

French on the Outside, Jewish on the Inside

The French Model of Citizenship and the Jews

from 2000-2011

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Introduction

Beginning in 2000, with the start of the Second Intifada¹, the French Jews have experienced a profound crisis in regards to their place within the French model of citizenship. Faced with mounting acts of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism, many questioned the possibility of a Republican identity. During this same period, not only the Jews, but also other minority groups, especially from North Africa and the Middle East, have entered a similar crisis with regard to the ways in which they relate to the French concept of the citizen. While France is a country historically and presently welcoming of people from many backgrounds, in recent years the ways in which these new populations integrate into the existing French society has come into question. This is not to say that there is a mass exodus from France, or even profound dissatisfaction felt by the entire population, but instead there are the undercurrents of questioning exactly the ways in which this model can work today.

This re-examination has called into question the notion of French republican model itself, which adheres to a concept of the responsibility of the citizen in a very different way than that in the United States. In a global context, especially from an American, multiculturalist perspective, it is often difficult to understand at first glance the rational behind the laws pertaining to the French Republican model, such as the laws against the wearing of religious symbols in the public sphere.

Overall, the French idea of a nation is founded on a heritage dating from the French Revolution and Enlightenment thought. In summary, this model affirms the equality of all citizens by creating a separation between a private life and a public one. It

¹ The second intifada began in September 2000 and ended in 2005, though the exact date

is a model founded on the idea of equality, while not necessarily the idea of liberty. In the public sphere, the individual partakes in a common national identity as a citizen: devoid of any religious or ethnic ties, each individual is seen as exactly the same in the eyes of the state. In the private sphere, these ties and affiliations can be expressed. This model guarantees equality by ignoring anything that could manifest existing differences and, therefore inequalities. It runs contrary to a Liberal model, which is founded on the idea of a society wherein the State guarantees each individual's right to express himself. In the Liberal model, the French division between private and public does not exist. The United States follows a Liberal model, with an emphasis on the right of personal expression.

While as France does not officially recognize ethnic and religious groups in official government proceedings, these affiliations undeniably exist. Therefore, there is constantly a tension between the need for groups of affiliation to express their interests and the French negation of these groups. An in-depth examination of the Jews and their relation to this model illustrates this tension.

France has the third highest Jewish² population in the world,³ and has a long and complex history with this population. In 1791 it became the first country in Europe to

² In talking about the 'Jewish population' I am referring to a group of affiliation (to use a term from Dominique Schnapper). However, I will not be delving into the politics and religious debate behind who can call themselves Jewish, and what that identity means (for example, do both parents need to be Jewish for their child to be considered Jewish? Is being Jewish an ethnicity? A race?). Within the context of the paper, I will leave these questions un-examined.

³ Although it is very difficult to calculate the currently worldwide Jewish population, for a variety of reasons, including not limited to the ways in which one identifies as being Jewish; nevertheless, efforts have been made to produce some figures. As of 2010, according to the American-Israeli cooperative enterprise, Israel has the highest Jewish population with 5,703,700, the United States has the second with 5,275,000 and France

give its Jewish population the equal status as citizens and since then, efforts at integration have invariably involved the Jewish populations: from the laws under Napoleon to the current debate over the wearing of religious signs in public schools. Thus, the Jews can be seen as the litmus test for the state of the French model, and are used as a representation for examining the complexities of French model of citizenship. The relationship with the Jews is at the heart of the debate between religious groups and the principles of a Republican state, notably the laïcité.

The laïcité affirms France's identity as a secular country by demanding a strict separation between Church and State. While historically a Catholic country, this principle ensures that religious identity remains separate from the identity of the citizen. Thus, while belonging to a group of affiliation, such as a religious group, in the public sphere ideally all citizens are ensured equality by ignoring those affiliations. It is theoretically impossible to differentiate between races and ethnicities when discussing the public sphere. However, given that religious practice often enters the public sphere, this militant division can be unrealistic. Since the French Revolution, the Jewish population has struggled with maintaining a religious identity while adhering to the principles of the laïcité. One way has been through religious reform, which was common in the aftermath of emancipation in the mid 19th century.⁴ Another way this tension has been mitigated is through the organization of the religion and its relationship to the State.

has the third with 483,500
Jewish Virtual Library. "The Jewish Population of the World". 2010. Web.

⁴ While religious reform in France is very important to the Jewish people, and the French traditions are unique, an in-depth examination of religious reforms is outside the scope of this paper.

The French Jewry relates to the State through a series of organizations, both religious and cultural, whose goal is to facilitate the relationship between the state and the religion. Thus, although religion is separate from the State, the interest of religious groups is still represented by these institutions and still gets some representation on a State level, though not with as much power as the American Jewish lobby. The main institutions are the consistory, the CRIF and the FSJU.

Founded in 1806 by Napoleon, the consistory represents the cultural and religious interests of Jewish community. Its head is located in Paris, while regional branches exist throughout France, wherever there is a large enough population of Jews, ideally over 2,000 people. All officially recognized synagogues receive money from the consistory, and its goal is to represent the cultural and religious interests of the group and act as a link between the religion and the State. It thus navigates the relationship between French Jews and living in France, and its chief rabbi set the tone of the relationship of the French Jewry to France—a more observant chief rabbi translates into a more observant Jewish population in the eyes of the French government. Thus the consistory projects the status of the religion to the medias and general public.

While the consistory organizes the cultural aspects of French life, the CRIF, (conseil représentatif des institutions juives), founded in 1944; advocates for the community politically. Through its articles and statistics on acts of anti-Semitism, it is the measure for political advocacy for the community and the voice of the Jewish community in times of crisis. It was founded without a religious focus, though in recent years that has changed. Its goals are tri-fold,

to fight against all forms of anti-Semitism, of racism, of intolerance, and of exclusion; to affirm solidarity with and support of Israel and a peaceful solution to

the Middle East conflict; to preserve the memory of the Shoah so that future generations will not forget the Jewish victims of Nazi barbarianism.⁵

In addition, one of its functions is to host annual dinners with leaders of the French community, both Jewish and non-Jewish. Through these dinners they hope to foster dialogue and represent the community and its interests to a larger public, the aforementioned French society. Often these interests are related to anti-Semitism or the Middle-East conflict, though political issues in France can also be a theme. Overall, the CRIF as a secular organization sets the tone politically for the representation of the community.

In addition to the consistory and the CRIF, the FSJU (fonds social juif unifié) also organizes the community. The FSJU is the umbrella organization that represents cultural, social, and youth organizations. Its central fundraising comes from the AUJF (appel unifié Juif de France), located in Israel. It also organizes the social life of the Jewish community and the various smaller organizations. In addition, it has strong Zionist ties imposed with its emphasis on programming and visits to Israel. These efforts reinforce a sense of dual-affiliation between France and Israel felt by many, as the leading Jewish organizations have a Zionist agenda.

Thus, the Jewish community is represented primarily by three organizations—the consistory, the CRIF and the FSJU. These organizations mitigate the interests of the French community and government with those of the Jewish community.

⁵ CRIF. "Présentation Générale." Web.

La lutte contre toutes les formes d'antisémitisme, de racisme, d'intolérance et d'exclusion; L'affirmation de sa solidarité envers Israël et son soutien à une solution pacifique au conflit du Proche-Orient; La préservation de la mémoire de la Shoah, afin que les futures générations n'oublient pas les victimes juives de la barbarie nazie

In order to fully understand the French model of citizenship and how it relates to the Jews of France, an in-depth analysis of the Republican model is necessary. The theoretical base for defining a citizen within the French model will be defined primarily using the works of Dominique Schnapper, a sociologist and member of the Constitutional Council of France.

It is also necessary to understand the history of the Jews in France. Beginning with their Emancipation in 1791, and ending with the Six-Day War in 1967, a historical background will serve as a frame of reference for issues surrounding French identity. This section will consist of a summary of major events in the history of the French Jews, and demonstrating the ways in which the Jewish identity in France has evolved, both within the community and from the perspective of the State. The history helps to clarify the specific challenges Jews face in France, as provide an analysis of the historic conditions of the community. Through this history, the ways in which the French Jews identify with the State, and the ways in which this identification have changed, become apparent. The historians Rita Hermon-Belot, Esther Benbassa, Simon Schwarzfuchs and Paula Hyman are the primary sources for this chapter.

The third chapter will contain an in-depth media analysis of the current situation in France. Currently there is a double challenge to the traditional French Republican model—both political and social. On the a political level, the media and political institutions represent the Jewish and Arab populations in similar ways—as two populations who struggle find a place within French society. They are the two religious minority groups that refuse to fit into the French citizenship model. Ignoring historic, contemporary, religious, and cultural differences, French government tries to replicate the Jewish institutions for the Muslim community, such as the CFCM, an organization

designed to organize the community in the same way as the CRIF. This affiliation negates the enormous differences between the two groups, and poses difficulties for the larger French community.

The second challenge for the French Jewish community is the recent rise of anti-Semitism over the past ten years. Since 2000, with the start of the Second Intifada, there has been a profound increase in anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist sentiment throughout France, as Jewish graves were violated, violent student protests erupted, and an overall sentiment of fear permeates through the community. This increase has led to a re-examination of the place of Jews in French society, as well as an increase in those who question their future in France, whether in the short time or the long term. In a series of interviews conducted in 2008, “All those interviewed declared having changed their relationship with France because of recent protests; 45% said that they had personally experienced a change in how they are perceived by the French.”⁶ While only a small proportion chose to make the drastic step to make Aliyah,⁷ nevertheless there has been a shift in the Jewish community and its relationship to Israel and France. One way of expressing this shift is through closer ties to Israel. Thus, while not making Aliyah, many vacation in Israel and are directly or indirectly involved with its politics. The journals edited and created by the community, notably *Arche*, enforce the links with Israel while also emphasizing the threat of living in France. This double-affiliation

⁶Dominique Schnapper; Chantal Bordes-Benayoun, Freddy Raphael. *La Condition Juive En France: La Tentation De L'entre-Soi*. Le Lien Social. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009.

Tous nos interviewés ont en commun un sentiment aigu de l’antisémitisme. Beaucoup déclarent avoir modifié leur relation à la France à cause des manifestations récentes ; 45% disent avoir fait l’expérience personnelle d’un changement de regard de la part des Français.

⁷ Aliyah or “going up” in Hebrew, is the term used for those Jews who move to Israel.

changes the place of the Jews within a Republican model, and brings into question the possibility of success of a purely Republican model given today's emphasis on affirming a cultural identity.

To further examine the motivations of French Jews who make Aliyah, in the annex there are interviews with leading members of the Franco-Israeli population. Making their Aliyah in the 1980's, these interviews give a personal perspective to the current situation.

Whether they chose to stay or leave; it is certain that French Jewish identity has evolved drastically in recent years. As France first tried its Enlightenment ideals out on the Jews with their emancipation 1791, to this day they still provide a revealing glimpse into the complexities and triumphs of the French concept of the citizen.

Chapter One: Theoretical Base

What is a citizen? What is a nation?

To understand the current debate over citizenship and integration, it is first necessary to define the nation as a theoretical concept. Each modern⁸ nation-state is founded on a specific heritage and philosophic idea of how individuals ought to relate to each other in a society. Often born of a rupture with an established religious order, the modern-nation state seeks to unite individuals in a society founded on philosophic principles that are forcibly not religious, yet at the same time guide the laws of the society. All efforts of assimilation of are founded on a specific idea of how the society will ideally function. This ideally functioning society constitutes the national project. Yet the idea of the modern-nation is not only philosophic, it is also founded on a historic narrative. Thus the individual must have a connection with the founding narrative of his country as well as with its vision of a perfect society. For example, as part of becoming a citizen, individuals must learn about the heritage and history of their new country and thus gain a new identity through this education. But, what is a citizen? What is the relationship of the citizen to the nation? What is the function of the nation?

⁸ I am referring to modernity using Jürgen Habermas' concept of a rupture between an established order and a new one. According to Habermas, "With varying content, the term 'modern' again and again expresses the consciousness of an epoch that relates itself to the past of antiquity, in order to view itself as the result of a transition from old to new."

Habermas, Jürgen ; Ben-Habib, Seyla. "Modernity Versus Postmodernity." *The New German Critique* 22. Special Issue on Modernism (1981): 9. Web.

First off, the concept of a nation⁹ must be defined. The nation is a modern political project, designed to unite individuals under a common identity and create a political unity. However, this common identity is fictive insofar as it is the product of a series of narratives constructed by the founders of the country. It is therefore a product of its time, yet also must be capable of evolving with changing social norms. The founding myth must be universal in its appeal, and serve both founding and future generations. This founding narrative, whether based on a spiritual principle or a tale of violent revolt, or both; is the foundation upon which a national identity is based. From this history the country gains a national identity.

This national identity can serve to replace a religious one in terms of the ways in which individuals relate to each other and the society as a whole. In breaking with an established past, there is a need to replace a unifying spiritual principle. According to Ernst Renan, “a nation is a spiritual principle, the result of profound complications in history, a spiritual family, and not a group determined by the configuration of the land.”¹⁰ Thus, the territory and land is not important to the creation of a nation. Rather it is a “spiritual principle,” that serves to unite individuals under a national project. As a “spiritual principle,” a nation serves to replace religious institutions, and give people a moral compass.

⁹ When discussing the nation, I am only referring to the modern nation, not religious states or dictatorships.

¹⁰ Schnapper, Dominique. *La Communauté des Citoyens: sur l’Idée Moderne de Nation*. Folio Essais. Paris: Gallimard, 1994 pour le texte, 2003 pour l'avant propos p. 76
Une nation est un principe spirituel, résultant des complications profondes de l'histoire, une famille spirituelle, non un groupe déterminé par la configuration du sol.

The nation is also a legal entity, which then provides incentives (such as punishment and fines) for adhering to its rules. Thus it replaces religious organizations as a guide for how individuals should interact with one another.

In addition, a national project is not dependant on geography. An individual can adhere to a national project regardless of where they reside and other affiliations, so long as they agree to the mission of the nation. As the case of Zionism and the founding of the state of Israel demonstrates, a national identity can be construed without a physical territory.

The “profound complications in history,” describe the founding national story. For example, France’s modern national identity is founded on the history of the French Revolution. Often, these founding stories are violent and speak of a rupture with an existing order. “In every nation, the political project is born of a singular history, the most common follows violent events, wars and revolutions, in a given territory.”¹¹ Through a violent break with the past a new nation can be formed. A creation of a new nation also involves the creation of a new citizenship, and a new way in which members of the national project see themselves and their relation to one other. No longer disparate individuals, the nation unites them under the banner of citizenship.

A national history thus serves to unite the individuals under a common identity and a common imagined heritage. Much in the way that the Jews affirm their ties to the religion through a shared history and the re-telling of the Passover story each year as a founding incidence in the creation of a religious identity; in that same way the re-telling

¹¹ Schnapper, Dominique. *La Communauté des Citoyens: sur l’Idée Moderne de Nation.* 81

Dans chaque nation, le projet politique est né d’une histoire singulière, le plus souvent à la suite d’événements violents, guerres et révolutions, dans un territoire donné.

of a national history and its celebration (Bastille day for example) affirms the individual's ties to the national project. This repetition creates a sense of shared heritage. Thus adherence to a national project is akin to a religious affiliation insofar as individuals gain a sense of shared heritage and identity from both projects. As Schnapper describes it, the nation is "defined by the sovereignty that it exerts, on the interior, to integrate the populations that it includes and on the exterior, to affirm as representing a historic subject in an world order founded on the existence and relations between unified political nations."¹² Thus the nation works on two levels—on the interior, it works to exert "sovereignty" —emphasizing the similarities between fidelity to a nation and to a religion—while on the exterior level the national project maintains relations with other countries. Although the international relations are beyond the scope of this paper, the nation as an international political entity is an important aspect of its conceptual function. The ways in which the nation integrates its "disparate populations" is the foundation of a national identity, and the creation of a citizen.

Throughout the discussion on the idea of the nation, it is import to emphasize the fact that it is the product of historic events. Like an ethnicity, nationalities are fabricated distinctions created out of historic precedents, whose importance rests in their perception by an exterior spectator. For example, one does not know he is of a certain ethnicity until confronted with those who are different. The nation serves to integrate individuals under a common identity (such as the French self-identifying as French regardless of if their

¹² Schnapper, Dominique. *La Communauté des Citoyens: sur l'Idée Moderne de Nation.* P. 45

La nation se définit par sa souveraineté qui s'exerce, à l'intérieur, pour intégrer les populations qu'elle inclut et, à l'extérieur, pour s'affirmer en tant que sujet historique dans un ordre mondial fondé sur l'existence et les relations entre nation unités politiques.

ancestors were Gallic or not). While imaginary, this shared heritage does serve a very real purpose, which is to unite individuals who otherwise may have very little in common under a shared identity.

However, the political project of a nation to integrate individuals does not negate the differences between its citizens,¹³ and citizens are free to maintain their personal affiliations in a democratic modern state. A failure to integrate diverse populations speaks to a failure in the modern national project. Thus, “the project of a democratic society is to integrate all members as free and equal citizens and give them the conditions of life as equal as possible.”¹⁴ Despite religious differences or other differences, all groups of affiliation ought to be guaranteed a place in the society in order for the modern nation to be successful. A failure to do so speaks to a rupture in the national project, and can lead to the destruction of the State. It implodes from the inside, as its citizens no longer feel connected to the nation, and cease to even identify as citizens, instead choosing other affiliations as a primary means of self-identification. Without citizens, a nation cannot exist.

The nation seeks to integrate members under an identity despite their religious affiliation, and therefore a national identity is different than a religious one. According to

¹³ For the purpose of this paper, individuals make the shift to citizens once they decide to adhere to the national project of the country with which they self-identify as their primary national affiliation.

