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## Introduction to Cyber Security Project

Groupe 07

# Edge Computing – Project Report

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# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction:</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Architecture of Edge Computing:</b>	<b>4</b>
2.1	Edge Device Layer (EDL): . . . . .	4
2.2	Edge Server Layer (ESL): . . . . .	4
2.3	Cloud Server Layer (CSL): . . . . .	5
2.4	Example . . . . .	5
<b>3</b>	<b>Edge Computing Security and Privacy:</b>	<b>7</b>
3.1	DDoS Attacks and Defense Mechanisms in Edge Computing: . . . . .	7
3.1.1	Introduction: . . . . .	7
3.1.2	Attack Specifications: . . . . .	7
3.1.3	Defense Strategies Against Flooding: . . . . .	8
3.1.4	Defense Strategies Against Zero-Day Exploits: . . . . .	8
3.2	Side Channel Attacks and Defenses: . . . . .	9
3.2.1	Introduction: . . . . .	9
3.2.2	OSI Layer Concerned: . . . . .	9
3.2.3	Attack Type and Location: . . . . .	9
3.2.4	Threat and Damage: . . . . .	9
3.2.5	Detection and Prevention: . . . . .	9
3.2.6	Attack Basis and Vulnerabilities: . . . . .	10
3.2.7	Existing Solutions and Limitations: . . . . .	10
3.3	Malware Injection: . . . . .	10
3.3.1	Introduction: . . . . .	10
3.3.2	Server-Side Injection Attacks: . . . . .	10
3.3.3	Device-Side Injection Attacks: . . . . .	11
3.3.4	Conclusion: . . . . .	12
3.4	Authentication and Authorization Attacks and Defense Mechanisms: . . . . .	12
3.4.1	Introduction: . . . . .	12
3.4.2	The four main types of authentication and authorisation attacks are: . . . . .	12
3.4.3	OSI layer targeted by the attack: . . . . .	12
3.4.4	Attack type: . . . . .	12
3.4.5	Attack location: . . . . .	12
3.4.6	Attack threat: . . . . .	12
3.4.7	Damage level: . . . . .	13
3.4.8	Reasons for low to moderate detection rate : . . . . .	13
3.4.9	Preventive measures : . . . . .	13
3.4.10	The authentication and authorisation attacks based on: . . . . .	13
3.4.11	The exploited vulnerabilities: . . . . .	13
3.4.12	Exesting solutions and their limitations: . . . . .	13
3.5	A Comparison Study on Security Issues in Edge Computing and Cloud Computing	14
3.5.1	Architectural Differences Between Cloud and Edge Computing . . . . .	14
3.5.2	Comparison of Security Attacks in Cloud and Edge Computing . . . . .	15

3.5.3	Conclusion	15
<b>4</b>	<b>Root Causes, Grand Challenges , and Furure Research:</b>	<b>16</b>
4.1	Root Causes of Security Issues:	16
4.2	Protocol-Level Design Flaws:	16
4.3	Implementation-Level Flaws:	16
4.4	Code-Level Vulnerabilities:	16
4.5	Data Correlations:	17
4.6	Lacking Fine-Grained Access Controls:	17
4.6.1	Root Causes of Security Issues (A Summary):	18
4.7	Status Quo and Grand Challenges:	18
4.7.1	Introduction:	18
4.7.2	Lack of Security-by-Design:	19
4.7.3	Non-Migratability of Traditional Security Frameworks:	19
4.7.4	Fragmented and Coarse-Grained Access Control:	19
4.7.5	Isolated and Passive Defense Mechanisms:	19
4.7.6	Conclusion:	19
4.8	Future Research Directions:	20
4.8.1	Introduction:	20
4.8.2	Multi-Layer Integrated Security Frameworks:	20
4.8.3	Cross-Cutting Security Imperatives:	20
4.8.4	Implementation Challenges and Research Trajectories:	20
4.8.5	Conclusion: Toward Comprehensive Edge Security:	21

