# Mutual Monitoring in the Cloud

Final Presentation

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#### The Problem

- Cloud computing infrastructure is essentially ubiquitous.
- Cloud service providers must cater to customers, especially regulated ones.
- A major barrier is ongoing evaluation of the provider's cybersecurity posture.
- The results are often centralized bureaucracies.

### The Problem

- Are cloud security bureaucracies the right way?
- Are they the only way?
- Who watches the watchers?



# FedRAMP

#### The Solution

- Analyze FedRAMP ConMon's strengths and weaknesses.
- Design an alternative model, for FedRAMP and similar programs.
  - Stakeholders mutually monitor each other with transparency services.
  - o Forgo control-driven assessment, focus measurable security properties.
  - Use a simple quantitative framework for measuring properties.
- Do not certify, do not authorize, but **measure** *each other*.

## How Did You Design This Solution?

- Previous engagement in standards bodies (NIST; FedRAMP; IETF)
- Analyzing industry trends and academic research
- Coding public feedback in FedRAMP's 20x forums

# **Background**

- What is FedRAMP?
- What is FedRAMP ConMon?
- What works?
- What doesn't?


#### What is FedRAMP?

In mid-2009, an interagency effort, created under the Federal Cloud Computing Initiative, was established to focus on solving a single problem statement—How do we best perform security authorization and *continuous monitoring for outsourced and multiagency systems*?

Metheny, M. (2017). Introduction to the federal cloud computing strategy. In Federal Cloud Computing (pp. 239). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-809710-6.00001-9

### What Were the FedRAMP Processes? (+ JAB)

# **FedRAMP Authorization Process**



**Note**: Readiness Assessment is required for the JAB Process and is optional but highly recommended for the Agency Process

### What Are the FedRAMP Processes? ( — JAB)

01

**Preparation** 

02

**Authorization** 

03

**Continuous Monitoring** 

#### Readiness Assessment

(Optional, but highly recommended)

- O
- RAR Development
- FedRAMP PMO Review of RAR
- Remediation (if needed)
- FedRAMP Marketplace Designation Ready



#### **Pre-Authorization**

- Partnership Establishment
  - Authorization Planning
  - Kickoff Meeting
- FedRAMP Marketplace Designation In Process

#### **Full Security Assessment**



Security Authorization Package (SSP, SAP, SAR, POA&M)\*



#### **Agency Authorization Process**

- Agency Review of Security Authorization Package
- SAR Debrief
- Remediation
- Agency Final Review
- Agency Issues ATO
- FedRAMP PMO Review
- Remediation (if needed)
- FedRAMP Marketplace Designation Authorized

#### **Post Authorization**



Ongoing Continuous Monitoring Deliverables



Annual Assessment

<sup>\*</sup> The full security assessment may be prepared in advance of the authorization phase, or completed during the authorization phase. This is dependent on the agency's review approach.

#### What is FedRAMP ConMon?

- Monthly assessments
  - Updated inventory; vulnerability scans; remediation plan
- Significant change requests
- Annual assessments
  - Updated inventory; vulnerability scans; remediation plan
  - Subset of full initial assessment

#### What is FedRAMP ConMon?

- Out-of-band coordination between provider and agency customers
- Manual upload of all data to max.gov or high repository
- Review by agency and FedRAMP PMO staff (sometimes separately)
- Synchronous meetings to review and adjust POA&Ms

#### What works?

- Consistent process (when followed)
- Rigor in third-party analysis and checking
- Standardized reporting
  - Detecting gaps in coverage at points in time
  - Analyzing trends in cloud security posture

#### What doesn't?

- Manual review and analysis mechanisms
- Too many different processes based on provider details
- No automation to retrieve continuous monitoring data
- No automation to combine data with "CSPs of the CSP"
- Centralized reviews and approvals slow change

#### What doesn't?

- No means to continuously check auditor, agency, or FedRAMP repository
- Lack of verifiable trust mechanisms for alternatives
  - Decentralized systems
  - Federated systems

## **Solution**

- Prototyping software
- Architecture specification

### **Prototyping**

- Started Transparency Service API after first rough draft of spec
  - Python 3 and Flask REST API framework
  - Open-source cryptograph, cwt and requests libraries
- Finished initial shared utils works
- Encountered trouble interpreting multiple IETF specs with more time allotted

## **Architecture Specification**

- Use Cases
- Architecture
- Components
- Flows

	Yes	No
Did you request access to max.gov FedRAMP package?	2	6
Did you receive max.gov's FedRAMP package?	3	5

	-2	-1	0	1	2	~
MAX.gov effective?	2	1	2	3	_	<u></u>
Leveraged system data effective today?	1	1	5	-	1	<u></u>
Leveraged system data important in future?	-	-	_	1	7	
Submitting raw data effective today?	-	4	2	2	-	
Submitting raw data important in future?	_	_	1	3	4	
Summarizing and linking to it important?	_	_	-	3	5	

	-2	-1	0	1	2	~
OSCAL important today?	1	2	2	_	4	
OSCAL important in future?	1	-	1	2	4	
Digital signatures effective today?	3	2	3	_	_	
Use digital signatures often today?	4	1	1	_	2	
Digital signatures important in future?	-	_	1	2	5	

	-2	-1	0	1	2	~
Common scanning support effective today?	1	2	_	3	2	
Common scanning support important in future?	1	_	_	1	6	
Significant change tracking effective today?	3	2	2	1	_	
Significant change tracking important in future?	-	1	_	1	6	

	-2	-1	0	1	2	~
Vulnerability management effective today?	1	2	2	1	2	<u></u>
Vulnerability management important in future?	-	-	1	_	7	
Securing confidential data effective today?	1	-	1	4	2	
Securing confidential data important in future?	_	_	1	_	7	

	-2	-1	0	1	2	~
3PAO measurement effective today?	2	3	2	1	_	
3PAO measurement important in future?	-	_	2	3	3	
Economic incentives effective today?	3	3	_	2	_	
Economic incentives important in future?	_	1	_	_	7	
Centralization effective today?	-	2	3	2	1	
Decentralization important in future?	3	_	2	1	3	

#### **Solution Limitations**

- Incomplete transparency service implementation
- Additional use cases for quantitative measurement framework
- Interaction patterns for ecosystem of different transparency services

### **Solution Limitations**

- Encrypted data storage for adjacent service confidentiality
- Custom role-based access control for adjacent service confidentiality
- Concrete privacy-enhancing techniques for transparency service confidentiality

### **Next Steps and Future Work**

- Complete a prototype implementation
- Vet new use cases for economic incentives of mutual monitoring
- Design applications of quantitative framework for new use cases
- Design privacy-enhancing techniques for transparency service confidentiality

### Feedback

- You can provide feedback in multiple ways.
- Post in the class discussion board in Canvas.
- Open issues in my GitHub repo at github.com/aj-stein/practicum/issues.



### **Conclusion**

Et fin.

(Find me on the Internet if you want to learn more.)