



**HITB<sup>+</sup>CyberWeek 2021**  
Brought to you by DisruptAD

# Deep Puzzling: Binary Code Intention Hiding based on AI Uninterpretability


**Jifeng Zhu & Keyun Luo**

Zhuque Lab, Tencent Security Platform Department



# Who Are We

- **Tencent Security Platform Dpt.** has been with Tencent for 16 years, and dedicated to the protection of QQ, Wechat, Tencent Games and other critical products.
- **Tencent Zhuque Lab** was founded in 2019 by Tencent Security Platform Dpt., focusing on red teaming and AI security research. Research results have been published on HITB, XCON, POC, etc.



*Tencent Security  
Platform Dpt.*



*Tencent  
Zhuque Lab*



# Outline

- *A Brief Introduction to Intent Hiding*
- *Why it Matters for Security*
- *Deep Puzzling Details*
  - Method Overview
  - Feature Extraction
  - Binary Code Generation
  - Binary Code Repair
- *Demonstration and Analysis*
- *Conclusion*



# A Brief Introduction to Intent Hiding

# The Evolution History of Malware

- *Obfuscation: Mutate payload*
- *Encryption : Hide payload*
- *Evasive malware: Avoid being analyzed*
- *Targeted attack: Disclose only at a target*

- Addition
  - $a = b - (-c)$

```
%0 = load i32* %a, align 4
%1 = load i32* %b, align 4
%2 = sub i32 0, %1
%3 = sub nsw i32 %0, %2
```




# Target Positioning

- *Narrow the scope to avoid large-scale detection*
- *Increased concealment*
- *Often Used in APT*
- *Main Work: Collect information about the target*




# DeepLocker

- AI-Powered Concealment and Unlocking [Blackhat USA 2018, Dhilung Kirat, etc.]




# Key Guaranteed Security

- *Face Detection as feature input*
- *The length of the key is critical*



# Debugging will Reveal Everything

- *Debuggability* : The adversary can discover the key role of the key
- *Attribute exposure risk*: There is a certain correlation between attribute and intention
- *Reverse analysis: The key may be violently enumerated*
  - Brute-force key
  - Brute-force attributes
  - Deceptive attributes



# From Attack to Defend

- *Intent Hiding + Anti-Debugging: Binary Code Protection*
- *Attacker* : hide the attack intent
- *Defender*: protect the core code from being reversed





# Motivation

- ***Multiple Task***
  - Task 1, Task 2, Task 3 ...
  - Anti-Debug
- ***Implicit Feature***
  - Intent is hidden in massive plain data
- ***Generated Payload***
  - The program does not store the payload directly
- ***End-to-End model***
  - Avoid tampering with intermediate values



# Why it Matters for Security

# The boom of AI technology



AI is steadily emerging as part of the agriculture industry's technological evolution. AI-powered solutions will not only enable farmers to improve efficiencies but they will also improve quantity, quality and ensure faster go-to-market for crops.

## AGRICULTURE




AI techniques are being increasingly deployed in finance, in areas such as asset management, algorithmic trading, credit underwriting and blockchain-based finance, enabled by the abundance of available data and by sufficient computing capacity.

## FINANCE



Big data and AI give industry a huge boost. AI can use the high volumes of data generated by a factory to identify trends and patterns that can then be used to make manufacturing processes more efficient and reduce their energy consumption.

## INDUSTRY




AI can be an assistant to doctors. AI-powered solutions can learn from various medical images such as endoscopy, ultrasound, CT, MRI, pathology, OCT, and etc., and then help the doctors to diagnose and screen major diseases in advance.

## MEDICINE

# AI-Powered Cybersecurity


- **Attack**

- Vulnerability: Vuldeepecker
- Trojan: MalwareGAN
- Phishing: SNAP\_R
- Penetration: Deep Exploit




- **Defense**

- Network Intrusion Detection
- Web application firewall
- Malware detection
- UEBA




# Success Factors

- *Learning the patterns behind the data*
  - Massive Data
  - Detection & Bypass Pattern




# The Generative Characteristic of AI

- *The encoder-decoder architecture*
  - The encoder takes a variable-length sequence as the input and transforms it into a state with a fixed shape.
  - The decoder maps the encoded state of a fixed shape to a variable-length sequence.