¹⁴ Schnapper, Dominique. *Qu'est-ce que l'Integration?*. Folio Actuel Inédit. Paris: Gallimard, 2007. p. 130
Le projet de la société démocratique est d'intégrer tous ses membres en tant que citoyens libres et égaux et de leur donner des conditions de vie aussi égales que possible.

Schnapper, “the laïcité,¹⁵ in particular, is an essential attribute of the modern State, because it permits the State to transcend the diversity of religious affiliations, to ordain the passage of beliefs and practices in the private domain, to ensure the public domain, religiously neutralized and common to all citizens.”¹⁶ The modern State is militantly laic, and does not adhere to religious organization or turn to religion as the basis for its laws. It therefore replaces the role formerly held by religious institutions as organizers of the society. It is theoretically capable of integrating members of all religious affiliations, since it itself does not have a religion to super-impose onto people’s already held belief-systems. However, insofar as religious practice runs counter to the national project, the nation must take explicit measures to mitigate this conflict between Church and State in the larger sense of the words. It must enforce the ideals of citizenship while also respecting religious affiliations its citizens may hold.

Through adhering the national project, individual members of a nation become citizens. Therefore, “citizenship, we have said, constitutes the source of social links. It is in exercising the rights and practices of citizenship that individuals form a society.”¹⁷ An

¹⁵ Throughout this paper, I will use the word laïcité. While the word roughly translates into secular society, it belies stronger implications, and a complete separation between the religious and the national.

¹⁶ Schnapper, Dominique. *La Communauté des Citoyens: sur l’Idée Moderne de Nation.* p. 74
La laïcité, en particulier, est un attribut essentiel de l’Etat moderne, parce qu’elle permet de transcender la diversité des appartenances religieuses, de consacrer, le passage dans le privé des croyances et des pratiques, de faire du domaine public le lieu, religieusement neutralisé, commun à tous citoyens.

¹⁷ Bachelier, Dominique Schnapper; avec la collaboration de Christian. *Qu'est Que la Citoyenneté.* Folio/Actuel. Paris: Gallimard, 2000. p. 200
La citoyenneté, on l’a dit, constitue la source du lien social. C’est en exerçant les droits et les pratiques de la citoyenneté que les individus forment une société.

adherence to the principles of a citizenship allows the society function. Through citizenship the nation can be fully realized. Based on their individual histories, each country uses a different model, both theoretic and practical, for creating a citizen.

Republican vs. Liberal: Different models of citizenship

Based on its history from the Revolution, France adheres to a Republican model of citizenship. The construction of the French nation began long before the French Revolution; indeed, the kings had already unified the country before it proclaimed its modern identity, establishing a territorial and bureaucratic base. Thus the roots of a national identity can be traced to before the Revolution, as centralized version of the State existed very early on in French history and there was already an infrastructure in place that served to govern many people. These individuals were part of a national project, albeit not a modern one. At the same time, the ideas of the Enlightenment movement led the philosophic creation of a new identity of the citizen and the State, which in turn challenged this existing norm. These philosophers advocated the idea that reason could surpass religious differences, and that in the equality of each man despite status. Through education all men can be integrated into the society as they are all born as equals.

In addition, the French Revolution gave these philosophers real-life examples and a chance to test out their theories, as they broke with the established religious institutions. The French Revolution, which quickly turned bloody, led the founders to turn to a Republican model, in part based on the philosophy of Rousseau, for whom:

The dependence between men is the source of inequality, and the intermediate bodies between the individual citizen and the State prevent man from being free, and they must be destroyed. The citizen, and expression direct of the ‘general will’ must...be independent of all intermediate links and keep a narrow and direct relation with the State.”¹⁸

The mission of the modern nation-state in the French model was to create a society without inequality. It sought to give individuals the opportunity to belong to a society in which they would be free to prosper and free from injustice that could have been the result of a monarchy. To ensure this, the individual is recognized as having a direct link with the State, devoid of all intermediaries, such as the Church. It is the foundation of a universalist model.

Therefore, this universalist model affirms the equality of all through the possibility that they can each be citizens. Their rights are assured through a direct relationship with the State. While individual rights are not emphasized, this direct relationship ensures that every individual will be seen as equal. It is founded on a separation between the private sphere and the public. In private one is free to express religious and other affiliation, but in public these ties are hidden. Thus, France does not count race in its census, because race as a concept does not exist in the public sphere. Through this equality, representation and justice are theoretically guaranteed.

¹⁸ Bachelier, Dominique Schnapper; avec la collaboration de Christian. *Qu'est Que la Citoyenneté ?* p 44
La dépendance entre les hommes étant la source d'inégalité, les corps intermédiaires entre l'individu-citoyen et l'Etat empêchaient l'homme d'être libre, ils devaient être détruits

This Republican model is founded on the idea of a singular citizenship. Individuals then belong to this group, but their identities and origins are unimportant for the State. Thus “the model is ideologically founded on a conception that all men, if they receive the necessary education, are likely to participate in a political project founded on the universality of citizenship.”¹⁹ Each individual, regardless of his origins or affiliations, is able, through the institutions set by the State, to achieve a place in the singular citizenship. They each have the same potential to become equal members of the society. The foundation of these institutions was laid with the centralization established prior to the Revolution. In the modern day, without forced military service, these institutions primarily consist of a secular education, through which the values and interests of the nation can be transmitted. Each citizen is formed in the same way, and education system does not acknowledge religious or ethnic differences.

Whereas the French model is founded on Republican ideals that advocate a singular citizenship, the British model seeks to protect individual liberties. Thus each citizen is seen as an individual in the British model. There is no “citizenship” to which each individual is a member. The British model and “is founded on the idea that, to assure the true liberty of men against a power that can become arbitrary, the diversity of affiliations and individual attachments must be respected.”²⁰ Therefore, this model guards

¹⁹ Schnapper, Dominique. *La Communauté des Citoyens: sur l’Idée Moderne de Nation.* p. 99

Ce modèle était idéologiquement fondé sur une conception selon laquelle tous les hommes, s’ils recevaient la formation nécessaire, étaient susceptibles de participer à un projet politique fondé sur l’universalité de la citoyenneté.

²⁰ Schnapper, Dominique; avec la collaboration de Christian Bachelier. *Qu'est Que la Citoyenneté?* . p. 39

individual attachments, whereas the Republican model does not publicly recognize these attachments. The British model affirms that the individual has the right to these attachments, and the power of the group helps to prevent totalitarianism. This model is founded on the idea of the rights of the individual and “the citizen ‘in the English style’ is first and foremost liberal. He required confidence of people, the freedom to think, to talk, and to act.”²¹ Under this principle of the liberty of expression falls the right to religious affiliations. Therefore while still protecting the separation between Church and State that is a hallmark of the modern nation-state, the British model recognizes religious affiliation in the public sphere, indeed this liberal model does not believe that there is, or should be, a distinction between the private and the public spheres.

Building on the English liberal model is the American one. This model advocates and enforces the individual’s right to expression and to belonging to a group of affiliation. Interactions with the State are held through intermediaries, such as lobbies and special interest groups, testifying to the profound spirit of individualism that influences the nation. Each person’s interest can be expressed in the State, everyone has the right to an individual opinion and group of affiliation. Indeed, the United States are ideologically founded on the idea of a melting pot. It is a country made up of immigrants

Est fondée sur l’idée que, pour assurer la véritable liberté des hommes contre le pouvoir qui risque toujours de devenir arbitraire, il faut respecter la diversité des appartenances et des attachements particuliers.

²¹ Schnapper, Dominique; avec la collaboration de Christian Bachelier. *Qu'est que la Citoyenneté*. p. 49

Le citoyen « à l’anglaise » est d’abord libéral. Il a exigé la sûreté des personnes, la liberté de penser, de parler et d’agir.

seeking religious freedom.²² Lacking a single ethnic group at its founding, the country portrays itself as a place where everyone has the right to express himself and his background. Contrary to the French model, which affirms a singular citizenship, each citizen is unique in the eyes of the American model.

These different models serve to elaborate the different options available for integrating minority groups within a national project. Thus the American and British models are Liberal models while the French model is a Republican model. The French model also enforces a strict separation between the public and the private, which does not exist in the eyes of a Liberal model.

Yet though the French model affirms a singular entity of citizenship, in reality, it cannot escape the fact that citizens come with their affiliations before adhering to the their new citizenship. Even while affirming a universalist model, the reality is a country is made up people from diverse backgrounds, and “every nation, by definition, is formed by diverse populations, in their culture, in the social milieu, their religion and practices or references, their regional or national origin.”²³ Thus, for France, one of the challenges they face in adhering to this model is how to respect the fact that groups of affiliation are common amongst its population, without sacrificing the integrity of the Republican model. To further examine this delicate balance, the Jews serve as an excellent and representative sample. With a history in France dating back to the Middle Ages, the

²² The Native Americans were of course in the United States before its founding, yet are ignored in the founding narrative, as are the large numbers of slaves brought over from Africa.

²³ Schnapper, Dominique. *La Communauté Des Citoyens: Sur L'idée Moderne De Nation.* p. 144
Toute nation, par définition, est formée de populations diverses par leur culture, leur milieu social, leur religion de pratique ou de référence, leur origine régionale ou nationale.

narrative of the Jews in France, with its many ups and downs, represents to the evolution of the French model.

Chapter Two: French Jewish History from 1791-1967

With a long history in France, the Jewish population, with its ups and downs, provides an excellent example of the challenges facing the French citizenship model. It serves as the representative of the state of the Republican model, and speaks to both its successes and failures. The Jews of France as a group have also evolved along with the changing definitions of the citizen.

Emancipation of the Jews and its consequences

Even before they were emancipated, France had a large and diverse Jewish population. At the end of the 18th century, around 40,000 of the 2 million Jews living in Europe resided in France.²⁴ There were large centers of Jewish life throughout the country, each with different cultures and practices. The main centers were in Alsace-Lorraine, Metz, Avignon, and Bordeaux, each of which appreciated a unique set of

²⁴Hermon-Belot, Rita. *L'émancipation des juifs en France* Paris : Presses Universitaires de France 1999 p. 7

traditions and history. Throughout these diverse regions, the inhabitants were of different origins without much cohesion between areas—the south was mainly inhabited by Sephardic Jews of Portuguese origin while the Alsace-Lorraine Jews were mostly Ashkenazi and had been living in the region since at least the Middle Ages.²⁵ These different communities were not unified and lacked a central administration. Thus “in conforming to the uses of the Ancient Regime, this Judaism was characterized by an extreme diversity of the statuses for the communities between different times, in different regions of the kingdom each had an individual history.”²⁶ The status of Jews in the Ancient Regime was dictated by a hodge-podge of different laws. Lacking a common status or common origins, the Jewish communities of this time were utterly disparate.

In 1791, for the first time, all Jews in France were given French citizenship, making them equal to all other citizens. The law represented a shocking rupture in the status of Jews throughout Europe, and was founded on Enlightenment philosophy, which ensured the fundamental equality of all men. Thus, for the first time, the Jews were the same as all other citizens from a legal standpoint. This affirmed the possibility of integrating them into the society, which has previously not been done in any major way throughout Europe. This confidence in the possibilities of enlightenment was also

²⁵ Though I use the terms Ashkenazi and Sephardic, I will not be going into the politics behind the differences between the two groups. In short, Ashkenazi Jews are from Europe (excluding the Iberian Peninsula) while Sephardic Jews have ancestors who lived in the Iberian Peninsula before expulsion in the 15th century. The term Sephardic also includes Jews from Africa and is used as a blanket term to describe Jews who are not Ashkenazi.

²⁶ Hermon-Belot, Rita. *L'émancipation des juifs en France* p. 9
De fait, en conformément aux usages d'Ancien Régime, ce judaïsme se caractérise par une extrême diversité des statuts pour des communautés entrées à des époques différentes, dans des régions du royaume dont chacune a connu son histoire singulière.

founded in religious reform movements within Judaism of the time. Thus from the standpoint of the community, there was a philosophic base leading to acceptance of this new status.

The enlightenment movement in the Jewish schools of thought was called the *Haskalah* movement. Primarily Ashkenazi, it sought to establish a new relation between the Jews and the State. The movement originated in Germany with Moses Mendelssohn. He advocated not only religious reform and a return to the five books of Moses, thus abandoning the Talmud, but also linguistic reform—translating works in the regional languages and making texts more accessible. Thus Judaism would be able to enter the public sphere in the same ways as other religions, losing its mystery and hopefully losing some of the harmful myths surrounding the religion. Jews would be able to participate in the society as any other citizen. At the same time, the movement advocates for a very strict separation between religion and the State. Thus, while secular thinkers were advocating a new non-religious national identity, so too were certain sects of the Jewish community embracing religious reform that would facilitate the transition into having both a religious and a national identity.

However, this is not to imply that the entire Jewish community was supportive of emancipation. On the contrary, a large variety of opinions existed—some were vehemently opposed to the idea, while others had a more open perspective. For the first time these diverse communities were unified under the law, and as such the communities had to work together in new ways, which causes a great deal of friction. These communities had only existed autonomously before Emancipation, and a common identity as both citizens and Jews created friction.

The law also changed France's global reputation, and facilitated its identity as a modern country. Especially for the Jews facing discrimination, France gained a new place in the popular imagination. "For many Jewish communities, France exerted a 'real fascination' felt from the south-west of Europe to the Near East; the fascination of a universalist model with a hope for emancipation that awakened a large party from the Diaspora."²⁷ Thus, France's reputation changed, as word spread that it had emancipated its Jewish population. As a result, many Jews saw France as a country where they would be able to both practice their religion and enjoy the benefits of equal citizenship. This special relationship with the State later created a new Jewish identity unique to France.

Other countries later followed suit, and the success of France's republican ideals created a model upon which other countries founded new national identities. For the Jews themselves in France, they were organized as a single entity, which led to religious reform both on a national level and within the community. These changes continued with Napoleon's reorganization in the beginning of the 19th century.

The Great Liberator?: Napoleon's Reforms

Napoleon founded some of the Jewish institutions that still exist today. His measures make up the framework for the model of religious integration. His goal was to incorporate the Jews under the same model as other religious groups, affirming the fact

²⁷ Hermon-Belot, Rita *L'émancipation des juifs en France* p. 99
Pour nombre de communautés juives, la France a exercé une « véritable fascination », ressentie jusque dans le sud-ouest de l'Europe et au Proche-Orient ; la fascination d'un modèle universel pour une espérance d'émancipation qui s'éveille peu à peu dans une grande partie de la diaspora.

that they could assimilate into the society in the same way as other citizens. The formation of these institutions gave him the reputation as the liberator of the Jews²⁸.

The religious reforms began in 1801, when Napoleon signed the Concordat with Pope Pius VII, which states that although the majority of the French are Catholic, the State does not have an official religion (in adhering with the definition of the modern nation state as a secular institution that was defined in the previous chapter). Therefore, France was officially not a Catholic State, but instead had three official religions, one of which was Judaism. This changed France's identity, and was one of the first steps towards the militantly laic State that exists today. Thus the Jews had an official right to practice their religion, guaranteed by national law.

In 1807 Napoleon reunited the Great Sanhedrin by arranging a meeting of the leaders of the Jewish community of the time. The Sanhedrin harkens back to the Sanhedrin of Roman times, a high tribunal whose function was to decipher state laws for a religious community. To that end, the leaders responded to a list of nine questions that justified the fact that the Jews could be assimilated within French society and disproved misconceptions of the time. "Essentially, the delegates reaffirmed that Judaism is perfectly compatible with citizenship in a state respectful of rights, and that the emancipated Jews will show their loyalty and devotion to a country in which they shall

²⁸ Though he has a popular reputation as the liberator of the Jews, Napolean in fact had a complicated relationship with the Jewish population. Although he established the institutions of the Jewish community, he did not believe that the Jews could fully become French citizens. He did not trust them and believed that they would always take advantage of non-Jews. To remedy this problem, he believed that in bringing them into a secular, French society, they would abandon their religion and become French citizens. He thus encouraged inter-marriage and an abandonment of the religion. He advocated assimilation in lieu of integration.

have their place.”²⁹ The grand Sanhedrin affirmed the possibility of integration, and the fact that the Jews could participate in the society like any other citizen. It served to counter some of the rumors about Judaism of the time, and led to a greater understanding of the religion by the State and other citizens. The following year, in 1808, Napoleon founded the consistory, which still exists today.

As already described in the introduction, the consistory serves to organize the Jewish community from a religious standpoint. In every region with over 2,000 Jews, there was a regional consistory that answered to the central consistory in Paris, which in turn received money from the State. This system was already in place for the Protestants, and in establishing one for the Jews, Napoleon continued the trend of treating the group the same as other religions. The changes due to this new organization led to religious reforms, as the French Jews were formally organized and therefore also enjoyed a new identity as citizens.

Israélite ou Juif?: Consequences of Emancipation

This emancipation project was followed by a period of religious reform, as Jews grappled with their new identity as citizens. A new term arose, Israélite, as individuals of Jewish faith began defining themselves primarily under a national identity, with their religious affiliation serving only as a secondary means of identification. An Israélite

²⁹ Sidi, Caroline. "Napoleon Le Grand Libérateur Des Juifs ?" *L'Arche*.595-596 (2007-2008): 6.

Pour l’essentiel, les délégués réaffirmaient que le judaïsme était parfaitement compatible avec la citoyenneté dans un Etat respectueux du droit, et que les Juifs émancipés feraient montrer de loyauté et de dévouement envers une société où ils auraient leur place.

refers to a French citizen who happens to be Jewish, yet in all other respects is exactly the same as other citizens. Thus “the repudiation of the term ‘Jew’ in favor of ‘Israélite’ didn’t only make a rupture with a tragic past, it also marks a decisive mutation: the abandoning of the notion of a Jewish nation.”³⁰ Thus this secular identity reflects the idea of an abandonment of the hope of an external home, a mythical Zion, in favor of France as a place where the French Jews could realize the full benefits of citizenship. For the Israelite, a return to the mythical idea of Israel is not necessary, as France is his home. Thus a national identity is completely separate from a religious one.

