Verifying filesystems in ACL2 Towards verifying file recovery tools

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Outline

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Our approach

Progress so fai

Future work

Why we need a verified filesystem

- ► Filesystems are everywhere, even as operating systems move towards making them invisible.
- In the absence of a clear specification of filesystems, users (and sysadmins in particular) are underserved.
- ► Modern filesystems have become increasingly complex, and so have the tools to analyse and recover data from them.
- It would be worthwhile to specify and formally verify, in the ACL2 theorem prover, the guarantees claimed by filesystems and tools.

Related work

- ▶ In Haogang Chen's 2016 dissertation, the author uses Coq to build a filesystem (named FSCQ) which is proven safe against crashes in a new logical framework named Crash Hoare Logic. His (exported) Haskell implementation performs comparably to ext4.
- Hyperkernel (Nelson et al., SOSP '17) is a "push-button" verification effort, but approximates by changing POSIX system calls for ease of verification.
- In our work, we instead aim to model an existing filesystem (FAT32) faithfully and match the resulting disk image byte-to-byte.

Outline


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File system models



Choosing an initial model


- Our goal here is to verify the FAT32 filesystem, but we need a simpler model to begin with.
- Our filesystem's operations should suffice for running a workload.
- Yet, parsimony and avoidance of redundancy are helpful for theorem proving.
- What's a necessary and sufficient set of operations?


Minimal set of operations?


- ▶ The Google filesystem suggests a minimal set of operations:
 - create
 - ▶ delete
 - open
 - ▶ close
 - read
 - write
- Of these, open and close require the maintenance of file descriptor state - so they can wait.
- ► However, they are essential when describing concurrency and multiprogramming behaviour.
- Thus, we can start modelling a filesystem, and several refinements thereof.


Quick overview of models

- What follows is a sequence of increasingly refined models.
- ▶ Model 1: Tree representation of directory structure with unbounded file size and unbounded filesystem size.
- Model 2: Model 1 with file length as metadata.
- Model 3: Tree representation of directory structure with file contents stored in a "disk" (unbounded in length).
- ► Model 4: Model 3 with bounded filesystem size and garbage collection.
- ▶ In our running example, we'll observe file creation, deletion, and overwriting in each of these models in turn.













- ▶ Model 1 supports nested directory structures, unbounded file size and unbounded filesystem size.
- ► However, there's no metadata, either to provide additional information or to validate the contents of the file.
- With an extra field for length, we can create a simple version of fsck that checks file contents for consistency.
- Further, we can verify that create, write, delete etc preserve this notion of consistency.









- As the next step, we focus on externalising the storage of file contents.
- We also choose to break up file contents into "blocks" of a constant length (8).
 - Note: this would mean storing file length is no longer optional, to avoid reading garbage past end of file at the end of a block.




Table: Disk

0	\0\0\0	
1	Sun 19:0	
2	0	




Table: Disk

0	\0\0\0
1	Sun 19:0
2	0
3	Tue 21:0
4	0




Table: Disk

0	\0\0\0
1	Sun 19:0
2	0
3	Tue 21:0
4	0






Table: Disk

0	\0\0\0
1	Sun 19:0
2	0
3	Tue 21:0
4	0
5	Wed 01:0
6	0


- ▶ In the fourth model, we attempt to implement garbage collection in the form of an allocation vector.
- ► The allocation vector tracks whether blocks in the filesystem are in use by a file. This allows us to reuse unused blocks.




0	\0\0\0	true
1	Sun 19:0	true
2	0	true
3		false
4		false
5		false



0	\0\0\0	true
1	Sun 19:0	true
2	0	true
3	Tue 21:0	true
4	0	true
5		false



0	\0\0\0	true
1	Sun 19:0	false
2	0	false
3	Tue 21:0	true
4	0	true
5		false



0	\0\0\0	true
1	Wed 01:0	true
2	0	true
3	Tue 21:0	false
4	0	false
5		false

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- ► There are many properties that could be considered for correctness, but we choose to focus on the read-over-write theorems from the first-order theory of arrays.
- Read n characters starting at position start in the file at path hns in filesystem fs:
 - 11-rdchs(hns, fs, start, n)
- Write string text characters starting at position start in the file at path hns in filesystem fs:
 - 11-wrchs(hns, fs, start, text)

First read-over-write theorem: reading from a location after writing to the same location should yield the data that was written. Formally, assuming n = length(text) and suitable "type" hypotheses (omitted here): l1-rdchs(hns, l1-wrchs(hns, fs, start, text), start, n) = text

Second read-over-write-theorem: Reading from a location after writing to a different location should yield the same result as reading before writing. Formally, assuming hns1 != hns2 and suitable "type" hypotheses (omitted here): l1-rdchs(hns1, l1-wrchs(hns2, fs, start2, text2), start1, n1) =

l1-rdchs(hns1, fs, start1, n1)

- ► For each of the models 1, 2, 3 and 4, we have proofs of correctness of the two read-after-write properties, making use of the proofs of equivalence between models and their successors.
- ▶ Model 4 presented some unique challenges proving the read-after-write properties required proving an equivalence between model 4 and model 2, rather than model 3.




Figure: I2-wrchs-correctness-1




Figure: 12-rdchs-correctness-1




Figure: I2-read-over-write-1

Source analysis

Table: Code (over 3 semesters)

sloccount (lines of ACL2 code) 4964 defun events (function definitions) 106 defthm events (lemmas and proofs) 374

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- Model and verify file permissions.
- Linearise the tree, leaving only the disk.
- Add the system call open and close with the introduction of file descriptors.
 - This would be a step towards the study of concurrent FS operations.
- Eventually emulate the FAT32 filesystem as a convincing proof of concept, and move on to fsck and file recovery tools.