

Vault Namespaces, Authentication, and ACL Policies





Agenda

- 1. Namespaces
- 2. Authentication
- 3. Policies
- 4. Next Steps

Namespaces




Namespaces



Namespaces create isolated "Vaults within a Vault" that enables you to provide Vault as a service in your organization.

Each namespace will maintain its own path structure. This allows you to delegate administration of policies and secrets management to teams while controlling the blast radius by isolating control within their namespace



Namespace Contents



Unique to each namespace

- Policies
- Secrets Engines
- Authentication Methods
- Tokens
- Identity Entities and Groups

Considerations

Doguiromont



| Requirement | What to Consider |
|---------------------------|--|
| Organizational Structure | What is your organizational structure? |
| | What is the level of granularity across lines of businesses (LOBs), divisions, teams, services, apps that needs to be reflected in Vault's end-state design? |
| Self-Service Requirements | Given your organizational structure, what is the desired level of self-service required? |
| | How will Vault policies be managed? |
| | Will teams need to directly manage policies for their own scope of responsibility? |
| | Will they be interacting with Vault via some abstraction layer where policies and patterns will be templatized? For example, configuration by code, Git flows, the Terraform Vault provider, custom onboarding layers, or some combination of these. |

What to Consider

Considerations




| Requirement | What to Consider |
|-------------|------------------|
|-------------|------------------|

| Audit Requirements | What are the requirements around auditing usage of Vault within your organization? |
|-----------------------------|--|
| | Is there a need to regularly certify access to secrets? |
| | Is there a need to review and/or decommission stale secrets or auth roles? |
| | Is there a need to determine chargeback amounts to internal customers? |
| Secrets Engine Requirements | What types of secrets engines will you use (KV, database, AD, PKI, etc.)? |

When to use?




Namespaces should be leveraged sparingly and primarily to delineate administrative boundaries. However, when considering namespace structure often many unnecessary namespaces get created by trying to replicate organizational structure.



When to use?




Instead of providing self-service by implementing many namespaces we recommend implementing an onboarding layer. We shift the administrative boundary from teams to the onboarding layer. This reduces the number of namespaces while enforcing a standard naming convention, secrets path structure, and templated policies.





Root Namespace



Root (Namespace)



Members:

Security Team


Namespace Specific Configuration: Defined global member access

Defined global member access
Defined global authentication mounts
Defined global secrets engines

Note: Vault supports namespaces within namespaces. By default there can always be a globally managed namespace that has rights to sub-namespaces, such as the Teams, and smaller namespaces



Namespaces for Teams and Groups



• Engineering Org (Namespace)



Members:

Security Team, Operations Teams, Engineering Manager


Namespace Specific Configuration:

Defined engineering member access
Defined engineering authentication mounts
Defined engineering secrets engines

Note: Vault supports namespaces within namespaces. By default there can always be a parent managed namespace that has rights to sub-namespaces, such as the Applications/User namespaces



Namespace per each **Application**



Application (Namespace)



Members:

Alex Smith, Jennifer Johnson, Steve Stevens

Namespace Specific Configuration:

Defined member access

Defined authentication mounts for AWS, Azure, and GCP systems

Defined custom secrets engine





Getting Started with Namespaces

CLI

- # Create namespace
- > vault namespace create usa-hq
- # Create child namespaces
- > vault namespace create -namespace=usa-hq sales
- # List namespaces from within root namespace
- > vault namespace list
- # List child namespaces for usa-hq namespace
- > vault namespace list -namespace=usa-hq
- # Instead of CLI flag, environment variable can be used
- > export VAULT_NAMESPACE="usa-hq"
- > vault namespace create sales





Getting Started with Namespaces

API

```
# Create namespace
> curl --header "X-Vault-Token: <TOKEN>" \
--request POST \
https://<vault_addr>/v1/sys/namespaces/usa-hq

# Create child namespaces
> curl --header "X-Vault-Token: <TOKEN>" \
--header "X-Vault-Namespace: usa-hq" --request POST \
https://<vault_addr>/v1/sys/namespaces/sales
```

Authentication




Authentication in Vault



Vault supports integrating with trusted identity providers to validate user or machine supplied information to create a token tied to a pre-configured policy.

- If Vault is able to successfully validate the credentials, a Vault token will be returned that can then be used to access Vault.
- The token Vault returns is associated to a Vault policy that defines what access and capabilities the token can perform.



Human vs. Machine Authentication




Vault provides authorization and not authentication of users so you will need to integrate with a trusted Identity provider to authenticate and verify the client before access to Vault is granted.

