



Higher-Order Logic (HOL) as a Lingua Franca for Argumentative Reasoning Agents

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The “Universal Logical Reasoning” Programme

“Classical higher-order logic, when utilized as a meta-logic in which various other (classical and non-classical) logics can be shallowly embedded, is well suited for realising a universal logic reasoning approach. Universal logic reasoning in turn, as envisioned already by Leibniz, may support the rigorous formalisation and deep logical analysis of rational arguments within machines.”



Calculemus!

Main Idea: HOL as universal meta-logic

cf. Benzmüller (2019) Universal (Meta-)Logical Reasoning: Recent Successes

2 BASIC MODAL LOGIC

In this section we introduce the basic modal language and its relational semantics. We define basic modal syntax, introduce models and frames, and give the satisfaction definition. We then draw the reader's attention to the internal perspective that modal languages offer on relational structure, and explain why models and frames should be thought of as graphs. Following this we give the standard translation. This enables us to convert any basic modal formula into a first-order formula with one free variable. The standard translation is a bridge between the modal and classical worlds, a bridge that underlies much of the work of this chapter.

2.1 *First steps in relational semantics*


Metalanguage

Those elements we typically write as p, q, r and those elements we typically write as m, m', m'' , and so on, are called *variables* or *constants* of the language; in other words, they have the *nature* (or *similarity type*) of the language; in particular, they have the same nature as the elements of the domain of discourse.

WHAT FOLLOWS WE WILL TACITLY ASSUME THAT PROP IS COUNTABLY INFINITE, AND WE'LL OFTEN WORK WITH SIGNATURES IN WHICH MOD CONTAINS ONLY A SINGLE ELEMENT. GIVEN A SIGNATURE, WE DEFINE THE *BASIC MODAL LANGUAGE* (OVER THE SIGNATURE) AS FOLLOWS:

$$\varphi ::= p \mid \top \mid \perp \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \wedge \psi \mid \varphi \vee \psi \mid \varphi \rightarrow \psi \mid \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi \mid \langle m \rangle \varphi \mid [m]\varphi.$$

That is, a basic modal formula is either a proposition symbol, a boolean constant, a boolean combination of basic modal formulas, or (most interesting of all) a formula prefixed by a diamond



Main Idea: HOL as universal meta-logic

cf. Benzmüller (2019) Universal (Meta-)Logical Reasoning: Recent Successes

A model (or Kripke model) \mathfrak{M} for the basic modal language (over some fixed signature) is a triple $\mathfrak{M} = (W, \{R^m\}_{m \in \text{MOD}}, V)$. Here W , the domain, is a non-empty set, whose elements we usually call points, but which, for reasons which will soon be clear, are sometimes called states, times and I
 $V(p)$
 $(W, \{$
in the


Metalanguage

encourage the reader to think of Kripke models as graphs (or to be slightly more precise, *directed graphs*, that is, graphs whose points are linked by directed arrows) and will shortly give some examples which show why this is helpful.

Suppose w is a point in a model $\mathfrak{M} = (W, \{R^m\}_{m \in \text{MOD}}, V)$. Then we inductively define the notion of a formula φ being satisfied (or true) in \mathfrak{M} at point w as follows (we omit some of the clauses for the booleans):

$\mathfrak{M}, w \models p$	iff	$w \in V(p)$,
$\mathfrak{M}, w \models \top$		always,
$\mathfrak{M}, w \models \perp$		never,
$\mathfrak{M}, w \models \neg\varphi$	iff	not $\mathfrak{M}, w \models \varphi$ (notation: $\mathfrak{M}, w \not\models \varphi$),
$\mathfrak{M}, w \models \varphi \wedge \psi$	iff	$\mathfrak{M}, w \models \varphi$ and $\mathfrak{M}, w \models \psi$,
$\mathfrak{M}, w \models \varphi \rightarrow \psi$	iff	$\mathfrak{M}, w \not\models \varphi$ or $\mathfrak{M}, w \models \psi$,
$\mathfrak{M}, w \models \langle m \rangle \varphi$	iff	for some $v \in W$ such that $R^m wv$ we have $\mathfrak{M}, v \models \varphi$,
$\mathfrak{M}, w \models [m] \varphi$	iff	for all $v \in W$ such that $R^m wv$ we have $\mathfrak{M}, v \models \varphi$.

