Investigation(Aside): OilRig Case Study

Webshells used by OilRig and their respective goals

Webshell	Goal		
HyperShell	 Variant of the TwoFace loader which when decrypted, drops the webshell, HighShell. 		
HighShell v5.0	 Variant of the TwoFace payload with two exceptions in the user interface, a version number and a means of displaying error messages and command results. Also includes a salt value applied to the actor-provided password for authentication. Another variant of HighShell v5.0 introduced an explorer tab to navigate the file system of the compromised server. 		
HighShell v7.1	• Expanded to split main functionality across multiple tabs, 'Command', 'Explorer', 'Upload', 'SQL Server' and 'Change Time'.		
HighShell v8.6.2/v8.8.5	 Enhanced user interface. Includes a front end user interface that interacts with a back end script via AJAX web requests. New executable modules '7za' to archive files from the Explorer tab, 'nbtscan' to scan the network for systems to build an IP list it can interact with and 'rx' for remote execution. The Network downloader functionality to allow the actor to quickly upload user files from remote victim systems and rapidly check for the creation of new files by network users. The spy check feature that compares the SHA256 hash of the HighShell front end to notify the actor to avoid using the webshell in the event of modification of the webshell. 		
Minion	 Variant of HighShell. Extends functionality by including modules 'Hobocopy', a backup/copy tool and 'Tardigrande' a port-scanning, screenshot tool. 		

Logical abstraction to get to writing indicators of compromise

ЮС	Tool Used	Data required to analyse	Logical abstraction to get to IOC
Poison Frog / Myleftheart[.]com	Poison Frog (backdoor)	The dropper 'poisonfrog.ps1' which installs the poison frog agents 'hUpdater.ps1' that uses HTTP for C2 and 'dUpdater.ps1' that uses DNS tunneling for C2.	 For the agent, there should be a server that would allow the actor to interact with the compromised system. Both of the poison frog agent scripts were configured to use this domain as its C2 server.
office365-manage ment[.]com (185.162.235[.]29) msoffice-cdn[.]com (185.162.235[.]121)	DNS Hijacking Script	An example adversary IP for the legitimate domain to be redirected to.	• The examination of the Class C IP block of 185.162.235[.]0/24 showed these domains which were previously identified as C2 servers for OilRig.
185.162.235[.]106	DNS Hijacking Script	Analysis of the IP.	 The analysis of this IP provided possible relationships to previous OilRig infrastructure. The examination of the hosting provider showed that this IP was associated with an Iranian hosting provider called NovinVPS. The autonomous system name of the IP showed that the allocation was controlled by Serverius Holding B.V., which was previously associated with OilRig.
185.161.209[.]57 / 185.161.210[.]25	Administr ative panel for a VPS account on DeltaHost	Screenshots of web browser sessions into VPS administrative panels.	These IPs were listed in the panel and were in the same range as an IP associated with the DNSpionage campaign.

			The combination of the use of DeltaHost and IPs belonging to a fairly small range.
OopsIE payload / 193.111.152[.]13	Administr ative panel for a VPS account on DeltaHost	Screenshots of web browser sessions into VPS administrative panels.	Observation of an organisation targetted by OilRig downloading a zip archive '[redacted]-ITsoftwareU pdate.exe', a variant of the OopsIE Trojan from this address, suggesting the server was in use by OilRig at the time.
164.132.67[.]216	Glimpse (backdoor)	Screenshots of remote desktop (RDP) sessions showing the Glimpse panel.	• Screenshot in leak of RDP session with a server running the Glimpse C2.
142.234.157[.]21	Scarecrow (backdoor)	Screenshots of web browser sessions displaying the Scarecrow panel.	The server of this backdoor is hosted on this address and it is evident in the snapshot that multiple systems were compromised.