## 1 Introduction:

IoT devices, mobile apps, and other systems that need super fast responses are everywhere now. That's why edge computing has become such a big deal, a system that moves data processing and storage closer to where the data is generated instead of sending everything to the cloud. This cuts down delays, saves bandwidth, and lets systems make decisions in real time in areas like self-driving cars, smart cities, industrial automation, and healthcare monitoring... But this setup also brings new security challenges since having devices and servers all over the place makes them more vulnerable to attacks, especially since they don't have the same protections as big cloud servers. Edge computing usually works in layers : the devices themselves (Edge Device Layer, EDL), the local servers that support them (Edge Server Layer, ESL), and then the big cloud servers (Cloud Server Layer, CSL). Devices like sensors and controllers interact directly with the real world, handling data locally. That's great for speed, but it also opens up new attack points. Edge servers take on heavier tasks from devices, manage multiple endpoints, and make sure communication stays secure. The cloud handles the big-picture stuff : analytics, AI, and storing data long-term. Every layer helps the system work, but each also has its own weak spots. Security in edge computing is tricky. Attacks like DDoS, side-channel exploits, malware, and stolen credentials are common. Since edge systems are spread out, resource-limited, and varied, old-school cloud security doesn't always cut it. Edge computing needs smarter, lighter, and adaptable defenses , ones that protect the system without slowing it down. In this research, we're looking at the architecture of edge computing, the security risks, and privacy challenges, with a close look at each layer (EDL, ESL, CSL). The goal is to figure out why problems happen, see how they're currently handled, and point out big challenges for the future.

## 2 Architecture of Edge Computing:

In this section, we present a general architecture of edge computing shown in Figure 1, which mainly consists of three layers: an edge device layer (EDL), an edge server layer (ESL), and a cloud server layer (CSL).

### 2.1 Edge Device Layer (EDL):

Edge devices are those low-level electronic devices deployed at EDL which operate in the physical world to complete tasks such as sensing, actuating and controlling. Each edge device is logically controlled by one or more microcontrollers (MCUs), with each being a small computer running on a single integrated circuit. The low-level software interface programmed in the MCUs that provide controls to the device's hardware is known as firmware. All the functions including sensing, controlling, and computing are coded in the firmware and therefore, handled by the MCUs. Edge devices can be further categorized as IoT devices and mobile devices. IoT devices are lightweight electronic devices that are interconnected or connected to the edge servers in ESL through wireless protocols such as 4G/5G, WiFi, and Bluetooth. They usually run on lightweight preemptive/cooperative real-time operating systems (RTOS), e.g., FreeRTOS and RT Thread. Once after a RTOS is burned into the chip of the IoT devices, it usually does not provide further programming interfaces. Some examples of IoT devices include: smart home devices, health monitoring devices, and smart warehouse carts in industrialized IoT (IIoT). Different from IoT devices, mobile devices usually have more advanced and costly preemptive operating systems, e.g., Android and iOS, providing programmable interfaces for developers to code their own applications at the top of the OSes. Some examples of mobile devices include: smartphones, tablets, and central controllers of smart vehicles.

### 2.2 Edge Server Layer (ESL):

ESL has a hierarchical structure with multiple sub-layers consisting of various edge servers with increasing computational power from bottom to up as shown in Figure \*. The edge servers located at the lowest sub-layer include wireless base stations and access points (APs), which are mainly deployed for communication purpose to receive data from the edge devices and send control flows back to them through different wireless interfaces. Upon receiving data from edge devices, base stations/APs forward the data to the edge servers located at the upper sub-layer, which are mainly in charge of handling computation tasks. Upon receiving data passed from base stations/APs or edge servers at the lower sub-layers, the edge servers conduct relevant computation and analysis tasks on their own. If the complexity of a task exceeds the computation limits of the current edge server, it would offload the task to the servers located at the higher sub-layers, which possess more powerful computation capabilities. These servers then conclude with a sequence of control flows and pass them back to the base stations/APs, which forward them to the edge devices in the end. Edge servers handle most of the core computing functions such as authentication, authorization, computation, data analytics, task offloading, and data storage for edge computing. Regardless of the server's layer, there are other important components that play a major role in connecting and communicating the sub-layers within this layer: the Edge Gateway collects data from nearby IoT devices, performs basic processing, and forwards only relevant information to upper layers. The




Figure 1: Architecture of Edge Computing

Switch connects local devices (like edge servers and gateways) within the same network, ensuring fast data transfer inside the local area. The Router directs data between different networks ( for example, from the edge network to the cloud ) managing traffic and choosing the best path for communication. Together, they enable efficient, secure, and low-latency data flow between devices and the cloud.

### 2.3 Cloud Server Layer (CSL):

Cloud server layer (CSL) hosts center cloud servers and data centers, with the cloud servers responsible for the highest level authentication and authorization, computation, and integration of different tasks offloaded from edge servers, and the data centers in charge of storing vast amount of data generated by the edge devices and edge servers. The state-of-the-art cloud servers and cloud data centers consist of clusters of powerful machines. Because the security of CSL has been extensively studied , in this article, we mainly explore the security issues of EDL and ESL in edge computing.

