

SCHOOL OF COMPUTATION,
INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY —
INFORMATICS

TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT MÜNCHEN

Master's Thesis in Informatics

**Establishing trust in an updatable fTPM
using remote attestation**

Andreas Korb

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**Herstellung von Vertrauen in ein
aktualisierbares fTPM durch Remote
Attestierung**

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Submission Date:	15.12.2023

I confirm that this master's thesis is my own work and I have documented all sources and material used.

Munich, 15.12.2023

Andreas Korb

Acknowledgments

Abstract

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1 Introduction

This chapter includes an explanation of the exact problem we are addressing, and why, a brief overview of our solution, and the attacks we are trying to fend off.

1.1 Motivation

Modern trust relationships, such as Zero Trust [1], require trustworthy platforms, which can reliably report their system state. In such models, trustworthiness can only be assumed after the platform configuration has been proved by all parties of the communication.

This is solved by remote attestation. In the simplest case, there is a prover and a verifier, as depicted in Figure 1.1. This requires the verifier to establish trust with software or hardware on the prover's machine that attests the remaining software running on the prover.



Figure 1.1: Simplified remote attestation process.

In the meantime, Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) rise in their deployments and importance, e.g., in 2013 the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology encourages the adoption of TPMs [2], and Microsoft publicized that they require a TPM module for Windows 11 in 2021 [3]. While they provide remote attestation mechanisms of system states, their applications are also expanding beyond their traditional use-cases. For example, they are used in anti-cheat software for games [4].

A dedicated hardware TPM (dTPM) increases cost and hardware complexity - especially for embedded platforms. Through Trusted execution environments (TEEs), such as Arm TrustZone, a firmware TPM (fTPM) can be used to provide similar security guarantees as a dTPM chip.

For a dedicated TPM (dTPM), which consists of an independent hardware unit manufactured by a single manufacturer and is directly activated by power, it is sufficient to identify its manufacturer and understand his provided guarantees. In contrast, an fTPM runs atop other firmware components and is started later in the boot chain, making its security dependent on the underlying firmware stack. As a result, the fTPM can only be trusted if the entire underlying firmware stack is also trusted.

However, while a TPM-compliant component provides an infrastructure with which trust in it can be established remotely, i.e., an endorsement certificate, the underlying firmware stack is not represented by this. Though, the underlying firmware could modify, i.e., compromise, the fTPM component which is then not detected.

Currently, this is solved by the manufacturer providing not only the fTPM, but also the entire underlying firmware stack. Consequently, by establishing trust to the fTPM manufacturer, one can implicitly trust the underlying firmware as well. This is possible since in the most general sense, one can derive from an endorsement certificate the endorser, i.e., manufacturer, and if the attester trusts the endorser and the guarantees he provides, trust is established to his provided components.




Figure 1.2: The state-of-the-art process how a verifier establishes trust to an fTPM, which is in fact done by trusting its manufacturer. The brown markers indicate a manufacturer. The firmware and the fTPM were built by manufacturer \mathcal{M} , and the EK certificate indicates this manufacturer.

This process is illustrated in figure Figure 1.2. The provers' area shows its boot chain, the verifiers' area shows how it evaluates the trustworthiness against the provers' boot chain. The verifier trusts the entire chain when he trusts the manufacturer of each individual boot component. Note that the verifier must assume that the manufacturer

of the firmware components is the same as the manufacturer of the fTPM.

In summary, with the current approach, the endorser, usually a CPU manufacturer, provides the firmware up to the fTPM and guarantees the firmware is not modifiable by untrusted parties. This enables to establish trust the other firmware components this manufacturer provided without knowing the firmware.

This approach is limited, as with this mechanism, independent verifiers have to blindly trust the firmware manufacturer, which drastically limits trust relationships. In contrast, an independently verifiable fTPM stack, rooted in a hardware trust anchor, can be leveraged in a zero trust environment without requiring additional hardware or compromising on security.

1.2 Goal

The goal is to break the requirement of the underlying firmware and the fTPM to originate from the same manufacturer, by providing the exact firmware component identities to the verifier, such that it can decide for itself whether they are trustworthy without relying on the manufacturer.

