CTI Report - Lumma Stealer

Cyber Threat Intelligence Report

Independent Researcher

September 9, 2025





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1 Report Metadata

• **Report ID:** CTI-2025-009

• **Date**: 09/09/2025

• **Priority:** High

• Company Name: Independent Research

• Report Title: Lumma Stealer Activity Report

• Source Reliability: B (Usually reliable)

• Information Sensitivity: TLP:AMBER

2 Intelligence Requirements Addressed

• Identify Lumma Stealer campaigns active in 2025

· Understand distribution vectors and capabilities

• Assess impact on victims and potential mitigation strategies

3 Data Sources

- Dark Web forums (exploit[.]in, RAMP)
- MalwareBazaar samples
- VirusTotal submissions
- Hybrid Analysis sandbox reports
- · Shodan queries

4 Threat Actor

• Name: Unknown affiliates (Malware-as-a-Service operators)



- **Profile:** Lumma Stealer is sold as a MaaS since 2022. The operators advertise updates on Telegram and dark web forums.
- Motivation: Financial gain through credential theft, crypto-wallet hijacking, and resale of access.

5 Victim Information

- **Location:** Global (notably Europe and LATAM)
- **Sectors:** Finance, E-commerce, Corporate IT
- Actor Motivation: Monetization of stolen credentials and resale on markets

6 Capabilities, Adversary Infrastructure & Victim

- Credential harvesting (browsers, crypto wallets, extensions)
- System reconnaissance (hostname, hardware ID, geolocation)
- Exfiltration via Telegram bots & C2 servers
- MaaS infrastructure with tiered subscription models

7 Cyber Kill Chain

- S1 Reconnaissance: Actor monitors infected hosts for valuable credentials
- **S2 Weaponization:** Malware builder creates customized stealer payload
- **S3 Delivery:** Malspam with malicious attachments and cracked software installers
- **S4 Exploitation:** User executes dropper disguised as legitimate software
- **S5 Installation:** Persistence achieved via scheduled tasks and registry keys
- **S6 Command & Control (C2):** Communication over HTTPS to C2 panels



• S7 Actions on Objective: Exfiltration of browser data, wallets, and credentials

8 Artifacts

8.1 Endpoint Artifacts

Туре	Description	Tactic
Registry Key	$HKCU \backslash Software \backslash Microsoft \backslash Windows \backslash Run$	Persistence
File Drop	lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:lem:	Execution, Persistence

8.2 Network Artifacts

Туре	Description	Kill Chain Stage
HTTP POST	Data exfiltration to C2	C2, Exfiltration
Telegram API	Bot used for credential uploads	C2

9 Malware

9.1 Malware Hashes

		Kill Chain
Type File Hash	Description	Stage
SHA25 6 5eb366739361b97fb68c0ac4b9fbaad2ac26e0	cB 0m211.e f0ad0a Stealer v4	•

9.2 Vulnerabilities



CVE #	CVSS Score	Patch Available (Y/N)	Remediation	Date Re- ported	Patch Applied (Y/N/N/A)
CVE- 2017- 11882	7.8	Y	Apply Microsoft Office patch KB2553204	2017- 11-15	N/A
CVE- 2021- 40444	8.8	Y	Block ActiveX controls, apply MS patch	2021- 09-07	N/A

10 Detection & Response

Tactic Technic	qu le rocedure	D3FEND Control	Rule / Query Name	Type Description	Reference
Credenti El 555.	0 0 Barvest browser credentials	Credentia Harden- ing	l Lumma _.	BigmætdCtS abnormal access to browser files	MITRE ATT&CK
Persiste T1547.	Registry Run Key persistence	Registry Monitor- ing	Lumma _.	Sigr Alerts when suspicious Run key is created	Sysmon Logs
Exfiltratī bh 041	Exfiltration over C2 HTTPS	Network Segmen- tation	Lumma __	BighPDexedts anomalous HTTPS POST exfiltration	Suricata Rule

11 Confidence Levels

- **Assessment:** Highly Likely (75-85%)
- Severity: High threat requires immediate containment and monitoring.

12 Source Reliability (A-F)

B - Usually reliable (consistent reporting across multiple vendors).



13 Information Credibility (1-6)

2 - Probably true (validated by sandbox analysis and multiple AV engines).

14 Traffic Light Protocol (TLP)

TLP:AMBER - Restricted to organization and trusted partners.

15 CTI Team Roles

Role	Name	Title	Contact
Head of CTI	John Doe	CTI Manager	j.doe@company.com
CTI Lead	Jane Smith	Senior CTI Analyst	j.smith@company.com
CTI Analyst	João Pedro Cezarino	Report Author	researcher@example.com

16 Glossary

- Lumma Stealer: Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) focused on credential and wallet theft.
- MaaS: Malware-as-a-Service, subscription-based criminal business model.
- C2: Command & Control infrastructure used for data exfiltration.
- IOC: Indicator of Compromise.
- TTP: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (MITRE ATT&CK framework).