Semantics



Shallow (Semantical) Embedding in HOL

HOL (meta-logic)

$\varphi ::=$ 

L (object-logic)

$\psi ::=$ 

Embedding of  in 

 = 

 = 

 = 

 = 

 = 

Shallow (Semantical) Embedding in HOL

HOL $s, t ::= c_\alpha \mid x_\alpha \mid (\lambda x_\alpha s_\beta)_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta} \mid (s_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta} t_\alpha)_\beta \mid \neg s_o \mid s_o \vee t_o \mid \forall x_\alpha t_o$

HOML $\varphi, \psi ::= \dots \mid \neg \varphi \mid \varphi \wedge \psi \mid \varphi \rightarrow \psi \mid \Box \varphi \mid \Diamond \varphi \mid \forall x_\gamma \varphi \mid \exists x_\gamma \varphi$

HOML in HOL: HOML formulas φ are mapped to HOL predicates $\varphi_{\mu \rightarrow o}$
(explicit representation of labelled formulas)

\neg	$= \lambda \varphi_{\mu \rightarrow o} \lambda w_\mu \neg \varphi w$
\wedge	$= \lambda \varphi_{\mu \rightarrow o} \lambda \psi_{\mu \rightarrow o} \lambda w_\mu (\varphi w \wedge \psi w)$
\rightarrow	$= \lambda \varphi_{\mu \rightarrow o} \lambda \psi_{\mu \rightarrow o} \lambda w_\mu (\neg \varphi w \vee \psi w)$
\forall	$= \lambda h_{\gamma \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)} \lambda w_\mu \forall d_\gamma h d w$
\exists	$= \lambda h_{\gamma \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)} \lambda w_\mu \exists d_\gamma h d w$
\Box	$= \lambda \varphi_{\mu \rightarrow o} \lambda w_\mu \forall u_\mu (\neg r w u \vee \varphi u)$
\Diamond	$= \lambda \varphi_{\mu \rightarrow o} \lambda w_\mu \exists u_\mu (r w u \wedge \varphi u)$
valid	$= \lambda \varphi_{\mu \rightarrow o} \forall w_\mu \varphi w$

AX (polymorphic over γ)

The equations in Ax are given as axioms to the HOL provers!

Shallow (Semantical) Embedding in HOL

HOL $s, t ::= c_\alpha \mid x_\alpha \mid (\lambda x_\alpha s_\beta)_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta} \mid (s_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta} t_\alpha)_\beta \mid \neg s_o \mid s_o \vee t_o \mid \forall x_\alpha t_o$

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C. Benzmüller & L. Paulson (2013)
"Quantified Multimodal Logics in Simple Type Theory" Logica Universalis

The equations in Ax are given as axioms to the HOL provers!