One mechanism enabling firmware attestation is the Device Identifier Composition Engine (DICE), focusing on resource-constrained devices. Although this mechanism shifts trust from the firmware provider to the hardware provider by allowing firmware attestation through a hardware root of trust, the exclusive use of this integrated solution is unsuitable for large dynamic systems, for example Linux based devices. Nevertheless, the advantage is that the state of each component of the firmware boot chain is represented.

We propose a hybrid solution, combining the advantages of fTPMs and DICE, yielding an independently verifiable certificate chain representing the boot chain up to and including the fTPM. This enables a verifier to only verify trust into an fTPM if the underlying firmware is benign as well and thus, providing a way to independently assess the properties of the fTPM.

Current fTPM implementations require additional security measures to not leak state between reboots and different software versions. The final concept should provide a comprehensive guideline to implement an fTPM, which accounts for such an environment and reflect any relevant information through remote attestation.

The research questions are:

- How to combine the DICE and TPM infrastructure?
- How to manage an fTPM's persistent data securely?
- What constitutes the identity of an fTPM?

- How to enable privacy for the attestation mechanism?

1.3 Threat Model

The main threat is the modification of the binary of the fTPM before or during boot. For example, by exchanging the SD card storing the binary. However, we assume that the fTPM cannot be modified by malicious parties after the boot process (regardless of whether the fTPM is benign or compromised) because we trust the OP-TEE environment. Out-of-scope are hardware attacks, side-channel attacks, control-flow attacks, and Denial of Service attacks.

1.4 Environment

This work was created at the 'Fraunhofer-Institut für Angewandte und Integrierte Sicherheit AISEC' in Garching. It is part of the 'Fraunhofer Society for the Promotion of Applied Research e. V.', which is an organization distributed over Europe with main focus on applied research. In the roughly 35 years of its existence, it rose to become the largest research institute in Europe with around 30,000 employees.

1.5 Outline

2 Background

This chapter discusses the relevant background knowledge required to understand the remainder of this work.

2.1 Trusted execution environment

One of the core security concepts of operating systems are the privilege levels of processes. Thereby, processes are protected against other processes with the same or lower privilege level. However, they are not protected against more privileged processes. This bears problems for example for cloud computing and edge computing. In cloud computing, other services, the hypervisor, or the cloud provider in general could potentially access sensitive data of the cloud tenant. In edge computing, the edge applications deal with plain text data, while they are potentially running on insecure edge devices. Hence, protection against more privileged processes is desired.

A TEE is an integrated hardware extension to processors. Effectively, the execution environment is separated into the Rich execution environment (REE) and the TEE by hardware. The REE runs the common software, e.g., a Linux-based operating system and the user applications. The TEE is an isolated tamper-resistant execution environment that guarantees the authenticity of the executed code, and the integrity of runtime states (e.g., memory) [5]. Since a TEE is integrated into the processor, there is no separate chip required. Moreover, the TEE commonly follows the same user and kernel space separation as REE operating systems. The kernel space is running a trusted OS kernel, and the user space is running the trusted applications.

Previous, mostly software-based technologies ensure confidentiality and integrity protection of data-in-transit, and data-at-rest [6], while a TEE additionally protects data-in-use [7]. For example, smart cards are commonly used to store keys to identify users and keys to encrypt data-at-rest [8].

One such TEE is ARM's TrustZone [9, 10]. It partitions all software and hardware resources of the containing system into the Normal world (NW) and the Secure world (SW). While the SW can access the resources of the SW and the NW, the NW is restricted to its own resources. Since ARM is the dominant processor architectures for IoT devices with a market share of 86 % [11], many of the approaches in this field

of research rely on ARM technology such as TrustZone. Our approach also leverages TrustZone to enable the execution and the remote attestation of an fTPM.

Other TEE technologies are Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX), and AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV), in the future also Intel Trusted Domain Extensions (TDX), and ARM Confidential Computing Architecture (CCA). Since we focus on the implementation of our concept with ARM TrustZone, we do not go into detail about these other technologies here. However, since our concept is not tied to ARM processors and can also be applied to others, they are mentioned for the sake of completeness.

2.2 Attestation

According to the Cambridge Dictionary an attestation is “a formal statement that you make and officially say is true”. Specifically in our context, attestation is a mechanism for software to prove its identity. In the following, the two types are discussed.