### 2.4 Example

#### Source

To better understand how communication and processing occur within this architecture, let's take one of the most well-known examples : the self-driving car.

1. **Edge Devices Layer** In this layer, all sensors inside the self-driving car ( such as cameras, radar, LiDAR, and GPS ) continuously collect real-time data about the surroundings. The onboard computer processes this data locally and makes instant decisions, like braking or steering, without

sending everything to the cloud. This allows the car to react immediately and avoid accidents by minimizing delay.

2. Edge Server Layer : Here, nearby edge servers or 5G base stations receive summarized information from several cars in the same area. These servers analyze local traffic conditions, detect incidents, and send quick alerts back to nearby vehicles ( for example, warning them about congestion or a roadblock ahead). This layer helps coordinate vehicles within a region efficiently and with low latency.

3. Cloud Server Layer: In the cloud layer, large data centers collect non-urgent information from many vehicles and edge servers. The cloud performs advanced analytics, trains AI models to improve driving algorithms, and sends software updates back to the cars. This global processing ensures continuous learning and long-term improvement of autonomous driving systems.




Figure 2: self-driving car

### **3 Edge Computing Security and Privacy:**

#### **3.1 DDoS Attacks and Defense Mechanisms in Edge Computing:**

##### **3.1.1 Introduction:**

DDoS refers to a type of active cyber attack in which external attackers aim to disrupt the availability of normal services provided by one or more servers using distributed resources such as a cluster of compromised edge devices (a.k.a. botnet). It mainly targets the Network, Transport, and Application layers of the OSI model. It is a powerful interruption attack that prevents legitimate users from accessing a service, thereby threatening the availability aspect of information security. A traditional DDoS attack occurs when an attacker persistently sends massive streams of packets to a victim from compromised distributed electronic devices; thus, the hardware resources of the victim are quickly exhausted for handling these malicious packets and can no longer process legitimate requests on time. In other cases, attackers send malformed or spoofed packets that confuse the victim's protocol, causing it to falsely conclude that all channels are occupied. Edge servers are particularly vulnerable because they have limited computational capacity, weak authentication, and often operate with heterogeneous and insecure firmware. Attackers commonly compromise numerous edge devices and coordinate them remotely to launch large-scale attacks against edge infrastructures.

##### **3.1.2 Attack Specifications:**

In a typical DDoS scenario, the attacker (external) compromises a cluster of edge devices, gains full control, and then commands each to send flooding traffic toward the target edge server, overwhelming it until services shut down. Such flooding-based DDoS attacks include UDP flooding, ICMP flooding, SYN flooding, and HTTP flooding, all relying on saturating the victim's network and processing capacity. Other variants such as zero-day attacks exploit unknown software vulnerabilities, affecting both availability and integrity of systems. Defensive measures include per-packet inspection, traffic filtering, and rate limiting, though detection remains challenging due to IP spoofing and the resemblance between malicious and legitimate traffic. An attacker in a DDoS scenario compromises a cluster of edge devices, takes control, and instructs them to send excessive traffic to a target edge server to overwhelm it and stop its service. Flooding-based attacks rely on high volumes of malformed or malicious packets and include major types: UDP flooding, ICMP flooding, SYN flooding, HTTP flooding, Ping of Death, and Slowloris. Brief mechanisms: UDP flooding: Sends huge volumes of UDP packets to prevent the server from processing legitimate UDP traffic. ICMP flooding: Sends many ICMP Echo Request (ping) packets rapidly; the victim replies to each, consuming both inbound and outbound throughput and slowing the system. SYN flooding: Abuses TCP's three-way handshake by sending many SYNs with spoofed IPs and not completing the handshake, leaving half-open connections on the server. HTTP flooding: Sends a large number of legitimate-looking HTTP requests (GET/POST/PUT, etc.), overwhelming the server's processing capacity. Zero-day attacks: Exploit previously unknown software or protocol vulnerabilities (e.g., memory corruption) to crash or corrupt systems; these are hard to predict or filter because they abuse logic/implementation flaws rather than just volume.



### 3.1.3 Defense Strategies Against Flooding:

D1. Per-packet inspection and filtering: Drop suspicious packets before they reach the server (e.g., packet filters tied to congestion control). Effective but can be evaded by IP/MAC spoofing, forged headers, or tools that alter identifiers. 2. Statistics-based detection: Analyze traffic aggregates for anomalies (entropy measures, statistical clustering). Requires large traffic samples and struggles with encrypted flows. 3. Machine/deep learning: Use models (decision trees, Naive Bayes, autoencoders, neural nets) to detect attacks, including some encrypted traffic. These require large, representative training datasets, risk overfitting, and typically become effective only after substantial attack traffic has been observed. Limitations: All approaches face practical challenges — IP spoofing, similarity between legitimate and attack traffic, encrypted flows that hinder inspection, and the need for extensive, high-quality training data. Effective defense usually combines real-time packet filtering with aggregate analysis and ML-based detection.

