

# 'MATH+ECON+CODE' MASTERCLASS ON MATCHING MODELS, OPTIMAL TRANSPORT AND APPLICATIONS

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Spring 2019

Wednesday: "Optimal transport II"

Block 8. A short tutorial on convex analysis

- ▶ A short tutorial on convex analysis

- ▶ [OTME], Ch. 6
- ▶ Rockafellar (1970). *Convex analysis*. Princeton.

# Section 1

## THEORY

- Assume that  $P$  and  $Q$  have a convex support with nonempty interior. Recall that if a dual minimizer  $(u, v)$  exists,  $u$  and  $v$  are related by

$$v(y) = \max_{x \in \mathbb{R}^d} \{x^\top y - u(x)\} \quad (1)$$

$$u(x) = \max_{y \in \mathbb{R}^d} \{x^\top y - v(y)\} \quad (2)$$

(we can always assign the value  $+\infty$  to  $u$  outside of the support of  $P$  and same for  $v$ ).

- This expression is a fundamental tool in convex analysis: it is called the *Legendre-Fenchel transform*, which is defined in general by:

## DEFINITION

The Legendre-Fenchel transform of  $u$  is defined by

$$u^*(y) = \sup_{x \in \mathbb{R}^d} \{x^\top y - u(x)\}. \quad (3)$$

## PROPOSITION

*The following holds:*

(i)  $u^*$  is convex.

(ii)  $u_1 \leq u_2$  implies  $u_1^* \geq u_2^*$ .

(iii) (Fenchel's inequality):  $u(x) + u^*(y) \geq x^\top y$ .

(iv)  $u^{**} \leq u$  with equality iff  $u$  is convex.

As an immediate corollary of (iv), we get the fundamental result:

## PROPOSITION

*If  $u$  is convex, then  $u = (u^*)^*$ . The converse holds true.*

## EXAMPLE

One has:

- (i) For  $u(x) = |x|^2/2$ , one gets  $u^*(y) = |y|^2/2$ .
- (ii) For  $u(x) = \sum_i \lambda_i x_i^2/2$ ,  $\lambda_i > 0$ , one gets  $u^*(y) = \sum_i \lambda_i^{-1} y_i^2/2$ .
- (iii) The entropy function

$$u(x) = \begin{cases} \sum_{i=1}^d x_i \ln x_i & \text{for } x \geq 0, \sum_{i=1}^d x_i = 1 \\ +\infty & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

has a Legendre transform which is the log-partition function, a.k.a. logit function

$$u^*(y) = \ln \left( \sum_{i=1}^d e^{y_i} \right).$$

We now restate the demand sets of workers and firms in terms of subdifferentials of convex functions. For this, let us recall the basic economic interpretation of relations (1)-(2), which we had previously spelled out: Expression (1) captures the problem of a firm of type  $y$ , which hires a worker  $x$  who offers the best trade-off between production if hired by  $y$  (that is  $\Phi(x, y) = x^\top y$ ) and wage  $u(x)$ . Thus, firm  $y$  will be willing to match with any worker within the set of maximizers of (1), while worker  $x$  will be willing to match with any firm within the set of maximizers of (2). The set of maximizers of (1) and of (2) are called *subdifferentials* of  $v$  and  $u$ ,



## DEFINITION

Let  $u : \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ . The subdifferential of  $u$  at  $x$ , denoted  $\partial u(x)$ , is the set of  $y \in \mathbb{R}^d$  such that  $\forall \tilde{x} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ ,  $u(\tilde{x}) \geq u(x) + y^\top (\tilde{x} - x)$ .

- The definition does *not* require  $u$  to be convex; however, if  $u$  is convex, Definition 5 immediately implies that

$$\partial u(x) = \arg \max_y \{x^\top y - u^*(y)\}, \quad (4)$$

hence the subdifferential of a convex function is always nonempty (while the subdifferential of a non-convex function can be empty in general).

- When  $u$  is differentiable and convex, then

$$\partial u(x) = \{\nabla u(x)\}.$$

## EXAMPLE

When  $u(x) = |x|$ , one has  $\partial u(x) = \{-1\}$  if  $x < 0$ ,  $\{+1\}$  if  $x > 0$ , and  $[-1, +1]$  if  $x = 0$ .

It also follows that if  $u$  is a convex function, the following statements are equivalent:

$$(i) \quad u(x) + u^*(y) = x^\top y \quad (5)$$

$$(ii) \quad y \in \partial u(x) \quad (6)$$

$$(iii) \quad x \in \partial u^*(y). \quad (7)$$

Going back to our worker-firm example, this has a straightforward economic interpretation. If worker  $x$  chooses firm  $y$ , then  $y$  maximizes  $x^\top \tilde{y} - u^*(\tilde{y})$  over  $\tilde{y}$ , thus  $y \in \partial u(x)$ . This means that while worker  $x$ 's equilibrium wage  $u(x)$  is in general greater or equal than the value  $x^\top y - u^*(y)$  she can extract from firm  $y$ , those two values necessarily coincide if  $x$  and  $y$  are willing to match, in which case  $u(x) + u^*(y) = x^\top y$ .

These considerations allow us to relate the solutions to the primal and dual problems. Recall that in the finite-dimensional case, where the primal and the dual problems are related by a complementary slackness condition. In the present case, let  $(X, Y) \sim \pi$  be a solution to the primal problem, and  $(u, u^*)$  be a solution to the dual problem. Then almost surely  $X$  and  $Y$  are willing to match, which, by the previous discussion, implies that

$$u(X) + u^*(Y) = X^\top Y, \quad (8)$$

or equivalently  $Y \in \partial u(X)$  or in turn  $X \in \partial u^*(Y)$ . In other words, the support of  $\pi$  is included in the set  $\{(x, y) : u(x) + u^*(y) = x^\top y\}$ . This condition appears as the correct generalization of the complementary slackness condition in the finite-dimensional case. Without surprise, taking the expectation with respect to  $\pi$  of equality (8) yields the equality between the value of the dual problem on the left-hand side, and the value of the primal problem on the right-hand side.