2.2.1 Local attestation

Local attestation enables assertions between two environments on the same system [12]. The claim of an environment can be verified by another environment, usually with the help of message authentication codes (MAC) [13]. For example, Intel SGX uses this mechanism to establish assertions between two enclaves [12].

2.2.2 Remote attestation




Figure 2.1: Data flow of remote attestation [14]. Initially, only the blue areas are trusted by the verifier. After the attestation, the verifier also trusts the target environment.

Remote attestation is a challenge-response protocol initiated by a remote attester.

Figure 2.1 depicts a simplified overview of the data flow of a remote attestation. The process is initiated by a remote trusted party (called “verifier”) to verify that a target environment on the end-device (called “prover”) has not been tampered with [13, 15]. This challenge contains a nonce, enforcing a fresh response. The response must be an evidence of the challenged system that it is trustworthy. To build that, an attesting environment on the prover device generally inspects the following properties of a program: (i) its code and data has been correctly loaded into memory for execution, and (ii) its data has not been maliciously modified at runtime.

The attesting environment acts as a trust anchor for the verifier. A trusted anchor is required on the device to be attested because at least one trusted component is necessary to extract the data from the remote device to be verified. In many cases, TEE’s act as a trust anchor because they are hardware-protected, making it an excellent candidate for a trust anchor.

2.3 Trusted Platform Module

The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) published the first TPM specification (v1.2) in 2009 [16], and the most current specification (v2.0 Revision 01.59) ten years later in 2019 [17]. It describes a cryptographic coprocessor that increases trust in the host platform. Specifically, this means that the platform exhibits the expected behavior and that this behavior can be trusted. For that, the TPM maintains a separated state from the host platform, which enables the TPM to take measurements of the host platform. It is also a passive device, meaning it only does something when prompted. Table 2.1 summarizes the main features of TPMs.

Table 2.1: TPM main features and exemplary use-cases.

Feature	Use-case
Device identification	for a network provider to identify a machine before granting it access to its VPN network
Encryption	file and folder encryption on a device
Key Storage	Store keys securely
Random Number Generator	Seed the key generation algorithms
Platform Configuration Registers	Store measurements of system components taken during the boot process

The Platform Configuration Register (PCR) values are the fundament for the remote

system attestation. They are one-way registers, which values can never be written to an exact value, but only be extended. This is known as ‘hash extend’. Its properties prohibit the removal of extensions, and the arbitrary writing of values, whether by a benign or malicious actor. The PCR value at index i can only be modified (i.e., extended) in the following way:

$$PCR(i)_0 := 0, \quad PCR(i)_{t+1} := \text{hash}(PCR(i)_t \parallel \text{new value})$$

A PCR value holds a hash representing the platform state. Thereby, a remote attester can request a so-called ‘quote’ from the TPM on the host in question. A quote contains the PCR values and is digitally signed.

Typically, a TPM contains 24 PCR values that form a bank, with the lower PCR values representing the system boot process and the higher ones representing the events after the kernel is booted [8]. The fixed length of the PCR values is important for memory-constrained TPMs [8].

TPM 1.2 is limited to SHA-1 hashes which are considered broken [18–20]. Although the SHA-1 uses in TPM 1.2 were analyzed to be not affected [21], cryptographic algorithms only become weaker over time [8]. In reaction, TPM 2.0 offers crypto-agility and allows newer algorithms such as SHA-256. In general, TPM 2.0 is more flexible, and is always turned on, while a TPM 1.2 needed to be turned on manually. Also, TPM 2.0 is more consistent across different implementations because of broader specifications. TPM 2.0 is the focused version nowadays, e.g., Microsoft recommends TPM 2.0 over TPM 1.2 because of security advantages [22], and also requires TPM 2.0 for Windows 11 with SHA-256 PCR banks [3].

There are three types of TPMs, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. They all offer the same functionality, but with different security guarantees and performance characteristics.

2.3.1 Discrete TPM

This is the classical form of a TPM. It is a dedicated piece of hardware, connected to the CPU via a bus. It is designed and manufactured to be highly temper-resistant against hardware attacks. The TPM specifications [17, 23] do not demand a specific bus system, however, they define the interfaces between the TPM and the following bus systems: LPC, I²C, and SPI.