### 3.1.4 Defense Strategies Against Zero-Day Exploits:

Zero-day defenses focus on mitigating code-level vulnerabilities through memory safety analysis and protective isolation mechanisms. Memory analysis and detection: Techniques like pointer-tainting, ECC memory, and firmware analysis help identify or reduce memory corruption. Deep learning models (RNNs, GNNs, NLP-based analyzers) can detect vulnerable code even without access to the source. However, encrypted firmware and anti-debugging measures often restrict their effectiveness. Active protection and isolation: Methods such as in-process memory isolation, SDN-based IoT firewalls, lightweight isolation at access routers, and application-side fuzzing help minimize the attack surface or detect crashes. Despite their benefits, these methods can impose heavy computational overheads that are unsuitable for resource-constrained IoT or edge devices and may still fail to prevent complex zero-day exploits.




Figure 3: A Typical Architecture of a DDoS Attack

## 3.2 Side Channel Attacks and Defenses:

### 3.2.1 Introduction:

What if I told you hackers could steal your data without ever touching your files, cracking your password, or breaking into your system? Sounds impossible, right? That is exactly what happens in a side-channel attack — a method where attackers exploit indirect physical or system signals, such as power usage, timing, or data from system files like `/proc`, to extract secrets without breaking encryption or accessing the main code.

### 3.2.2 OSI Layer Concerned:

Side-channel attacks primarily target the **Physical Layer**, since they rely on observable physical behaviors like power consumption and electromagnetic signals. They can also affect the **Application Layer**, where exposed data sources and sensors provide additional leakage paths.

### 3.2.3 Attack Type and Location:

These attacks are generally **passive**, meaning the attacker observes system behavior rather than altering it. They can be launched by:

- **Internal attackers:** malicious applications reading accessible data or sensors.
- **External attackers:** capturing power traces, electromagnetic emissions, or timing information remotely.

### 3.2.4 Threat and Damage:

Side-channel attacks primarily compromise **confidentiality**, exposing cryptographic keys, user data, or private operations. The potential damage can range from partial data leakage to a complete compromise of secure systems, depending on the sensitivity of the extracted information.

### 3.2.5 Detection and Prevention:

Detection of side-channel attacks is extremely difficult because they leave no direct logs or traces. Therefore, prevention focuses on reducing the available leakage sources through:

- **Data Perturbation:** adding noise to timing, power, or communication patterns to hide correlations.
- **Access Control:** restricting access to system interfaces and files like `/proc`.
- **Obfuscation:** randomizing computations and introducing timing variations.
- **Hardware Isolation:** separating sensitive operations using trusted hardware zones.

### 3.2.6 Attack Basis and Vulnerabilities:

Side-channel attacks exploit indirect signals that correlate with internal system operations, such as:

- Power consumption and timing delays.
- Electromagnetic emissions.
- System and sensor data exposure.

Edge computing devices are especially vulnerable due to their limited resources, high sensor density, and distributed nature, which increase both physical and software side-channel opportunities.

### 3.2.7 Existing Solutions and Limitations:

- **Differential Privacy:** masks patterns with noise but reduces accuracy and data utility.
- **Access Control:** limits software-based leaks but cannot protect against physical emissions.
- **Obfuscation:** increases latency and energy usage.
- **Hardware Isolation:** enhances protection but cannot completely prevent signal leakage.

## 3.3 Malware Injection:

### 3.3.1 Introduction:

A malware injection attack occurs when malicious code is inserted into a legitimate process, service, or device so that it executes within the victim's environment. These attacks aim to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability. They are particularly dangerous in edge computing because devices often have limited resources and inconsistent patching mechanisms.

