ECO862 - International Trade Lecture 4: Dynamic Trade Models - Sunk cost model

Model outline

- 1. CES + monopolistic competition math
- 2. Firm decision problem in partial equilibrium
- 3. Success and challenges

CES + monopolistic competition: Consumers

- ▶ m is mass of varieties available
- ► Total expenditure *E* exogenous but time-varying

$$\max_{c(\omega)>0} \left(\int_0^m \nu_t(\omega) c(\omega)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} d\omega \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$
s.t.
$$\int_0^m p(\omega) c(\omega) d\omega = E_t$$

▶ Demand function

$$d(\omega, p) = \nu_t(\omega)^{\sigma} \left(\frac{p(\omega)}{P_t}\right)^{-\sigma} \frac{E_t}{P_t}$$

- ightharpoonup Price of ω relative to aggregate price
- ightharpoonup Price elasticity of demand σ
- ▶ Other demand curves get used, linear, translog, etc. often feature "chokepoint".

CES + monopolistic competition: Variety producers (ω)

- Monopolistic competitors: monopolists in their variety.
- ▶ Choose prices taking residual demand as given (atomistic)
- ► Linear (generally CRS) production
- ▶ Variable trade costs: $\tau_t \ge 1$ = tariffs; ξ_t = common trade cost; $\hat{\xi}_t(\omega)$ = idio trade cost

$$\max_{p,l} p(\omega)d(\omega,\tau p) - Wl(\omega)$$

s.t. $\xi_l \hat{\xi}_l(\omega)d(\omega,\tau p) = z_l(\omega)l(\omega)$

▶ The ex-tariff pricing decision

$$p(\omega) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{w}{z_t(\omega)} \xi_t \hat{\xi}_t(\omega)$$

- ▶ Markup decreasing in $\sigma > 1$ (Why?)
- ▶ More productive (z, ξ) firms charge lower prices. Higher demand firms don't.

CES + monopolistic competition: Variety producers

Substitute price and labor demand functions into the objective

$$p(\omega)c(\omega) = E_t P_t^{\sigma-1} \nu_t(\omega)^{\sigma} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{\mathbf{w}}{\mathbf{z}_t} \tau_t \xi_t \hat{\xi}_t(\omega) \right)^{-(\sigma-1)}$$

▶ and profits...

$$\pi(\omega) = \frac{1}{\sigma} p(\omega) c(\omega)$$

▶ These are very special properties of CES + monop. competition

- ▶ Notice that p, c, π do not depend on ω . They depend on $z, \hat{\xi}$, and ω .
- ▶ Index goods by $(z, \hat{\xi}, \omega)$ and use the measure over them to aggregate.

Static "entry" model intuition

- ▶ Assume there is a fixed cost to export, f
- ► Then decisions depends on

$$\pi(\omega) = \frac{1}{\sigma} E_t P_t^{\sigma - 1} \nu^{\sigma} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{W}{z_t} \tau_t \xi_t \hat{\xi} \right)^{-(\sigma - 1)} \ge f(\omega)$$

Sunk-cost model: decision problem

- ▶ Now we introduce the sunk-cost model, sometimes with a more general notation
- ► Three key features in firm-level models of trade
 - 1. An investment in "market access" technology
 - 2. An uncertain future return to that investment
 - 3. A depreciation process of that investment

Sunk-cost model: decision problem

▶ Consider a firm *i* making a decision to export: $x_{it} = \{0, 1\}$

$$V_t = \max E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \frac{1}{1+r_s} x_{is} \left(\pi_{is} \left(\cdot\right) - f_{is}(\cdot)\right)$$

- ► Fixed export costs: f_{it} (ϵ_{it} , x_{it-1} , x_{it-2} , ..., x_{it-k}) depend on random variable (ϵ) and experience (past realizations of x_i)
- ▶ Flow profits: $\pi(x_{it}, z_{it}, d_{it})$
 - $ightharpoonup z_{it}$ = variables related to productive efficiency
 - $ightharpoonup d_{it}$ = variables related to foreign demand for firm i's
 - ▶ Assumes constant returns to scale, otherwise $z_{it}(s_{it}, d_{it})$ where s_{it} is sales at home
- \blacktriangleright Future discounted by interest rate, r_s . Role of interest rate depends on how interest rate affects rest of the economy.

