

Continuous Transparent Authentication with User-Device Physical Unclonable Functions (UD-PUFs) based on Mobile Device Touchscreen Interactions

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ABSTRACT

A mobile device user continually interacts with many sensors through the natural user interface (UI) of apps. These interactions are unique for each (user, device) pair forming a user-device biometric. A physical unclonable function (PUF) can be realized from the touch screen pressure variability. We illustrate how a sequence of these pressure values from discrete touchscreen interactions may be used to uniquely characterize a user-device pair. These touch screen interactions Markov models can be integrated into a continuous authentication layer. Based on the most recent sequence of touch screen interactions, the continuous authentication layer can assign a probability that these interactions came from the authenticated (user, device) pair. Continuous authentication may help protect access to a mobile device from a malicious party by detecting the anomalies early. The effectiveness of this scheme is described in terms of how definitively can one user be differentiated from another.

1. INTRODUCTION

Mobile devices are ubiquitous in the modern world. These devices are becoming progressively more important for many applications with hold sensitive data such as financial and health care data. Securing mobile devices poses unique challenges and opportunities. Traditional user authentication is a single challenge-response model based on a password. A mobile device, however, has a greater number of available device sensors that have been used to capture the uniqueness of a specific user, device interaction for enhanced traditional user authentication. Traditional user authentication however leaves large gaps in between successive user authentications. If the device is compromised in between two successive user authentications, there is a long time available to the adversary for inflicting damage. This paper proposes a continuous authentication framework in which an authentication framework running in the background is continu-

ally monitoring user activities. Moreover, this monitoring is based on the combined biometric of the user and the device silicon captured as a physical unclonable function (PUF).

Traditional physical unclonable functions (PUFs) which generate a unique signature of a given hardware device are not sufficient to guarantee the identity of a user. A mechanism that combines the biometric identity of a human user and the device silicon in a way that is not mathematically separable is more robust in the mobile world. UD-PUFs (user-device entangled physical unclonable functions) [?] serve just that role. Integration of such UD-PUFs into a continuous authentication environment is the main problem addressed in this paper.

A UD-PUF is a function of both the device silicon and the user behavior. Such a function must show significant change in the output given a small change in any component of a user-device pair somewhat like a hash function. Hence the UD-PUF must be based on a property or properties which vary significantly and identifiably among mobile device hardware and users. The best candidates to use will be properties which offer the most variability, and properties which are most easily exposed in the android operating system.

System efficiency and response times imposes additional constraints on properties to base a UD-PUF on. The system must also be practical under normal use conditions for mobile devices. The system must be non-intrusive to the user, fast enough to run on mobile devices, and accurate when authenticating users. If a user must spend a long time authenticating they are not able to use this time to accomplish the task for which they are being authenticated. This detracts from the efficiency of using a mobile device to complete the task. If the proposed system is too computationally intensive to be run on a mobile device, or the system has low accuracy then it is useless for any practical application.

In the continuation authentication world, a composite sensor vector [3] has been used to establish a user identity. Other user biometrics such as inter key stroke timing have also been used. In this paper, the continuous authentication is based on a combined user-device identity. The continuous authentication signature will fail if either the biometrically correct human being or the biometrically correct device component

is removed. This paper builds the continuous authentication framework on the user touch screen interactions. We establish that the user touch screen interactions do differentiate one user from another. Note that there are advantages to basing a framework on a single source of information. A failure of the touchscreen to function also constitutes device failure. This system is more robust because it will only fail upon failure of the device touch screen. Compare this to other systems whose functionality depends on many components. A failure in any one of these components disrupts the authentication scheme making these systems more prone to failure.

Continuous authentication frameworks' basis premise is that a user behavior over time gravitates towards predictable. It can be frequently modeled as an n -Markov model. It states that the user tokens of length n repeat themselves with certain frequency. Hence if we can record history of n -token sequences, they could help us classify the user's current behavior. The tokens are touch screen pressure values that are continually generated as the user interacts with an app through a soft keyboard.

The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses related work. Touchscreen pressure and the corresponding UD-PUF model are described in section 3. The n -Markov model and its parametrization are discussed in section 4. Section 5 provides some implementation details with respect to how touchscreen pressure is used in the modeling scheme. Data collection methods are discussed in section 6. The authentication scheme is discussed in section 7. The results including final numbers and suggestions in practical applications are articulated in section 8. Conclusions are presented in section 9. Finally section 10 discusses future work in this area.