To express this new identity, new Jewish institutions and publications were created in the 19th century³¹. In 1840, Samuel Cohen founded the journal *les archives Israélites*, the first journal for the new Israelite community, and in 1844, Simon Bloch launched a journal in response called *l'univers Israélite* which had a more orthodox slant. In 1860, a group of 17, with ties both to the consistory and to Orthodox Judaism founded the *alliance Israélite universelle* (AIU) in Paris. This institution was primarily primarily had an educational mission, and helped new immigrants adjust to life in France, providing them with resources. Its goal is to fight against intolerance and prejudice, and also to educate Jews in both religion and culture. Thus it acted as one of the major

³⁰ Hermon-Belot, Rita *L'émancipation des juifs en France* p. 96
La répudiation du terme « juif » en faveur de celui d' »israélite », ne faisait pas que rompre avec un triste passé, elle marquait aussi une mutation décisive : l'abandon de la notion de nation juive.

³¹ France was not the only country where Jewish identity was being reformed. Indeed throughout the 19th century, religious reform was common, nowhere more so than in Germany, where had the Wissenschaft des Judentums (the scientific investigation of Judaism) that advocated a new examination of what it means to be Jewish as well as a re-examination of the central Jewish texts. Thus throughout Europe, there was a re-examination a historic Jewish identity in favor of one more compatible with the principles of the modern nation.

organizing cultural organization for the new Israelite identity in the 19th century, especially in the wake of enormous waves of immigration.

Attracted to France's reputation as a country very welcoming to the Jews where they were given equal rights as other citizens, this period was marked by a large increase in immigration and a rise in prominent Jewish families. With access to the highest levels of education, Jews were able to rise in the society and achieve prominent posts in government and business. One such was the Camondo family. They came to France from Istanbul in 1869. While in France, they lived in Paris along the newly constructed mansions along the Parc Monceau with many other wealthy Jewish families from the time. Art enthusiasts, the family was also a rich banking family like many of their neighbors and lived a very comfortable life among the French elites.

These Jews also were represented in the literature of the time, as Proust describes the wealthy Jewish families in his oeuvre. Jews were prominent patrons of the arts and literature, ensuring their ranks in French society. However, this optimism came under question with the Dreyfus Affair, which exposed the underlying anti-Semitism and prejudices of the time. Though French Jews had thought that they were immune to anti-Semitism, the Dreyfus affair revealed the contrary.

The Dreyfus Affair and a re-evaluation of the French model

Dreyfus was arrested in 1894 under charges of treason. However, realizing a the dubious circumstances surrounding both the accusation and the following trial, Dreyfus was retried. With the help of notable intellectuals such as Emile Zola who took on the cause, Dreyfus was eventually proclaimed to be innocent.

The Affair profoundly divided French society into two camps, those who believed in Dreyfus' innocence, and those who believed in his guilt. Dreyfus incarnated a Jew who was successfully integrated within the French model—while Jewish of Alsatian origins; he served as a captain in the army and was above all else a French citizen who believed in the laws of his land, even as those very laws wrongly convicted him. His accusation marked a rupture with the optimism in France, and opened the country up to the reality of the rampant anti-Semitism of the period. As a result of this trial, Theodor Herzl realized the problems of the French emancipation project, and was inspired to write *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State), which outlined his plan for the founding of a Jewish nation-State as a solution to the Jewish question.

However, many French Jews did not see the same solution as Herzl, and did not support the Zionist cause in its early days, and despite support from the AIU, which was an early adopter of the Zionist cause, overall the Zionist project can be seen as a missed opportunity in France. The French had confidence in the Republican identity and did not feel a need for another homeland. “In France, the Zionists found themselves straightforwardly set up for failure. This missed encounter with French opinion, especially with the “Israelites” handicapped greatly the official Franco-Zionist relationships and favored the installation of various prejudices and misunderstandings.”³² The French Jews had confidence in their Republican project, to which Zionism presented a direct threat, as it advocates for a Jewish homeland. As the Barons de Hirsch and Edmond de Rothschild

³² Nicault, Catherine. *La France et Le Sionisme 1897-1948: Une Rencontre Manquée?* Diaspora. Ed. Errera, Roger. Paris: Calman-Lévy, 1992 p. 17
En France, les sionistes se trouvent d'emblée placés en situation d'échec. Cette rencontre manquée avec l'opinion française, et notamment avec les « Israélites », handicape durablement les relations officielles franco-sionistes et favorise l'installation de divers préjugés et malentendus.

affirmed in regards to the Jews in a letter to Herzl, “their situation here is too good for them to envision a change. I say to conclude that for us, the ‘Français-Israelites’—if that really exists—are not Jews and thus their cause is of no concern for us”³³ Thus, while the Dreyfus Affair was a calling for some to re-evaluate the possibility of integration, overall in France, Zionism was met with skepticism and a lack of support as a Jewish elite felt comfortable and successful in France.

This perceived success of the Republican project continued into the 20th century, with enormous waves of immigration from Eastern Europe. Driven out of their countries of origins by pogroms and other acts of anti-Semitism, many Jews moved to France to seek refuge in the French model of citizenship. These Eastern European Jews relied enormously on the French institutions, such as the AIU (alliance israélite universelle). However, France was not always welcoming of these new immigrants. The organizations were not always welcoming of these new Jews and did not see them successfully integrating in France. Indeed,

the paternalistic attitude was reinforced by the clash of social classes and the mentalities of immigrant sand native Jews respectively. Proud of their status as French citizens, at home in French culture, and disdainful of immigrant Jewish manners, customs and of what they viewed as lack of culture, the native Jews were unable to accept their immigrant coreligionists as they were.³⁴

³³ Nicault, Catherine. *La France et Le Sionisme 1897-1948: Une Rencontre Manquée?* p 39-40

Leur situation ici est trop bonne pour qu'ils envisagent un changement. (...) Je dirai pour conclure que, pour nous, les « Français israélites si cela existe vraiment ne sont pas des Juifs et que notre cause ne les concerne pas.

³⁴ Hyman, Paula. *From Dreyfus to Vichy: The Transformation of the French Jewry, 1906-1939*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979. p. 116

Despite proclaiming equality and acceptance, in reality the Jewish institutions were not accepting of new immigrants, and the Eastern Europeans had a very difficult time assimilating in French culture and into a new identity as Israélites. At the same time, these immigrants were reluctant to change their traditional way of life, and thus could not integrate into the French model. Therefore while the project of integration had worked for French Jews at the time of the Revolution, these new immigrants from Eastern Europe found themselves in front of an insurmountable difficulty in adhering to the French project. Unable or unwilling to abandon the trappings of a Yiddish culture, they were not accepted as French Jews, keeping an identity as the “other.”

These new immigrants had to change their traditional religious ways of life once in France and work with the consistory model. However, the consistory was not always welcoming of these immigrants, and thus from both ends integration in France was nearly impossible.

Consistorial circles, however, developed no respect for the Jewish culture and prevalent ideologies of the immigrant Jews. While lamenting the indifference of a vast number of native Jews, they refused to attribute that indifference to the failure of their own approach to assimilation.”³⁵

The French Jewish community at this time was seriously divided, between those who were in the consistorial system and those who were struggling to have their practices recognized by the official religious authority. The situation changed somewhat in 1905 with the formal separation of Church and State, which officially changed the relationship

³⁵ Hyman, Paula. *From Dreyfus to Vichy: The Transformation of the French Jewry, 1906-1939* 154

between France and the consistory system, as it could no longer be directly state-run³⁶.

Thus “it was not until after the separation of Church and State, when immigrants became free to choose whether or not to affiliate with the consistory, that consistorial leaders were motivated to meet their needs and keep them under the consistorial aegis,”³⁷ and the consistory was therefore forced to evolve to accept the ne immigrant population. Nevertheless, the difficulties did not disappear, and immigrants still faced substantial difficulties in integrating in France. At the same time, there was still hope in the Republican model with many Jews enlisting in the army and finding success, both financial and social, in France.

WWI was a time of great patriotism for the French Jews, as faith in the Republican model was still very strong and over 30,000 Jews served in the military³⁸. The FFSU was founded in 1923 to organize the community socially. This optimism towards the national project and possibility of integration, in spite of difficulties with immigrant populations, was also affirmed with the election of Léon Blum, who was the Prime Minister of France from 1936-1937.

Unabashed by his Jewish identity, Blum became the prime minister of Third Republic after being elected to the head of the Popular Front. However, his time in office

³⁶ The Law of 1905 concerning the separation of Church and State article two states, “Article 2. The Republic neither acknowledges, nor pays for nor subsidizes any form of worship. Consequently, from 1 January on, after the present law has been publicized, all spending related to worship will be eliminated from the budgets of the State and localities.”

"The Law of 1905." *Virtual Museum of French Protestantism*. Web.

³⁷ Hyman, Paula. *From Dreyfus to Vichy: The Transformation of the French Jewry, 1906-1939* p. 140

³⁸ IBID p. 160

also brought about an enormous backlash, as many right-wingers saw it as the fulfillment of a Jewish-socialist conspiracy. He was physically assaulted and threatened by the extreme right. Xavier Vallat, the leader of the extreme French right wrote of Blum,

your arrival into power incontestably marks a historic date. For the first time this ancient Roman-Gallic country will be governed by a Jew. I dare to say in a loud voice that this country thinks at its depths that it is better to have at its head someone from its country rather than a subtle Talmudist.³⁹

To Blum however, he was anything but a “Talmudist” and instead had led a secular life in the French government. Indeed, he did not see his Jewish identity as primary, and considered himself a French citizen like any other. Yet his time in power was still met with extreme conflict. To prevent the spread of anti-Semitism and protect existing populations, the consistory officially asked him to step down. Thus, while France was making huge strides in its national project, it was not immune to the trends of the time, and the enormous rise of anti-Semitism plaguing Europe at the time also found an expression in France.

Rupture: The Vichy Regime

³⁹ Landau, Lazare. "Léon Blum." (1993). Web.
Votre arrivée au pouvoir marque incontestablement une date historique. Pour la première fois, ce vieux pays gallo-romain va être gouverné par un juif. J'ose dire à haute voix ce que le pays pense en son for intérieur ; il est préférable de mettre à la tête de ce pays un homme dont les origines appartiennent à son sol... qu'un subtil talmudiste.

Anti-Semitism came to France during the Vichy regime, which marked the end of the Third Republic.⁴⁰ On June 16th 1940, France signed an armistice agreement with Germany and on June 18th 1940, the Third Republic ended and the French State began under the Marshal Petain. Under the armistice France was formally divided into two zones—a free zone, governed by the Marshal Petain and an occupied zone, which was under direct Nazi rule. Despite proclaiming to be independent, the Vichy government collaborated with the Germans and took many measures against the Jews. Jews were the victims of denaturalization and deportations. Before the war there were around 300,000 Jews living in France, and among them around 76,000 were deported between 1940 and 1944.⁴¹

Under Vichy, a series of laws were imposed against the Jews. Beginning with the law of July 22nd 1940, which took away naturalizations to all citizens deemed undesirable who had gained residency after 1927, these laws became increasingly severe. For the first time, the Jews were seen as a separate race by the French government⁴². The law of October 3rd 1940 stipulates that, “to be regarded as Jewish under the current law, each person with three grand parents of the Jewish race or two grand parents of the same race,

⁴⁰ Vichy poses a problem in the French national narrative, particularly from a Jewish perspective. While it undeniably occurred on French soil, the Regime was nevertheless not a part of the Republican system, and exists outside of the long-held Republican traditions and values. Thus it has been difficult for many scholars to address Vichy when discussing the French Republican history

⁴¹ Poznanski, Renée. "Reflections on Jewish Resistance and Jewish Resistant in France." *Jewish Social Studies* 2.1 (1995): 124-58. 127.

⁴² In this case, the French government is Vichy, though Vichy does not adhere to the same principles as past French governments and was a collaborationist government.

if their joined race is Jewish.”⁴³ Jews were forbidden from holding positions in the army and government, and were later excluded from nearly all professions. No longer Israélites with a secular identity but who happen to practice a certain faith, Jews were instead seen as fundamentally different from other French citizens and thus excluded from participating in French society. This new definition ran completely contrary to the French republican model, severing ties with the former as the State of France ran the country. The question of assimilation was no longer viable, as France sent its former citizens to camps.

Furthermore, the political atmosphere in Vichy was anti-Semitic. French leaders doubted the very possibility of Jewish assimilation, justifying their deportation. According to Xavier Vallat⁴⁴, a vehement anti-Semite and commissioner-general for Jewish affairs, the Jews would never be able to be completely assimilated in France, and would never be able to fit into the French model of the citizen.

In 1942, the Vichy government radicalized against the Jews, whereas before the free zone was seen as an area that had the potential to avoid traumatizing persecution that plagued other parts of Europe, by 1942 that myth was debunked. In 1942 the first waves of deportation began, culminating in the roundup at the Vélodrome d’Hiver in Paris, during which 13,152 Jews were gathered together. Even the extraordinarily wealthy and well assimilated could not avoid the utter destruction of Jewish life in France. The

⁴³ Picard, Marianne. "Le Staut des Juifs en 1940." *Aloumim, association israélienne des "enfants cachés" en France pendant la Shoah* 2004. Web.
Est regardé comme Juif, pour l’application de la présente loi, toute personne issue de trois grands-parents de race juive ou deux grands-parents de la même race, si son conjoint lui-même est Juif.

⁴⁴ This is the same Vallat who was vehemently against Léon Blum in power on the grounds that he was Jewish and therefore not fully French.

Camondos, who had so well integrated into French society, were victims of the Vichy laws, and the last Camondo was deported and died in Auschwitz. Thinking that their position would shield them from the Nazi measures, many Jews did not react in time.

However, that is not to say that the only reaction in the Jewish community was passive observance followed by terrifying deportation. Realizing that the free zone was still closely tied with the Nazi regime, a small minority of groups left France to continue doing their work from abroad, especially in the United States and in Britain. Others left France to fight for the cause from abroad and as part of the Resistance. For example, Pierre Mendes France was convicted in 1941 by the Vichy government and sentenced to 6 years in prison. He later escaped and he joined de Gaulle and the Resistance. He advocated for rescuing French children and bringing them to Algeria. Thus Jewish activism continued throughout the war.

At the same time as prominent Jews were arrested by the Vichy government, Zionist organization were outlawed as were other political expressions of Jewish interests. The period marks “the end of the liberty that Zionist organizations and parties had always had always known in Republican France,”⁴⁵ as Jewish organizations were united under the UGIF (union général des Israélites de France), run by the Vichy regime.

The UGIF was created in 1941. In fact there, were two UGIFs—one in the north and west, subject to direct Nazi rule, and the other in the southeastern part, in occupied France. This reflects both the disparity of the Jewish community time, and the differences in attitudes between the two areas. Reflecting long-held prejudices, some

⁴⁵ Nicault, Catherine. *La France et Le Sionisme 1897-1948: Une Rencontre Manquée?* p. 183

...le fin de la liberté que les organisations et partis sionistes avaient toujours connue dans la France républicain

Jews thought that the UGIF was primarily an organization designed to create measures for immigrant Jews. Despite the chaos reigning around them, the community was still strongly divided between those who felt integrated as French citizens and those who kept Eastern European traditions, which was one of the reasons many chose to stay in France until it was too late. “French Jews still believed that all laws that were promulgated against Jews before the UGIF were directed primarily at foreign Jews. French Jews, they thought, would still have the possibility to protect themselves.”⁴⁶ Yet Vichy laws did not discriminate between Jews of different backgrounds.

In 1943 discussions began to create an organization whose goal would be to defend the Jews. In 1944 two former heads of the consistory created the CRIF, which was discussed in the introduction. “The intention, in principle, wasn’t to create a political representation, the notion which could already be supported by the consistory, but the reunite a representative collective around a common program, to be capable to plead the Jewish cause to the best advice.”⁴⁷ Thus the CRIF served to unite all Jewish organizations that were fighting for the Jewish cause. It was not an explicitly political organization, since the consistory still theoretically represented the political interests of the Jews. However, during the Liberation, the CRIF gave enormous amounts of aid to Jews returning from throughout Europe. It acted as an advocacy group for many Jews and was

⁴⁶ Szajkowski, Zosa. "The Organization of the UGIF in Nazi-Occupied France." *Jewish Social Studies* 9.3 (1947): 239-56. p 248.

⁴⁷ Nicault, Catherine. *La France et Le Sionisme 1897-1948: Une Rencontre Manquée?* Diaspora. Ed. Errera, Roger. Paris: Calman-Lévy, 1992 Print p. 190
L’intention en principe n’est pas de créer une représentation politique, notion que n’aurait pu cautionner le consistoire, mais de réunir autour d’un programme commun minimum un collectif représentatif et capable de plaider la cause matérielle et morale des Juifs à meilleur escient.

a key piece in the French resistance as well as in later efforts to rebuild a Jewish community in France and prevent future crises.

The Nazis left Paris definitively on August 25th 1944. In the midst of the exuberance of being liberated from the collaborationist government, France was faced with the difficult problem of re-affirming the Republican model that had disappeared under Vichy. The terrible state of the D.P.'s (personnes déplacés) attested to the atrocities of the war. The D.P.'s themselves, as well as the Jews who had stayed in France during the war, had to find a way to re-integrate into a state that had betrayed them and its promise of a Republican project. Some Jews, traumatized by the war, preferred to re-integrate without any religious ties, and renounced their affiliation with the group. At the same time, for others, France still clung to its reputation as a welcoming country for the Jews. However, as for the Jewish community as a whole, WWII marks a rupture between a past that no longer exists and the present, as throughout Europe the Jewish population was decimated. With homes that no longer existed, over 35,000⁴⁸ Jewish immigrants made their way to France. However, as much as they hoped to integrate into the French republican project, the war had left scars and many regarded their new homeland with a suspicion, knowing that citizenship could be taken away as easily as it had been given. With the creation of the state of Israel, this conflict was resolved with the possibility of a double-national identity.