### 3.3.2 Server-Side Injection Attacks:

1. **SQL Injection (SQLi):** OSI Layer: Application Attack Type: Active Attacker Location: External Attack Threat: Data confidentiality and integrity Damage Level: High Detection Chance: Moderate Possibility of Prevention: High Attacks Based On: Manipulating input fields to alter database queries Vulnerability: Dynamic SQL queries without proper sanitization Existing Solutions and Limitations: Parameterized queries and ORMs mitigate risk but do not prevent logic-level flaws.
2. **Cross-Site Scripting (XSS):** OSI Layers: Presentation and Application Attack Type: Active Attacker Location: External Attack Threat: Session hijacking and data theft Damage Level: Moderate to High Detection Chance: Low Possibility of Prevention: Medium Attacks Based On: Injecting malicious JavaScript into web pages Vulnerability: Unsanitized output rendered in browsers Existing Solutions and Limitations: Content Security Policy and escaping user input, but developers often misapply them.

3. **CSRF / SSRF:** OSI Layers: Network and Application Attack Type: Active Attacker Location: External Attack Threat: Unauthorized requests or internal resource access Damage Level: Moderate Detection Chance: Low Possibility of Prevention: High Attacks Based On: Trick authenticated users or services into sending crafted requests Vulnerability: Missing CSRF tokens or improper request validation Existing Solutions and Limitations: SameSite cookies and allowlists reduce exposure but may break service communication.
4. **XML Signature Wrapping:** OSI Layers: Presentation and Application Attack Type: Active Attacker Location: External or Man-in-the-Middle Attack Threat: Message integrity and authenticity Damage Level: High Detection Chance: Low Possibility of Prevention: High Attacks Based On: Wrapping signed XML nodes with new malicious elements Vulnerability: Insecure XML parsing and ID binding Existing Solutions and Limitations: Schema validation and correct parser configuration; however, legacy systems often skip updates.

### 3.3.3 Device-Side Injection Attacks:

1. **Firmware Injection:** OSI Layers: Physical to Application Attack Type: Active Attacker Location: Internal or Supply-Chain Attack Threat: System takeover and persistent malware Damage Level: Critical Detection Chance: Very Low Possibility of Prevention: Medium Attacks Based On: Modifying firmware updates or flashing malicious images Vulnerability: Unsigned or unverified firmware Existing Solutions and Limitations: Secure boot and digital signatures protect new devices but may not apply to legacy hardware.
2. **Remote Code Execution (RCE):** OSI Layers: Transport and Application Attack Type: Active Attacker Location: External Attack Threat: Complete device control Damage Level: Critical Detection Chance: Moderate Possibility of Prevention: High Attacks Based On: Exploiting vulnerabilities in running services Vulnerability: Outdated software or insecure service exposure Existing Solutions and Limitations: Patching and sandboxing help but rely on consistent maintenance.
3. **Supply-Chain Injection:** OSI Layer: Application Attack Type: Passive to Active Attacker Location: Internal / Third-Party Attack Threat: Malicious dependency integration Damage Level: High Detection Chance: Low Possibility of Prevention: Medium Attacks Based On: Inserting malware into libraries or software updates Vulnerability: Unverified dependencies and unsigned packages Existing Solutions and Limitations: Code-signing and supply-chain monitoring, but trust in third parties remains a weak link.
4. **WebView / Mobile Injection:** OSI Layers: Presentation and Application Attack Type: Active Attacker Location: External Attack Threat: Session hijacking and data manipulation Damage Level: Moderate Detection Chance: Low Possibility of Prevention: Medium Attacks Based On: Abusing WebView or native-JS bridges in mobile apps Vulnerability: Over-permissive WebView settings Existing Solutions and Limitations: Restrict bridge interfaces and sandbox web content, though many apps neglect these controls.

### **3.3.4 Conclusion:**

Each malware injection vector targets different OSI layers and system components. Understanding which layer is affected helps prioritize security controls and apply layered defenses across both server and device sides.

## **3.4 Authentication and Authorization Attacks and Defense Mechanisms:**

### **3.4.1 Introduction:**

Authentication is the process of verifying the identity of users who request certain services. Authorization is the process that determines an entity's access rights and privileges. In edge computing, authentication often takes place between edge devices and edge servers, but it can also be decentralized among devices.

### **3.4.2 The four main types of authentication and authorisation attacks are:**

- Brute-force attacks : guessing passwords to gain access.
- Authentication protocol flaws : exploiting weaknesses
- Authorization protocol flaws : bypassing access controls to gain privileges.
- Over-privilege attack : abusing excessive permissions to perform unauthorized actions.

### **3.4.3 OSI layer targeted by the attack:**

In edge computing, authentication and authorization attacks mainly target the application layer (identity, access, and API management). They also affect the session ,presentation and network layers .

### **3.4.4 Attack type:**

Authentication and authorization attacks are generally active attacks, because the attacker must interact directly with the system. They are rarely passive.