2. RELATED WORK

SenSec, a similar authentication scheme to the one proposed in this paper, completed at Carnegie Mellon used information from from accelerometers, gyroscopes and magnetometers to construct a model of a user. [3] This method can be classified as a UD-PUF as each accelerometer, gyroscope and magnetometer will have some variance inherent in the manufacturing process for these devices [?]; the input to these devices will also vary significantly by user [?]. As a result the output is a function which varies with changes in user or device, a UD-PUF.

Another notable aspect of the SenSec system is their method of modeling users with an n -Markov model. This system presents several benefits which include relative simplicity and scalability. [3]

[2] [1]

3. TOUCHSCREEN PRESSURE

If our goal is be be able to distinguish a user's interaction with a given device from this same user on a different device and from different users on any device than our description of the user will need to be a product of both the user and the device. In the android operating system there exists a pressure function which returns a value proportional to current at sides of phone for a given touch screen interaction.

[3] This is the value which will serve as the basis for our scheme and will henceforth be referred to as touch pressure.

The pressure function is significant because it's value not only depends on the characteristics of the device but also on the way in which a user interacts with a given device. The effect of a given device on the touch pressure value will differ significantly due to variations implicit in the manufacturing process for the touchscreens of these devices. [?] Our supposition is a given user will interact with a touchscreen in such a way as to cause significant variations in the touch pressure values when compared to other users on the same touchscreen [?]. Given this, we have chosen touch pressure as the basis for our UD-PUF.

4. MODELING A USER-DEVICE PAIR

Interactions between users and devices are complex. To interpret these actions in a meaningful way, in order to perform an authentication for example, it is necessary to simplify these interactions. The chosen model must provide sufficient entropy such that a model generated with a given user-device pair is not consistently reproducible by another user or on a different device. The modeling method must also be easily reproducible by the original user on the original device. A model having the necessary characteristics required for this application is a Markov Chain.

Markov Chains are useful in predicting systems whose behavior can be modeled in discrete states. The transitions between states can be identified to happen with some probability.

Historically the Markov Chain has found applications in (statistics?)

Upon identification of an appropriate model the next step is to discover an optimal way in which it may be applied to the current problem. An interaction between a user and device can be described as a sequence of touch pressure values. Using a Markov Chain to describe this sequence is only reasonable if we suppose that a given touch pressure value depends on some number of preceding touch pressure values. [?]

5. TOUCH PRESSURE MODELING

The goal in modeling a system with a Markov model is to classify the system in terms of its transitions between states. If such a model is to be used to purposes of uniquely identifying a given system, than the model must be chosen in a way which exposes the uniqueness of the system. Our scheme uses a Markov model constructed from the sequence of touches entered by a user. Each touch contains information about the pressure and location of the interaction with the touchscreen.

Our Markov model calculates the probability of a given touch coming after a sequence of n touches. n is a parameter to the model which should allow for increased accuracy in determining the true probability of a given touch to come after a preceding sequence of touches when given more data to construct the model. The increased accuracy is due to a greater number of possible model states which decreases

Authentication Threshold vs. Percentage




Figure 1: Describes how false positive and false negative percentages vary as the authentication threshold is adjusted.

the likelihood that a user will have states which overlap a different user.

The probability of a touch coming after a sequence of touches can be expressed as the number of occurrences of touch after a given sequence by the total number of occurrences of that sequence.

6. DATA COLLECTION

Data for creating touch pressure models in this experiment was generated using a special keyboard application for the android operating system. Users would load the keyboard onto their device and continue using the device in the way they would normally. Some users were asked to play a typing game in order to help expedite the data collection process. After the users had generated at least ten thousand touches the data was collected from the user's device.

7. DIFFERENTIATING USER-DEVICE PAIRS

In distinguishing a particular user from another different user, it is necessary to develop a method of comparison between users. In our method of comparison we take the probability associated with a touch pressure coming after a sequence of preceding touch pressures for a particular user and compute the difference between this probability and the probability of the same touch pressure coming after the same sequence of touches for a different user. The average of these probability differences is taken to be the difference between two users. Once a comparison is established a natural extension is a system of authentication. This system needs to determine when two sets of touch pressure values came from the same user-device pair. When authenticating a user, we take one minus the average difference between the model constructed from the two sets of touch pressure values. Take this value to be the authentication percentage for a given set of touch pressure values against another. To determine how well this system does at differentiating users it is useful to develop metrics which describe the system's performance under conditions which are similar to it's potential real-world applications. Figure 1 illustrates how false positive percent-



Figure 2: Authentication accuracy is a function of both the base model size and authentication model size.

age and false negative percentage vary based on where the threshold for authentication is set.