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- ► Future discounted by interest rate, *r_s*. Role of interest rate depends on how interest rate affects rest of the economy.
 - ► Fast growth or high distortions.

Model: foreign demand

► Assume a firm charging price *p_{it}* sells

$$d_{it}\left(p_{it}\right) = \nu_{it}\left(p_{it}\frac{\tau_t \xi_t \tilde{\xi}_{it}}{P_t}\right)^{-\sigma} D_t$$

- ▶ Common factors: market size (D_t) , real exchange rate (P_t) , ad-valorem tariff (τ_t) , iceberg trade costs (ξ_t)
- ▶ Idiosyncratic factors: demand shifter (ν_{it}) and $\left(ilde{\xi}_{it}\right)$ e.g., shipping/distribution technology
 - ▶ Two idiosyncratic factors redundant, combine into ξ_{it}
 - ▶ No congestion effects on distribution
- CES framework is common

Fixed costs

- ► Following Baldwin and Krugman (1989); Roberts and Tybout (1997)
- ▶ $f(\epsilon_{it}, x_{it-1})$: only t-1 export status matters (full depreciation of market-access investment)
- ▶ $f(\epsilon_{it}, 1) < f(\epsilon_{it}, 0)$: cost of entering exceeds continuation cost (upfront investment in market access)
- ▶ fixed cost lowers iceberg cost from $\xi = \infty$ to $\xi < \infty$ (return on investment)
- When fixed trade cost only depends on last period's export status the fixed cost and history variable are redundant.
- ▶ A richer model in which fixed costs depend on experience requires tracking longer history

- ▶ Microeconomic $(z, \xi, f(\epsilon_{it}, x_{it-1}))$
 - ▶ Let z, ξ follow AR1 process $\left(\rho_z, \sigma_z^2, \rho_\xi, \sigma_\xi^2\right)$
 - lacktriangle Fixed cost component follow $\epsilon_{\it it} \sim \log {\sf Normal}\left(0,\sigma_\epsilon^2
 ight)$
 - ▶ Often assume aspect of ξ is learned upon entry (Learning)
- Macroeconomic
 - ightharpoonup Processes for exchange rate (P_t) & demand (D_t) depend on equilibrium concept
 - \blacktriangleright In partial equilibrium (P, D) are exogenous AR processes
 - ▶ In general equilibrium, (P, D) depend on shocks and transmission (can be highly non-linear)
 - ► For tariffs no standard (indeed lots of processes).

Bellman Equation

▶ The firm solves a standard discrete-choice problem

$$V_{t}(x_{it-1}, z_{it}, \xi_{it}, f_{it}) = \max \left\{ V_{t}^{0}(x_{it-1}, z_{it}, \xi_{it}, f_{it}), V_{t}^{1}(x_{it-1}, z_{it}, \xi_{it}, f_{it}) \right\}$$

- ▶ To solve this problem we will need to know
 - ▶ A firm's survival probability (δ_{it})
 - ightharpoonup The interest rate (r_t)
- ▶ The *t*s capture non-stationary functions from aggregate shocks
 - ▶ Most partial equilibrium models assume stationarity

Bellman Equation

Value of not exporting

$$V_{t}^{0}(x_{it-1}, z_{it}, \xi_{it}, f_{it}) = \pi_{t}(0, z_{it}, \xi_{it}) + \delta_{it} \mathop{\mathsf{E}}_{z, \xi, f} \frac{1}{1 + r_{t+1}} V_{t+1}(0, z_{it+1}, \xi_{it+1}, f_{it+1})$$

Value of exporting

$$V_{t}^{1}(x_{it-1}, z_{it}, \xi_{it}, f_{it}) = \pi_{t}(1, z_{it}, \xi_{it}) - f(\epsilon_{t}, x_{i,t-1}) + \delta_{it} \underbrace{E}_{z, \xi, t} \frac{1}{1 + r_{t+1}} V_{t+1}(1, z_{it+1}, \xi_{it+1}, f_{it+1})$$