- Multiple authentication methods can and should be used
- Human users should authenticate using a method that leverages an external identity provider
- Machine users should authenticate using AppRole or auth type that uses instance metadata to authenticate the machine such as AWS or GCP.

| Human Auth | Machine Auth |
|---------------------|------------------|
| GitHub | AppRole |
| LDAP/AD | AWS |
| OIDC | Azure |
| Okta | Google Cloud |
| Cloud IAM | JWT |
| Username & Password | Kubernetes |
| | RADIUS |
| | TLS Certificates |
| | Cloud Foundry |

Vault Identity Recap





Entities and Aliases




Map multiple user authentication schemes to a single entity to provide for more efficient


authorization management Entity can have policies Entity is a representation of a single and metadata Entity person or system used to login name: John Smith policy: accounting entity id: 404e57bc-a0b1-a80f-0a73-b6e92e8a52d3 path "secret/accounting_database" { Aliases capabilities = ["list", "read"] **Aliases** is a mapping between an entity and auth methods ID: 3498 GitHub jsmith22 ID: 92308b08-4139-3ec6-7af2-8e98166b4e0c metadata: LDAP (Active Directory) jsmith22@example.com ID: a3b042e6-5cc1-d5a9-8874-d53a51954de2 "organization": "hashicorp", LDAP (OpenLDAP) johnjsmith@dev-example.com "region": "US-West"

Token and Policies




Policies can be assigned to entities which will grant **additional** permissions






Basic Workflow





Organizational Structure






Identity Groups




Identity group maps multiple user entities to a group for authorization management at scale.

- Identity groups can have multiple entities as its members as well as subgroups
- Entities can be direct member of groups
- Inherits the policies of the groups they belong to
- Entities can be indirect member of groups
- Groups can have a set of policies and metadata inherited from the member entity or subgroups



Group Hierarchical Permissions






Entity, John Smith inherits the policy assigned to the Security group

Identity Groups Aliases



- Internal groups are those groups manually created by the operators via API
- External groups are the groups which Vault infers and creates based on the group associations coming from the auth methods
- Identity group alias is a mapping between identity groups and groups in an third party authentication provider
 - If a user is a part of an external group (LDAP group), automatically adds the user to the identity group inheriting the policies and metadata



Policies




Vault Policies

例

Role-Based Access Control

- Use policies to govern the behavior of the Vault clients
- Instrument Role-Based Access
 Control (RBAC)
- Safeguard access and secret distribution to apps




Vault Policies and Client Tokens



How it all fit together

- Every Vault client must authenticate
 with Vault to acquire a client token
- The client token has policies attached
- Use the client token to invoke Vault operations (e.g. read secrets)



Language of policies



- Policies are written in HashiCorp Configuration Language (HCL)
- Everything is path-based and corresponds to Vault API endpoints
 - Policies grant or deny access to certain paths and operations
- Empty policy grants no permission

Vault is deny by default

No policy = No authorization



Policies path

```
TERMINAL
path "<PATH>" {
   capabilities = [ <LIST> ]
```

Example path

```
http://VAULT_ADDR:8200/v1/auth/userpass/users/apps
```





Policies path capabilities



capabilities

create read update delete

list

sudo deny

HTTP Verbs

POST/PUT

GET

POST/PUT

DELETE


LIST



Root protected paths


The **sudo** capability must be provided for those root protected paths

Refer to the **Learn tutorial**










Three discovery techniques



- API documentation
- -output-curl-string
- Vault's audit logs



API docs





CLI command flag

-output-curl-string

```
TERMINAL
 $ vault policy read -output-curl-string test
                              default HTTP verb is GET
curl -H "X-Vault-Request: true" -H "X-Vault-Token:
 $(vault print token)"
http://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/sys/policies/acl/test
                                                path
```

```
path "sys/policies/acl/test" {
    capabilities = [ "read" ]
}
```



Audit Log

A detailed log of every authenticated interaction.