The well-known ‘TPM Reset Attack’ was independently described in [24, 25]. It requires minimal hardware, precisely only a wire connecting the reset line of the LPC bus [26] to ground. This results in a reset signal for the TPM, yielding predictable values for the PCR registers, i.e., 0. This allows an attacker to replay the measurement log of a benign boot process to achieve valid PCR values, even though a modified chain has been booted. Since TPM 1.2, TCG provides a mitigation specification for this reset




Figure 2.2: Schematic illustration of the different TPM types in their pure form. Blue: Hardware, Orange: Software.

attack [27], requiring the BIOS to overwrite sensitive data after each unexpected reset, preventing an attacker to gain a valid measurement log. However, this mitigation is still vulnerable to cold boot attacks [28, 29].

Winter and Dietrich [29] demonstrate a bus modification attack at TPMs integrated with the LPC bus or the I²C bus. Their approach, labeled ‘Active LPC frame hijacking’, allows them to “lift” commands to a higher locality than the one they were originally sent with. This allows them to evolve the ‘TPM Reset attack’ from being only usable for S-RTM, to also D-RTM systems. They also introduce a new approach of circumventing the TPM’s measurement feature. Instead of resetting the TPM as previously described [24, 25], they reset the main device, i.e., the users’ device like a desktop PC while preventing the TPM from receiving the reset signal. This keeps the state of the TPM, e.g., the valid PCR values of the previous boot procedure, and the attacker can hijack the boot procedure triggered by the platform’s reset and boot a malicious operating system or firmware, while the TPM still stores the old and valid PCRs. While its conceptually easier since the attacker does not need to know the measurement log since the valid PCR values are already in-place, it requires active manipulation of bus transmissions to shield the TPM from the reset signal.

Seunghun Han et al. [30] report two attacks on discrete TPMs to reset the PCR registers. The first targets a gray area in the power management section of the TPM 2.0 specification. The TPM shall store its state into the (its?) non-volatile random

access memory (NVRAM) before shutting down when the host platform goes to sleep, and restore it when it wakes up. However, the specification is missing a concrete description how to handle a lack of a stored state when waking up. Therefore, some implementations simply reset the state. Their second attack targets a DRTM, namely an implementation flaw in tboot [31], the most widely used measured boot environment used with Intel's Trusted Execution Technology. However, in their work, they found that some mutable function pointers are not measured, which allows attacks.

A time-based side-channel attack [32] during signature generation based on elliptic curves allows an attacker to recover 256-bit private keys for ECDSA and ECSchnorr signatures.

A passive sniffing attack is shown in [33]. It is applicable to TPM 1.1 connected to an LPC bus. They observed that the data of some operations like unsealing are transmitted via the bus in plain text. Since TPM 1.2, however, the modules no longer send sensitive data unencrypted [29].

That invasive hardware attacks against dTPMs are possible was already shown by Tarnovsky in 2010 [34]. However, this requires a lot of time, knowledge and resources, i.e., hardware and money.

2.3.2 Firmware TPM

As seen in the previous section about discrete TPMs, the bus between the CPU and a TPM can be considered as their biggest attack vector. An fTPM [35, 36] circumvents this by being directly executed within the CPU within a TEE, revealing no easily accessible bus. The trend is moving towards fTPMs, which can also be seen by the increasing efforts to bring an fTPM to the RISC-V processor family [37]. Also, since they require less hardware, they are cheaper for manufacturers.

As of now, a fTPM is strictly bound to the processor manufacturer, such that you can trust the underlying firmware as well which is provisioned by the manufacturer, e.g., Intel, too. For example, common implementations are the Intel® Platform Trust Technology (Intel PTT) [38], and AMD's Secure Processor (AMD-SP), which in fact is an ARM-based coprocessor on the die which enables ARM's TrustZone [39].

Cheng et al. [40] conducted a detailed performance comparison between dTPMs and fTPMs. They found that fTPMs are faster overall. In addition, as is the nature of software, fTPMs are easier to update than dTPMs.

However, there are also disadvantages. First, they cannot provide true RNG, since hardware is required for that. Second, they are started later in the hosts' boot chain than a dTPM that is accessible from the beginning. This has the consequence that the hashes of the components booted before the fTPM cannot be sent to the fTPM. Last, fTPMs depend on more components for its security than single-component dTPMs,

e.g., the TEE, and the boot chain.

