TPM AND SECURE BOOT 101

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
TPM and Linux [Ubuntu] (SSH/FDE)




What is a TPM?

TPM Implementations:

- ☐ Discrete chipset
- ☐ Integrated into CPU
- ☐ Firmware in a Trusted Execution Mode
- ☐ Virtual TPM
- ☐ Software (Only for testing)



· · · What does a TPM do?



output

input

secured

Cryptographic processor

random number generator

RSA key generator

SHA-1 hash generator

encryption-decryptionsignature engine

Persistent memory

Endorsement Key (EK)

Storage Root Key (SRK)

Versatile memory

Platform Configuration Registers (PCR)

Attestation Identity Keys (AIK)

storage keys



TPM Use Cases











- NVRAM Storage
- Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs)
- Privacy Enablement




What is Secure Boot?



What is Measured Boot?




UEFI Keys Structure




What (the heck) is shim?

Secure Boot With MOK



Putting it all together

#ls /boot/efi/EFI/ubuntu/
... grubx64.efi mmx64.efi shimx64.efi



• • • Changing MOK List

```
# mokutil --import Mok.der
# mokutil --list-new
```

Continue boot
Enroll MOK
Enroll key from disk
Enroll hash from disk

```
integrity: Loading X.509 certificate: UEFI:MokListRT (MOKvar table)
integrity: Loaded X.509 cert 'Mahsan-MOK: c9dbb66deabd3cd806472e780e7671e257410f5f'
Loading compiled-in module X.509 certificates
```




Signing the Linux Kernel

```
root@akjvm02:~# sbverify --list ./vmlinuz-5.13.0-52-generic
signature 1
image signature issuers:
- /C=GB/ST=Isle of Man/L=Douglas/O=Canonical Ltd./CN=Canonical Ltd. Master Certificate Authority
image signature certificates:
- subject: /C=GB/ST=Isle of Man/O=Canonical Ltd./OU=Secure Boot/CN=Canonical Ltd. Secure Boot Signing (2017)
   issuer: /C=GB/ST=Isle of Man/L=Douglas/O=Canonical Ltd./CN=Canonical Ltd. Master Certificate Authority
root@akjvm02:~# sbsign --key Mok.key --cert Mok.pem ./vmlinuz-5.13.0-52-generic --output ./vmlinuz-5.13.0-52-generic.newsign
Image was already signed; adding additional signature
root@akjvm02:~# sbverify --list ./vmlinuz-5.13.0-52-generic.newsign
signature 1
image signature issuers:
 - /C=GB/ST=Isle of Man/L=Douglas/O=Canonical Ltd./CN=Canonical Ltd. Master Certificate Authority
image signature certificates:
- subject: /C=GB/ST=Isle of Man/O=Canonical Ltd./OU=Secure Boot/CN=Canonical Ltd. Secure Boot Signing (2017)
 issuer: /C=GB/ST=Isle of Man/L=Douglas/O=Canonical Ltd./CN=Canonical Ltd. Master Certificate Authority
signature 2
image signature issuers:
 - /CN=Mahsan-MOK
image signature certificates:
 - subject: /CN=Mahsan-MOK
   issuer: /CN=Mahsan-MOK
```

· · Linux Lockdown

- ☐ Was added in Linux 5.4
 - ☐ Will be automatically enabled if the system boots in EFI Secure Boot
- Only validly signed modules may be loaded
- Designed to prevent both direct and indirect access to a running kernel image
 - ☐ Use of **debugfs** is not permitted




Putting Lockdown into Practice 1

```
root@akjubuvm01:~# mokutil --sb-state
SecureBoot enabled
. . root@akjubuvm01:~# cat /sys/kernel/security/lockdown
none [integrity] confidentiality
· · · root@akjubuvm01:~# modinfo test.ko
filename: /root/test.ko
license: GPL
 srcversion: 8110BDA05F2C22DD9878A25
 depends:
retpoline:
     name: hello_3
vermagic: 5.13.0-52-generic SMP mod_unload modversions
root@akjubuvm01:~# insmod test.ko
. . insmod: ERROR: could not insert module test.ko: Operation not permitted
· · · root@akjubuvm01:~# dmesg | tail -1
[ 1204.536278] Lockdown: insmod: unsigned module loading is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
```