A double-affiliation: Consequences of the creation of a Jewish State

⁴⁸ Nicault, Catherine. *La France et le Sionisme 1897-1948: Une Rencontre Manquée?*
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After the war, Zionism gained a new support worldwide as well as in France. Representing an enormous change from the politics before the war, the differences between Jews from Eastern Europe and those with a long history in France did not play a large role. There was a new sense of solidarity pervading throughout the community as individuals “felt towards their brothers of alyah beth and Palestine, not only sympathy, even lively, but a sentiment of solidarity that found a way to express itself in the search and care of rescued orphans and the elderly.”⁴⁹ Fueling the Zionist fire were efforts to repair the decimated Jewish community. Whereas in the period before Vichy, the French Jewry had largely been divided, and even hostile towards new immigrants, in light of the recent tragedy, the Jewish community was able to band together and the institutions welcomed new immigrants with open arms. This new sense of unity represents a shift in the French identity—no longer “Israelites” in the sense of the term used by the Baron de Rothschild; it affirms solidarity with Jews worldwide. However, this shift in the self-identification was largely invisible to the larger French population of the time, as the whole of France was engulfed in a brief moment of pro-Zionist fervor, making this shift only visible in retrospect during the Six-Day War. The overall pro-Zionist fervor led it to vote “yes” during the United Nations vote for the creation of the State of Israel in 1947, and France gave its support to the infant nation in its war for Independence from 1948-1949.

⁴⁹ Nicault, Catherine. *La France et le Sionisme 1897-1948: Une Rencontre Manquée?* p. 214

[les juifs] ressentent envers leurs frères de l’alyah beth et de Palestine, c’est non pas seulement de la sympathie, même vive, mais un sentiment de solidarité qui a trouvé aussi à s’exprimer dans la recherche et la prise en charge des vieillards et des orphelins rescapés.

While the new adherence to the Zionist project was not immediately apparent in post-war France, it came to light during the Six-Day War, which lasted from June 5-10th, 1967. Faced with the possibility of the destruction of Israel soon after its creation, the feelings of allegiance with Israel came to surface. The memory of the Shoah, still recent in the eyes of survivors, united them to act against the threat of destruction and protest in great numbers. This fear unified the community, and the Jewish communal spirit in France was reborn.

Increasing the intensity of the situation, the General de Gaulle's political leanings were not explicitly pro-Zionist, representing a shift from the immediate post-war period. As a result, his position intensified the overall sentiment of fear of the destruction of Israel in the community. The General tried to remain neutral during the crisis. He affirmed that if Israel was attacked, France would intervene, but only if the Arab countries fired the first shot. For a brief yet terrifying moment, it was unclear if France would lend its support to Israel, thus increasing fears of another genocide.

This attitude led the community to unite against the threat of Israel's destruction. Former political differences ceased to matter, and Jews of France came to terms with the importance of the State of Israel in light this great menace. According to Raymond Aron,

At very few exceptions, the Jews of France feel in regards to Israel a particular dilection. Even the anti-Zionists, even those who had foreseen the Arab-Israeli war, they could not feel that the eventual destruction of Israel as a catastrophe for all Jews, for the Occident itself.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Aron, Raymond, *Essais sur la condition juive contemporaine ; textes réunis et annotés par Perrine Simon-Nahum*. Paris : Editions de Folio, 1989 p. 290
A peu d'exceptions près, les juifs de France éprouvent à l'égard d'Israël une dilection particulière. Même les antisionistes, même s'ils avaient prévu la guerre israélo-arabe, ils ne

In this post-war period, Israel became part of the Jewish identity, regardless of other national affiliation. Thus for the first time a dual identity was realized, which informed the necessity of action for Israel's survival. Its destruction would be a catastrophic world event, which led many, both Jews and non-Jews to protest in the streets in support of Israel. Thus the dual identity that was first created in response to Vichy made itself apparent in the French response to the Six-Day War.

Thus during the Six-Day war thousands took to the street to show their support for Israel and against the French policy at the time. Ashkenazi, Sephardic, and non-Jews all united to encourage the French government to lend its support to Israel. Thus, they were demonstrating against French politics in support of another country. These demonstrations represent a new relationship between French citizens and the Republic, as a double national affiliation made itself apparent for the French Jews. The protesters brought their “private life” selves, with religious and cultural ties, to the French government, and into the public sphere. The Jews thus found a common ground in their support for Israel. As Aron eloquently phrases the new Jewish identity, “French, I confess that in certain instances, I feel in regards to Israel, to the State of Israel, a particular dilection. I plead that the patriotism is neither exclusive nor total.”⁵¹ His sentiments echo the overall trend of the time, as Jews increasingly realized that their fate as a people was irrevocably aligned with that of Israel.

peuvent pas ne pas ressentir la destruction éventuelle d’Israël comme une catastrophe pour tous les juifs, pour Occident lui-même.

⁵¹ Aron, Raymond, *Essais sur la Condition Juive Contemporaine ; Textes Réunis et Annotés par Perrine Simon-Nahum* p. 188
Français, j'avoue que dans certaines circonstances, j'éprouve à l'égard d'Israël, de l'État d'Israël, une dilection particulière. Je plaide que le patriotisme ne doit être ni exclusif ni totalitaire.

This gap between the Jews and their French national identity was increased due to the General de Gaulle's personal attitude towards the Jews. While he had worked with the Jews and Zionists during the war, his politics as Prime Minister can hardly be qualified as pro-Zionist, to the extent that he has been accused by some of being anti-Semitic. However, they can also be understood within the context of the Republican model, as this model strives to invoke a national identity superior to religious affiliations. Thus his policies were not particularly pro-Israel, as he wanted all citizens to primarily identify as French, instead of by other, , affiliations.

His republican attitudes were clearly shown in a speech made on November 27th 1967, in which he proclaimed that the Jews are “an elite peoples, sure of themselves and dominators.”⁵² This statement hearkens back to Napoleon’s attitude about the Jews. In de Gaulle’s eyes, the Jews were therefore a people with an elite position in France, who are not to be trusted. At the same time, this statement affirms the inherent conflict within the French national project, as a Republican model can never totally ignore religious affiliations in a modern state that respects the right to religious freedom. Yet the Six-Day War marks a changing point in the French Jewish identity, and reveals a very different people from the Israelites of the 19th century. These Jews have a double allegiance, and

Since the Six-Day war, however, the process of a double allegiance subjected to the Jews who protested to show their support for Israel in a way judged too exuberant, things changed a double movement is since that time perceptible in a

certain class of Jews: an attitude of defiance towards France and a sudden burst of nationalist feelings towards Israel.”⁵³

The reaction to the Six-Day War marks a definitive shift in the French Jewish identity, which had begun following the creation of the State of Israel. For the first time, nationalistic feelings towards the fledgling country of Israel made themselves known in a very public and “exuberant” manner. At the same time, this attitude shows an outright defiance of the French nationalistic identity in favor of a different nationalist identity, an allegiance to Israel. This new double allegiance complicates foreign affairs in the Middle East, especially in light of the rise of immigrants from Arab countries following decolonization.

The period following the Algerian war and decolonization were times of enormous waves of immigration in France, especially from the Maghreb and former French colonies. This period of decolonization and the founding of new governments encouraged many to leave their homes for France. These new immigrants from Arab countries had to integrate into France, changing the country on both a national level and within the Jewish community. The Jewish community itself shifted profoundly from an Ashkenazi one to a more Sephardic one. On the national front, these new immigrants demanded a voice within the government and representation, setting the stage for the push and pull between Arab and Jewish interests that continues to this day within French

⁵³ Azria, Régine. "Le Judaïsme, Contours et Limites de la Reconnaissance." *Archives de sciences sociales des religions* 50 129 (2005): p. 135
Depuis la guerre de Six jours cependant et le procès de double allégeance intenté aux juifs qui manifestaient leur soutien à Israël de façon jugée trop exubérante, les choses ont changé et un double mouvement est depuis lors perceptible dans certains milieux juifs : une attitude de défiance envers la France et un sursaut nationaliste au bénéfice d'Israël.

politics. These tensions exacerbate the challenges to the French model that it currently faces.

Chapter Three: The Current Situation

With its first inklings beginning in 1980, with the bombing of the Copernic Synagogue⁵⁴, and lasting up until today, the possibility of the success of the republican model with regards to the Jews is under examination. As recently described, this sort of evolution is not uncommon for the Jews in France, who constantly are re-evaluating their place in society. At the same time, the recent outbreaks of anti-Semitism coupled with the government's response has changed France's reputation in the past ten years and brought into question the possibility of a Republican project today. In particular there

⁵⁴ On October 3rd, 1980, the Copernic synagogue was bombed. To this day, it is unclear who the perpetrators were and what their exact motives were.

has been a resurgence of anti-Semitic acts beginning in 2000 with the commencement of the Second Intifada. Thus, France's reputation has changed from being a country in which Jews could freely integrate with the rest of the population to a country in which the Jewish community is seized by a profound fear.

One of the more serious aspects leading up to this skepticism of the French Republican ideal is the assimilation of the Jews and Muslims as the two religious minorities who pose a problem to the French Republican model. Both the medias and governments facilitate this sort of blending.

Another serious problem facing the Jewish community is the rise of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionist sentiment. This resurgence has led to the community being seized by a profound sense of fear and dread. Many decide to live within a closed community, where they may feel safer, yet at the same time, while living in this sort of community, a secular identity proves difficult. This rise in communitarianism poses a threat to the Republican ideal.

The assimilation two minority groups by the media

Perhaps one of the more serious consequences of the increase in immigration from North Africa is the blending of the Jews and Muslims as the two religious minority groups who challenge the French model of citizenship. In the eyes of some French media, the two groups challenge the very idea of laïcité through their perceived unwillingness to adhere to the French specificity, and their desire to remain in closed-off communities, often times very close to one another. Jews and Muslims live in communities next to each other, yet do not interact. Often assimilated together in the eyes of the media, the

two are, in reality, very different. Yet due to the fact the two communities are often near one another, these differences are ignored.

The French government tends to combine the two, as it tries to replicate Jewish Institutions in the Muslim community. For example, the CFCM (conseil français du culte musulman) was created in 2003, and seeks to represent secular interests of the Muslim community. It unites the CRCMs (conseil régional du culte musulman) throughout France under a four-fold plan of action, which is:

To defend the dignity and interests of the Muslim religion in France; to encourage and organize the sharing of information and services between regions of the religion; to encourage dialogue between religion; to assure the representation of the religion in front of public powers.⁵⁵

In the same way that the CRIF acts as a lobbying force for Jewish interests and tries to represent the Jewish community for a secular government, so too does the CFCM try to represent the political interests of the Muslim community. The CRIF is thus the model for political representation in the French society for a religious minority group.

However, this attempt to replicate Jewish institutions is dangerous and misleading. As previously demonstrated, the Jews have a very particular and specific history in France, which cannot be replicated for other minority groups. The CRIF was born under a very specific set of circumstances. Thus, while the CFCM may try to replicate the dialogue around assimilation that the CRIF uses, its different history and the

⁵⁵Conseil Français du Culte Musulman. "CFCM Brochure." (2010). Web. De défendre la dignité et les intérêts du culte musulman en France; de favoriser et d'organiser le partage d'informations et de services entre les lieux de culte; d'encourager le dialogue entre les religions; d'assurer représentation des lieux de culte musulman auprès les pouvoirs publics.

differences between the ways in which the Muslims relate to the State invariably leads to problems. The CFCM, started in 2003, does not have the same history as the CRIF, and indeed the Muslim community has an extraordinarily different historic relationship with the State, as well as a different history.⁵⁶

While the CFCM tries to replicate the organization of the Jewish community for the Muslim community, the medias also link the two together when discussing integration into the French society. Especially in the law concerning the wearing of religious objects in public schools, headscarves and kippot were two items that were explicitly banned by this law. Thus both communities were targeted by this measure, furthering their reputation as outsiders within the French model. This linkage of the two persists especially in right-wing attacks on both communities on the grounds that they are not really French and will never fully integrate and fulfill the demands of French citizenship. By publicly expressing their religion in a nation that advocates a militant separation between Church and State, the two are seen as posing a threat to the French model. At the same time, France is a historically Catholic country, and Jews and Muslims clearly do not fit into this mold.

In the eyes of the extreme right, the two are the same and are therefore persecuted in similar ways. In Strasbourg in 2010, 36 Muslim graves were violated, representing the fourth time that either Jewish or Muslim graves were desecrated by the extreme right in the region.⁵⁷ Though it was a small, radical fringe group who desecrated the graves, at the same time, in not differentiating between the Jews and the Muslims, this shows that

⁵⁶ The challenges and history of the Muslims in France is outside of the scope of this paper.

⁵⁷ AFP. "Violence; Trente-Six Tombes Musulmanes Vandalisées en Alsace." *Le Monde* 26 September 2010, sec. Politique. Web.

the two groups are seen as the same by some extremists. There is a perceived link between the two communities and their relationship to an imagined France body of the citizen. This dangerous assimilation leads to many problems, and also serves to exacerbate tensions between Muslim and Jewish relationships within the France.

For the Jewish community, this artificially assimilation represents a threat to the efforts to integrate, through both institutions and through religious reform. Indeed, the very possibility of compatibility with the French model is currently being questioned. In a study done by the CSA (conseil sondage analyse) institute⁵⁸, 21% of those surveyed said that they believed that Islam is absolutely not compatible with the French society. In that same article, 10% of those surveyed said that Judaism is not at all compatible with French society.⁵⁹ While the fact that the CSA grouped the Jews and Muslims together in this study serves as evidence to the problem of confusing the two groups, the study reveals doubts on both sides. Though the majority may believe that the religions are compatible with the rules outlined by French society, nevertheless the 21% and 10% respectively represents a large portion of the population who do not believe in the possibility of integration within the French society, and thus are questioning the foundation of the French republican model. Thus for these individuals, the Republican model poses extreme problems.

One factor that can be attributed to this negative attitude about the possibility of the success of the republican model is the rise of communitarianism since 1980

⁵⁸ The CSA institute is a private institution that conducts studies and surveys primarily in France and Europe.

⁵⁹ AFP. "Une Majorité de Français Jugent l'Islam Compatible avec la Vie en Société." *Le Monde* 10 December 2009. Web.

throughout France. Communitarianism refers to the phenomenon of individuals choosing to live with people of similar backgrounds, and thus less in mixed neighborhoods. For immigrants, these neighborhoods replicate their country of origins. They primarily identify as members of a small group, rather than through a larger national identity. A communitarian state would then be required to “intervene in processes of identity formation and maintenance, if necessary. And such intervention is supposed to be necessary if the ‘survival’ (or even only the flourishing) of national, ethnic, or religious minorities is threatened.”⁶⁰ The United States somewhat endorses this model, and tries to protect ethnic neighborhoods as part of its national heritage. France is not a communitarianist State, yet the rise in communitarianism translates into more Jews living in close-knit communities, sheltered from the vicissitudes of French politics. They do not assimilate into the French model. Indeed, it can be argued that this rise in communitarianism represents a new sort of ghettoization in France, in which for the first time there are “ethnic” neighborhoods in a country, which, paradoxically, proclaims not to recognize these affiliations in a public sphere.

In addition, this living close together yet not interacting, tensions rise between Muslim and Jewish populations. These incidents are then reportedly yearly by the CRIF, which then serves to increase the fear felt in the Jewish community, as individuals perceive a constant rise in acts of anti-Semitism. Thus the resurgence in anti-Semitic acts can be seen as an effect of the rise in communitarianism. This is not to excuse these acts, or fully explain them, but instead treat them as a symptom of a problem within the French Republican model.

⁶⁰ Habermas, Jürgen. "Address: Multiculturalism and the Liberal State." *Stanford Law Review* 47.5 (1995): 849-53. Web.

Terrified by not shocked: the rise of anti-Semitism and communitarianism

Since 2000 there has been a profound increase in the number of anti-Semitic acts as reported on by the CRIF, leading to a crisis for the French Jewish community, and a profound-reevaluation of the possibility of its integration in French society. Synagogues and cemeteries were vandalized in the Alsace. Anti-Israel protests were held throughout France, often with an anti-Semitic tinge, and in 2006 Ilan Halimi, a French Jew of Moroccan descent was tortured and murdered by a youth gang called “les barabres” (the barbarians). As Alain Finkielkraut described the situation in 2006, “I am horrified by the vandalism that has burst out throughout the French territory. Horrified but not shocked. This apocalypse was predictable, it was announced.”⁶¹ Perhaps the term “apocalypse” is strong, but nevertheless, the years of 2000-2006 represented a profound shock for the Jewish population of France. One possible causes of this crisis is the rise in communitarianism and the following decline of integrated communities and open dialogue. These boundaries greatly diminished the equalizing effects of a Republican model

The rise in communitarianism represents a threat to the Republican model. Ethnic populations are not integrated into the national model, but instead adhere primarily to a different affiliation that cannot be monitored and does not adhere to the national philosophic principles. Instead of primarily identifying as French, either a territorial or

⁶¹ Finkielkraut, Alain. "Un Certain Sens de l'Honneur." *L'Arche*.573 (2006): 26
Je suis épouvanté par le vandalisme qui s'est déchainé sur l'ensemble du territoire français. Épouvanté, mais pas étonnée. Cette apocalypse était prévisible, et elle était annoncée.

ethnic affiliation grows, as individuals self-identify principally based on where their families are from or their religion and the important boundary between the public and the private crumbles. This problem is felt particularly strongly among immigrant populations.

