

Masking Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption Schemes

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Introduction


Introduction to Homomorphic Encryption



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
Homomorphic Encryption



Homomorphic Encryption



Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption



Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption

Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption: HERA


KEY




$$\mathbf{k} \in \mathbb{Z}_t^{16}$$

ASIACRYPT 2021: Transciphering Framework for Approximate Homomorphic Encryption, Jihoon Cho, Jincheol Ha, Seongkwang Kim, Byeonghak Lee, Joohee Lee, Jooyoung Lee, Dukjae Moon, and Hyojin Yoon


Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption: HERA




Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption: HERA




Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption: HERA




Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption: HERA




Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption: HERA




Are Implementations of Hybrid Homomorphic Schemes Secure?



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First-order arithmetic masking


First-order arithmetic masking of HERA

KEY




$$k_0 + k_1 \equiv k \pmod{p}$$


Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption: HERA




Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption: HERA




Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption: HERA



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


Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption: HERA



Idea: If we can securely compute x^2 ,
then extending this approach to x^3 is straightforward.

Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption: HERA




$$\text{Cube}(\mathbf{x}) = x^3$$
$$x_0 + x_1 \equiv x \pmod{p}$$

$$\text{Cube}(\mathbf{x}) = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} r = \text{rand}() \pmod{p} \\ x'_0 = (x_0 + r) \pmod{p} \\ x'_1 = (x_1 + p - r) \pmod{p} \end{array} \right.$$

Note:

$$x'_0 + x'_1 \equiv x \pmod{p}$$

Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption: HERA



$$\text{Cube}(x) = x^3$$
$$x_0 + x_1 \equiv x \pmod{p}$$

$$\text{Cube}(x) = \begin{cases} r = \text{rand}() \pmod{p} \\ x'_0 = (x_0 + r) \pmod{p} \\ x'_1 = (x_1 + p - r) \pmod{p} \\ f(x_0, x_1, x'_0, x'_1) \\ f(x''_0, x''_1, x'_0, x'_1) \end{cases}$$


Note:

$$x'_0 + x'_1 \equiv x \pmod{p}$$

Note:

$f(\dots)$ executes
secure multiplication

Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption: HERA



$$\text{Cube}(x) = x^3$$
$$x_0 + x_1 \equiv x \pmod{p}$$


Note:

First call to $f(\dots)$: $(x_0 + x_1)^2 \equiv x^2 \pmod{p}$

Second call to $f(\dots)$: $(x_0 + x_1)^3 \equiv x^3 \pmod{p}$

$$\text{Cube}(x) = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} r = \text{rand}() \pmod{p} \\ x'_0 = (x_0 + r) \pmod{p} \\ x'_1 = (x_1 + p - r) \pmod{p} \\ f(x_0, x_1, x'_0, x'_1) \Rightarrow (x''_0 + x''_1)^2 \equiv x^2 \pmod{p} \\ f(x''_0, x''_1, x'_0, x'_1) \end{array} \right.$$

Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption: HERA



$$\text{Cube}(\mathbf{x}) = x^3$$

$$x_0 + x_1 \equiv x \pmod{p}$$

$$\text{Cube}(x) = \begin{cases} r = \text{rand}() \pmod{p} \\ x'_0 = (x_0 + r) \pmod{p} \\ x'_1 = (x_1 + p - r) \pmod{p} \\ \mathbf{f}(x_0, x_1, x'_0, x'_1) \\ \mathbf{f}(x''_0, x''_1, x'_0, x'_1) \end{cases} \quad \mathbf{f}(\dots) = \begin{cases} c_0 = \text{rand}() \pmod{p} \\ c_1 = (c_0 + (x_0 \cdot x'_1) + (x_1 \cdot x'_0)) \pmod{p} \\ x''_0 = ((x_0 \cdot x'_0) + p - c_0) \pmod{p} \\ x''_1 = ((x_1 \cdot x'_1) + c_1) \pmod{p} \end{cases}$$

Results

Metric	Not Masked	Masked
Encryption Time (μs)	84	123
Decryption Time (μs)	66	106
CPUs Utilized	0.617	0.785
Task Clock (ms)	3.24	3.45
Instructions Executed	6,044,834	6,114,087

Table: Comparison of Masked vs. Non-Masked Implementations

Conclusion

Conclusion and Future Scope

- First-order masking protects against first-order attacks.
- Implementation is easily extendable to higher-order masking to protect against higher-order attacks.
- Taking hybrid homomorphic encryption one step closer to real-world secure cloud computing.

Masking Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption Schemes

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Extending HERA to Higher-Order Security

Key Idea: Increase the number of shares to improve security.

Current Two-Share Representation

$$x_0 + x_1 \equiv x \pmod{p}$$

Generalized N-Share Representation

$$x_0 + x_1 + x_2 + \dots + x_{N-1} \equiv x \pmod{p}$$

Note:

- Each share is randomized but maintains modular sum.
- Security improves, but computational cost increases.

Formal proof: AddRoundKey

Algorithm 4 HERA AddRoundKey Function (Masked)

Require: Masked state arrays S_0, S_1 , masked key arrays K_0, K_1 , length $n = \text{HERA_K}$.

