

Analyzing Zeus, an Intriguing Trojan Botnet

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When messing with malware on your machine I figured I would either want to run it in a VM or make sure none of the prerequisites are enabled on the machine itself. This is where malware written in C or C++ thrive as languages like Python and Java need the run time and interpreter already installed to meet that prerequisite. For this assignment I decided to take a look at the Zeus Trojan malware pkg that initially gaining traction in the late 2000s when used to steal info from the US DOT. Trojans are known to be malware that behaves as legitimate programs. The bot would go on to infecting millions of computers and spawning any variants. The bot is aimed to target windows machines to extract banking in formations using keystroke logging. This form of attack is a common example of a man-in-the-

middle attack. The malware pkg performs infection via phishing schemes or drive-by downloads and infected some of the largest companies such as Bank of America, Oracle, Cisco, Amazon, etc. The Trojan violates just about every principle in the CIA triad. Since confidential banking information was taken as well as money, confidentiality and integrity are both violated while availability remains in questions. Patches to the malware offered from cybersecurity consultants is known to eradicate it from the infected machine, however strains of the virus were spawned remaining a constant battle. I was able to find several versions of the "leaked" banking trojan but check out the version I had found from here!

<https://github.com/touyachrist/evo-zeus>

Although not the most detrimental part of the source code, in a repo containing the Zeus source code this block minimally shows the entry point to the windows core API was created and giving root permission

```
void WINAPI entryPoint(void) {
    Mem::init();
    Console::init();
    Crypt::init();
    Core::init();

    CUI_DEFAULT_COMMANDLINE_HELPER;

    Core::uninit();
    Crypt::uninit();
    Console::uninit();
    Mem::uninit();

    CWA(kernel32, ExitProcess)(coreData.exitCode);
}

%
```

A similar version of this code I ran on my machine running kali linux, was able to give me root permissions as a regular user. See here (maybe it works for you):

```
int getuid(){
```

```

        return 0;
    }
    int geteuid(){
        return 0;
    }
    int getgid(){
        return 0;
    }
    int getegid(){
        return 0;
    }
}

```

The bot has gone through many stages and versions with earlier implementations of the bug containing executable files hardcoded to one of these files

```

ntos.exe
oembios.exe
twext.exe

```

Data being stored in the following dirs

```

System>\wsnpoem
System>\sysproc64
System>\twain_32

```

The next iteration and stored files in a single directory later found by security researchers, with another version storing executables in randomly named folders in app data. The bot executes in the following stages

- **Builder** This malware comes in a kit usable by regular users with no technical knowledge, meaning the "owner" must deploy their own executables to who they wish to infect. This is done easily by using the builder in the tool kit. Each build will be unique to the infectee, due to some cryptographic implementations, there are unique keys generated for the configuration file embedded into the built .exe.
- **Configuration** Seperate from the build stage, contains the address to where the sniffed data is sent to in a series of blocks enables customization and hardcoding settings into the final binary. The config includes these sections:

StaticConfig
DynamicConfig
KeyLogger
WebFilters
WebDataFilters
WebFakes

Static and Dynamic Config both are dealing with the hardcoding of settings that eventually get executed at runtime. Here the questions of what is the target and destination get answered. In addition to the hardcoding of generic settings, dynamic features that imply additional complexity such as redirection URLs of targets and destination addresses, URL masks, log disabling, sets of URLs performing Transaction Authentication Number (TAN) harvesting, as well as URL masks that contain corresponding HTML blocks injecting into webpages who match the Webinjects requests. The bot is responsible for running queries.

Example of the config.txt file used to initiate seen here:

<https://github.com/touyachrist/evo-zeus/blob/master/output/builder/config.txt>

Example of webinjects.txt file used for targeting:

<https://github.com/touyachrist/evo-zeus/blob/master/source/other/webinjects.txt>

- Execution The final executable file produced from build and configure (sounds like installing a C application) is finally deployed by the "owner" of the bug. If the .exe is produced with the same configuration and build settings the end results will usually vary in where the config file is stored.
- Server Finally the bot is deployed on a php-based server utilized by an abundance of php scripts that allows the deployer to monitor their results! This also serves as a sort of remote access type application where CMDs can be issued using this stage.
- Why wasn't it detected? From its initial release, the bot itself was made more complex and harder to detect for a number of reasons. What made things tricky was random naming of files to specific directories and in small sizes. Using checksums is monitoring bits transmitted at a higher

rate than normal, letting professionals know of some potential issues. In earlier stages the bug transmitted files carelessly and copied them into the system dir. Later versions made use of ensuring dropped files were not to have the same checksum as the original.