As Schnapper phrases,

Given the marginalization of a group of minorities and of descendants of immigrants, more generally, the weakening of the transcendence of the particularism of the common citizenship, identity affirmations and claims of particular memories are from there forth expressed freely in the public space.⁶²

Thus, due to marginalization of these communities, they demand recognition of a different struggle, and “transcend” the Republican model, demanding to express their individual affiliations in the public sphere.

While Jewish communities have experienced a rise in communitarianism, the organizations have needed to evolve to fit this changing community as they struggle to maintain a relationship with the French government. Thus this shift has also been felt within the Jewish institutions themselves.

The French Jewish organizations have undergone immense change in the past years, led both by the rise of anti-Semitism and the changes in French politics and Jewish religious movements. Whereas in the last 25 years the United States has seen new liberal movements gain popularity, in France the opposite is true, as more and more people affirm a very ritual and practice-oriented brand of Judaism. Thus more Jews observe

⁶² Schnapper, Dominique. *Qu'est-ce Que l'Integration?* p. 196
Étant donné la marginalisation d'une partie minoritaire des descendants de migrants, et, plus généralement, l'affaiblissement de la transcendance des particularismes par la citoyenneté commune, les affirmations identitaires et le revendications des mémoires particulières s'expriment désormais plus librement dans l'espace public.

Shabbat and keep Kosher, which inhibits their participation in the French national project. For example, refusing to work on a Saturday for religious reasons affirms a religious identity in the public sphere. This profound return to traditional roots and practices makes living in a Republican society more difficult. Thus,

The return to Judaism, the beginnings of which was observed in the 1970's, translates from now on for the majority of individuals by a large intensification of religious references. Community organizations accompany and reinforce this intensification of practices becoming more demanding. More and more, the Orthodox are dominating official organizations.⁶³

These orthodox populations have a more difficult time adhering to the French national project outlined in the first chapter, and tend to stay within pre-determined, closed communities. They go to kosher restaurants, do not eat at non-Jewish houses, and go to Jewish schools. They even have a separate calendar from the rest of France. As a result, they do not integrate easily, yet are also very vocal about their special interests and advocate for their needs to be recognized by the government. As the most vocal group, this very practicing group is the primary face of Judaism in France, with more liberal movements not taking hold or fading into the background. Thus, the State is dealing with a vocal orthodox population, with very specific interests, which may not represent those

⁶³ Dominique Schnapper; Chantal Bordes-Benayoun, Freddy Raphael. *La Condition Juive en France: la Tentation de l'Entre-Soi.* p. 83
Le retour au judaïsme, dont on avait observé les premiers dans les années 1970, se traduit désormais, pour la majorité des individus, par une plus grande intensité des références religieuses. Les organisations communautaires accompagnent et renforcent l'intensification de pratiques devenues plus exigeantes. De plus en plus, les orthodoxes tendent à dominer dans les organisations officielles.

of the entire community, yet are nevertheless the only interests the State is given. These interests now dominate the political and cultural Jewish institutions, notably the CRIF.

Since the 1980's, the CRIF has undergone major reforms in both its mission and its organization. These changes have mostly been at the behest of Theo Klein, who was elected as president of the CRIF in 1983 and served until 1989. He made numerous changes to the CRIF and its mission, including making it a more political organization and aligning it more with the consistory, whereas before the two organizations had a more limited relationship. He changed the CRIF's identity from a purely secular organization to an organization with religious ties, and a more religious identity. His actions have led to the rise in communitarianism and, according to Shmuel Trigano, "if one must talk about Jewish 'communitarianism,' it is Theo Klein who inaugurated it."⁶⁴ Thus even within a secular society, the representative of Jewish interests is religious and not cultural or political. Therefore in the eyes of a public sphere, there is no Jewish identity aside from a religious one. After Theo Klein, the fate of the consistory and the CRIF were intertwined, and the fragile balance of powers was shifted as political and religious interests merged. New immigrants as well as long-time citizens must contend with these shifting organizations that are designed to represent their interests.

For recent immigrants, the French Jewish community and its representative organizations are practicing⁶⁵, and thus face different challenges than a more reform Jewish community. Thus, immigrants find themselves isolated within the confines of

⁶⁴ Trigano, Shmuel. *L'avenir des Juifs de France*. Ed. Simon-Nahum, Perrine. Paris: Editions Grasset & Fasquelle, 2006. P. 90.
S'il faut parler de « communautarisme » juif, c'est bien Theo Klein qui l'inaugure.

⁶⁵ By « practicing » I am referring to the term « pratiquant, » which defines those Jews who are more traditional yet not necessarily orthodox or Loubavich.

their community and “different from the diverse evolutions that took place in Israel and in the United States, the heads of consistorial organizations favor conservative forms with respect to religion.”⁶⁶ In both cultural and religious institutions, France does not know the same sorts of reforms that were popular in the United States and Israel, ones that promote a brand of Judaism that does not necessarily follow strict traditions instead favoring compatibility with modern societal values. Therefore, when recent immigrants come to France, they are faced with a primarily practicing Jewish population. The liberal and reform movements are very small and do not have the same political power as more practicing forms.

The rise of communitarianism and education

As in the case of most immigrant populations entering France, Jews integrate themselves into isolated communities with like-minded individuals, and face the same problems as other minority groups struggling to find a place within the French model. Segregated within their own specific enclaves, their children do not adhere to the system of public education and “this assemblage the children of immigrants fuels the process of imprisonment in a neighborhood, and marginalization, the language and manners become markers that make participation in the social life outside of the city more difficult.”⁶⁷

⁶⁶ Dominique Schnapper; Chantal Bordes-Benayoun, Freddy Raphael. *La Condition Juive En France: La Tentation De L'entre-Soi*. p. 94

À la différence des évolutions diverses qui se dessinent en Israël et aux États-Unis les responsables des organisations consistoriales favorisent les formes conservatrices du respect de la tradition.

⁶⁷ Schnapper, Dominique. *Qu'est-ce Que l'Integration?* p.193
Ce rassemblement des enfants des immigrés nourrit les processus d'enfermement dans le

Thus, effectively trapped within their own social circles, immigrants find themselves in front of an enormous challenge to break free of the confines of a segregated community. The infrastructure of the French systems of integration, such as the educational system, is therefore met with skepticism as these immigrant populations and their children find themselves unwilling to participate in these institutions, as shown by the rise in attendance in Jewish schools.

Since the early 2000's, the number of Jewish students enrolled in religious schools has drastically increased. This shift does not only represent immigrant children, but also those who have lived in France for a longer period of time. In the scholarly year from 2002-2003, there were 25,884 students enrolled in Jewish schools⁶⁸ representing a 78 % increase from 1988⁶⁹. In addition an estimated half of the Jews have some contact with a religious education. Thus a religious affiliation is passed down through education, and the increase in communitarianism manifests itself through a desire to attend similar sorts of schools, where youths make friends exclusively with other Jews and are temporarily shielded from the threat of anti-Semitism. While being sheltered from anti-Semitism, this comes at the expense of a national project, and large percentages of Jewish students to not have the chance to interact with peers with other religious affiliations. According to Roger Ian, "In this difficult context, school is the last rampart, the last

quartier et de marginalisation, la langue et les manières deviennent des marques qui rendent de plus en plus difficile la participation en dehors de la cité.

⁶⁸ Trigano, Shmuel *L'Avenir des Juifs de France* p. 29

⁶⁹ Dominique Schnapper; Chantal Bordes-Benayoun, Freddy Raphael. *La Condition Juive En France: La Tentation De L'entre-Soi*. p. 86

citadel of knowledge and above all, of the learning of citizenship, of normalcy.”⁷⁰

However, due to a recent rise in anti-Semitism in schools, many parents may choose to send their children to a religious school.

Recently the number of anti-Semitic acts in public schools has greatly increased, as seen in recently headlines. For example, some articles from 2004 read: “a Jewish adolescent stabbed in the middle of the street in Épinay-sur-Seine (June 6th 2004); an adolescent excluded from a middle school in Lyon because of racism (June 11th 2004).”⁷¹ Thus throughout France, the possibility of a successful integration is therefore put under question, as tensions erupt between religious groups. As the problems from the Middle East transport themselves into France, even in a country that ignores religious identities, these affiliations still create tensions within public schools. As a means of transmitting a national identity, these problems within the schools make it difficult for future generations to feel ties with France and a common national heritage. Sheltered amongst like-minded individuals, they feel no allegiance towards their adopted homeland, instead feeling allegiance with other affiliations.

The crisis and its relation to Israel

⁷⁰ Roder, Ian. "L'école, Témoin De Toutes Les Fractures." *Les Études de CRIF*. 12 (2006). 3. Web.

Dans ce contexte difficile, l'école est le dernier rempart, la toute dernière citadelle du savoir, et surtout de l'apprentissage de la citoyenneté, de la normalité.

⁷¹ Dominique Schnapper; Chantal Bordes-Benayoun, Freddy Raphael. *La Condition Juive En France: La Tentation De L'entre-Soi*. Le Lien Social p. 22.

Un adolescent juif poignardé en plein rue à Épinay-sur-Seine (6 juin 2004); une adolescent exclue d'un collège lyonnais pour racisme (11 juin 2004)

Since the 1970's, and especially in the aftermath of the Six-Day War, one of the primary means of auto-identification for the Jewish community has been through its relationship with Israel. Thus "from the moment that Jews recognized and laid claim to the historical dimension of their identity, relations with France had to change."⁷² Thus French Jews are forcibly linked with Israel, and can no longer maintain the distinction between Israélite and Jew that was popular during the Rothschild's time. This linkage means that the Jewish community directly feels issues relating to Israel.

At the same time as pro-Israel sentiment and Jewish identity are linked, so too are anti-Semitic rhetoric and anti-Zionist rhetoric. In the eyes of some medias there is no difference between a Jew and a Zionist. This dangerous assimilation of Zionist and Jewish interests, which are fundamentally not the same, although they occasionally have similar goals, leads to problems within the media of deciphering between religious and ethnic tensions.

The anti-Zionist rhetoric that has recently swept through France can be seen as an expression of anti-Semitism. The authors of this rhetoric do not discriminate between Jews and Israelis, a dangerous outcome of the place of Israel as the Jewish homeland. This rhetoric leads to an increase in fear felt by the Jewish community, as the possibility for a double-affiliation comes into question. Jews are automatically identified as Zionists, which negates a French secular identity. Indeed that identity no longer exists in the same way as it did before the creation of Israel. There is now an external homeland, and the role of France as a country with the potential to be a place where Jews feel at home has been greatly diminished. Therefore anti-Zionist attacks are felt within the

⁷² Schnapper, Dominique. *The Jews and Political modernity in France*
The Jerusalem quarterly. Issue 38 1996

Jewish community, and according to anti-Zionist rhetoric, “the triple accusation is clear: the Jews are the original racists, imperialists, and exterminators of foreign peoples.”⁷³ Thus in the eyes of many these medias, Jews are oppressors of minorities, racists, and colonists.

This rhetoric is covered every month in *Arche*, which has a section on the anti-Semitic portrayals by the Arab medias. These monthly reminders of the hate towards Jews felt in the Middle East increases the sense of fear and panic felt by the Jewish community. It increases the sentiment that they are not protected under the French system. Tied with the conflict in the Middle East, especially the Second Intifada, this rhetoric took on a new measure of strength that has not yet disappeared. For example, while protests may occur for disengagement in Gaza, in portraying Israel as a country of colonizers, the Jews are implicated as racists and colonizers. This may have been a political protest against Israel’s politics, but the implications lead for a profound discomfort felt by the Jewish community, as they see themselves as the targets of the accusations of the protesters. Furthermore, the protesters explicitly targeted Jews, refusing to differentiate between Jewish interests and Israeli ones. Thus the rise of anti-Zionism is also a rise in anti-Semitism. While trying to mitigate the growing fears of a rise in anti-Semitism, *Arche* does little to contrast the disturbingly negative images of Jews portrayed throughout the Arab world for a secular population. Instead, its articles serve to increase fears of anti-Semitism. This fear is also propagated by the CRIF and its articles, such as an in-depth examination of the recent boycott of Jewish goods.

⁷³ Taguieff, Pierre-André. "Penser La Judéophobie Mondialisée, À L'Ère de l'Antisionisme Absolu." *L'Arche*.577 (2006): 8.

L'accusation triple est claire : les Juifs sont originellement racistes, impérialistes et exterminateurs de peuples étrangers.

In 2009, a pro-Palestinian group advocated for a boycott of all Israeli goods in Carrefour markets. This was seen as an act of anti-Semitism for many members of the community, who asked themselves, “how can historic analogies not come to us in this spirit? ‘Don’t buy Israeli products’ resembles ‘don’t buy Jewish products’ too much.”⁷⁴ Anti-Zionist propaganda instantly brings up fears of a new form of anti-Semitism, and reminds individuals of the economic measures taken against Jews during Vichy.

Confronted with a rising tide of anti-Zionism, Jewish organizations are forced to take a stand. Most often, this stance is a necessarily pro-Israel stance. This negates some of the valuable criticism that could have been propagated by Jewish organizations. However, since the anti-Zionist rhetoric invariably has an anti-Semitic tinge, especially since the pursuit of the destruction of Israel also implicates the destruction of the Jewish homeland, the community organizations are thus forced to be politically pro-Israel, at the potential expense of creating more open dialogue. It is impossible to be critical of Israel while advocating for Jewish rights within this highly politicized context. For example, even on a cultural level, Jewish organizations are vehemently pro-Israel. Every issue of *Arche* has a dispatch from Israel, while also showcasing popular beach spots. The implication of these articles is that in the face of the challenges of living as a Jew in France, Israel is a valid and excellent option. At the same time, the rise in anti-Semitism since 2000 has led Israeli politicians to re-examine the possibility of a Franco-Jewish population, and encourage French Jews to move to Israel.

⁷⁴ Waintrater, Meir. "Le Boycott d'Israël: un Meurtre Symbolique." *Les Études du CRIF* (2011). Web.

Comment les analogies historiques ne nous viendraient-elles pas à l'esprit ? «N'achetez pas de produits israéliens» ressemble trop à «n'achetez pas de produits juifs».

Escaping the “wildest anti-Semitism:” Response to rise in anti-Semitism in France

One popular response to the current crises has been to make Aliyah. Through the law of return, Jews have the option of automatic Israeli citizenship.⁷⁵ In response to the rise in anti-Semitic acts beginning in 2000, Ariel Sharon issued an invitation to all French Jews to escape “the wildest anti-Semitism”⁷⁶ by moving to Israel. He proclaimed, “if I have to advise our brothers in France, I'll tell them one thing -- move to Israel, as early as possible.”⁷⁷ According to Esther Benbassa,

In stigmatizing France as the country of ‘raging anti-Semitism’ and in calling for French Jews to immigrate to Israel, Ariel Sharon renewed one of the original foundations of Zionism, the affirmation of the centrality of Israel in face of the Diaspora, even when this affirmation becomes in conflict with the latter.⁷⁸ Sharon formally and publically questioned the possibility of France to combat the ‘raging anti-Semitism’ that plagued the country at the start of the new millennium. Thus France’s reputation in the eyes of the global community changed drastically, and it was

⁷⁵ The law of return states all Jews are guaranteed automatic Israeli citizenship. Started in the wake of the Holocaust, the law has also come under attack for its sometimes-narrow definition of who qualifies as Jewish. Unrestricted immigration has also led to economic problems for Israel.

⁷⁶ "France Scolds Sharon for Calling Jews to Israel." *New York Times*: A.3. ProQuest. Jul 19 2004. Web.

⁷⁷ IBID

⁷⁸ Benbassa, Esther *Juifs de France, des sionistes sans sionisme* Le monde 31 August 2004. Web.

En stigmatisant la France comme le pays d'un « antisémitisme déchaîné » et en appelant les juifs français à émigrer en Israël, Ariel Sharon a renoué avec l'un des fondements du sionisme originel, l'affirmation de la centralité d'Israël par rapport à la diaspora, quand bien même cette affirmation devait entrer en conflit avec les intérêts de cette dernière.

“stigmatized” in the eyes of Israel as a country with great problems of anti-Semitism. Sharon publicly questioned the French government’s ability to quell the rising tides of anti-Semitism, and brought global attention to the rise of anti-Semitism in France and the government’s response. Although Sharon later apologized for his remarks by putting them within a larger context of Zionism and more fully acknowledging the French government’s efforts; France’s reputation remains tarnished in Israel, and the very possibility of a French Jewish community is placed under strong scrutiny for the Israelis. In other words, the damage of his comments has been long lasting and remains to this day a blemish on France’s reputation.

At the same time, there is a very strong attachment for Israel among the French community. Not only among those who make Aliyah, but many go to Israel for vacation and express a strong allegiance with the country. Indeed, “In 2005, 45 % of people interrogated agreed with the statement: ‘for French Jews, Israel counts more than France.’”⁷⁹ Despite living in France, in terms of their identity, the politics and problems of Israel matter more than those in France, and they feel more closely attached to the fate of Israel than that of their country of residence.