# The Memory Characteristic of AI

- *Autoencoder: A special case of sequence generation model*
  - Generating ability naturally means memory
  - Many parameters in the original model are redundant
  - No Labels are needed
  - It is able to restore original data
  - Compress information to reduce volume



# The Blackbox Characteristic of AI

- *AI model consists of network structure and weight parameters*
- *It is difficult to explain why such a network structure is effective or not*
- *It is difficult to explain the meaning of each parameter*
- *It is difficult to explain what features the model has learned*




```
tensor([[ 0.0347, -0.0409, -0.0340, ..., 0.1204,  0.0096,  0.0436],  
       [-0.0187,  0.0556,  0.0537, ..., 0.1807,  0.0240,  0.0440],  
       [ 0.0429,  0.0072,  0.0365, ..., 0.1516, -0.0481,  0.0082],  
       ...,  
       [ 0.0328,  0.0037,  0.0140, ..., 0.0623,  0.0301,  0.0055],  
       [ 0.0711,  0.0254,  0.0026, ..., 0.0850, -0.0125,  0.0356],  
       [-0.0025, -0.0615, -0.0336, ..., 0.1774, -0.0324,  0.0663]],
```

# What do these Characteristics mean

- ***Powerful sequence generation ability means greater capacity***
  - It's easy to generate a passage
  - It is able to adjust the decoding output according to the input of the encoder
- ***Advanced memory ability means fault tolerance***
  - Damaged data recovery
- ***Poor interpretability means the natural difficulty of reverse analysis***
  - Brute force enumeration of massive parameters is almost impossible
  - We can't easily find the relationship between data input and result output
  - Even if the model is obtained, it is difficult to infer the part of the data that can really work

# Make use of AI Power

- *AI-enabled security practices based on generative ability and uninterpretability*






# Deep Puzzling Details


# The Core Idea

- *Avoid explicit conditional judgments in code execution*



- *Let the AI model make black-box decisions*

# Method Overview



# Method Overview



## Data & Feature

### Runtime

- Process
- File Name
- Service
- Path Env
- Regedit

### Feature

- Conv1D
- Max Pooling
- Dense



Error Correction: LSTM AutoEncoder


Sequence Generation: BiLSTM

Intent hiding

## C++ Loader


- Read Model
- Collect Data
- Generate Code

Execute Code




# Feature Extraction

- *How to model the "hidden backdoor" in massive features?*
- *How to ensure the model's "robustness" to different input spaces?*



Conv1D



Dense Connect

TextInpu;.java;wininit.exe  
.java;wininit.exe; TextInput  
java; wininit;TextInput  
JAVA;wininit.exe;TextInpu

Data Augmentation

# Feature Extraction

Input

0	1	2
3	4	5
6	7	8

Kernel

0	1
2	3

\*

=

Output

19	25
37	43

Input

0	1	2
3	4	5
6	7	8

Output

2 x 2 Max Pooling

4	5
7	8

## Convolutions

$$\begin{aligned} 0 \times 0 + 1 \times 1 + 3 \times 2 + 4 \times 3 &= 19 \\ 0 \times 0 + 1 \times 1 + 3 \times 2 + 4 \times 3 &= 19 \end{aligned}$$


## Pooling

$$\max(0, 1, 3, 4) = 4$$

$$\max(0, 1, 3, 4) = 4$$


# Binary Code Generation

1. *Repeat Feature Vector to MAX\_LEN*
2. *Use BiLSTM for Sequence modeling*
3. *Use Full Connect for Hidden State*
4. *Use Softmax to output the character probability of each position*



# Binary Code Repair

- Deep neural network is a *probabilistic model*
- If a certain bit is wrong, then the entire shellcode will not be executed
- Use an autoencoder to correct a small number of errors





# Demonstration and Analysis

# Target

- ***Hidden intent***
  - Target 1: for ordinary people, execute a [MessageBox](#) code
    - Feature: Clean office system
  - Target 2: for developers, execute a [Calculator](#) code
    - Feature: Visual Studio、Python、SSH, etc.
- ***Anti-debugging***
  - Target3: for debuggers, [no code](#) execution
    - Feature: IDA、OllyDbg、WinDbg, etc.