Shallow (Semantical) Embedding in Isabelle/HOL

```
consts aRel::"w⇒w⇒bool" (infixr "r")
abbreviation mbox :: "(w⇒bool)⇒(w⇒bool)" ("□_") where "□φ ≡ (λw. ∀v. w r v → φ v)"
abbreviation mdia :: "(w⇒bool)⇒(w⇒bool)" ("◊_") where "◊φ ≡ (λw. ∃v. w r v ∧ φ v)"
```

```
abbreviation mnot::"(w⇒bool)⇒(w⇒bool)" ("¬_") where "¬φ ≡ λw. ¬(φ w)"
abbreviation mand::"(w⇒bool)⇒(w⇒bool)⇒(w⇒bool)" (infix "∧") where "φ ∧ ψ ≡ λw. (φ w) ∧ (ψ w)"
abbreviation mor::"(w⇒bool)⇒(w⇒bool)⇒(w⇒bool)" (infix "∨") where "φ ∨ ψ ≡ λw. (φ w) ∨ (ψ w)"
abbreviation mimp::"(w⇒bool)⇒(w⇒bool)⇒(w⇒bool)" (infix "→") where "φ → ψ ≡ λw. (φ w) → (ψ w)"
```

```
consts Actualized::"e⇒w⇒bool" (infix "actualizedAt")
abbreviation mforallAct::"(e⇒w⇒bool)⇒(w⇒bool)" ("∀^A")
  where "∀^AΦ ≡ λw. ∀x. (x actualizedAt w) → (Φ x w)"
abbreviation mexistsAct::"(e⇒w⇒bool)⇒(w⇒bool)" ("∃^A")
  where "∃^AΦ ≡ λw. ∃x. (x actualizedAt w) ∧ (Φ x w)"
```

axiomatization where

T: " $\boxed{[\forall\varphi. \square\varphi \rightarrow \varphi]}$ " **and** (* or simply T: "reflexive aRel")
 B: " $\boxed{[\forall\varphi. \varphi \rightarrow \square\Diamond\varphi]}$ " **and** (* or simply T: "symmetric aRel")
 IV: " $\boxed{[\forall\varphi. \square\varphi \rightarrow \square\square\varphi]}$ " **and** (* or simply T: "transitive aRel")
 V: " $\boxed{[\forall\varphi. \Diamond\varphi \rightarrow \square\Diamond\varphi]}$ " (* or simply T: "euclidean aRel")


We can combine logics by
adding/removing
(meta-)axioms and definitions
in the embedding logic.




Embedding Non-Classical Logics in HOL

Logics **L** embedded in HOL (with quantifiers!)


- Multi-modal & hybrid logics
- **Deontic logics** & conditional logics
- Many-valued logics
- Free logics (e.g. for category theory)
- 2D-semantics (Kaplan's Logic of Indexicals)
- Dynamic logics (incl. logics of preference & **public announcement logics**)
- **paraconsistent logics** & paracomplete logics
- **Substructural logics** (Lambek calculus, relevance logics, linear logics, etc.)







The screenshot shows the official Isabelle website homepage. It features a logo of colored blocks (red, yellow, blue, green) and the word "Isabelle". A sidebar on the left includes links for Home, Overview, Installation, Documentation, and Site Mirrors (Cambridge (uk), Munich (de), Sydney (au), Potsdam, NY (us)). The main content area has a purple header "What is Isabelle?". Below it, a paragraph describes Isabelle as a generic proof assistant. A section titled "Now available: Isabelle2017 (October 2017)" includes download links for Mac OS X (with an Apple icon) and Linux/Windows (with a generic file icon). At the bottom, there's a list of "Some notable changes" and a link to "See also the cumulative NEWS".


D. Kirschner, C. Benzmüller & E. Zalta
 "Computer Science and Metaphysics: A Cross-Fertilization" Open Philosophy, 2 (2019)








HOL as Universal Meta-Logic



HOL as Universal Meta-Logic





The Universal (?) Logical Reasoning Programme

Leibniz's “Calculemus”