- Time
- Requestor
- Request
- Response

```
TERMINAL
               $ cat log/vault audit.log | jq -s ".[-1]"
                cat log/vault audit.log | jq -s ".[-1].request"
                 "id": "70419a8b-d904-542b-fe48-61d8f869a0b7",
                 "operation": "update",
                 "mount type": "transit
                                        operation maps to capability
                 "path": "transit/keys/app-auth",
                 "remote address": "127.0.0.1"
                                                             path
path "transit/keys/app-auth" {
    capabilities = [ "update" ]
```

Example Scenario



Using transit secrets engine for data encryption/decryption



- Each application has its own encryption key
- Challenge:
 - The number of applications will grow
 - You cannot foresee the name of future applications to be developed

Policy Solutions



Using transit secrets engine for data encryption/decryption

```
path "transit/encrypt/*" {
    capabilities = [ "update" ]
}

path "transit/decrypt/*" {
    capabilities = [ "update" ]
}
```

• Trouble points:

The policy is **too open**. App1 can access app4 encryption key.

```
path "transit/encrypt/app1" {
    capabilities = [ "update" ]
  }
  path "transit/decrypt/app1" {
    capabilities = [ "update" ]
  }
```

Trouble points:

You have to write policies for each app.

ACL Templating



```
path "secret/data/{{identity.entity.id}}/*" {
    capabilities = ["create", "update", "read", "delete"]
}

path "secret/metadata/{{identity.entity.id}}/*" {
    capabilities = ["list"]
}
```

- Use variable replacement in some policy strings with values available to the token
- Define policy paths containing double curly braces: {{<parameter>}}

Available Templating Parameters (1 of 2)



| Parameter | Description |
|---|---|
| identity.entity.id | The entity's ID |
| identity.entity.name | The entity's name |
| identity.entity.metadata.< <metadata key="">></metadata> | Metadata associated with the entity for the given key |
| identity.entity.aliases.< <mount accessor="">>.id</mount> | Entity alias ID for the given mount |
| identity.entity.aliases.< <mount accessor="">>.name</mount> | Entity alias name for the given mount |
| identity.entity.aliases.< <mount accessor="">>.metadata.<<metadata key="">></metadata></mount> | Metadata associated with the alias for the given mount and metadata key |

Available Templating Parameters (2 of 2)



| Parameter | Description |
|---|--|
| identity.groups.ids.< <group id="">>.name</group> | The group name for the given group ID |
| identity.groups.names.< <group name="">>.id</group> | The group ID for the given group name |
| identity.groups.names.< <group id="">>.metadata.<<metadata key="">></metadata></group> | Metadata associated with the group for the given key |
| identity.groups.names.< <group name="">>.metadata.<<metadata key="">></metadata></group> | Metadata associated with the group for the given key |



Token policies & Identity Policies

```
$ vault token lookup
                                Value
Key
accessor
                                yOMHJzMZ5Krz7BSrOtF2ZzC2
creation time
                                1622087787
creation ttl
                                768h
display name
                                userpass-bob
entity id
                                bf3ea189-61a1-d7...snip...
expire time
                                2021-06-28T<time stamp>
explicit max ttl
                                0 s
external namespace policies
                                map[]
id
                                s.UYkAjU6ak70qwQ40CmLP3uyT
identity policies
                                [base]
issue time
                                2021-05-27T<time stamp>
                                map[username:bob]
meta
                                0
num uses
orphan
                                true
                                auth/userpass/login/bob
path
policies
                                [default test]
...snip...
```



ACL Templating with Identity Entity Names

```
CODE EDITOR
path "transit/encrypt/{{identity.entity.name}}" {
   capabilities = [ "update" ]
path "transit/decrypt/{{identity.entity.name}}" {
   capabilities = [ "update" ]
```

If the app name and key name do not match, you can store the key name as a metadata → {{identity.entity.metadata.key_name}}

ACL Templating with Identity Groups



```
path "auth/ldap/groups/{{identity.groups.ids.fb036ebc-2f62-4124-9503.name}}" {
    capabilities = [ "update", "read" ]
}

path
"secret/data/groups/{{identity.groups.names.education.metadata.product}}/*" {
    capabilities = [ "create", "update", "read", "delete" ]
}
```

- Identity groups are not directly attached to a token and an entity can be associated with multiple groups
- To reference a group, the group ID or group name must be provided




CLI

vault

```
TERMINAL
$ vault policy --help
$ vault policy list
default
                                        list all policies
root
$ vault policy read default
                                          show policy
$ vault policy write apps-policy apps-policy.hcl
                                        create or
                                        update policy
```

Vault UI








root and default policies

- There are two out of the box policies:
 - root policy grants access to everything. A root token was generated when
 Vault was unsealed and is the only token that is able to grant this policy to other tokens.
 - default policy grants a lot of the bare minimum operations




Associate policies

Upon successful authentication, the generated token will have the policies attached



Next Steps







Discuss


Engage with the HashiCorp Cloud community including HashiCorp Architects and Engineers.


discuss.hashicorp.com





Step-by-step guides to accelerate deployment of Vault







Support

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Thank You

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