

Operational Considerations for MASA

<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-richardson-anima-masa-considerations/>


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ANIMA Working Group

Two Aspects of Relationship b/w Device and Manufacturer

- Manufacturer provisions an identity (IDevID) for the device
 - Device identity is validated by MASA before issuing the voucher
 - Considerations include:
 - Key Pair Generation
 - PKI for IDevID
- Manufacturer provides a mechanism that convinces the device to trust the new owner
 - Device can validate that the **voucher** is issued by a legitimate MASA
 - Considerations include:
 - PKI for MASA signing keys
 - Different MASA types




Operational Considerations for IDevID

--- Key Pair Generation

- On-device Key Pair Generation
- Off-device Key Pair Generation
- Key Pair Generation Based on 256-bit Secret Seed


On-device Key Pair Generation

- Private key never leaves the device
- But, device may not have a verified random number generator




Off-device Key Pair Generation

- Better randomness, the authenticity of the public key is well known
- But, private key is seen by the manufacturing infrastructure



Key Pair Generation Based on (256-bit) Secret Seed


- Trust is replaced with a heightened trust placed in the silicon fabrication facility.
- Key Pair and certificate may be calculated by the OEM asynchronously. Key derivation system can be completely disconnected from networks.
- But, OEM must be supplied by a trusted silicon fabrication system. OEM must store and care for these keys very carefully



Operational Considerations for IDevID

--- PKI for IDevID

- Three-tier PKI infrastructure is appropriate
- A root CA
 - Private key kept offline
 - Issue intermediate CA certificates
- A number of intermediate CAs
 - Have online private keys
 - Issue IDevID certificates
 - Periodically destroy the private key and generate a new one
- Many End-Entity certificates (i.e., IDevID certificates)



Some say this is properly a two-tier, as the EE leaf should Not count

Operational Considerations for MASA

--- Self-contained multi-product MASA

- A offline CA
 - Periodically sign a new End-Entity (EE) Certificate (i.e., MASA certificate)
- Use EE Certificate's online private key to sign voucher requests
- Public key of the offline CA is built-in to the firmware of the device, providing a trust anchor with which to validate vouchers




Diagram of Trust Relationship

Operational Considerations for MASA

--- Self-contained per-product MASA

- A simple enhancement to the previous scenario is to **have a unique MASA offline key for each product line**
 - Private keys are kept separately, compromise of a single product line MASA doesn't compromise all products
 - If a product line is sold to another entity, the MASA escrow process affects only this single product line
 - SerialNumber can be duplicated among different product lines
- Disadvantage: Requires a private key to be stored per product line
- Per-product MASA signing keys is encouraged
- DIAGRAM of relationships

Operational Considerations for MASA

per-product MASA keys

intertwined with IDevID PKI

- Use the same root CA for MASA Certificate and IDevID Certificates
 - Pledge needs to make sure that the voucher is signed by a key which is authorized to sign vouchers
 - Prevent the voucher being signed by other devices' IDevID
- Root CA needs to sign an intermediate CA or End-Entity certificate with an extension OID that is specific for Voucher Authorization
- Diagram of relationships

Operational Considerations for MASA

--- Rotating MASA authorization keys

- Have multiple MASA offline key for each product line, and these keys can be rotated though in some deterministic order
 - All of the MASA signing keys need to be online and available in order to respond to any voucher request
 - Keep track of which device trust which key in the asset database

Next steps

- More reviews and comments

Thank You!