# Main Steps

- ***Make Dataset***
  - Environmental Data : Shuffle, Crop, Random Pick, about **20,000** characters
  - Label: Target group and corresponding shellcode
  - Error Correcting Code Data: 0 ~ 2 bit error per 10 bytes
- ***Train and Convert Model***
  - TensorFlow/Keras: Ensure an accuracy of more than **99%** on the validation set
  - FDeep Convert: H5 Model → Json File → Dump to Resource File
- ***C++ Inference***
  - Collect Data → Load Model → Decode Shellcode → Fix Code → Execute

# Input and Output

## - Data

- Process Names
- Service Names
- Desktop/Startup Menu Files
- Regedit Keys

## - Model


- CNN Neural Networks
- Max Pooling Aggregate
- Concatenate Multiple Dense Part
- BiLSTM Sequence Decoder
- LSTM Auto Encoder

Input: "SysMain;.part;RmSvc;DeviceAssociatio;...; wininit.exe;Java"

Output: [252, 232, 130, 0, 100, 0, 96, 137, 229,..., 101, 120, 101, 0]


Revised: [252, 232, 130, 0, **0**, 0, 96, 137, 229,..., 101, **121**, 101, 0]

# Model



# Demonstration


- *Target 1*



- *Target 2*



- *Target 3*



# Analysis

- ***We do not seek to use any techniques to obfuscate the source code***
- ***It's not difficult to locate the code that runs the "intent", the difficulty lies in when it will be triggered***
- ***The key point is that the address of the decrypted code is dynamically obtained***

```
● 232 if ( sub_415CBD((int)&v84) )
● 233 {
● 234     v58 = sub_415CBD(v57);
● 235     v59 = 0;
● 236     if ( v58 )
● 237     {
● 238         do
● 239         {
● 240             v60 = (char *)sub_415CB1(&v84, v59);
● 241             Src_build_intend_code[v61] = *v60;
● 242             v59 = v61 + 1;
● 243         }
● 244         while ( v59 < v58 );
● 245     }
● 246     Pcode_buffer = VirtualAlloc(0, 0x1000u, 0x3
● 247     memcpy(Pcode_buffer, Src_build_intend_code,
● 248     ((void (*)(void))Pcode_buffer)());
● 249 }
```

# Analysis

- *If the ECX value here is not the "input" of our intended purpose, it will be the wrong value, and There will be no payload running*
  - *We can see the important role of multitasking here*

The screenshot shows the x32dbg debugger interface with the following details:

- Assembly View:** The main window displays assembly code for the `intenthiding.00414BE3` function. The instruction at address `00414BE3` is highlighted in red. The assembly code includes various `call`, `jmp`, and `push` instructions, along with conditional jumps (`jne`, `je`) and comparisons (`cmp`). A red box highlights the value `0016EE38` in the ECX register.
- Registers View:** The registers pane shows the current state of CPU registers. The ECX register is highlighted in red and contains the value `0016EE38`.
- Registers View (Details):** A tooltip or callout box points to the ECX register value, stating "Its bad value of ECX would lead to process end."
- Registers View (Registers List):** The list of registers includes EAX, ECX, EDX, EBPF, ECSP, EDSP, ESI, EDI, EIP, EFLAGS, GS, ES, CS, and ST(0) through ST(4).
- Memory Dump View:** The bottom pane shows memory dumps for Dumps 1 through 5, Watch 1, Locals, and Struct. It displays ASCII and Hex values for memory locations such as `0018EE38` and `0018EE48`.

# Analysis

- The “input” we mentioned here is a high-dimensional space vector*
- It is difficult to infer the real “purpose” simply by modifying some data because of Robustness of AI model*

IntentHiding.exe - PID: 880 - Module: intenthiding.exe - Thread: Main Thread 1428 - x32dbg

File View Debug Tracing Plugins Favourites Options Help Apr 3 2021 (TitanEngine)

EAX 0018EC7C "wininit.exe" EBX 0000022C ECX BEE6020F EDX 0018E97F EBP 0018EC98 ESP 0018E9C0 ESI 00000144 EDI 0018ECC0 EIP 0044462C intenthiding.00

EFLAGS 00000244 ZF 1 PF 1 AF 0 OF 0 SF 0 DF 0 CF 0 TF 0 IF

LastError 000000EA (ERROR\_MORE\_DATA) LastStatus 00000000 (STATUS\_SUCCESS)

GS 002B FS 0053 ES 002B DS 002B CS 0023 SE 002B

DR0 00000000 DR1 00000000 DR2 00000000 DR3 00000000 DR6 00000000

Default (stdcall) 5 Unlocked

1: [esp-4] 00968820 2: [esp-8] 00961968 3: [esp-C] 00000000 4: [esp-10] 00000044 5: [esp-14] 00000000

It's hard to predict trigger conditions when you changed the process name of input environment.