Ensure: Updated masked state arrays S_0, S_1 .

```
1: for  $i = 0$  to  $n - 1$  do  
2:    $r_i \leftarrow \text{UniformRandom}(\mathbb{Z}_p)$   
3:    $m_{0,i} \leftarrow (K_{0,i} \cdot r_i) \bmod p$   
4:    $m_{1,i} \leftarrow (K_{1,i} \cdot r_i) \bmod p$   
5:    $S'_{0,i} \leftarrow (S_{0,i} + m_{0,i}) \bmod p$   
6:    $S'_{1,i} \leftarrow (S_{1,i} + m_{1,i}) \bmod p$   
7: end for
```

Formal proof: MixColumns

Algorithm 7 HERA MixColumns Function (Masked)

Require: Masked state shares $S_0 = \{c_{i,j,0}\}$, $S_1 = \{c_{i,j,1}\}$

Ensure: Updated masked state shares $S'_0 = \{c'_{i,j,0}\}$, $S'_1 = \{c'_{i,j,1}\}$

1: **for** $i = 0$ **to** 3 **do**

2: $sum_0 \leftarrow (c_{i,0,0} + c_{i,1,0} + c_{i,2,0} + c_{i,3,0}) \bmod p.$

3: $sum_1 \leftarrow (c_{i,0,1} + c_{i,1,1} + c_{i,2,1} + c_{i,3,1}) \bmod p.$

4: **for** $j = 0$ **to** 3 **do**

5: $c'_{i,j,0} \leftarrow (sum_0 + c_{i,j,0} + c_{i,(j+1 \bmod 4),0} + c_{i,(j+2 \bmod 4),0}) \bmod p.$

6: $c'_{i,j,1} \leftarrow (sum_1 + c_{i,j,1} + c_{i,(j+1 \bmod 4),1} + c_{i,(j+2 \bmod 4),1}) \bmod p.$

7: **end for**

8: **end for**

Formal proof: MixRows

Algorithm 8 HERA MixRows Function (Masked)

Require: Masked state shares $S_0 = \{r_{i,j,0}\}$, $S_1 = \{r_{i,j,1}\}$

Ensure: Updated masked state shares $S'_0 = \{r'_{i,j,0}\}$, $S'_1 = \{r'_{i,j,1}\}$

```
1: for  $j = 0$  to  $3$  do
2:    $sum_0 \leftarrow (r_{0,j,0} + r_{1,j,0} + r_{2,j,0} + r_{3,j,0}) \bmod p.$ 
3:    $sum_1 \leftarrow (r_{0,j,1} + r_{1,j,1} + r_{2,j,1} + r_{3,j,1}) \bmod p.$ 
4:   for  $i = 0$  to  $3$  do
5:      $r'_{i,j,0} \leftarrow (sum_0 + r_{i,j,0} + r_{(i+1 \bmod 4),j,0} + r_{(i+2 \bmod 4),j,0}) \bmod p.$ 
6:      $r'_{i,j,1} \leftarrow (sum_1 + r_{i,j,1} + r_{(i+1 \bmod 4),j,1} + r_{(i+2 \bmod 4),j,1}) \bmod p.$ 
7:   end for
8: end for
```

Formal proof: S-box

Algorithm 6 HERA S-Box Cube Function (Masked)

Require: Masked state shares $s_0 = \{s_{0,0}, s_{0,1}, \dots, s_{0,n}\}$, $s_1 = \{s_{1,0}, s_{1,1}, \dots, s_{1,n}\}$

Ensure: Updated masked state shares s'_0, s'_1 , satisfying $s' = (s^3) \bmod p$.

- 1: **for** $i = 0$ **to** $n - 1$ **do**
 - 2: Generate random value $t_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_p$.
 - 3: $t_2 \leftarrow (s_{0,i} + t_1) \bmod p$.
 - 4: $t_3 \leftarrow (s_{1,i} + p - t_1) \bmod p$.
 - 5: SECURE_MUL($s_{0,i}, s_{1,i}, t_2, t_3$), resulting in intermediate masked shares $(z_{0,i}, z_{1,i})$
 - 6: SECURE_MUL($z_{0,i}, z_{1,i}, t_2, t_3$), resulting in updated masked shares $(s'_{0,i}, s'_{1,i})$
 - 7: $s_{0,i} \leftarrow s'_{0,i}$
 - 8: $s_{1,i} \leftarrow s'_{1,i}$
 - 9: **end for**
-

Formal proof: Masked Gadget

Algorithm 5 HERA Secure Multiplication (Masked Gadget)

Require: Masked inputs (x_0, x_1) and (y_0, y_1)

Ensure: Masked outputs (z_0, z_1) , where $z = (x \cdot y) \bmod p$

- 1: Generate random value $r_{0,1} \in \mathbb{Z}_p$
 - 2: $r_{1,0} \leftarrow ((x_0 \cdot y_1) + (x_1 \cdot y_0)) \bmod p$
 - 3: $z_0 \leftarrow ((x_0 \cdot y_0) + p - r_{0,1}) \bmod p$
 - 4: $z_1 \leftarrow ((x_1 \cdot y_1) + r_{1,0}) \bmod p$
-