While only a small percentage chooses to make Aliyah, ties to Israel are affirmed in many ways. Through Birthright⁸⁰ and youth groups, many young French Jews find themselves attached to Israel, both from a religious and cultural perspective. Many

⁷⁹ Taguieff, Pierre-André. "Penser La Judéophobie Mondialisée, À L’Ère de L’antisionisme Absolu." *L’Arche*.577 (2006): 8.
En 2005, 45% des personnes interrogées affirment leur accord avec la proposition « Pour les Juifs français, Israël compte plus que la France »

⁸⁰ Birthright is an Israeli charity that sponsors free heritage trips to Israel for Jews ages 18-26.

vacation in Israel over the summer and “in a general manner, the voyage to Israel is frequent. 85% of those surveyed had gone at least once, which confirms not only the importance of the origins myth, but also the concrete relationships of the Diaspora with the Promised Land.”⁸¹ Some go to visit family, other go because of youth groups, while still others go for religious reasons. Since 2000 in particular, the number of Jews, mostly wealthy, with second houses in Israel has greatly increased. In communities such as Netanya, with a large French population, there has been an enormous boom in the past years of new developments and skyrocketing real-estate prices. According to the Jewish Independent, “France, some Jews have even taken in their mezuzot and nailed them up inside. Those who can afford it are buying "safe houses" in Israel, some with future plans to move there permanently.”⁸² While they may only live in these houses while on vacation, nevertheless, the fact that they own them represents a mistrust of the French Republican project. They are houses to be lived in “in case of” implying that in the event of a resurgence of anti-Semitism, these individuals will have somewhere to go and will not be trapped in a country that no longer accepts them. It speaks to a profound mistrust of France’s ability to maintain its Republican principles.

Indeed, not only Ariel Sharon, but also many French people are openly questioning the possibility of a French Jewish community. On March 30th 2008, Rabbi Sitruk, then the Chief Rabbi of France, head of the consistory declared, “our place for

⁸¹ Dominique Schnapper; Chantal Bordes-Benayoun, Freddy Raphael. *La Condition Juive en France: la Tentation de l'Entre-Soi*. p. 76.
D'une manière générale, le voyage en Israël est fréquent. 85% des personnes interrogées l'ont fait au moins une fois, ce qui confirme non seulement l'importance du mythe d'origine, mais aussi des relations concrètes avec la Terre promis.

⁸² Spivak, Rhonda. "Israel's Euro Housing Boom." *Jewish Independent* 2007. Web.

everyone is in Israel.”⁸³ Thus he too is affirming a Zionist message for the French Jews. According to this statement, all efforts at integration, of which France has many, are eventually doomed for failure. Acting accordingly, since 2000, the number of Olim⁸⁴ from France has increased.

In Israel, I feel at home: the rise in Aliyah from 2000-present

Since 2001 there has been a profound spike in the number of Jews who left France for Israel. From 1990-2001 there were 11,958 French Olim and from 2002-2009, there have been 18,689 French Olim⁸⁵. Peaking in 2005, at the end of the Second Intifada, this shift represents a large questioning of the possibility of the French project of integration. For a variety of reasons, these individuals no longer feel comfortable in French society. Despite its many comforts and social programs, they decide to leave for the economically poorer Israel. The reasons for making Aliyah are always varied, but it invariably involves a profound lifestyle change and adjustment. Picking up and leaving for Israel, where it is much harder to raise a family and to provide the same standards of living as in France, speaks to a large problem within French society.

The following graph shows the number of French Olim compared with those from the United States and England from 2000-2010. France shows the greatest change in

⁸³. Dominique Schnapper; Chantal Bordes-Benayoun, Freddy Raphael. *La Condition Juive en France: la Tentation de l'Entre-Soi*. p. 91
Notre place pour tous est en Israël.


⁸⁴ Olim is the French word for recent immigrant

⁸⁵ l'Integration, Ministre de. "Les Chiffres Que Nous Communiquent Le Ministère De L'intégration ". Web.

immigration, whereas England stays at around a steady level, and in the United States the number is climbing constantly.

Olim arrivés en Israël des USA, France et Angleterre de 2000 à 2010

Source Ministère de l'Intégration - Graphique www.terredisrael.com



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According to the graph, France has the largest change in the number of Olim. This speaks to the fact that the decision to move is often linked to the political situation, instead of trends within the Jewish community or other causes. Thus a large number has decided to make their Aliyah and leave the French national project. This represents a large decision, abandoning all former ties to France and its generous social programs. Realizing that emancipation does not guarantee integration or equality, many begin to question their relationship with France and their reasons for staying in a country where they do not feel at home. Israel has a very large French population and according to a

⁸⁶ "Le Chiffre D'alya Des Juifs De France Ne Décolle Pas." (2011). *Terre d'Israël*. Web.

poll by the French Embassy in Israel taken in 2007, 20% of Israelis, nearly a million people, are francophone.⁸⁷ Therefore already in 2007, a huge French community exists in Israel, making the prospect of Aliyah more attractive for those who may be undecided, yet definitively unhappy in France. In addition, with a new globalized world, the prospect of making a living in Israel is much easier without speaking the language.

Thus, many decide to make Aliyah, and as the figures show, since 2000, there has been a large increase in the number of Olim.⁸⁸ Some of the immigrants are from parents of North African origins, whose parents or grandparents immigrated to France in the wake of decolonization. Without a long history in France, the prospect of leaving for Israel may be easier. According to Avi-Zana, the president of Ami Israel, "These Olim, from the year 2000, often born to parents from North Africa, have always kept a privileged relationship with Israel."⁸⁹ Thus, already from immigrant families, leaving France did not represent an enormous shock for them or their community, as they already had close ties with Israel. In addition, coming from families without a long history in France, but rather in French territories, leaving France does not represent a large shift from a deeply rooted familial tradition. France represents the country where they live, not a homeland.

⁸⁷ Sitbon, Claude. "La Francophone, une Neuve en France." *L'Arche*.588 (2007): 1
Selon un sondage publié par l'ambassade de France en Israël, 20% des Israéliens—soit près d'un million de personnes—sont francophones.

⁸⁸ Olim is the Hebrew word for those who make Aliyah

⁸⁹ Sitbon, Claude. "Juifs Français (ou Issus de la Francophonie) qui Ont Contribués à Bâtir Israël." *L'Arche*.612 (2009): 10.
Ces *olim*, des années 2000, souvent nés en France de parents originaires d'Afrique du Nord, ont toujours entretenu une relation privilégiée avec Israël.

This is not to imply that the Olim abandon their cultural ties with France. Indeed, quite the opposite is true. Everyone I interviewed in Israel maintained strong ties with France. They read French journals, and keep up with French news and politics. In addition, Israel has journals geared towards Francophone speakers, making speaking Hebrew unnecessary for many. Thus, while many live in Israel and participate in Israeli society, on a cultural level they affirm a French identity.

This French identity is affirmed to such an extent that many do not even see a reason to learn Hebrew. They work in French, and with the rise of the Internet, do not need to learn Hebrew to make a living. While their children often join the army and are better integrated into Israeli society, for many, especially older Olim, learning Hebrew is not a prerequisite for making Aliyah and is not necessary to make a living or be comfortable in French society. There are French cafés, bookstores, and cinemas, replicating French communities. Especially for older Olim, Israel proves itself to be a comfortable place to have a retirement.

Though largely invisible in the figures, one group that has immigrated to Israel in large numbers is retirees. Perhaps following their children who have already made Aliyah, or expressing an ancient religious desire to live in Israel, many retirees find themselves in Israel. While they may not integrate into the Israeli society, preferring not to mix with other Israelis, often due to language barriers, these groups still represent a large number of recent immigrants, and a group that will continue to make Aliyah regardless of the political situation in Israel.

For those with a family, the decision to leave France can be a harder one. It is this group that has the highest rate of return to Israel. Economically, Israel does not have the same support as France, and many live in worse conditions than they did in Israel. There

are not the same social services, or government aid in Israel that exists in France.

Nevertheless, if they can make it past the first year, many do not leave Israel, and choose to raise their children in Israeli society. Or, for younger Olim, they are able to find a spouse in Israel and start a life as an Israeli. In Israel, with its strong Jewish identity, the conflicts of identity that plague French society disappear, and many feel at home for the first time.

Therefore, due to increased anti-Semitism and a feeling of lack of support by the French government, many choose to make Aliyah. Among those who stay in France, they assert strong ties with Israel. Thus for French Jews, Israel asserts a fascination and interest, attracting them to a place where the feelings of fear that plague French society are absent, and they are free to practice their religion however they see fit. Yet this attachment to Israel comes at the expense of the Republican project, as a double allegiance of this sort is nearly impossible to maintain while also adhering to a universalist model. As this divide grows, France will increasingly need to re-evaluate its methods for creating a society in which individuals of different affiliations feel comfortable and patriotic.

Conclusion

The French Republican model assures a singular identity for individuals in the society. Each citizen is seen as exactly equal in the eyes of the law, to such an extent that the State is blind to religious and ethnic affiliations. However, these affiliations do exist, and efforts to ignore them often result in tragedy.

For the Jews especially, but not only, efforts to integrate into the society have often been difficult. As seen in the historic section, France has tried many methods and theories in integrating its Jewish population, and the group itself has also evolved dramatically since emancipation in 1791. This evolution has changed the ways in which the community relates to its long-standing institutions, such as the CRIF and the consistory. In particular, given that these institutions have very little political power (unlike the Jewish lobby in the United States), the relationship between political power and Jewish interests is very different. . Thus the Jewish community relies more on the State to protect it, and due to its small size and lack of political influence, it is often left in a vulnerable position.

Yet not only for the Jews, but also for other religious groups, the French model is coming under intense scrutiny. The issues facing the Jewish community in regards to assimilation and integration are not unique not that particular minority group. On the contrary, they are the issues facing most minority groups in the 21st century, in particularly Arab groups. How can a country with a Republican model recognize diversity and minorities? Overall, there has been an increase in communitarianism in France, which in its current form presents a challenge to the historic French Republican

model. As France opens itself up to more and more individuals of different backgrounds, who intend to stay with their affiliations, the Republican model will continue to be questioned and evolve.

It is impossible to predict the future, but for the French Jews, it is clear that in the past ten years, due to the increase in anti-Semitism, there has been a profound shift in how the community views itself and its relationship to France. There is a deep fear in the community, and a profound mistrust of the French institutions. At the same time, the institutions are powerless to combat against the rising tide of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionist sentiment. They cannot control the Arab medias and the condition in the Middle East, further, representing such a small population compared with the much larger Arab population, it cannot be expected that the French government will favor the Jews. To remedy their situation, some choose to make Aliyah, and in the annex there are some transcripts of those who I interviewed in Israel. Mostly leaders of the French community in Israel who immigrated in the 1980's, they each had a different view of the current situation, yet most felt a deep connection to the French culture. Thus one of the current challenges France faces is translating a cultural identity into a national one.

Annex

Interview with Avi Zana, director and founder of Ami Israel

Je m'appelle Avi Zana, j'habite 32 ans en Israël, et toujours je travaillais avec la communauté juive en France, et depuis sept ans dans ce bureau. Ce bureau on avait créé parce que, en 2000, on avait senti qu'il y a une changement en France, dans l'identité, dans la façon de voir la France, c'est évidemment très lié à l'Intifada. En 2000, 2001, 2002, il y a eu l'Intifada en Israël, et en France, comme vous l'avez vu, en France les Juifs et les Arabes vivent très près, dans les mêmes quartiers, ils viennent des mêmes endroits, parce que les Juifs et les Arabes viennent de l'Afrique de nord, du Maroc, de la Tunisie, d'Algérie, et donc il y a eu un conflit, le conflit entre les Israéliennes et les Palestiniens. Un petite peu il est transféré en France. Le grand problème c'est que les Juifs se sentent qu'il y a eu un changement, au niveau de média, au niveau de pouvoir. Et, les Juifs qui ont habitué à être eux, le première minorité en France, comme les Juifs qui ont habité aux États-Unis, la première minorité estimée, respectée, qui ont un pouvoir politique, ils ont compris pour la première fois, pas tous, mais beaucoup ont compris que les règles de jeu avaient changé.

Plusieurs problèmes sont passés. Premièrement, les gens ont compris que c'est plus difficile à vivre dans un *mixed-neighborhood*. Parce que les Arabes ont décidé d'affirmer leurs identités, politique et religieuse, ce qui n'était pas tellement fait avant. Tout un coup on a découvert d'un point de vue démographique, même qu'on le savait, en France en parle de 6 millions, 7 millions d'arabes, mais la France est un grand pays, et les Arabes ils ne sont pas partout, ils sont dans certains endroits. Donc 7 ou 8 millions, ils ne sont pas dispatchés dans tout le pays. Ils sont comme les *hasidim* à Brooklyn, et par hasard, ou pas par hasard les Juifs et les Arabes, ils habitent beaucoup dans les mêmes quartiers. Les gens compris qu'il fallait peut-être déménager.

Donc ici dans la banlieue, surtout au nord de Paris, il y a beaucoup des Juifs, mais beaucoup plus d'Arabes. Il y a trois mouvements dont on n'a pas beaucoup parlé, comme à l'époque d'immigration de Pologne. Même au 21^e siècle, il y a beaucoup de déménagement, de la banlieue vers l'est de Paris. Ici il y a 70% des juifs. De l'est de l'ouest, et un mouvement de tout vers Israël. Et il y a un mouvement vers Miami, Londres, New York, Bruxelles. On a eu trois mouvements : interne en France, chacun a déménagé d'un quartier plus riche pour être loin des Arabes. Autres ont dit si déjà on bouge, alors on quitte la France. Certains, ils sont quittés la France, il n'y a qu'Israël, ça, c'est les gens un peu plus sionistes. On estime c'est les dizaines de milles des personnes, Israël représente 25 mille personnes. Sur Miami, Londres, New York, Bruxelles, peut-être la même chose. C'est-à-dire que dans la France, c'est énorme. Peut-être un Juif sur cinq a changé la maison en France. Donc c'est un vrai phénomène de peur, de recueil, d'enfermement. Ça change l'identité, il y a un qui était plus riche, plus pauvre, tout le

monde n'était pas le même devant ce problème. Le monde, c'est un changement en France, si t'es en France, tu te rends compte que c'est une communauté d'immigrations ; les Alsaciens, les Polonais, les Égyptiens, les Marocains ça c'est tout la communauté française. Ils ont tous voulu être français.

D'être français la façon de la Révolution : être juif dedans, être français dehors. Les gens ne portent pas une kippa dehors. Les gens ils étaient pratiquants, mais pas tous. On ne disait pas qu'on est juif, on essaie de le cacher. Il y a eu quand même plusieurs événements dans l'histoire de France: Dreyfus, Vichy, la colonisation, tout ça a beaucoup influencé sur les juifs. Les Juifs ont compris que la France et un pays riche, ouvert aux Juifs et les Juifs ont beaucoup réussi. Et la population qui a réussi est énorme, c'est un peu comme aux États-Unis, peut-être un peu moins de richesse, mais beaucoup plus des gens qui ont réussi.

Dans les années 80, 90, il y a eu deux phénomènes-il y a eu le phénomène du *hazard-lituba*, qui veut dire que les gens sont plus religieux. Les gens se sont intégrés, sont devenus français, mais au but d'un moment ils se rendent compte que s'ils deviennent plus français, ils deviennent assimilés complètement. Il y a eu un réveil, qui est difficile à expliqué, comme il y a eu en Israël aussi. Il y a eu un réveil aux sépharades. En France il y a deux communautés: une grande communauté sépharade, et une petite communauté ashkénaze. La communauté active, c'est les sépharades religieux, et les riches, qui sont encore un parti ashkénaze. Par exemple, dans les olim, 80% sont des ashkénazes.

Donc il y a eu un réveil religieux important, qui s'arrêtait un peu maintenant. Un gros parti actif, par exemple dans les olim 80% dit qu'ils sont pratiquants. Ceux-ci ont compris qu'en Israël il est plus facile d'être religieux avec la barbe, le cachrout, etc. Ils ont compris qu'avec les Arabes il ne soit pas possible. Certainement, il y a eu un changement dans l'identité dans les années 2000 une grosse partie des Juifs de France, qui n'a pas eu dans autres pays. C'est quasiment qu'en France, c'est très particulier. Aujourd'hui ça s'est calmé il y a quelques années. Tous les gens qui ont voulu bouger, changer la position, il reste encore. On a passé cette étape. Il a duré de 2002 à 2008, pendant 6 ans, c'était la période le plus fort. Ce n'est pas une décision de 21^e siècle, des milliers de juifs ont frêne au silence.

Ça se crée de plus en plus les ghettos modernes. On s'appelle ça les quartiers juifs, mais c'est pareil, pour moi ils sont le ghetto. Une fille juive, elle va à la maison, elle va à l'école, aux synagogues, chez sa copine, c'est tout. Elle ne vit pas dans la ville, et vit dans le ghetto. Avant le ghetto c'était un quartier de la ville, même maintenant d'ailleurs. Tout la reste de la ville, les Juifs n'y viennent pas. Les gens pauvres, eux ils ne peuvent pas démanger, donc ça augmente la différence entre les pauvres et les riches, puisque les pauvres, eux, ils ne peuvent pas déménager.

Pour les gens qui ont démangé, est-ce qu'ils sont restés en Israël ?

Toujours 10% alya, ce sont les gens qui ne réussissent pas. Notre organisation aide à l'alya, plus l'État d'Israël qui a compris qu'il y a une crise des Juifs. Les gens ont dit, revenir où ? Vivre en Israël; c'est plus facile pour les Juifs de France, parce

qu'aujourd'hui, il y a l'*out-sourcing*. Donc, beaucoup de sociétés françaises proposent le travail en Israël. Le problème de la langue, il a un peu disparu. Tu gardes tes clients à Paris et tu travailles ici. Avant les gens ne peuvent pas partir parce qu'ils ne peuvent pas trouver de travail à cause de la langue. Aujourd'hui c'est beaucoup plus facile, donc très peu des gens sont repartis, et pourquoi repartir ? Qu'est qui est changé en France ?

Les gens sont très déçus de Sarkozy. Sarkozy était le *messiah* (messiah). Sarkozy est venu, et rien n'est changé, parce que rien ne peut changer. Il y a 10 millions de musulmans en France, qui n'ont pas tous les Islamistes, mais qui sont tous les musulmans, qui sont tous les Arabes, et qui n'ont pas d'amitié particulière pour les Juifs. Pourquoi revenir, qu'est qui a changé ? Si t'as un peu plus riche, tu habites dans un quartier riche, tu vis dans un autre ghetto, dans un ghetto riche, mais tout le monde ne peut pas. Paris est une ville très chère. Je pense que malheureusement la communauté va rester comme ça jusqu'à la prochaine crise. La communauté des juifs en France a perdu l'initiative, elle n'est plus maître de son destin. Elle ne fait que réagir à ce qui s'est passé.