“... if controversies were to arise, there would be no more need of disputation between two philosophers than between two accountants. For it would suffice for them to take their pencils in their hands and to sit down at the abacus, and say to each other: *Calculemus.*”

characteristica universalis

$$\begin{aligned}
 & (\forall x.(P(x) \wedge Q(x)) \leftrightarrow ((\forall x.P(x)) \wedge (\forall x.Q(x)))) \\
 & (\exists x.(P(x) \wedge Q(x)) \rightarrow ((\exists x.P(x)) \wedge (\exists x.Q(x)))) \\
 & (\exists x.(P(x) \vee Q(x)) \leftrightarrow ((\exists x.P(x)) \vee (\exists x.Q(x)))) \\
 & ((\forall x.P(x)) \vee (\forall x.Q(x))) \rightarrow (\forall x.(P(x) \vee Q(x))) \\
 & (\exists x.\forall y.R(x,y)) \rightarrow (\forall y.\exists x.R(x,y)) \\
 & (\neg(\exists x.P(x))) \leftrightarrow (\forall x.(\neg P(x))) \\
 & (\neg(\forall x.P(x))) \leftrightarrow (\exists x.(\neg P(x))) \\
 & (\neg(\exists x \in t.P(x))) \leftrightarrow (\forall x \in t.(\neg P(x))) \\
 & (\neg(\forall x \in t.P(x))) \leftrightarrow (\exists x \in t.(\neg P(x))) \\
 & (\forall x.(x = t \rightarrow F(x)) \leftrightarrow F(t)) \\
 & (\exists x.(x = t \wedge F(x)) \leftrightarrow F(t))
 \end{aligned}$$


The Universal and Pluralistic Logical Reasoning Programme

Leibniz's “Calculemus”

“... if controversies were to arise, there would be no more need of disputation between two philosophers than between two accountants. For it would suffice for them to take their pencils in their hands and to sit down at the abacus, and say to each other: *Calculemus.*”



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 & (\exists x.(P(x) \vee Q(x)) \leftrightarrow ((\exists x.P(x)) \vee (\exists x.Q(x)))) \\
 & ((\forall x.P(x)) \vee (\forall x.Q(x))) \rightarrow (\forall x.(P(x) \vee Q(x))) \\
 & (\exists x.\forall y.R(x, y)) \rightarrow (\forall y.\exists x.R(x, y)) \\
 & (\neg(\exists x.P(x)) \leftrightarrow (\forall x.(\neg P(x))) \\
 & (\neg(\neg x.P(x)) \leftrightarrow x.P(x)) \\
 & (\neg(\neg x.P(x)) \leftrightarrow x.P(x))
 \end{aligned}$$

Domain specific!



Domain specific!



A Digression:



Artificial Intelligence
Volume 287, October 2020, 103348



Designing normative theories for ethical and legal reasoning: LogIKEY framework, methodology, and tool support ☆

Christoph Benzmüller^{b, a}  , Xavier Parent^a , Leendert van der Torre^{a, c} 

Show more ▾

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2020.103348>


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LogIKEY: Flexible Ethico-Legal Reasoning (in HOL)




A Digression:

The LogiKEy Layers




A Digression:

The LogiKEy Layers




A Digression:

The LogiKEy Layers




A Digression:

The LogiKEy Layers



LogiKEy as a Framework for Trustworthy AI




Benzmüller, Parent & van der Torre. "Designing Normative Theories of Ethical Reasoning: Formal Framework, Methodology, and Tool Support". Artificial Intelligence (2020)

“Layered” Reasoning

Automated Theorem Proving is hard...

...like searching for a needle in a haystack



Automated Theorem Proving is hard...

...or even harder!

The Space of Proofs

“... The overriding difficulty met at every turn was the unimaginably vast size of the space of proofs, a space in which all proofs solving a particular problem at hand might well be as unreachable as the farthest stars in the most distant galaxies. Consideration of quite short proofs suffices to illustrate this combinatorial explosion: even for systems of logic of the sort studied in this book that have just one axiom, for instance, there can be more 10-step proofs than kilometers in a light year, more 15-step proofs than stars in a trillion Milky Ways.”

Foreword (by Dolph Ulrich) of the book “Automated Reasoning and the Discovery of Missing and Elegant Proofs” by Larry Wos & Gail W. Pieper

Automated Theorem Proving is hard...

