

Robust VisIntel:

A Road towards Robustness of Visual Intelligence





GUO Qing, Scientist, CFAR

tsingqguo@ieee.org


<https://tsingqguo.github.io/>



Visual Intelligence Everywhere



Robustness Issues




How easy is it to fool a face recognition system?

Attacking the face recognition authentication – how easy is it to fool it?

This article will show you how we have managed to bypass face recognition used by among others financial industries as a biometric solution followed by ways to make it more secure.


SEBASTIAN DRYGIEL 2020.11.04 - 12 MIN READ

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
A team of Google researchers has created psychedelic stickers that can fool image recognition software into seeing objects that are not there.

Complex Real-world Scenarios




Research Goals

Goal: Robustness Evaluation and Enhancement of Visual Intelligence to Real-world Degradations:




Research Goals

Goal: Robustness Evaluation and Enhancement of Visual Intelligence to Real-world Degradations:



Research Goals

Goal: Robustness Evaluation and Enhancement of Visual Intelligence to Real-world Degradations:



Robustness Evaluation

Blurred Video Benchmark – An Example (TIP' 21)

➤ Motivation



Car11 [65]:
IV, BC.




Car25 [82]:
OPR, SV, OCC, FM,
IPR.




ClifBar [5]:
SV, OCC, MB, FM,
IPR, OV, BC.



Coke [5]:
IV, OPR, OCC, FM,
IPR.



David [65]:
IV, OPR, SV, OCC,
DEF, MB, IPR.



David2 [65]:
OPR, IPR.



David3 [65]:
OPR, OCC, DEF, BC.



Deer [43]:
MB, FM, IPR, BC.



- ✗ **Cannot exclude other factors during evaluation**
- ✗ **Cannot evaluate the effects of different blur levels**

TABLE 2
Annotated Sequence Attributes with the Threshold Values in the Performance Evaluation

Attr	Description
IV	Illumination Variation—The illumination in the target region is significantly changed.
SV	Scale Variation—The ratio of the bounding boxes of the first frame and the current frame is out of range. $[1/t_s, t_s], t_s > 1$ ($t_s = 2$).
OCC	Occlusion—The target is partially or fully occluded.
DEF	Deformation—Non-rigid object deformation.
MB	Motion Blur—The target region is blurred due to the motion of the target or the camera.
FM	Fast Motion—The motion of the ground truth is larger than t_m pixels ($t_m = 20$).
IPR	In-Plane Rotation—The target rotates in the image plane.
OPR	Out-of-Plane Rotation—The target rotates out of the image plane.
OV	Out-of-View—Some portion of the target leaves the view.
BC	Background Clutters—The background near the target has similar color or texture as the target.
LR	Low Resolution—The number of pixels inside the ground-truth bounding box is less than t_r ($t_r = 400$).

Y. Wu, J. Lim, and Ming-Hsuan Yang. Object Tracking Benchmark. In IEEE TPAMI, 2015.


H. Fan, L. Lin, F. Yang, et al. LaSOT: A High-quality Benchmark for Large-scale Single Object Tracking. In CVPR, 2019.

Q. Guo, W. Feng, R. Gao, Y. Liu, and S. Wang. Exploring the Effects of Blur and Deblurring to Visual Object Tracking. In IEEE TIP, 2021

Robustness Evaluation

Blurred Video Benchmark – An Example (TIP' 21)



➤ Construction strategies



Robustness Evaluation

Blurred Video Benchmark – An Example (TIP' 21)

➤ Some insight observations



Insight observations:

- ❖ Single blur-level videos are not enough.
- ❖ Light motion blur is helpful but heavy blur is harmful.

Robustness Evaluation

Blurred Video Benchmark – An Example (TIP' 21)


➤ Limitations



✗ Cannot cover the diverse and hard blur patterns.


Robustness Evaluation

Goal: Robustness Evaluation and Enhancement of Visual Intelligence to Real-world Degradations:



Robustness Evaluation

Additive-Perturbation Adversarial Attack



- ✓ **Noise-like adversarial perturbation cannot represent diverse natural degradations in the real world.**

.Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. In ICLR, 2015.

Alexey Kurakin, Ian J Goodfellow, and Samy Bengio. Adversarial examples in the physical world. In ICLRW, 2017.