Et les institutions juives ?

Qu'est ce qu'elles peuvent faire ? Crie à cette cause ? C'est bien, mais qu'est qui elles vont, elles vont régler le conflit Israélo-Arabe ? Elles vont donner l'argent aux gens ? Elles règlent les petits problèmes quotidiens, mais ce n'est pas APAC. Cela n'a rien à voir, c'est un mythe. Et, si tu demandes à un petit Juif dans la rue, c'est quoi le consistoire, il va te dire : « la consistoire est pour la synagogue. » Ce n'est pas eux qui vont aller voir le président. Le président va dire : « il y a 500 milles de juifs, il y a 5 millions d'arabes, donc de me demandent pas, je fais déjà beaucoup plus pour les juifs que je peux faire. »

Mais ils ne partent pas de France, parce que la France est un pays très riche. Il y a beaucoup de l'aide de l'État, ce qui n'est pas au Israël, n'est pas aux États-Unis. La santé, les centaines et les centaines d'euros pour la famille, et ça, c'est un problème. Même si c'est un peu difficile, la France est un pays où il y a d'argent. Mais, d'autrès moi, le problème est un problème qui va ressortir dans quelques années.

Est-ce qu'il y a une place pour les Juifs en France ?

Il y a toujours une place pour les Juifs partout. Je pense qu'il va être de plus en plus difficile d'être un Juif infirmé, qui dit : « je suis juif », mais qui travaille. Parce que de plus en plus les Juifs vont être discrets. Il y aura de moins au moins de liberté pour les Juifs. Simplement les seuls endroits qui sont gardés en France, c'est les synagogues, ce n'est pas les églises ni les mosquées. Il y a des caméras dans toutes les synagogues, dans toutes les écoles juives. Ça veut dire quoi ? L'État nous protège, parce qu'on est en danger. Je ne veux pas vivre dans un État où je suis en danger. Tout le monde ne voit pas ça comme ça. Il y a quand même, dans les dernières années, plusieurs milliers des Juifs, qui ont bougé. Quand on bouge, on n'est pas bien.

Il y a toujours de place pour les Juifs en France. Tout le monde n'est pas sioniste. Parce que quand tu t'enfermes chez toi, tu te sens moins en danger. Quand tu vas qu'aux écoles juives, tu n'écoutes que la musique juive, tu n'es plus en France, tu es dans le ghetto, le ghetto moderne. De plus en plus, les Juifs qui s'affirment comme juifs vivent dans un monde très enfermé.

Ils viennent en Israël pour les vacances. C'est les plus grands visiteurs d'Israël. Ils achètent les maisons en Israël. Ils se marient en Israël, ils s'enterrent en Israël, qui n'existe nulle part d'ailleurs. C'est le même phénomène : les gens qui ne veulent pas vivre en Israël achètent les maisons en Israël. Même pour les mariages : on se sent libre en Israël. Ici, Israël leur sert pour enlever la pression. Après on retourne dans le ghetto.

Pour être juif, il faut être dans le ghetto. Pour être dans le ghetto, il faut être religieux. Ce qui ne veut pas être dans le ghetto, petit à petit, ils s'éloignent--devenir français. Et malheureusement, les gens perdent sa religion. Parce qu'en France il n'y a pas de conservateur mouvement ni réforme mouvement, ça n'existe pas. Donc c'est ou orthodoxe, ou rien de tout. Aujourd'hui, il y avait un mouvement traditionaliste. Traditionnel, c'est : je mange cachère, je fais un peu shabbat, mais c'est tout. Je garde le bas. Ça va être de plus en plus difficile dans une société où pour être juif, il faut être enfermé.

Ou niveau de la population arabe, elle est là, elle est en force. Elle s'affirme, elle prend de la place dans la politique, les ministres, les députés, elle défend politiquement le Moyen-Orient et la position de conflit israélo-arabe, à part de ce qui est en Israël.

Moi, je suis sioniste, donc je pense que la place de tous les Juifs est en Israël. Je ne pense pas qu'il y a en France un malheur pour les Juifs, et je pense qu'il est mieux et plus facile, dans le contexte du monde, pour un Juif de France à vivre en Israël qu'à vivre dans certains endroits en France. Il est plus facile d'être juif, d'être libre. C'est difficile de faire alya, mais aujourd'hui, c'est plus légitime. Il y a plus des gens qui veulent partir. Même s'ils ne partent pas, ils comprennent qu'Israël, c'est la place pour les juifs. Pour longtemps ils ont le rêve que la France est le paradis. C'était le paradis pendant trente ans, après la guerre. On appelle ça les trente glorieux. Les Juifs, ils sentent que le mouvement, il n'est pas bon. La machine va tourner, c'est très difficile de tourner le roule en arrière.

Pour quelles raisons avez-vous fait votre alya?

J'avais 18 ans quand j'ai fait mon alya. J'ai fait mon alya pour les raisons idéologique seulement, parce que j'ai compris, quand j'étais jeune, que pour moi, tous les peuples de monde, ils ont un état.

Les familles moyennes, ils disent, OK, on souffrit un peu, mais on mange. Je pense, malheureusement, que le modèle français va devenir de plus en plus un modèle de la communauté qui est l'antithèse de modèle français. Le modèle français dit : «intégration.» L'intégration est finie maintenant. Et c'est ça qui fait peur dans la société française, que les Noirs veulent être avec les Noirs, que les Arabes veulent être avec les

Arabes, les Juifs avec les Juifs. Donc il n'aura plus de la France, et c'est ça qui est dangereux pour la France.

On fait les lois contre la burqa, contre les mosquées, mais je pense que c'est trop tard. Il faut que la France adopte un nouveau modèle. Et la gauche l'accepte, pour avoir la loi, le vote de cela, et la droite dit non, on va perdre la France. Et c'est ça qui risque d'arriver. C'est évident de faire marche en arrière; c'est impossible.

Et pour les Français qui font leurs alya, restent-ils français ?

Oui. Parce qu'Israël aussi a changé. Depuis l'immigration russe, Israël, qui voulait aussi faire le même modèle que la France, qui tout le monde devient-il israélien. Quand les Russes venaient il y a quinze ans, les Russes n'avaient pas besoin d'être israélien, ils veulent rester Russes. Les Français ont dit aussi : «on peut rester français.» Cela Israël a compris, au contraire de la France, et l'a accepté. Grâce aux Russes, Israël a accepté, OK, il ne faut pas rêver, Israël ce n'est pas bon pour tout le monde. La deuxième génération s'intègre, c'est trop difficile pour la première génération. Israël a compris que dans le nouveau monde, il y a moins des frontières. La France ne l'a pas compris.

Interview with Annie Kurland, teacher

Quel âge avez-vous?

J'ai 50 ans. Je viens d'avoir 50 ans.

Quand avez-vous fait votre alya ?

J'ai fait mon alya en 1982. Pour la première guerre de Liban. Ce n'était pas lié à la guerre, mais j'étais à *b'n'ai hakiva*, et mon chevet de *b'n'ai hakiva* est monté en Israël pour s'engager. J'ai senti que moi aussi je dois venir, je n'étais pas engagée parce que je n'ai jamais fait de l'armée, mais avant ils avaient fait leur *Hashelvha*.

Hashelvha c'est quoi ?

Hashelvha c'est une année en Israël et on fait kibbutz et armée. Et moi je n'ai pas fait le *Hashelvha*, je suis restée en France. Et donc ils sont tous rentrés pour monter en armée et moi je suis venue, je ne suis pas rentrée en armée, mais j'étais là, en 1982. Je me suis sentie obligée d'être ici, et j'ai fait mon *mehina* ?

Qu'est-ce que c'est mehina ?

Mehnia, c'est préparation. Donc je l'ai fait en 1982.

C'était un désir ancien ?

Oui, c'était un désir depuis que j'étais petite, parce que, si tu veux, chaque année, on dit : « *shanhah bahag yerusalayim* », à Pesach. Et je m'ai dit que je viendrais en Israël. Et mes parents étaient très sionistes. On a une famille qui était toujours très sioniste. Mais c'est vrai que quand je me suis dit à mes parents : « bon, aller, je monte » ils étaient un peu surpris. Je suis montée dans les conditions un peu spéciales parce qu'on m'a demandé d'être *madhira*⁹⁰. On m'a demandé de venir en Israël pour le groupe, d'être *madhira*, et après quand le group était fini, j'ai appelé mes parents et je les ai dit : « je ne rentre plus à la maison, je ne rentre pas. » Mon père m'a dit il n'y a pas de problème, on va voir combien de temps tu vas tenir, parce que je n'avais pas d'argent. Je n'avais pas des vêtements, je n'avais rien, j'avais ma valise de *madhira*. Il a dit : « bon, OK, » et là j'ai eu des *mehinot*, je suis allée à l'agence juive, on m'a donné *mayonet*⁹¹, et j'ai entendu de la rentré de classe pour la *mehina*⁹² (one year of préparation) et après tu peux rentrer à l'université. C'est rigolo, au début, il n'y avait pas de problème, mais je n'ai pas d'argent, même pour manger. Il fallait que je trouve un travail, etc., et chaque fois j'ai appelé mes parents, et j'ai dit : « eh c'est difficile » et mon père ma dit : « bon, tu veux rentrer à la

⁹⁰ Moniteur.

⁹¹ Appartement avec les étudiants.

⁹² Année préparatoire pour les *olims*.

maison, tu veux qu'on t'achète les billets,» et j'ai dit : « non ! Je reste ! » Et donc je suis restée et après j'ai fait université, tout,

Et après votre famille l'a fait l'alya?

Non, au début ils sont restés en France, et après il y a quelques années une de mes sœurs est venue, et une autre sœur est venu, et là mes parents sont venus. Si tu veux, on est six enfants, trois enfants en France, trois en Israël.

Voyez-vous souvent les frères et sœurs qui sont en France ?

Alors, moi au début, j'avais deux fois par an en France : à Pesach et aux vacances, et après je me suis mariée, etc., j'avais encore une fois par an et puis là j'étais en France pour Pesach l'année dernière, mais eux, ils viennent beaucoup plus que moi. Si tu veux, la France est moins intéressante, et si on voyage, on va à l'étranger, vers les États-Unis, l'Irlande, la Norvège. Mes parents sont montés, c'est beaucoup plus facile de rester ici.

Et vos parents, quand est-ce qu'ils sont montés ?

Mes parents ils sont montés il y a deux ans. Mes parents ont voulu toujours rester en Israël. Ils venaient tout les temps en vacances et puis là mon père est au retrait, ma mère aussi, maintenant ils sont là. Maman étudie l'hébreu à Ulpan, sort avec ses amis, ça va quoi, la vie d'une retraitée.

Votre famille est-elle religieuse ?

Oui, très religieux, il n'y a que moi, qui ne suis pas de tout. Ce n'est pas que je ne suis pas religieuse. Si tu veux, ma famille est orthodoxe et sépharade. La manière de m'inculquer le judaïsme ne m'a pas de tout plu. Donc quand je suis montée en Israël, j'ai tout laissé tombé. Je ne fais pas le shabbat, je me suis mariée avec quelqu'un de très non religieux, un Argentin, qui n'avait aucun contact avec la religion, qui savait qu'il est juif, avec une identité juive très forte, mais pas religieuse. Il y a vingt ans, je ne pratique pas de tout ce que je pratique à la maison. Il y a cinq ans je suis divorcée, et je veux commencer à étudier le judaïsme, ce me rapprocher une fois maintenant je pratique le shabbat, on est cachrut. Si tu veux, j'étudie beaucoup plus maintenant. Je me sens juive.

Alors c'était un désir religieux de monter en Israël ?

Je ne sais pas quoi de dire, parce que oui, c'est une décision religieuse. Habiter en Israël a un rapport avec la Torah, notre lien avec Israël, c'est la Torah. Mais ce n'était pas pour faire plus la religion. En France on est très religieux, on allait au Kippour, le shabbat, on n'avait jamais eu les problèmes d'être juif, pas de tout. Au contraire, je me sentais beaucoup plus religieuse en France qu'en Israël.

En France, la religion est un moyen de différencier entre non-juifs. C'était le moyen, pour moi, de garder mon identité. À partir de moment où je suis montée en Israël où tout le monde est juif, je n'avais pas vraiment plus besoin de me différencier. En plus, ici, t'es

obligé de te définir, tu n'as pas *Massorati*, qu'en France on est *Massoratim*. On a vécu une vie en dehors de la maison. À la maison on était très juif, en dehors on était aussi juif, on faisait shabbat, on mangeait casher, mais on avait une vie normale. On ne voyait pas sur nous qu'on était Juif.

Avez-vous des liens forts avec la France ?

Pas de tout. J'ai les liens fort avec la culture française. Je suis très contente d'avoir une culture française, parce que parfois je vois la culture israélienne vulgaire, sauvage, et pas polie. Mais, si tu veux, j'ai un fort contact avec la France, j'ai fait une License en littérature française, j'aime beaucoup ma culture française, mais je ne m'identifie pas de tout avec la France. Et tu me dis que les gens sont d'abord citoyens français ensuite juifs, à mon époque ce n'était pas de tout ça. On était juif, et ensuite français. Et si on devait choisir entre fidélité de la France et fidélité d'Israël, ce n'était pas de toute fidélité à Israël, il n'était pas de question, fidélité à Israël. C'était très différent des Etats-Unis.

Considérez-vous comme Israelité ?

À mon époque, le terme Israelite était péjoratif. Juive. Tu sais que ce terme change beaucoup avec les époques. En tout cas, je me sens, je suis juive.

Tu te considères comme française ? Israélienne ?

Je crois que je suis israélienne, mais si tu veux, aujourd'hui je suis un mélange des deux, j'ai critiqué la culture israélienne, mais j'adore la culture israélienne. Si tu veux, c'est une culture très franche, les gens sont beaucoup plus directs, ils ne sont pas occupés à faire semblant de t'aimer. Et qu'on appelle ici droit, ce pas comme en France, j'aime beaucoup cette culture, c'est une des raisons pour lequel je suis restée en Israël, je me sens vraiment chez moi ici. Je n'ai pas besoin de faire plein de choses pour être acceptée, je suis à la maison ; je ne suis pas touriste, je ne demande pas qu'ils m'acceptent, je suis chez moi.

Si tu veux aujourd'hui, je sens que suivent les deux. Je lis beaucoup en français, mais je lis beaucoup en hébreu. Il était une époque où je ne lisais qu'en français. Et j'habitais déjà dix ans, mais je ne suis pas arrivée lire en hébreu, parce que si tu lis un mot, ce n'est pas seulement pour avoir les informations, c'est pour sentir les choses. Une des choses qui a beaucoup changé la manière de voir Israël. Il y a sept ans, je suis sortie en *Sheyrut*. Je suis envoyée par Israël pour travailler dans les communautés en dehors d'Israël. Moi, je n'étais pas envoyée, c'était mon mari qui était envoyé, et c'est le gouvernement israélien qui l'a envoyé, mais pas avec la communauté juive, pour travailler avec la communauté d'El Salvador, en Amérique Centrale.

J'étais là-bas, et je me suis rendu compte que vivre en extérieur de pays, c'est une catastrophe pour les Juifs. Je me suis sentie complètement étrangère. À El Salvador il n'y a rien de casher, et donc il faut aller jusqu'au Guatemala pour acheter de la viande. Je me suis rendu compte de quelle chance on a d'être ici. Si avant de partir, j'ai dit qu'on n'est

pas bien ici, que c'était un village, quand j'étais en dehors d'Israël j'ai appris que ma place était ici. Donc je suis revenue et je suis très contente d'être ici.

Je voyage beaucoup, je vois les pays. Je ne pourrais plus habiter en dehors d'Israël. Je peux habiter pour deux ou trois ans pour travailler.

Selon vous, est-ce qu'il y a un endroit pour les Juifs en France ?

Il me semble qu'il serait beau que tous les Juifs viennent vire en Israël, mais je sais que chacun fait ce qu'il veut. Au début, quand je suis montée en Israël j'étais très sioniste, et je disais que tous les Juifs qui ne sont pas en Israël, zéro. Après j'ai fait un programme avec les Américains. Aujourd'hui, j'admire ce qui ne vit pas en Israël parce qu'il faut de force pour rester juif. Je ne juge personne, mais ça serait tellement bien si toute la force vient ici.

D'une autre côté, je suis consciente de faits que si on a des Français qui sont bien placés en France, c'est évident que pour nous c'est bien et c'est important. Tous les Juifs viennent en Israël, on deviennent une pays très fort et varié, et qu'on serait un pouvoir extraordinaire.

À mon avis, ce qui sauve les Français, et qui est beaucoup plus difficile aux États-Unis, c'est que les Français font un retour à la religion. Il y a une montée de l'orthodoxie en France qui est impressionnante. Je vois que c'est plus en plus orthodoxe. À mon avis, ça va les garder pour une autre génération. Aux États-Unis c'est la fin du judaïsme. 70% sont mariés avec les non-juifs. Il n'y a pas plus de raison pour être juif. Dans les synagogues c'est terminé. La France, il y a aussi beaucoup des mariages mixtes. On a toujours été deux cotes.

Les Juifs de France, il reste beaucoup, à cause de la situation financière. À mon avis c'est une erreur. Je vois mes frères et sœurs qui sont restés en France. Ils gardent leur religion, mais on ne peut pas savoir pour leurs enfants. Ma famille, ma grande sœur qui est très religieuse, elle se marie avec un guy qui est devenu juif. Il n'était pas juif à l'époque. Mes parents étaient effrontés, parce qu'ils sont religieux.