### **3.4.5 Attack location:**

In edge computing, about 70% of authentication and authorization attacks come from external sources (through public interfaces ), while around 30% are internal.

### **3.4.6 Attack threat:**

Authentication and authorization attacks threaten several security properties: authentication , confidentiality , integrity and availability .

### 3.4.7 Damage level:

Authentication and authorization attacks can have high to critical impact, allowing unauthorized access, data modification, and disruption of system operations. They also undermine trust and accountability, making detection and response difficult.

### 3.4.8 Reasons for low to moderate detection rate :

- Attackers use legitimate credentials or sessions, blending with normal activity.
- Conventional monitoring cannot detect actions within granted privileges .
- Effective detection requires advanced techniques (UEBA, AI-driven anomaly detection).

### 3.4.9 Preventive measures :

- **Robust authentication:** Hardware-bound MFA, no password-only schemes.
- **Granular authorization:** Least-privilege via dynamic RBAC/ABAC .
- **Real-time monitoring:** UEBA, AI-driven anomaly detection, distributed SIEM.
- **Zero-trust posture:** Verify all requests using mutual TLS and workload identity.

### 3.4.10 The authentication and authorisation attacks based on:

The attack consists of impersonating a legitimate identity to perform unauthorized actions in real time directly on an edge node. It allows the attacker to steal, modify, redirect, or block critical flows (data, commands) before they reach the cloud.

### 3.4.11 The exploited vulnerabilities:

- Weak identity
- Poorly validated permissions
- Implicit network trust
- Exposed APIs without protection

### 3.4.12 Existing solutions and their limitations:

**Existing solutions:** MFA (confirmation of user identity), RBAC/ABAC, end-to-end encryption (mTLS) end API security.

**Limitations:** Vulnerable if credentials or tokens are stolen, nodes are compromised, or policies misconfigured; they can add complexity, overhead, and scalability challenges.

### 3.5 A Comparison Study on Security Issues in Edge Computing and Cloud Computing

#### 3.5.1 Architectural Differences Between Cloud and Edge Computing

Aspect	Cloud Computing	Edge Computing
Architecture	Centralized — uses remote servers and large data centers on the Internet.	Decentralized — hierarchical structure with distributed edge servers.
End Devices	Fully-fledged computers (PCs, servers).	IoT and mobile devices with limited resources.
Connectivity	Mainly wired Internet connections.	Primarily wireless connections (Wi-Fi, 4G/5G).
Resource Capability	High — powerful centralized infrastructure.	Limited — low-profile edge devices and servers.
Data Processing Location	Centralized data processing in cloud data centers.	Localized processing near data sources (edge nodes).
Service Characteristics	High latency, not location-aware, large-scale centralized control.	Low latency, location-aware, real-time, privacy-enhanced, and bandwidth-efficient.
Attack Surface	Concentrated — fewer but high-value centralized targets.	Distributed — many small edge nodes vulnerable to local and physical attacks.
Security Challenges	Cloud provider security breaches, data leaks, insider threats, DDoS on central servers.	Node tampering, device hijacking, insecure wireless communication, local denial-of-service attacks.
Defense Focus	Strong centralized authentication, encryption, and access control.	Lightweight security, trust management, secure device authentication, decentralized intrusion detection.
Privacy	Centralized data storage — higher privacy risk.	Local data processing — improved privacy control.

### 3.5.2 Comparison of Security Attacks in Cloud and Edge Computing

Attack Type	Cloud Computing	Edge Computing
DDoS Attacks	Uses heavyweight protocols (HTTP/HTTPS, FTP, SMTP) → harder to attack. Strong firewalls reduce impact. Still vulnerable to zero-day DDoS due to software flaws.	Uses lightweight protocols (CoAP, MQTT, UDP) → easier to attack. Low-end devices can be easily compromised (e.g., Mirai botnet). Flooding attacks still practically effective.
Side Channel Attacks	Wired connections limit attack surface. Attacks mostly through packet eavesdropping or crafted queries.	Wireless connectivity increases attack surface. Attackers can exploit wireless signals, power consumption, or proximity-based leaks.
Malware Injection Attacks	Attackers usually compromise the cloud server first, then infect clients. Harder to compromise cloud devices.	Attackers compromise edge devices first, then target servers. Interconnected IoT devices make propagation easier.
Authentication & Authorization Attacks	Vulnerable to dictionary attacks and SSL/TLS weaknesses. Centralized → simpler authorization scenarios.	More weak passwords on IoT/mobile devices. Vulnerable to WPA/WPA2, Bluetooth, 4G/5G weaknesses. Decentralized → complex authorization, more prone to overprivilege attacks.

