

CCA

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Assuming our MAC and CPA are secure.

To prove:

For all PPTM Adversary A given two messages m_0 and m_1 and an encryption $E(m_r)$ of a random message m_r between m_0 and m_1 , A cannot determine which message (m_0 or m_1) was encrypted.

Proof: Let $C = E(m_r)$ be the encryption of the random message m_r , and let C' be any other ciphertext except C .

Let B be a PPTM that can distinguish between encryptions of m_0 and m_1 with non-negligible advantage.

Then we can construct an attacker A' that can break semantic security of the encryption scheme, as follows:

A' is given C and C' , and uses C as the encryption of m_r and C' as any other ciphertext. A' runs B on (m_0, m_1, C) and obtains the output bit b . A' outputs b as its guess for whether C was encrypted under m_0 or m_1 . Since B has non-negligible advantage, the probability that A' outputs the correct guess is non-negligible as well. Therefore, the encryption scheme is not semantically secure, which contradicts our assumption.

Thus, we have proven that for all PPTM Adversary A , given two messages and an encryption of one random message between the two, A cannot determine the original message with non-negligible advantage.

Alternate proof: For all PPTM Adversary A given two messages m_0, m_1 and an encryption c of one random message m_b between the two, the adversary should not be able to figure out the original message. A can also query any other ciphertext other than c to a decryption Oracle O to get its decryption.

$$Pr(A(c) = b; \text{s.t } c \notin Q) \leq \text{negl}(n)$$

Proof

Assuming our MAC is secure and enc scheme is CPA secure, our construction will only return decryption if decrypted message and tag are valid message-tag pair. Since we proved the security of MAC,

$$Pr(\text{Vrfy}(< m, t >) = 1 | m \notin Q) \leq \text{negl}(n)$$

Hence,

$$Pr(\text{ValidQuery}) \leq \text{negl}(n)$$

This hides our decryption oracle since the adversary cannot produce a valid query. And since our encryption scheme is also CPA secure, any CPA attack also does not work. Therefore,

$$Pr(A(c) = b; \text{s.t } c \notin Q) \leq \text{negl}(n)$$

Thus, the statement is proved.