Of course, there are also attacks against fTPMs. The previously mentioned side-channel attack [32] against dTPMs, can also be applied to fTPMs.

Jacob et al. [41] target proprietary AMD fTPMs by attacking their TEE, namely the AMD Secure Processor (AMD-SP). Thereby, they can expose the full internal state of the fTPM bypassing any authentication mechanisms. To do so, they leak the secret key from the BIOS flash chip which is used to derive the encryption and signature keys for the fTPMs non-volatile data. They achieve this by using a voltage fault injection that bypasses the authenticity check in the hosts' boot process and allows them to boot their own firmware component that leaks the required information.

Cfir Cohen from Google's cloud security team has uncovered an attack on fTPMs, which also runs on AMD-SP [42]. They store a maliciously crafted payload - a certificate - on the fTPM and trigger a function with a stack-based overflow error that accesses this payload, giving them full control over the program counter.

2.3.3 Virtual TPM

A vTPM is a software-based TPM provided by a hypervisor for one of its managed virtual machines [43]. The vTPMs can be realized fully in software [43], or backed by dTPMs [44]. The hypervisor can provide a (theoretically) unlimited number of vTPMs. For the virtual machines it seems that they have access exclusive access to their own private TPM, even though all vTPMs are managed by the same hypervisor. A characteristic feature of virtual resources are their migration capabilities, i.e., they can be suspended and later continued on another machine. vTPMs support this as well. Note the different security properties between vTPMs and dTPMs.

Because of the increasing popularity of cloud computing, the research of vTPMs focuses less on specific attacks, and more on reducing the trusted computing base, i.e., privacy-focused. The initially proposed design [43] has a large trusted base, e.g., the operating system and the hypervisor need to be trusted.

Wang et al. [45] bring the vTPM into the TEE, namely Intel SGX, essentially creating an fTPM and vTPM hybrid. They launch each vTPM in a private hardware-protected enclave. This reduces the trusted computing base to the individual enclaves and SGX itself, enabling the host operating system and hypervisor to be untrusted.

Pecholt and Wessel [6] describe a design named CoCoTPM where the hypervisor and the hosts' operating system do not need to be trusted as well. This is realized by establishing an integrity-protected secure channel with end-to-end encryption between the driver in the VM and the software TPM on the host.

Stateless ephemeral vTPMs [46] eliminate the need of manually establishing a secure channel by leveraging the confidential VM memory encryption provided by AMD's SEV-

SNP, a variant of AMD secure encrypted virtualization (SEV) technology. Ephemeral vTPMs support the remote attestation of virtual machines. However, they intentionally do not support persistent storage to preclude exfiltration attacks on stored TPM state, which has the disadvantage that persistent keys or nonvolatile indexes cannot be stored.

2.4 Secure Boot and Measured Boot

When the system is started, the root component, e.g., from ROM, is executed. This subsequently launches the next component, and so forth. This boot structure is called the boot chain. Typically, the first component turns on the memory, the second stage initializes the platform, and finally, the last stage boots the operating system [47].

Secure Boot [48–50] is locally attesting components of the boot chain directly at boot-time. For that, the boot component is equipped with a public key. With that, they verify the digital signature of the respective subsequent component, before handing over the execution. This ensures the authenticity of the boot components. The first boot component, usually stored in ROM, needs to be trusted without verification, i.e., it acts as the root of trust. However, Secure Boot does not prevent downgrade attacks, since only the authenticity, but not the concrete versions of boot components are verified [51]. Hence, further defenses like Measured Boot have been designed.

Measured Boot [52] is a concept that is implemented in interplay with a TPM. It allows remote attestation to a later time. Just as with Secure Boot, each boot component hashes the subsequent component. However, instead of directly locally attesting the measured value, the hash value is passed to the TPM to extend a PCR value. As described in Section 2.3, these values can be used by a remote attestor to verify the state of the software on the system. The goal is to detect manipulated system configurations.

Secure Boot and Measured Boot are often used in conjunction.

2.5 Device Identifier Composition Engine

To the best of our knowledge, DICE is so far considered a secure concept apart from physical attacks, only implementation problems can mean security problems.