Y. Dong, T. Pang, H. Su, and J. Zhu. Evading defenses to transferable adversarial examples by translation-invariant attacks. In CVPR, 2019.

Q. Guo, X. Xie, F. Juefei-Xu, L. Ma, Z. Li, W. Xue, W. Feng, and Y. Liu. Spark: Spatial-aware online incremental attack against visual tracking. In ECCV, 2020

Robustness Evaluation


General Adversarial Attack

$O($
 x_{real}



, +

δ



) =



Incav3: Bird

Incav3: Dog

$$\arg \max_{\delta} J((O(x_{\text{real}} + \delta), y)) \text{ subject to } \text{regular}(\delta)$$

- ✓ Turning the additive operation to nature degradation-based operations.


Robustness Evaluation

Adversarial Blur Attack (NeurIPS' 20)

Blur(



Incv3: Bird



$$\mathcal{K} = \{\mathbf{k}_p | \forall p \text{ in } \mathbf{X}^{\text{real}}\}$$



Incv3: Car

$$\arg \max_{\mathcal{K}} J(\{ \sum_{q \in \mathcal{N}(p)} \mathbf{X}_q^{\text{real}} k_{pq} \}, y)$$

$$\text{subject to } \forall p, \|\mathbf{k}_p\|_0 \leq \epsilon,$$


$$\max(\mathbf{k}_p) = k_{pp}, \sum_{q \in \mathcal{N}(p)} k_{pq} = 1,$$



Robustness Evaluation

Adversarial Blur Attack (NeurIPS' 20)

- Physical model of motion blur




- ✓ Pattern of motion blur is mainly decided by the motion of the camera/object and the accumulation process.

Robustness Evaluation

Adversarial Blur Attack (NeurIPS' 20)


- Digital Simulation of motion blur



Robustness Evaluation

Adversarial Blur Attack (NeurIPS' 20)


- Adversarial motion blur



Robustness Evaluation

Adversarial Blur Attack (NeurIPS' 20)

➤ Physical Adversarial Blur Attack



Robustness Evaluation


Adversarial Blur Attack (NeurIPS' 20)

➤ Physical Adversarial Blur Attack



Robustness Evaluation


Adversarial Blur Attack against Tracking (ICCV' 21)



- ✓ How to make tuned motion blur keep realistic blur appearance?
- ✓ How to realize efficient adversarial blur attack to adapt the real-time trackers?

Robustness Evaluation

Adversarial Blur Attack against Tracking (ICCV' 21)



Robustness Evaluation

Adversarial Blur Attack against Tracking (ICCV' 21)




Figure 3: Architecture of JAMANet.

Robustness Evaluation

Adversarial Blur Attack against Tracking (ICCV' 21)





Table 4: Effects of \mathcal{W}_t and \mathcal{A}_t to OP-ABA and OS-ABA by attacking SiamRPN++(ResNet50) on OTB100. The best results are highlighted by red color.

Attackers	Succ. Rate	Succ. Drop ↑	Prec.	Prec. Drop ↑
Original	66.5	0.0	87.8	0.0
Norm-Blur	65.3	1.2	86.2	1.6
OP-ABA w/o \mathcal{A}_t	51.5	15.0	67.6	20.2
OP-ABA w/o \mathcal{W}_t	40.9	25.6	53.4	34.4
OP-ABA	35.3	31.2	46.1	41.7
OS-ABA w/o \mathcal{A}_t	61.0	5.5	80.8	7.0
OS-ABA w/o \mathcal{W}_t	41.6	24.9	58.3	29.5
OS-ABA	38.4	28.1	55.3	32.5

Robustness Evaluation

Degradation-aware Adversarial Attack

- Generalizing adversarial blur attack to other degradations



Robustness Evaluation

Solution1: Degradation-aware Adversarial Attack

Adversarial
Deformation/Rain/Fog/Relighting Attack (ACMMM'20,
IEEE TIFS & TMM)



Adversarial
Noise/Vignetting/Exposure Attack
(ECCV'20, IJCAI'21, CVPR'22)

Adversarial Denoising/DeID
Attack (TMM' 21)

Scene variations

Camera variations



Post modifications



Visual
Intelligent
Tasks


Robustness Evaluation

SPARK - Effects of noise to tracking (ECCV'20)



Main Challenges:

- ✓ Tracking focuses on the object trajectory instead of category.
- ✓ Tracking requires the attacking to be enough efficient.