... that came from an
automated reasoning in
first-order logic (FOL) book



Automated Theorem Proving is hard...

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What about HOL?



Automated Theorem Proving is hard...

... that came from an automated reasoning in first-order logic (FOL) book

What about HOL?

- Worst-case theoretical analysis:



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What about HOL?

- Worst-case theoretical analysis:
“intractable”



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What about HOL?

- Worst-case theoretical analysis:
“intractable”
- Software engineering/AI:



Automated Theorem Proving is hard...

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What about HOL?

- Worst-case theoretical analysis:
“intractable”
- Software engineering/AI:
“it depends”



Automated Theorem Proving is hard...

... that came from an automated reasoning in first-order logic (FOL) book

What about HOL?

- Worst-case theoretical analysis:
“intractable”
- Software engineering/AI:
“it depends”



**Domain
specific!**

Automated Theorem Proving is hard...


... that came from an automated reasoning in first-order logic (FOL) book

What about HOL?


- **Optimistic** theoretical analysis:



Automated Theorem Proving is hard...




Automated Theorem Proving is hard...



Automated reasoning in HOL is more complex, but more rewarding!

Automated Theorem Proving is hard...



Proofs in HOL can be short, elegant (and arguably more intuitive)

A Digression:

Wormholes in Proof-Space

It is possible to obtain (hyper-)exponentially smaller proofs to a given problem by moving from an N-order encoding to an N+1-order one.

Classic references:

- **(claim)** K. Gödel “Über die Länge von Beweisen” (1936)
- **(proof)** S. Buss “On Gödel's theorems on lengths of proofs. I-II” (1994-95)

A Digression:

Wormholes in Proof-Space

Paper advertisement:

“*Who Finds the Short Proof?*” (Benzmüller, Fuenmayor, Steen & Sutcliffe, 2022)

Follow-up for:

“*A Lost Proof*” (Benzmüller & Kerber, 2001)

Motivated by:

“*A Curious Inference*” (Boolos 1987)

“*Don’t eliminate cut!*” (Boolos 1984)

A Digression:

Wormholes in Proof-Space

Who Finds the Short Proof?

Folbert and Holly (waiting at the gates of heaven) become engaged in a **theorem proving contest** in which they have to pose **first-order** proof problems to each other, and the one whose **ATP solves the given problem the faster will be admitted to heaven**. **Folbert goes for first-order ATPs and Holly for higher-order ATPs.**

A Digression:

Wormholes in Proof-Space

Who Finds the Short Proof?

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We **quote** from Benzmüller, Fuenmayor, Steen & Sutcliffe (2022):

"Key to Holly's advantage are the (hyper-)exponentially shorter proofs that are possible as one moves up the ladder of expressiveness from first-order logic to second-order logic, to third-order logic, and so on [Gö36]. The fact that the proof problems are stated in FO logic does not matter. When stating the same problem in the same FO way but in higher-order logic, much shorter proofs are possible, some of which might even be (hyper-)exponentially shorter than the proofs that can be found with comparatively inexpressive FO ATPs. A very prominent example of such a short proof is that of Boolos' Curious Inference [Boo87]."

A Digression:

Wormholes in Proof-Space

Boolos “A Curious Inference” (1987):

$$\forall n. f(n, e) = s(e) \tag{A1}$$

$$\forall y. f(e, s(y)) = s(s(f(e, y))) \tag{A2}$$

$$\forall x y. f(s(x), s(y)) = f(x, f(s(x), y)) \tag{A3}$$

$$d(e) \tag{A4}$$

$$\forall x. d(x) \rightarrow d(s(x)) \tag{A5}$$

$$d(f(s(s(s(s(e))))), s(s(s(s(e)))))) \tag{C}$$

A Digression:

Wormholes in Proof-Space

$$\forall n. f(n, e) = s(e) \tag{A1}$$

$$\forall y. f(e, s(y)) = s(s(f(e, y))) \tag{A2}$$

$$\forall x y. f(s(x), s(y)) = f(x, f(s(x), y)) \tag{A3}$$

$$d(e) \tag{A4}$$

$$\forall x. d(x) \rightarrow d(s(x)) \tag{A5}$$

$$d(f(s(s(s(s(e))))), s(s(s(s(e)))))) \tag{C}$$

- Axioms **A1-A3** capture the fact that f belongs to a class of extremely fast growing functions, also known as Ackermann(-style) functions.