3 Related Work

In the following, we describe defense mechanisms for fTPMs that can be seen as complementary to our approach. They all have in common that they offer no way for a third party to ensure that the hardened fTPM is actually running on the device under test, which is exactly what our work aims to cover.

One approach is to verify the code of fTPMs [53]. Here, the TPM 1.2 code is written in a functional programming language that enables automatic verification.

There exist efforts to improve the security of TPM by introducing the concept of hybrid TPMs [54, 55]. Kim and Kim [54] extend a hardware TPM with software support, which they name hTPM. This increases the defense of the TPM, e.g., circumventing side-channel attacks, and also enables more secure TPM functions, e.g., enabling true random number generation. Their hTPM implementation also shows significantly better performance due to the use of modern CPU features. Vice versa, Gross et al. [55] propose the reverse approach of backing an fTPM with hardware. While their implementation has similar properties to hTPM, it inherits some downsides of fTPMs. For example, their fTPM is still started later in the boot chain than a dTPM, which is not the case for hTPM. However, it is easier to update than hTPM since the lack of a dTPM, and the overall design is simpler.

4 Methodology

4.1 Terminology

4.2 Architectural overview

4.3 Chaining DICE and TPM certificate infrastructure

4.4 Provisioning process

4.5 Attestation process

4.6 Updating the fTPM

We consider it as critical that the fTPM is updatable. This is due to the history of fTPMs showing vulnerabilities which have been patched consequently.

Our fTPM can be only updated with the system shut down. This is due to the required out-of-band signing procedure of trusted applications before being deployed. This also while system is shut down. This ensures that the TCI part of the EKcert generated at boot-time does not become obsolete, in other words, keeps representing the state of the currently running fTPM.

To protect against downgrade attacks: NV data is encrypted/integrity with AESP. Encryption required to ensure confidentiality. AESP used to also ensure integrity. This is required since also the cipher text of the NV could be modified, which might change security critical information. Encryption-only would not prohibit that. As soon as an integrity violation is detected, the fTPM is fully reset, effectively invalidating all previously stored data. Note that an attacker could thereby easily trigger a data loss. This has to be avoided by integrating the good-practices with working with a TPM, which includes having secrets stored also elsewhere. This introduces storage and memory overhead. Processing overhead only slightly, since the data is already decrypted during start-time, which happens only once at boot time, and then later data is encrypted only while it is stored, which happens only ... Hence, there is no performance penalty during common uses of a TPM, e.g., key creation.

This might seem redundant because of the storage protection of for example TrustZone, but this does not protect against downgrade attacks. With our approach, the access to the data is bound to the exact identity of the fTPM including all underlying firmware.

So, our protection additionally protects data-at-rest, while the data-at-use is protected by the TEE's secure memory, i.e., the memory isolation from the normal world.

4.7 Privacy

5 Implementation

5.1 Prover

5.1.1 Normal World

5.1.2 Secure World

Measuring the fTPM

5.2 Attester

5.3 Technical obstacles

6 Discussion

6.1 Assessment of the fulfillment of requirements

6.1.1 Security requirements

6.1.2 Attestation process requirements

TCG defines as part of their Trusted Attestation Protocol [56] the requirements for an attestation process to provide assurance to a verifier that it is (i) accurate, (ii) interpretable, and (iii) attributable.

(i) Accurate attestation data represents the actual state of the device. This includes freshness, i.e., the data is not replayed and does not represent an old, outdated state of the device.

(ii) Intuitively, the data must be interpretable by the verifier. In other words, the verifier must be able to derive a decision about the trustworthiness of the prover based on the attestation data.

(iii) It must be possible to assign the attestation data to a specific device, i.e., it must be verifiable that the attestation data originates from the prover.

6.2 Higher level protocols' compatibility

6.3 Implications of missing privacy

6.4 Hardware knowledge dependency

6.5 Hardware requirements DICE + fTPM vs TPM

6.6 Personal opinion about developed system

7 Future Work and Conclusion

7.1 Future Work

7.2 Conclusion

Abbreviations

TPM Trusted Platform Module

fTPM firmware TPM

dTPM dedicated TPM

DICE Device Identifier Composition Engine

TEE Trusted execution environment

REE Rich execution environment

PCR Platform Configuration Register

TCG Trusted Computing Group

NW Normal world

SW Secure world

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