### 3.5.3 Conclusion

Cloud computing and edge computing offer similar services and functionalities, but their architectural differences lead to significant variations in security risks. Cloud computing, with its centralized design, powerful servers, and wired connections, is generally more resilient to traditional attacks such as DDoS and side channel exploits, though it remains vulnerable to zero-day attacks at the software level.

Edge computing, by contrast, relies on decentralized servers and resource-constrained IoT/mobile devices connected via wireless networks, which exposes it to a wider range of attacks, including device-level DDoS, side channel attacks, malware injection, and authentication/authorization exploits.

Overall, while cloud systems benefit from stronger protections and centralized management, edge systems trade off some security for proximity, real-time performance, and low-cost services, making security a more critical and complex challenge in edge computing environments.



## **4 Root Causes, Grand Challenges , and Furure Research:**

### **4.1 Root Causes of Security Issues:**

Current edge computing infrastructures suffer from serious cyber-attacks, which may result in huge financial loss. The leading root causes of these security threats lie in the unavoidable flaws or vulnerabilities in protocol and code designs as well as their implementations, the concealed correlations between the public and the protected private/secure data, and the lack of fine-grained access control.

### **4.2 Protocol-Level Design Flaws:**

Protocol is the fundamental support for basic functions such as communications and data processing in edge computing from the theoretical perspective. Unfortunately, many of the current protocols adopted by edge computing systems have design flaws because their designers mainly focus on utility and user experience, treating security as something unimportant if not unnecessary. By exploiting these flaws, an attacker can achieve attack goals ranging from simply shutting down a normal service (e.g. DDoS) to fully controlling an edge device or server (e.g., malware injection attacks).

### **4.3 Implementation-Level Flaws:**

Implementation is the process of practically realizing the edge computing functionalities. Even if a protocol may be proven secure mathematically, it does not necessarily mean that its implementation is secure. Logic flaws in an implementation can neutralize the security strength of a protocol which has been proven strictly secure. There are two main reasons leading to these flaws:

- Developers may misunderstand the foundations of the protocol .
- Migrating a protocol from other platforms to the edge computing platform may cause adaptivity in consistencies.

By exploiting implementation flaws, an attacker can bypass the security features provided by the protocol (e.g., authentication attacks).

### **4.4 Code-Level Vulnerabilities:**

Code is the basic unit of a program, which defines the exact execution flow a processor should follow. Many attacks are, in fact, the results of the code-level vulnerabilities. Note that implementation-level flaws and code-level vulnerabilities are two different concepts, with the former mainly referring to the logic flaws in a practical realization while the latter mainly referring to the system bugs that can cause memory failures/corruptions. Such vulnerabilities include stack/heap overflow, use-after-free dangling pointer, format string, and so on. By exploiting these vulnerabilities, an attacker can achieve attack goals ranging from simply shutting down a normal service to fully controlling an edge device or server (e.g., malware injection attacks).

#### **4.5 Data Correlations:**

In an edge computing system, tons of data would be generated from the edge infrastructures constantly, with some of them being sensitive and placed under strict protections while others less sensitive and exposed to the public without protection. However, there may exist hidden correlations between the sensitive data and insensitive data, which may not be straightforward. Nevertheless, by exploiting these correlations and leveraging various attack models, an attacker can infer the sensitive data (e.g., side channel attacks) or even tamper them (e.g., bad data injection attacks) based on the insensitive data.

#### **4.6 Lacking Fine-Grained Access Controls:**

Access control is one of the most important security measures, via which an entity is permitted to access only the least resources it needs. Such a measure has a good reputation in protecting traditional general-purpose computing systems for a long time but it cannot be directly adapted to edge computing due to the more complex and fine-grained permission scenarios. Many current edge computing systems implement only coarse grained access control mechanisms, or even do not employ any access control mechanism. Lacking a fine-grained access control specifically designed for edge computing applications may significantly lower the bar of launching an attack (e.g., authorization attacks and MITM attacks).