► Focus on a stationary environment for now (drop *t*s)


Decision Rules

- ▶ Assume 1) f is deterministic (i.e. $\sigma_{\epsilon} = 0$) and 2) export and domestic profit increasing in z (monopolistic competition + CES demand).
- ▶ Optimal policy is a cutoff rule $z_m(\xi)$ s.t. $x_{it} = 1$ iff $z \ge z_m(\xi)$

$$f_{m} - [\pi(1, z_{m}(\xi), \xi) - \pi(0, z_{m}(\xi), \xi)] = \frac{\delta}{1 + r} E \begin{bmatrix} V^{1}(z', \xi', f_{1}) \\ -V^{0}(z', \xi', f_{0}) \end{bmatrix}$$
$$f_{m} - \Delta \pi(z_{m}(\xi), \xi) = \frac{\delta}{1 + r} E [\Delta V(z', \xi', f_{1}, f_{0})]$$

- ▶ The LHS is the current cost of exporting net of increased profits
- ► The RHS is the future benefit (increase in market value of the firm)

Breakevens



- ► Holding fixed the firm-size distribution, when the thresholds are farther apart, exporters become and smaller, non-exporters larger, and the exporter premium decreases.
- ➤ The exporter premium is a key empirical moment to discipline the model's parameters.

The gain in firm value from exporting

- ► The RHS of the break-even condition
- ▶ The upward sloping line in the figure depends on fixed costs and persistence of shock
- ▶ The slope is increasing in the persistence of shocks
 - ▶ It determines both how long and how much you earn exporting
 - ▶ Higher persistence lowers both thresholds, and the gap
- ▶ The intercept is mostly determined by the gap between $f_0 f_1$
 - ▶ If $f_0 = f_1$ then $\Delta V = 0$
 - ► Holding f_1 constant, $\frac{\partial \Delta V}{\partial f_0} > 0$

The current cost of exporting

- ► The LHS of the break-even condition
- ▶ The downward sloping lines in the figure : Holding fixed ξ profits increase z, so $f_m \pi_m$ decrease in z
- ► Exporting more profitable to more productive firms

Distributions

- ▶ The cutoff thresholds and the process for (z, ξ) determine the measure of firm types $\mu(z, \xi, f)$
- $\blacktriangleright \mu(z,\xi,f_0) [\mu(z,\xi,f_1)]$ denotes the beginning of period non-exporters [exporters]
- ▶ The measures of current non-exporters and exporters

$$N_{N} = \int_{\xi} \int_{0}^{z_{0}(\xi)} \mu(z, \xi, f_{0}) + \int_{\xi} \int_{0}^{z_{1}(\xi)} \mu(z, \xi, f_{1})$$

$$N_X = \int_{\xi} \int_{z_0(\xi)}^{\infty} \mu(z,\xi,f_0) + \int_{\xi} \int_{z_1(\xi)}^{\infty} \mu(z,\xi,f_1)$$

▶ The export participation share is $N_X/(N_N + N_X)$

Laws of motion

$$N_X' = \delta_{X,X} \Pr (\text{continue}) N_X + \delta_{N,X} \Pr (\text{start}) N_N$$


$$N_N' = \delta_{X,N} \left[1 - \Pr\left(\text{continue} \right) \right] N_X + \delta_{NN} \left[1 - \Pr\left(\text{start} \right) \right] N_N + N_E$$

▶ A more careful exposition would focus fully on


$$\mu'(z,\xi,f) = T(\mu(z,\xi,f))$$

► See the appendix to Alessandria et al. (2021a) for details

Distributions



... with $f_0 > f_1$. What happens when $f_0 = f_1$?