A Digression:

Wormholes in Proof-Space

$$\forall n. f(n, e) = s(e) \tag{A1}$$

$$\forall y. f(e, s(y)) = s(s(f(e, y))) \tag{A2}$$

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- Axioms **A1-A3** capture the fact that f belongs to a class of extremely fast growing functions, also known as Ackermann(-style) functions.
- Axioms **A4-A5** introduce an inductive set “ d ”

A Digression:

Wormholes in Proof-Space

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- This proof problem is solvable in a “cut-free” first-order calculus by applying an astronomically large number of modus ponens steps to **A4** and (instances of) **A5**.

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$$p = \lambda x y. (\lambda z. \forall X. ind\ X \rightarrow Xz)\ fxy \quad (\text{Def_}p)$$

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
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
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
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
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Domain
specific!




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


The “Problem of Formalization”




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- Almost nothing afterwards in ATP. Some hints in ITP (premise selection, “hammers”).

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
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- Fusion of horizons: mixing “**top-down**” & “**bottom-up**”:
 - **Top-down** proof planning (Bundy & co.; cf. also OMEGA system team)
 - **Bottom-up** theory construction (Buchberger's *Theorema* system; systems like *IsaScheme*, *IsaCosy*, *Hipster*, etc.)


The “Problem of Formalization”

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
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
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Cf. Fuenmayor & Benzmüller (2019)

- “A computational-hermeneutic approach for conceptual explication”
- “Computational hermeneutics: An integrated approach for the logical analysis of natural-language arguments”


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
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The “Problem of Formalization”

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- **Next step:** A combinators-based (aka. “point-free”) mathematical language (on top of HOL) as a vehicle to navigate the interpretation space.



The “Building Blocks” Approach to Mathematical Logic

- First presented in a 1920 talk by Moses Schönfinkel

STEPHEN WOLFRAM | *Writings*

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
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
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- Stephen Wolfram has recently done some research on what (may have) happened.

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
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The “Building Blocks” Approach to Mathematical Logic

Recalling:

HOL = *Simply-Typed Lambda Calculus
extended with a generic constant symbol
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My work: The best of both worlds!

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An implementation: “Combinatory Logic Bricks Library”

<https://github.com/davfuenmayor/logic-bricks>



The “Building Blocks” Approach to Universal/Pluralistic Logic(s)

A very quick “one-minute” demo:


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
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
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- Concepts are introduced as clusters of equivalent definitions (with the main one being “point-free”).



Yet another digression:

Knowledge Representation and Reasoning without variables (aka. “point-free style”)

- The “compositionality mindset” taken to its extreme.

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- LLMs can cope with much easier (e.g. avoiding complex variable-substitution bookkeeping).

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- Agents
 - as in “multi-agent systems” but also “AI agents”



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- ...



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The “Combinatory Logic Bricks” Isabelle/HOL library:

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is a first step towards implementing this CNL.



Past Present Hype: Reasoning Agents

Contemporary AI is an 80's party



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 - Planning
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
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Usability??



Current Work: Truth-grounding signal for “AI Agents”


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
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- AI-agents can generate/modify and formally check Isabelle theories (via Isabelle-server + Python/Elixir Isabelle-client)
- Isabelle processes can invoke arbitrary external programs (e.g. LLM agents) as “abductive oracles” (e.g. to suggest “cut” definitions and lemmata)





Thanks for your attention!

Discussion / Q&A