The general function of the bug is to continuously spawn threads based on previous ones that go around crawling the infected devices hard drive. Doing so by embedding itself into system directories. The config file is written into our registers and that same thread it is executed in will attempt to scrape for new .exe files for config to point to.

Here is an example of how the keylogging and screens scraping takes place by importing a hook to the API

```
user32!TranslateMessage
```

If the a left click is detected, a global flag is set within another PAI hook and another check is conducted to check if the user is visiting a location specified in the config file. Screen captures are then only taken when visiting what is specified by the creator.

This uses win32 functions that can also be seen here:

<https://github.com/touyachrist/evo-zeus/blob/master/source/client/screenshot.cpp>

```
HDC hDC = CreateCompatibleDC(0);
HBITMAP hBmp = CreateCompatibleBitmap(GetDC(0), screen_width,
screen_height);
SelectObject(hDC, hBmp);
BitBlt(hDC, 0, 0, screen_width, screen_height, x_coordinate,
y_coordinate, SRCCOPY);
```

Lets also take a look at the differences in a small implementation of the RC4 stream cipher in a early and more recent version

The difference being the second implementation is encrypting the config file a 0x100 byte key at build time. An extra layer seen in v2 adds more complexity by implementing a XOR decryption (last code block)

```
/*
 * Example of config file encryption seen in v1
 */
```

```

dataSize = size of data
dataIn = encrypted data
char b;
    for (i = 0; i < dataSize; i++) {
        dataOut[i] = 0;
    }
    for (i = 0; i < dataSize; i++) {
        b = dataIn[i];
        if ((i % 2) == 0) {
            b += 2 * i + 10;
        }
        else {
            b += 0xF9 - 2 * i;
        }
        dataOut[i] += b;
    }

/*
 * A look at v1.x encryption on config files
 */

int rc4_decrypt(unsigned char *in, unsigned long size,
    unsigned char *S, unsigned char *out) {
    int i, j, dataCount;
    i = j = dataCount = 0;
    unsigned char temp, rc4_byte;
    for (dataCount = 0; dataCount < size; dataCount++) {
        i = (i + 1) & 255;
        j = (j + S[i]) & 255;
        temp = S[j];
        S[j] = S[i];
        S[i] = temp;
        rc4_byte = S[(temp + S[j]) & 255];
        out[dataCount] = in[dataCount] ^ rc4_byte;
    }
    return dataCount;
}

```

```

for (m = (decSize-1); m >0; m--) {
    decData[m] = decData[m] ^ decData[m-1];
}

```

Further Look at RC4 Stream Cipher w/ Static Analysis in CLang + cppcheck

The RC4 Stream Cipher was an encryption algorithm used in many Windows systems for a variety of applications. The Zeus bot exploited this algorithm and went under a series of patches (for example using logical operator XOR to swap instead of int/ char method)

We will take a look at how the cipher is implemented for small scale use (passing in a key, string, expecting a returned hash). The analysis on this isn't very exciting and was not implemented by the attackers but exploited by them. The errors in the RC4 algorithms are beyond what I believe will be caught by a static analysis tool like CLang. Running the windows-based bug on my linux machine was troublesome with CLang so I had decided to look at a more broad issues that contributed to the bug. So we will be looking at a minimal reproducible problem for catching bank statements from the system.

rc4-v0.c

ITER 1 :

```

$ ./rc4-v0 1 hello
087FAE01F8
KEY = 1
STRING = hello
HASH = 087FAE01F8

```

ITER 2 :

```

$ ./rc4-v0 1 HELLO
285F8E21D8
KEY = 1
STRING = HELLO
HASH = 285F8E21D8

```

ITER 3 :

```
$ ./rc4-v0 224 secure_software
F96FCDD6802CC1F80298D5C5439B26
KEY = 224
STRING = secure_software
HASH = F96FCDD6802CC1F80298D5C5439B26
```

ITER 4 :

```
$ ./rc4-v0 int too
28BEF0
KEY = int
STRING = too
HASH = 28BEF0
```

Produces different hash based on case-type

Static Analysis

```
$ clang --analyze rc4-v0.c
rc4-v0.c:72:33: warning: Result of 'malloc' is converted to a pointer
of type 'unsigned char', which is incompatible with sizeof operand type
int' [unix.MallocSizeof]
    unsigned char *ciphertext = malloc(sizeof(int) * strlen(argv[2]));
    ~~~~~~                ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~
rc4-v0.c:79:12: warning: Potential leak of memory pointed to by
'ciphertext' [unix.Malloc]
    return 0;
    ^
```