Here, authentication threshold refers to the value of authentication percentage one model must have against another for the models to be considered the same; two models which are the same are supposed to have been created from touches generated by the same user-device pair. False positive percentage measures what fraction of authentications between two sets of touch pressures which did not come from the same user-device pair, therefore these sets should not be considered the same, but did authenticate as being the same in our authentication system. False negative percentage is exactly the inverse of false positive percentage in that it describes what fraction of authentications between two sets of touch pressures which did come from the same user-device pair, but did not authenticate as being the same in our authentication system.

In Figure 1 there exists a clear intersection between false negative and false positive percentages. This intersection is significant; at this point the system neither biased toward allowing user-device pairs which should not authenticate to pass authentication nor toward disallowing user-device pairs, which should authenticate, from passing authentication. This point represents a balance in design, but the best authentication threshold will depend on the application of this system.

The implementation of the authentication system is as follows. A Markov model is constructed from a sequence of touches known to have come from the user. A separate Markov model is then constructed from a sequence of touches which need to be compared to the model. The probabilities computed for each of these models are then compared and a percent difference is derived from these comparisons. We then choose to authentication only those models which have achieved a low enough percent difference.

8. RESULTS




Figure 3: Depicts the result of many model comparisons done around the area of best results in Figure 2.

In exploring the design space of this system we are trying to determine how well the system will perform in the end use case. Perhaps the best measure of the system’s performance is how accurate the system is when authenticating users. Figure 2 depicts authentication accuracy as a function of base_model_size, number of touches known to have originated from an authentic user, and auth_model_size, number of touches which are to be checked against the model generated from the base touches. We define authentication_accuracy to be the percentage of authentications for which our system makes the correct decision. In other words, an authentic user is authenticated and a non-authentic user is not authenticated. The size of base model and user model which result in a given authentication accuracy are aligned with that authentication accuracy on the horizontal axis in the chart.

To establish that the results in Figure 2 hold for large numbers of comparisons many more comparisons were done around the area of best results. The results of these tests are presented in Figure ???. For the results depicted in the figure, user_model_size is held constant at ten thousand while auth_model_size is varied. The test was performed in this way because variations in auth_model_size seems to have a greater impact on authentication accuracy than variations in base_model_size. Approximately the same trend as seen in Figure 2 presents itself in Figure 3.

9. CONCLUSIONS

This paper presents an approach toward continuous authentication which utilizes the variability in the way users interact with the touchscreens of their devices to differentiate distinct user-device combinations. This is useful in situations similar to theft where a mobile device is accessible to a party which may desire to use the device to compromise sensitive data. One shot authentication systems like passwords are not the ideal solution in this case. If the password has also been compromised or is weak such that it may be easily broken, then the attacker has access to the device indifferently. In the continuous authentication model presented here, if the device is compromised then the way the attacker

interacts with the device will deviate away from the model which has been established for the authentic user. After the the newest sequence of touch interactions has become significantly different from the established model, then the device may be locked or some other arbitrary action taken.

The implementation of our system has both modeling and authentication components. The modeling component depends on the use of an n -Markov model constructed from a sequence of touches entered by the user. This allows for the likelihood that two sequences of touch pressure values came from the same user to be calculated in a probabilistic fashion. The authentication system constructs two models. One of the models coming from the most recent touches and the other coming from touches preceeding the most recent. A difference is derived between the models which is a function of the probability derived in the modeling phase. If difference is sufficiently large it can be said with reasonable certainty that the user from which the touch sequences originated for the most recent touches differs from the user who generated the touches preceeding those most recent.

Data for this approach comes from the user’s interactions with the touchscreen of their device. This data will be generated over time by the user; thus this scheme lends itself very well to a continuous authentication model. In addition, this data is reliable over the lifespan of the device. The authentication system will persist as long as the touchscreen functions correctly. A failure of the touchscreen renders the mobile device useless; hence the system is more robust compared to systems which depend on multiple sensors contained on the mobile device. Mobile device touchscreen interactions are also ideal for use in an authentication scheme. They function both as a biometric of the human user and the silicon of the device; a change in either device or user will be detected as a result.

Depending on the implementation of this system, varying the parameters of the modeling system can allow the implementer to tune the system to their specific purpose.

10. FUTURE WORK

11. REFERENCES

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