered in the United States Patent Office.<sup>3</sup> Also validated were retaliation laws prohibiting sale of beer from states that discriminated against sale of beer from the enacting state.<sup>4</sup>

Conceding, in State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co.,<sup>5</sup> that, "[p]rior to the Twenty-first Amendment it would obviously have been unconstitutional to have imposed any fee for [the privilege of importation] . . . even if the State had exacted an equal fee for the privilege of transporting domestic beer from its place of manufacture to the [seller's] place of business," the Court proclaimed that this Amendment "abrogated the right to import free, so far as concerns intoxicating liquors." Because the Amendment was viewed as conferring on states an unconditioned authority to prohibit totally the importation of intoxicating beverages, it followed that any discriminatory restriction falling short of total exclusion was equally valid, notwithstanding the absence of any connection between such restriction and public health, safety, or morals. As to the contention that the unequal treatment of imported beer would contravene the Equal Protection Clause, the Court succinctly observed that "[a] classification recognized by the Twenty-first Amendment cannot be deemed forbidden by the Fourteenth." 6

In Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter <sup>7</sup> the Court upheld a state statute regulating the price of intoxicating liquors, asserting that the Twenty-first Amendment bestowed upon the states broad regulatory power over the liquor sales within their territories. The Court also noted that states are not totally bound by traditional Commerce Clause limitations when they restrict the importation of intoxicants destined for use, distribution, or consumption within their

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Mahoney v. Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 (1938).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Brewing Co. v. Liquor Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939) (Michigan law); Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939) (Missouri law).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> 299 U.S. at 64. In the three decisions rendered subsequently, the Court merely restated these conclusions. The contention that discriminatory regulation of imported liquors violated the Due Process Clause was summarily rejected in Brewing Co. v. Liquor Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391, 394 (1939).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> 384 U.S. 35 (1966).

 <sup>8 384</sup> U.S. at 42. See United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 299 (1945) and Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).