Robustness Evaluation

Amora- Effects of deformation to FR (ACM-MM'20)




(a) Presentation spoofing attacks



(b) Adversarial noise attack




(c) Adversarial morphing attack



Robustness Evaluation

AVA - Effects of vignetting to recognition (IJCAI'21)



Robustness Evaluation

Effects of exposure and noise to CoSOD (CVPR'22)




Figure 1: Overall of the novel problem and our solution. We expect the perturbed image to be undiscoverable in an even dynamically growing group of images across multiple CoSOD methods, which is much more challenging and practical in real-world scenarios. Note that our attack is black-box and can be performed without references provided in the group.

Robustness Evaluation

Effects of rain to recog. & detection





Figure 4: Comparison of our adversarial rainy images on three datasets (a-c) and other synthesized rainy images from Rain100H (Yang et al. 2017), Rain800 (Zhang, Sindagi, and Patel 2019), Rain1200 (Zhang and Patel 2018), Rain1400 (Fu et al. 2017) and Physics-based Rain Rendering (Halder, Lalonde, and Charette 2019) (d-h).


Robustness Evaluation

Goal: *Robustness Evaluation and Enhancement of Visual Intelligence to Real-world Degradation:*



Robustness Enhancement

Goal: *Robustness Evaluation and Enhancement of Visual Intelligence to Real-world Degradation:*




Robustness Enhancement

Selective Deblurring for Blur Robust Tracking (TIP' 21)

➤ Motivation

- ❖ Blurred Video Benchmark:
Effects of deblurring to different blur levels are different.
- ❖ Blurred Video Benchmark:
Selective deblurring improves tracking accuracy significantly



_gan: deblurring all frames

_ganslt: selective deblurring w.r.t GT


Robustness Enhancement

Selective Deblurring for Blur Robust Tracking (TIP' 21)

➤ DeblurGAN-D as Blur Assessor




Generator



Deblurred

Blur level from
heavy to
light during
training

Discriminator



Robustness Enhancement

Selective Deblurring for Blur Robust Tracking (TIP' 21)

➤ Pipeline




Fig. 10. The pipeline of our selective deblurring-based tracking. We can use existing deblurring methods, *e.g.*, DeblurGAN-G [14] for ‘deblurring’, and the classification is set as an offline trained SVM that indicates when we should deblurring a coming frame t .


Robustness Enhancement

Selective Deblurring for Blur Robust Tracking (TIP' 21)

➤ Results

TABLE I
COMPARISON RESULTS ON THE MOTION BLUR SUBSET OF OTB.


Trackers	raw (AUC)	blur-robust tracking (AUC)
fDSST	0.512	0.530
Staple_CA	0.551	0.561
Siamfc	0.343	0.353
MBT	0.233	0.242
ECO	0.677	0.679
STRCF	0.633	0.637



Robustness Enhancement


Task-aware Data Restoration

- Generalizing deblurring to other degradation restorations




Robustness Enhancement

Task-aware Data Restoration – Denoising (MM'21)




Robustness Enhancement

Task-aware Data Restoration – Denoising (MM'21)




Robustness Enhancement

Task-aware Data Restoration – Night2Day




Robustness Enhancement

Task-aware Data Restoration – Shadow Removal




Robustness Enhancement

Task-aware Data Restoration – Shadow Removal




Robustness Enhancement

Goal: *Robustness Evaluation and Enhancement of Visual Intelligence to Real-world Degradation:*




Robustness Enhancement

Failure-set Guided Data augmentation




Robustness Enhancement

Failure-set Guided Data augmentation



Robustness Enhancement

Task-guided Data Augmentation




Robustness Enhancement

Solution2: Task-guided Data Augmentation


- Generalizing Data Repair to Architecture Repair via NAS


ArchRepair for unknown failure patterns



Robustness Enhancement

Goal: *Robustness Evaluation and Enhancement of Visual Intelligence to Real-world Degradation:*







Centre for
Frontier AI
Research
—
CFAR

Thank You!

Q & A



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