Et mon frère a vécu pendant deux ans avec une fille qui n'est pas juive. Maintenant il se marie avec une femme orthodoxe. Ce retour comme ça à l'orthodoxie et lié beaucoup avec le climat en France.

C'est ici qui est le futur du peuple juif. C'est la raison pour laquelle j'enseigne dans une école juive. Même en Israël il faut développer le judaïsme.

Myriam Grunwald, Annie's sister, scientist

Quel âge avez-vous ? Quand avez-vous fait votre alya?

J'ai 44 ans. J'ai fait mon alya en 90, j'avais 24 ans. Je me suis mariée avec un Français, mais qui habite en Israël déjà. Je pensais toujours vivre en Israël, mais en France j'avais commencé mes études. Donc si je n'étais pas mariée, je pense que je pourrais continuer en France. Et lui il a déjà venu en Israël en 84.

Comment vous vous êtes rencontré ?

On s'est rencontré dans *akiva* quand on était tout petit. Et après lui il a monté en Israël, moi j'ai commencé mes études en France et on s'est re-rencontré, et on s'est marié.

Comment ont-ils réagi, votre famille ?

Ma famille était tout à fait pour. Ma sœur a déjà installé en Israël, donc c'était très facile pour moi. Et la famille de mon mari était déjà là. C'était très naturel, ce n'était pas une décision très lourde à prendre. Juste au niveau des études, je n'étais pas assez préparée.

Comment sentez-vous après avoir faire l'alya ?

Moi je me suis très vite sentie à la maison, et j'ai eu des problèmes avec l'administration israélienne, qui est très particulière, très différente de système français. En France, les gens sont là pour rendre le service pour laquelle ils sont payés. Ici on arrive, il boit de café, rien n'est clair, c'est mal fait. Mais j'ai passé deux, trois mois très difficiles. Et puis, tu te rends compte de la choque de venir ici. Je me suis habitée à *Reyhovot*, qui n'est pas très développé en ce moment là. Il y avait un cinéma, un restaurant cacher, c'était très différent comme ville par rapport à ma vie en France. Mais sinon, après c'était facile.

Êtes-vous restée avec les Français pendant votre alya?

Je n'étais jamais avec les Français, j'étais tout suivi dans un bain israélien, à part de la famille de mon mari. Mais lui, comme il a fait ses études en Israël depuis 84, il avait beaucoup d'amis israéliens et on est vite tombé dans les milieux israéliens. Ce qui était très bien.

Tous les ans on part en France pour voir les parents qui étaient encore en France, maintenant ils sont en Israël. Quand je suis revenue en France, je me suis comprise tout le temps que je suis perdue en France. On se rencontre comme on vit bien ici, comme être humains. Les gens ici sont différents. Les relations sont beaucoup plus vraies, on fait les amis vrais, tandis qu'en France c'est très superficiel et on sent aussi les préoccupations au quotidien, en France ils sont tout à fait différent qu'ici. Ici on est occupé de ce qui se passe dans le pays, dans l'armée, parce qu'il y avait la guerre. On arrive en France, où les

gens vivent tout à fait différents qu'ici. Les gens s'attachent en Israël, mais de loin. Ils ne sont pas tout le temps en écoutant les nouvelles. J'avais l'impression que j'avais dormi et que maintenant je me réveille une vraie vie.

Vous avez grandi dans un quartier juif ?

Je n'étais pas dans une école juive. À Toulouse il n'avait pas à l'époque. On habitait dans un quartier où il n'y a pas des Juifs, des Espagnols, mais pas des Juifs. On était quand même dans la communauté, on allait au synagogue et à *akiba*, mais pas plus que ça.

Mon père était toujours très religieux, ma mère plus *massorti*. Mes frères et soeurs, on est chacun différent. Mais, à la maison, c'était Shabbat, etc. à partir de 13 ans. Avant on était toujours juif, mais on ne respecte pas le shabbat, on allait au cinéma. On est devenu plus religieux.

Moi j'ai les amis goy, mais je ne pouvais pas manger chez eux. C'était difficile-tu ne peux pas vraiment créer les liens. Ici, tu viens, tout est ouvert, tout est beaucoup plus simple. En France, tu dois toujours expliquer que t'es Juif, qu'est ce que c'est. Ici tu arrives et tu ne dois plus expliquer ce que c'est d'être religieux, pas religieux, tu te sens plus chez toi.

Pensez-vous à revenir en France ?

Mes deux sœurs vivent en France, et mon frère. Ils vivent très bien, ils ont de l'argent, des amis, mais ils vivent dans une boule des Juifs. Je pense qu'il est mieux de vivre ici, de vivre pleinement, leur vivre. On ne vit pas cent pour cent en France. Quand on est religieux, c'est tellement différent, les liens avec les Français, ce n'est aucun intérêt.

Sentez-vous plutôt française ou israélienne ?

Je me considère comme juive de la culture française. Au niveau de la culture, je n'arrive pas aller au théâtre ici, écouter les pièces israéliennes, le cinéma israélien. Il y a que des très peu choses. Je lis très peu des livres en hébreu, je lis en français, et moins en anglais. Tous qui est culture israélienne, je me sens encore française. Quand je rencontre les gens français, quand on parle entre nous, on a la même culture, les mêmes blagues, les mêmes références, et c'est très agréable pour moi. Avec des israéliens j'ai du mal, mais eux aussi, ils ont une culture très intéressante, mais je ne me sens pas vraiment dans la culture israélienne. Mon mari, par contre, il est très israélien. Il s'est grandi à Strasbourg et il est français comme moi, mais il ne lit pratiquement pas en français, il a fait toutes ses études en hébreu.

Interview with Michael Blum, journalist

J'écris des livres. Je travaille pour quelques médias, je suis indépendante, je travaille pour quelques journaux de la communauté. Je travaille pour les médias non-juifs.

Quand avez-vous fait votre alya ?

Je suis arrivée à 85. Après le Bac, je suis venu, passé un an en Israël, et je suis resté. J'ai fait mon alya vraiment en été 87. Ma première année j'ai étudié à Yeshiva, on était dans un programme pour les Français. On était un petit groupe des français. Il n'y avait pas vraiment beaucoup des activités pour les français : on avait Ulpan, on avait parfois des cours français. On avait chacun une famille adoptive. Une famille française qui était plus ou moins notre famille adoptive, avec laquelle on a fait du Shabbat de temps en temps.

Pourquoi l'avez-vous fait ?

Il y a très peu des gens qui montent pour une seule raison. J'ai fait mon alya pour un ensemble des choses qui se retrouvent ici. Chez moi, c'est trois éléments. Un, c'est le sionisme, idéologie. Par idéologie, je crois que l'histoire de peuple juif se joue aujourd'hui en Israël et que je n'ai pas envie d'être un spectateur, j'ai envie d'être un acteur. Je n'ai pas envie de regarder la vie des peuples juifs, j'ai envie de faire partie de l'histoire de peuple juif. J'ai senti très fort de faire partie d'une nation, et la nation juive, c'est ici qu'elle vit. J'ai reçu cette éducation d'une famille religieuse. Je suis fils d'un rabbin. Ma famille habite encore à Paris.

C'est évident qu'après le Bac je pars en Israël pour l'Yeshiva. Et après, c'est presque naturel que je reste. Je n'ai pas vraiment de place chez mon père, qui s'est remarié, et ma place chez ma mère, qui s'est remariée aussi, n'existe pas. Je ne sens pas que j'ai une vraie place à Paris. À 18 ans j'ai décidé de partir. Je pense que ça joue beaucoup dans l'alya aussi. J'ajouterais le fait qu'à 18 ans j'avais les copains en terminal, même les premières années, ça donne envie de rester quelque part. C'est sympa, il y a de copains, il fait beau. Je ne suis pas attachée à la famille.

Et la troisième raison, c'est par rapport à la France spécifiquement. C'est que la France est un pays qui a déporté mon grand-père à Auschwitz. À l'époque, c'était seulement 40 ans que les gendarmes français avaient envoyé ma famille à Auschwitz, je sentais que ce n'est pas ma place. Le fait de dire que la France n'est pas pour moi. Je n'ai pas envie d'élever mes enfants en France. Mais j'adore la France, j'adore retourner à Paris, faire de tourisme à Paris, promener sur les quais. Mais je n'ai pas envie d'être une adulte en France. Je suis française à longterm.

C'est l'école juive de ma jeunesse. Je suis assez actif. J'avais un copain Arabe, mais pas des copains goy.

Avez-vous fait votre alya pour vous exprimer un désir religieux ?

J'ai fait l'Yeshiva, je dis que je vais rester ici. Je ne suis pas un étudiant. L'idée c'est de prendre une pause après le Bac, c'est un classique de la famille orthodoxe.

Comment avez-vous fait votre période de transition? L'armée par exemple ?

En France, je n'avais pas fait l'armée, mais j'ai obtenu une dispense. Je faisais que des réserves ici. J'ai fait 4 mois des réserves, et après j'ai fait des réserves, un mois par an. Ça passait vite. Mes études ont été payées. À l'époque l'État payait trois ans. Il y avait de l'aide pour les nouveaux immigrants. À 18 ans ce n'est pas très dur, on n'a pas besoin de refaire sa vie, et je parlais hébreu, ça aide beaucoup. J'ai déjà appris à l'école et j'étais très fort, donc je me suis très vite débrouillée. Je n'allais pas à Ulpan, j'avais l'Ulpan gratuit, mais je n'y allais pas.

Et maintenant, vous avez les amis plutôt français ou israéliens ?

Français. Je fais chaque année une grande fête chez moi, pour mon anniversaire, depuis 5 ans, et 90% c'est les Français.

Il y a deux raisons. Première, je me suis mariée avec une Française, donc je ne peux pas imaginer me marier avec une Israélienne. Nos enfants parlent le français, on parle le français à la maison, on lit en français, et moi, plus que d'autres, parce que je travaillais tous les temps avec les Français. Là je suis journaliste pour la presse française, mais avant j'ai travaillé chez *uniphone*, je m'occupais des nouveaux immigrés français, j'avais dans les éditions françaises ici, je travaille avec les Français mêmes si avant j'ai fait les études intégrées. Je suis fondateur d'un mouvement pour les jeunes, le but c'était d'intégrer les jeunes à Israël. Quand j'étais à la FAC, j'ai organisé déjà les activités pour les Français : des cours, des sorties, des aides, donc j'ai toujours été toujours très français d'Israël. Je suis encore au cœur de l'actualité Franco-Israélien.

Suivez-vous les journaux français ?

Oui, mais pas spécialement les actualités françaises, en France, mais, disons, je sais qu'est qui c'est passé ici. Quand les gens font un truc sur la communauté Franco-Israélienne, ça arrive à moi en général. Je connais tout le monde, j'ai les contacts dans tous les milieux. Les Français, l'ambassade, je connais beaucoup de monde.

Mais pas tout le monde est comme ça. J'ai les amis ici, qui sont intégrés. Pour moi, l'intégration, c'est d'avoir les enfants ici. Mais c'est mes enfants qui sont israéliens. Moi je me considère toujours comme un Français en Israël. Je suis israélien, j'ai une carte d'identité, mais j'ai gardé ma citoyenneté française, mais je ne vote pas en France. C'est permis, mais ce n'est pas juste moralement. Mais je suis active. J'organisais pour la deuxième année consécutive un salon des livres français. J'ai rédigé un annuaire des francophones israéliens, je suis assez actif. Je diffuse un texte depuis quelques jours qui va être publié dans les médias locaux. J'ai lancé ça vendredi, ça va lancer dans *le petit hebdo*. J'ai joint quelques personnalités de la communauté : rabbins, universitaires, les gens qui sont respectés. Ça fait sérieux. Je suis tout le temps là dedans. J'ai plein de présidents d'associations.

Avez-vous vu les changements dans les dix dernières années ?

Oui. Avi Zana⁹³ parle mieux que moi. D'abord les gens sont mieux préparés, je crois. À l'époque j'ai l'impression que les gens venaient n'importe comment. Les Français maintenant, ils connaissent déjà le pays. Ils font les voyages d'études, ils viennent souvent, la plupart des temps quand ils arrivent ils savent ce qu'ils vont avoir ici. Ça, c'est une chose.

Un autre changement, c'est le fait qu'aujourd'hui les olim de France peuvent travailler sur place en français. C'est la multiplication des *call centers*. Les gens qui travaillent dans leur langue. Ils ne sont pas intégrés de toute, ils n'ont pas besoin de langue. Ils peuvent vivre. Leurs enfants s'intégreront. Comme autres groupes d'immigrants, il y a un écart de plus en plus grand entre les enfants et leurs parents. Parce que les enfants parlent l'hébreu parfaitement très vite et les parents font les années et les années. Il ne faut pas oublier aussi qu'en général il y a trois groupes qui font leur alya. Les retraités, qui achètent une petite maison et qui rentrent souvent pour les enfants ici. Le fait qu'ils ne parlent pas hébreu n'est pas très grave. Même à Jérusalem il y a au moins une dizaine des synagogues où ils peuvent venir, où tout le monde est français. Il y a les étudiants, qui arrivent assez jeunes et qui rentrent dans le FAC ou dans l'armée. Qui apprend l'hébreu et qui s'intègre même s'ils restent très français, ils gardent les particularités françaises. Et il y a le groupe des familles. C'est là qu'il est plus difficile. Ce qui repart en France c'est là-dedans. Ce qui n'arrive pas avec la langue, qui n'arrive pas à trouver un milieu social, alors qu'en France tous ont un carnet d'adresses, tout le monde parle la langue. Ici, pas de toute. C'est plus facile quand on arrive dans une alya des groupes, ce qui est commun dans les dernières années. Les groupes permettent les gens aux premières années d'être ensemble. De soutenir, d'aider. Ça permet les gens de passer une première année pas trop difficile. Alors c'est assez difficile, surtout la langue et le boulot.

Pourquoi les familles quittent-elles la France ?

Chez les Juifs de France, il y a toujours un front idéologique, et personne ne les empêche de vivre en France. C'est Israël, le rêve de notre pays, etc. C'est souvent économique. Les gens qui sont plantés en France qui perd leur boulot. Il y a les raisons de l'atmosphère en France ces dernières années. Même s'il y a très peu qui part parce qu'ils étaient les victimes d'antisémitisme, mais il y a eu une atmosphère en France. Le fait qu'on ne peut pas porter sa kippa dans certains endroits, on ne trouve pas de boulot parce qu'on ne travaille pas le Shabbat. Plus qu'idéologiques, beaucoup viennent ici parce que c'est plus facile de pratiquer la religion. On a 20% des olims de France, selon Avi, sont des orthodoxes. Ils ne sont pas venus ici pour trouver un boulot, parce qu'ils ne travaillent pas, mais parce que c'est plus facile d'envoyer les enfants à l'école ici, ça coutera moins cher, et on peut être juif, ça ne dérange personne. Le fait qu'une partie de la communauté juive en France se sont renforcé religieusement a poussé beaucoup de familles de venir ici.

⁹³ See Avi Zana interview

Sentez-vous que l'immigration est liée à l'Intifada ?

Les faits prouvent que non. C'est-à-dire qu'ils sont venus à cause de la Deuxième Intifada et les attaques dans deux synagogues ? Ça paraît complètement paradoxal. Ici on tue les gens, on monte sur un bus on peut mourir. Il y a plusieurs Juifs de France qui sont morts dans les attentats. Dire que j'ai peur en France d'être comme juif, je vais monter en Israël pour risquer ma vie ? Ici c'est beaucoup plus dangereux.

C'est les gens qui prévoyaient de partir et qui acceptent qui font leur alya. On va partir cette année plutôt que dans cinq ans. Je n'ai pas vu les gens qui ont prévenu de rester en France toute leur vie, et qui ont dit que ce n'est plus possible. Mais peut-être je me trompe.

Sentez-vous encore français ?

Oui, je lis en français. Je ne suis pas une patriote française. Une Marseillaise ne me fait pas vivre les émotions. Je ne suis pas les actualités en France. Je ne regarde que les grands trucs qui se passent en France : les élections, DSK, comme tout le monde. Mais, toute ma famille est en France. J'ai un frère à New York et une sœur ici, mais sinon, tout le monde est en France. Donc oui, je suis attaché à la France. Je suis allé en France une fois chaque année ou deux années. C'est un pays où j'aime bien être en vacance, je connais plein gens, je ne rejette pas la France.

Les Juifs français ils ont dû prouver qu'ils sont bien intégrés. Je m'habille comme toi, je pense comme toi. Et c'est cette tendance qui fait qu'il n'y a jamais eu un regroupement des Juifs français.

Que pensez-vous de l'avenir des Juifs de France ?

On ne sait jamais de quoi va arriver demain. Mais pour l'instant je pense qu'on peut très bien vivre un Juif en France. J'aurais préféré que les Juifs de France viennent ici, parce que je pense que les Français auraient bien pour l'État d'Israël. Je comprends qu'ils restent dans leurs petits mondes. J'ai la famille en Strasbourg, et ils vivent très bien.

Ma mère elle est née à Paris des parents de l'Europe de l'Est. Mon père, on est en France depuis 27 générations. J'ai un arbre généalogique qui remonte sur le 12^e siècle. On est très français, mais d'Alsace. Ils étaient très français. Je comprends ça, c'est une autre époque. Aujourd'hui je ne sais pas si les Juifs de France sont très patriotes. À mon avis, quand ça viendra plus difficile, ils viennent ici. Les lois contre la burqa ont prouvé se défendre contre l'interaction religieuse. Ces dernières années la justice est plus dure contre les actes antisémites. Je trouve que les Juifs sont bien protégés pour l'instant. Finalement, c'est ici que les Juifs s'entendent plus comme juifs.

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