Verifying the FAT32 filesystem in ACL2

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Outline

Motivation and related work

Our approach

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Why we need a verified filesystem

- Filesystems are everywhere, even as operating systems move towards making them invisible.
- In the absence of a clear specification of filesystems, users (and sysadmins in particular) are underserved.
- Modern filesystems have become increasingly complex, and so have the tools to analyse and recover data from them.
- It would be worthwhile to specify and formally verify, in the ACL2 theorem prover, the guarantees claimed by filesystems and tools.

Related work

- In Haogang Chen's 2016 dissertation, the author uses Coq to build a filesystem (named FSCQ) which is proven safe against crashes in a new logical framework named Crash Hoare Logic. His (exported) Haskell implementation performs comparably to ext4.
- Hyperkernel (Nelson et al., SOSP '17) is a "push-button" verification effort, but approximates by changing POSIX system calls for ease of verification.
- In our work, we instead aim to model an existing filesystem (FAT32) faithfully and match the resulting disk image byte-to-byte.

Outline

Modelling a filesystem

- We opt to iteratively model a filesystem, incrementally adding features of FAT32.
- This also allows us to prove correctness in an iterative fashion, by proving equivalences and thereby reusing correctness results from previous models.
- Apart from noting that some of these models were based on the previous technology target, the CP/M filesystem, we will not dwell on these.

Modelling a filesystem

- In our most recent model, we separate our filesystem into:
  - a tree, in which non-leaf nodes represent (sub)directories and leaf nodes represent regular files;
  - a disk, containing the textual contents of regular files broken into fixed-size blocks;
  - and a file allocation table, mapping each block in a regular file to the next, this allowing us to read the contents of the entire file.

Verifying the model

- We've focussed so far on two filesystem properties, derived from the theory of arrays where they are known as the read-over-write properties.
  1. After a write, a read of the same length at the same location should yield that which was written.
  2. After a write, a read at a different location should yield the same results as a read before the write.
- These properties have been proven for all models so far, including the present model which features a file allocation table.

Proof challenges

- How do we define a "good state" of a filesystem, which shows that reading, writing and other operations can be safely carried out?
- Answering this question involves a trade-off between simplicity (to help with verification) and generality (to model as many real-world situations as possible.)
- We choose to require:
  - that each block on the disk is attributed to at most one regular file;
  - that the clusters attributed to each non-empty regular file end with a legal EOF value, as defined by the FAT specification.
  - that each regular file is annotated with "length", a metadata field that corresponds to the actual length of the file as determined by traversing the file allocation table and reading the corresponding blocks.

Validating the model

Future work

1. Complete the FAT32 model, by means of
   - supporting variable cluster sizes,
   - moving the file allocation table onto the disk, and
   - moving all file and directory metadata from the tree to the disk.
2. Model a more complex filesystem, for instance NTFS, by re-using algorithms and proofs from the models built so far.