Address	Hex	Dump 1	Dump 2	Dump 3	Dump 4	Dump 5	Watch 1	Locals	Struct
775D1000	68 48 00 00 C0 6A FF E8 24 C4 03 00 E9 35 E0 01	0018EC7C	00968820	00000000	0018E9C8 00961968	00000000	0018E900 00000044	0018E904 00000000	0018E908 00000000
775D1010	00 00 00 00 48 80 14 C0 89 95 D8 FF 40 49 80 14	0018E90C	00961968	00000000	0018E904 00000000	00000000	0018E908 00000000	0018E90C 00000000	0018E910 00000000
775D1020	CE B9 AD 88 FF 00 00 00 88 40 68 89 85 ED FE 40 49	0018E914	00961968	00000000	0018E908 00000000	00000000	0018E910 00000000	0018E914 00000000	0018E918 00000000
775D1030	41 04 64 A1 30 00 00 00 88 40 68 89 85 ED FE 40 49	0018E91C	00961968	00000000	0018E910 00000000	00000000	0018E914 00000000	0018E918 00000000	0018E920 00000000
775D1040	FF A9 00 08 00 00 00 F4 F2 01 00 E9 CE 81 07 Y9 00 00	0018E924	00961968	00000000	0018E914 00000000	00000000	0018E920 00000000	0018E924 00000000	0018E928 00000000
775D1050	C6 45 FF 02 C7 45 CC 00 00 00 E9 BD 14 04 4E Y9 00 00	0018E92C	00961968	00000000	0018E920 00000000	00000000	0018E924 00000000	0018E92C 00000000	0018E930 00000000
775D1060	00 B5 C0 0F 85 DE 14 04 00 88 55 D4 E9 EB 14 04 A1 b... 00	0018E934	00961968	00000000	0018E92C 00000000	00000000	0018E930 00000000	0018E934 00000000	0018E938 00000000
775D1070	00 C1 E8 10 25 FF 00 00 00 75 12 C1 EA 18 0F B6 A1 w... 00	0018E93C	00961968	00000000	0018E930 00000000	00000000	0018E934 00000000	0018E93C 00000000	0018E940 00000000
775D1080	B2 F0 05 61 77 83 C0 18 E9 13 00 00 00 00 B6 80 A1 w... 00	0018E944	00961968	00000000	0018E93C 00000000	00000000	0018E940 00000000	0018E944 00000000	0018E948 00000000

# Analysis

- *If the trigger environment is not met, the ECX value cannot be obtained*
- *Finding "rules" in massive data is difficult*
- *The AI model is neutral and does not contain any intent code directly , This is very different from previous designs*

```
const auto result = decoder_model.predict(  
{  
    fdeep::tensor(fdeep::tensor_shape(static_cast<std::size_t>(max_feature_len)),  
    feature_float),  
});  
auto probes = result[0].to_vector();
```



# Conclusion



- We propose a ***binary code intention hiding framework*** based on deep sequence generation network
- We conduct an experiment to hide ***MessageBox*** and ***Calculator*** to avoid being discovered in the debugging environment
- Our experiment confirmed that due to the powerful distinguishing ability and ***uninterpretability*** of the AI , it greatly increases the difficulty of analysis for reverse engineers
- The combination of AI and security will magnify the ***offensive and defensive*** situation in Cybersecurity

# Take away

- ***frugally-deep: Use Keras models in C++ with ease***
  - <https://github.com/Dobiasd/frugally-deep>
- ***CNN Network for Feature Extraction***
  - [https://keras.io/api/layers/convolution\\_layers/convolution1d](https://keras.io/api/layers/convolution_layers/convolution1d)
- ***Encoder – Decoder Model for Sequence Generation***
  - <https://blog.keras.io/a-ten-minute-introduction-to-sequence-to-sequence-learning-in-keras.html>
- ***Autoencoders for Error Correction***
  - <https://blog.keras.io/building-autoencoders-in-keras.html>



# Thank You

Email: [keyunluo@tencent.com](mailto:keyunluo@tencent.com). [jifengzhu@tencent.com](mailto:jifengzhu@tencent.com)

Join our Discord channel to discuss more or ask questions

<https://discord.gg/dXE8ZMvU9J>