Putting Lockdown into Practice 2


```
root@akjubuvm01:~# alias sign-file=/usr/src/linux-headers-5.13.0-52-generic/scripts/sign-fi
    root@akjubuvm01:~# export KBUILD_SIGN_PIN=
      root@akjubuvm01:~# sign-file sha256 Mok.priv Mok.pem test.ko
   root@akjubuvm01:~# insmod test.ko
root@akjubuvm01:~# dmesg | tail -1
[ 2000.623355] Hello, world 3
      root@akjubuvm01:~# modinfo test.ko
      filename: /root/test.ko
      license:
                      GPL
      srcversion:
                      8110BDA05F2C22DD9878A25
      depends:
      retpoline:
                      hello_3
   name:
                      5.13.0-52-generic SMP mod_unload modversions
      vermagic:
      sig_id:
                      PKCS#7
      signer:
                      akjmahsan.mah
      sig_key:
                      0E:01:B1:59:6E:BB:EF:9B:9C:53:E5:9B:22:DF:EB:54:FA:64:E9:F7
      sig_hashalgo:
                      sha256
      signature:
                      2E:5D:AF:08:2A:0E:87:30:AD:26:C2:C5:5E:89:97:3B:3E:62:2A:48:
                      10:2C:CD:86:0B:65:2E:24:D9:85:10:
```

Back to TPM [Structure]




TPM Key Generation








TPM Software Stack






TPM and PKCS#11


```
$ tpm2_ptool init
action: Created
         id: 1
          $ tpm2 ptool addtoken --pid=1 --label=mylabel --sopin=XXXX --userpin=YYYY
          $ tpm2 ptool addkey --label=mylabel --userpin=YYYY --algorithm=ecc256
          $ ssh-keygen -D /usr/local/lib/pkcs11/libtpm2_pkcs11.so > key.pub
          $ ssh -I /usr/local/lib/pkcs11/libtpm2_pkcs11.so myserver.example 
          Enter PIN for 'mylabel': YYYY
          $ cat ~/.ssh/config
          Host myserver.example
            PKCS11Provider /usr/local/lib/pkcs11/libtpm2_pkcs11.so
            IdentityAgent none
```

TPM and Full Disk Encryption [except /boot/]






TPM and Full Disk Encryption [except /boot/]





TPM and Full Disk Encryption [except /boot/]





TPM and FDE < STEPS>

- 1. Install TPM2-TSS and TPM2-TOOLS
- 2. Generate a new key for LUKS to be stored in TPM
- 3. Store the key in TPM
- 4. Write a script to read the key from TPM on Boot and add it to crypttab
- 5. Generate a new **initrd** [initramfs] file to get the key and decrypt the disk on Boot

TPM and FDE

I. Key Generation and TPM Storage

```
cat /dev/urandom | tr -dc 'a-zA-Z0-9' | fold -w 64 | head -c64 > root.key
cryptsetup luksAddKey /dev/sda3 root.key
```

```
tpm2_nvdefine 0x1500016 -C o -s 64 -a 0x2000A -T device
tpm2_nvwrite 0x1500016 -C o -i root.key -T device
```

TPM and FDE

II. Setting crypttab to read the key from TPM

```
#!/bin/sh
key=$( tpm2_nvread 0x1500016 -C o -s 64 -T device )
echo -n $key

sda3_crypt UUID=a8e7db54-cf16-4dad-b516-010bffd45e75 none
luks,discard,keyscript=/usr/local/sbin/key
```

TPM and FDE

III. Generating a new initrd file (/etc/initramfs-tools/hooks/decryptkey)

```
#!/bin/sh
PREREQ=""
prereqs()
    echo "$PREREQ"
case $1 in
                mv /boot/initrd.img-`uname -r` /boot/initrd.img-`uname -r`.orig
preregs)
                mkinitramfs -o /boot/initrd.img-`uname -r` `uname -r`
    preregs
    exit 0
esac
. /usr/share/initramfs-tools/hook-functions
copy exec /usr/local/bin/tpm2 nvread
copy_exec /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libtss2-tcti-device.so.0
```

Things to Consider

- ☐ For more security enable Secure Boot and FDE together
- ☐ Limit the TPM access to trusted entities
- ☐ Harden the OS and set grub/root passwords
- ☐ Set a password for UEFI

Thanks