More can be said when  $u$  is differentiable at  $x$ . In that case, it is not hard to show that  $\partial u(x) = \{\nabla u(x)\}$ , i.e. contains only one point, which is  $\nabla u(x) = (\partial u(x) / \partial x_i)_i$ , the vector of partial derivatives of  $u$ , or gradient of  $u$ . Similarly, if  $u^*$  is differentiable at  $y$ , then  $\partial u^*(y) = \{\nabla u^*(y)\}$ . Hence, if  $u$  and  $v$  are differentiable, then the equivalence between (6) and (7) implies that  $y = \nabla u(x)$  if and only if  $x = \nabla u^*(y)$ , that is

$$(\nabla u)^{-1} = \nabla u^*. \quad (9)$$

Alternatively, relation (9) can be seen as a duality between first-order conditions and the envelope theorem. First order conditions in the firm's problem (1) implies that if worker  $x$  is chosen by firm  $y$ , then  $\nabla u(x) = y$ , but the envelope theorem implies that the gradient in  $y$  of the firm's indirect profit  $u^*(y)$  is given by  $\nabla u^*(y) = x$ , where  $x$  is chosen by  $y$ . Thus the first-order conditions and the envelope theorem are “conjugate” in the sense of convex analysis.

## EXAMPLE

When  $u(x) = \sum_i \lambda_i x_i^2 / 2$ ,  $\lambda_i > 0$ , recall that  $u^*(y) = \sum_i \lambda_i^{-1} y_i^2 / 2$ . Define  $\Lambda = \text{diag}(\lambda)$ . One has  $\nabla u(x) = \Lambda x$  and  $\nabla u^*(y) = \Lambda^{-1} y$ .

Assume both  $u$  and  $u^*$  are strictly convex and differentiable. Then it can be shown that their Hessians are invertible at all points, and that if  $y = \nabla u(x)$ , then

$$D^2 u^*(y) = \left( D^2 u(x) \right)^{-1}.$$

This can be obtained by differentiating the relationship  $\nabla u^*(y) = (\nabla u)^{-1}(y)$ .

## Section 2

# EXERCISES

## EXERCISE

Compute the Legendre-Fenchel transforms of the following functions:

- (i)  $u(x) = x^T \Sigma x / 2$ , where  $\Sigma$  is a positive definite matrix, one has  $u^*(y) = y^T \Sigma^{-1} y / 2$ .
- (ii) Let  $p > 1$  and  $u(x) = \frac{1}{p} \|x\|^p$ , where  $\|\cdot\|$  is the Euclidean norm. Then  $u^*(y) = \frac{1}{q} \|y\|^q$ , where  $q > 1$  such that  $1/p + 1/q = 1$ .
- (iii)  $u(x) = 1 \{x \in [0, 1]\}$ .

## EXERCISE

Give the subdifferentials of the following functions from  $\mathbb{R}$  to  $\mathbb{R}$ :

- (a)  $u(x) = \max(x, 0)$ .
- (b)  $u(x) = \max(f(x), g(x))$ , where both  $f$  and  $g$  are convex and differentiable.
- (c)  $u(x) = \max_{1 \leq i \leq n} \{a_i x + b_i\}$ , where  $a_1 < a_2 < \dots < a_n$ .
- (d)  $u(x) = -x^2$ .

Consider the entropy function

$$u(x) = \begin{cases} \sum_{i=1}^d x_i \ln x_i & \text{for } x \geq 0, \sum_{i=1}^d x_i = 1 \\ +\infty & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

As it is defined on the simplex, it is not a differentiable function from  $\mathbb{R}^d$  to  $\mathbb{R}$ . Instead, let us take  $x_d = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{d-1} x_i$ , and let us view  $u$  as a function  $\tilde{u}$  from  $\mathbb{R}^{d-1}$  to  $\mathbb{R}$ . We define

$$\tilde{u}(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{d-1} x_i \ln x_i + \left(1 - \sum_{i=1}^{d-1} x_i\right) \ln \left(1 - \sum_{i=1}^{d-1} x_i\right)$$

if  $x \geq 0, \sum_{i=1}^{d-1} x_i \leq 1$ ,  $\tilde{u}(x) = +\infty$  otherwise.



## EXERCISE

Show that:

(a) The Legendre transform of  $\tilde{u}$  is a function of  $\mathbb{R}^{d-1}$  to  $\mathbb{R}$  given by

$$\tilde{u}^*(y) = \ln \left( \sum_{i=1}^{d-1} e^{y_i} + 1 \right).$$

(b) The gradient of  $\tilde{u}$  is a vector in  $\mathbb{R}^{d-1}$  given by

$$\nabla \tilde{u}(x) = \left( \ln \left( \frac{x_i}{1 - \sum_{i=1}^{d-1} x_i} \right) \right)_{1 \leq i \leq d-1}$$

(c) The gradient of  $\tilde{u}^*$  is a vector in  $\mathbb{R}^{d-1}$  given by

$$\nabla \tilde{u}^*(y) = \left( \frac{e^{y_i}}{\sum_{i=1}^{d-1} e^{y_i} + 1} \right)_{1 \leq i \leq d-1}$$

(d) Compute  $D^2 \tilde{u}$  and  $D^2 \tilde{u}^*$ .