# Verifying filesystems in ACL2 Towards verifying file recovery tools

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27 October, 2017

#### Outline

Motivation and related work

Our approach

Progress so far

Future work

# Why we need a verified filesystem

- ► Filesystems are everywhere, even as operating systems move towards making them invisible.
- In the absence of a clear specification of filesystems, users (and sysadmins in particular) are underserved.
- ► Modern filesystems have become increasingly complex, and so have the tools to analyse and recover data from them.
- It would be worthwhile to specify and formally verify, in the ACL2 theorem prover, the guarantees claimed by filesystems and tools.

#### Related work

- In Haogang Chen's 2016 dissertation, the author uses Coq to build a filesystem (named FSCQ) which is proven safe against crashes in a new logical framework named Crash Hoare Logic.
- ► His implementation was exported into Haskell, and showed comparable performance to ext4 when run on FUSE.
- Hyperkernel (Nelson et al, SOSP '17) is a "push-button" verification effort, but approximates by changing POSIX system calls for ease of verification.
- In our work, we instead aim to model an existing filesystem (FAT32) faithfully and match the resulting disk image byte-to-byte.

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# Choosing an initial model


- Our goal here is to verify the FAT32 filesystem, but we need a simpler model to begin with.
- Our filesystem's operations should suffice for running a workload.
- Yet, parsimony and avoidance of redundancy are essential for theorem proving.
- What's a necessary and sufficient set of operations?


# Minimal set of operations?


- ▶ The Google filesystem suggests a minimal set of operations:
  - create
  - ▶ delete
  - open
  - ▶ close
  - read
  - write
- Of these, open and close require the maintenance of file descriptor state - so they can wait.
- ► However, they are essential when describing concurrency and multiprogramming behaviour.
- Thus, we can start modelling a filesystem, and several refinements thereof.


## Quick overview of models

- ▶ Model 1: Tree representation of directory structure with unbounded file size and unbounded filesystem size.
- ▶ Model 2: Model 1 with file length as metadata.
- ▶ Model 3: Tree representation of directory structure with file contents stored in a "disk".
- ► Model 4: Model 3 with bounded filesystem size and garbage collection.













- Model 1 supports nested directory structures, unbounded file size and unbounded filesystem size.
- ► However, there's no metadata, either to provide additional information or to validate the contents of the file.
- With an extra field for length, we can create a simple version of fsck that checks file contents for consistency.
- Further, we can verify that create, write, delete etc preserve this notion of consistency.









- ► As the next step, we focus on externalising the storage of file contents.
- ► We also choose to break up file contents into "blocks" of a constant length (8.)
  - Note: this would mean storing file length is no longer optional, to avoid reading garbage past end of file at the end of a block.




Table: Disk

\0\0\0 Sun 19:0 0




Table: Disk

\0\0	0/0
Sun	19:0
0	
Tue	21:0
0	





Table: Disk


\0\0\0	
Sun 19:0	
0	
Tue 21:0	
0	



#### Table: Disk

/0/0/0	
Sun 19:0	
0	
Tue 21:0	
0	
Wed 01:0	
0	

- In the fourth model, we attempt to implement garbage collection in the form of an allocation vector.
- ► The allocation vector tracks whether blocks in the filesystem are in use by a file. This allows us to reuse unused blocks.



#### Table: Disk

\0\0\0	
Sun 19:0	
0	






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
- ▶ There are many properties that could be considered for correctness, but we choose to focus on the read-over-write theorems from the first-order theory of arrays.
- Read n characters starting at position start in the file at path hns in filesystem fs:
  - 11-rdchs(hns, fs, start, n)
- Write string text characters starting at position start in the file at path hns in filesystem fs:
  - 11-wrchs(hns, fs, start, text)

First read-over-write theorem: reading from a location after writing to the same location should yield the data that was written. Formally, assuming n = length(text) and suitable "type" hypotheses (omitted here): l1-rdchs(hns, l1-wrchs(hns, fs, start, text), start, n)

text

Second read-over-write-theorem: Reading from a location after writing to a different location should yield the same result as reading before writing. Formally, assuming hns1 != hns2 and suitable "type" hypotheses (omitted here): l1-rdchs(hns1, l1-wrchs(hns2, fs, start2, text2), start1, n1) = l1-rdchs(hns1, fs, start1, n1)

- ▶ For each of the models 1, 2, 3 and 4, we have proofs of correctness of the two read-after-write properties, making use of the proofs of equivalence between models and their successors.
- ▶ Model 4 presented some unique challenges proving the read-after-write properties required proving an equivalence between model 4 and model 2, rather than model 3.



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#### Other future work

- Model and verify file permissions.
- Linearise the tree, leaving only the disk.
- Add the system call open and close with the introduction of file descriptors.
  - This would be a step towards the study of concurrent FS operations.
- Eventually emulate the FAT32 filesystem as a convincing proof of concept, and move on to fsck and file recovery tools.