Properties

- ▶ Crucial outcome of dynamic decision: $z_1(\xi) < z_0(\xi)$
 - Harder to break into exporting than to stay
- ▶ This generates
 - ▶ Exporter hysteresis: Firms continue exporting after conditions deteriorate
 - ▶ Low exit rate: Exporters will delay exiting to avoid paying the entry cost again
 - ▶ Export Premium: Exporters are larger than non-exporters
 - Increasing in the average fixed cost
 - ► Falling in the difference in fixed costs

Properties

- ightharpoonup Consider Δ in current and future primitives abstracting from GE interactions
- ▶ Let's look at
 - 1. Trade barriers
 - 2. Uncertainty

Trade costs and Tariffs

- ▶ Consider three possible reductions in variable trade costs, either (ξ, τ)
 - 1. Current trade costs temporary
 - 2. Future trade costs permanent
 - 3. Current and future trade costs

Temporary current

- ▶ Experiment: $\tau_t \downarrow$, $\tau_s = \tau_{t-1}$, s = t+1, t+2, ...
- ▶ Lowering today's tariff will shift down the LHS $_m(z)$
- Increasing entry and decreasing exit
- ► Through law of motion, trade will remain persistently high, only gradually mean-reverting

Permanent future

- ▶ Lowering tariff in the future will shift up the RHS $_m(z)$
- Increasing entry and decreasing exit today
- ▶ Trade grows in advance of liberalization
- ► Through law of motion trade will increase gradually
- ► Current response to a unobserved future change in trade barriers can be used to identify the expected path of future policy.

Permanent current

- ▶ Lowering tariff in the current will shift up the RHS $_m(z)$ and LHS $_m(z)$
- ► Combination of previous two shocks
- ► Increasing entry and decreasing exit today
- ▶ Trade grows by more on impact
- ► Through law of motion trade will increase gradually.

- ► As in typical models with non-convexities, uncertainty matters (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994)
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 - ► Thicker tails → more entry and more exit
 - ► Volume of trade should increase since conditional mean of productivity ↑ (selection on a thicker right tail)
- **2.** Future uncertainty/dispersion, $\sigma'_z \uparrow [permanent]$
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- **2.** Future uncertainty/dispersion, $\sigma'_z \uparrow [permanent]$
 - ► Shift up and flattening of the marginal gain curve
 - ▶ Entry and exit fall, ambiguous effect on trade today and in the future

Success and Challenges

- Successes
 - ▶ Persistent export participation (fact #1)
 - ► Low export and entry rates (facts #3,4)
 - ▶ Dynamic macro adjustment (fact #7)
- ▶ Challenges
 - New exporters (too productive at entry, too likely to continue, and export intensity too high)
 - Connection in exporting across markets
 - ▶ High re-entry rates in monthly and longer frequencies
- Causes
 - ▶ Exporting technology too simple (parsimonious): f_0, f_1, ξ
 - ▶ Need to shift more investment into post-entry period and reduce depreciation

Resolutions: Starting and stopping

- ► Small new-exporters & low continuation rate
 - ▶ Let $f_1(t_e)$ be a decreasing function of t_e =age in market
- ▶ High re-entry data
 - ▶ Annual: Let firm that stops re-enter with $f_R \in [f_1, f_0]$
 - Monthly: set $f_0 = f_1$ + inventory cost abroad: firms order infrequently and hold inventories. Account for fact #5 and generate a large short-run elasticity.

Resolution: Export intensity dynamics

With CES

$$exs(z,\hat{\xi}) = \frac{(\tau\xi\hat{\xi})^{1-\sigma}}{1+(\tau\xi\hat{\xi})^{1-\sigma}}$$

- ▶ Modify iceberg cost structure so that they fall with experience
 - ▶ Alessandria et al. (2021b) assume firm enters at $\xi_H > \xi_L$ and then Markov transition between states
 - ▶ Reflects improvements in export distribution technology
- ► Alternatively could accumulate customers or build habit (Fitzgerald et al., 2023; Piveteau, 2021; Ruhl and Willis, 2017; Rodrigue and Tan, 2019)
- Both approaches have investments in improving market after entry, not just maintaining access
- ▶ Backloads profits which leads to lower estimates of entry costs.
- ▶ When growth process is uncertain, this makes it more likely to exit

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