

Cl. 2—Supremacy of the Constitution, Laws, and Treaties

vides further and additional support for the pre-emption claim. Nor need we consider the applicability of field pre-emption.”⁷⁴

Similarly, the Court found it unnecessary to consider field pre-emption due to its holding that a Massachusetts law barring state agencies from purchasing goods or services from companies doing business with Burma imposed obstacles to the accomplishment of Congress’s full objectives under the federal Burma sanctions law.⁷⁵ The state law was said to undermine the federal law in several respects that could have implicated field preemption—by limiting the President’s effective discretion to control sanctions, and by frustrating the President’s ability to engage in effective diplomacy in developing a comprehensive multilateral strategy—but the Court “decline[d] to speak to field preemption as a separate issue.”⁷⁶

Also, a state law making agricultural producers’ associations the exclusive bargaining agents and requiring payment of service fees by nonmember producers was held to counter a strong federal policy protecting the right of farmers to join or not join such associations.⁷⁷ And a state assertion of the right to set minimum stream-flow requirements different from those established by FERC in its licensing capacity was denied as being preempted under the Federal Power Act, despite language requiring deference to state laws “relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water.”⁷⁸

Contrarily, a comprehensive federal regulation of insecticides and other such chemicals was held not to preempt a town ordinance that required a permit for the spraying of pesticides, there being no conflict between requirements.⁷⁹ The application of state antitrust laws

⁷⁴ 520 U.S. at 841. The dissent, *id.* at 854 (Justice Breyer), agreed that conflict analysis was appropriate, but he did not find that the state law achieved any result that ERISA required.

⁷⁵ *Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council*, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).

⁷⁶ 530 U.S. at 374 n.8.

⁷⁷ *Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass’n v. Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Bd.*, 467 U.S. 461 (1984). *See also* *Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg*, 476 U.S. 953 (1986) (state allocation of costs for purposes of setting retail electricity rates, by disallowing costs permitted by FERC in setting wholesale rates, frustrated federal regulation by possibly preventing the utility from recovering in its sales the costs of paying the FERC-approved wholesale rate); *Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp*, 467 U.S. 691 (1984) (state ban on cable TV advertising frustrates federal policy in the copyright law by which cable operators pay a royalty fee for the right to retransmit distant broadcast signals upon agreement not to delete commercials); *International Paper Co. v. Ouellette*, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (damage action based on common law of downstream state frustrates Clean Water Act’s policies favoring permitting state in interstate disputes and favoring predictability in permit process).

⁷⁸ *California v. FERC*, 495 U.S. 490 (1990). The savings clause was found inapplicable on the basis of an earlier interpretation of the language in *First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC*, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).

⁷⁹ *Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier*, 501 U.S. 597, 614–16 (1991).