#### 4.6.1 Root Causes of Security Issues (A Summary):

ROOT CAUSE	PROBLEM	POSSIBLE ATTACKS
<b>Protocol-Level Design Flaws</b>	Edge protocol designers mainly focus on utility and user experience, treating security as something unimportant.	Ranging from simply shutting down a normal service (e.g., DDoS) to fully controlling an edge device or server (e.g., malware injection attacks).
<b>Implementation-Level Flaws</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Developers may misunderstand the foundations of the protocol.</li><li>• Migrating a protocol from other platforms to the edge computing platform may cause adaptivity inconsistencies.</li></ul>	Bypass the security features provided by the protocol (e.g., authentication attacks).
<b>Code-Level Vulnerabilities</b>	Stack/heap overflow, use-after-free, dangling pointer, format string, and so on.	Ranging from simply shutting down a normal service to fully controlling an edge device or server (e.g., malware injection attacks).
<b>Data Correlations</b>	There may exist hidden correlations between sensitive data and insensitive data, which may not be straightforward.	Infer the sensitive data (e.g., side-channel attacks) or tamper with them (e.g., bad data injection attacks) based on the insensitive data.
<b>Lacking Fine-Grained Access Controls</b>	Implement only coarse-grained access control mechanisms, or do not employ any access control mechanism at all. (Lacking a fine-grained access control specifically designed for edge computing applications.)	E.g., authorization attacks and MITM attacks.

#### 4.7 Status Quo and Grand Challenges:

##### 4.7.1 Introduction:

Edge computing has rapidly evolved as a response to the limitations of traditional cloud computing, offering low latency, location awareness, and efficient data processing near the source. However, this fast growth has outpaced the development of robust security mechanisms. Current edge infrastructures face several significant challenges that hinder the establishment of a secure and resilient ecosystem. These challenges can be grouped under four main aspects: design philosophy, framework adaptability, access control, and defensive capabilities.

#### **4.7.2 Lack of Security-by-Design:**

Most edge systems are developed with a strong emphasis on performance optimization and low latency to meet the demands of IoT, smart city, and mobile applications. Security is often treated as an afterthought rather than an integral part of the design process. This lack of a security-by-design approach results in inherent vulnerabilities, exposing edge nodes and devices to a wide range of attacks such as malware injection, DDoS, and unauthorized access. Because the architecture of edge computing is distributed and heterogeneous, adding security later becomes complex and inefficient. Integrating security considerations from the early design stages is thus a fundamental but still largely unmet challenge.

#### **4.7.3 Non-Migratability of Traditional Security Frameworks:**

Existing security mechanisms built for centralized systems, such as those used in cloud environments, cannot be directly applied to edge computing. The differences in computational power, operating systems, communication protocols, and network hierarchies make direct migration impractical. Moreover, the diversity of devices—from sensors to mobile phones to microservers—creates compatibility issues that prevent unified implementation. Even within the same domain, a framework developed for one edge computing scenario (e.g., industrial IoT) may not function effectively in another (e.g., vehicular networks). This lack of standardization leads to fragmented security management and complicates the creation of universally applicable solutions.

#### **4.7.4 Fragmented and Coarse-Grained Access Control:**

Access control in edge systems remains one of the weakest links. Current models are fragmented because different vendors and platforms use different access strategies, making it difficult to design a global or interoperable security policy. They are also coarse-grained, meaning that permissions are typically broad (e.g., read/write access) instead of being fine-tuned to specific operations, contexts, or devices. In complex edge environments where multiple devices interact dynamically, this limited granularity makes it difficult to define “who can do what, where, and when.” Developing fine-grained, context-aware access control remains an open research problem.

#### **4.7.5 Isolated and Passive Defense Mechanisms:**

Most existing defense mechanisms for edge computing are isolated, protecting against only specific types of attacks, and passive, responding only after a threat has occurred. Many systems rely on “detect-and-patch” approaches, which cannot prevent zero-day attacks or coordinated, multi-vector intrusions. Furthermore, these mechanisms lack collaboration across devices and layers—edge nodes rarely share threat intelligence or coordinate active defense strategies. Building adaptive, intelligent, and cooperative defense mechanisms that can anticipate and respond dynamically to evolving attacks is a critical challenge for the future.

#### **4.7.6 Conclusion:**

In summary, the current state of edge computing security is still immature. The absence of integrated design principles, the poor adaptability of existing frameworks, weak access control, and

passive defense strategies all contribute to an insecure environment. Future research must aim to create unified, scalable, and proactive solutions that embed security into the foundation of edge computing systems.

## **4.8 Future Research Directions:**

### **4.8.1 Introduction:**

Recent analyses of Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks, malware injection, and authentication breaches reveal major limitations in current edge computing security. These threats exploit edge-specific characteristics such as limited resources, protocol diversity, and physical exposure. To strengthen resilience, future research must explore advanced, adaptive defense mechanisms that evolve with emerging attack techniques.

### **4.8.2 Multi-Layer Integrated Security Frameworks:**

Future studies should focus on designing comprehensive multi-layer architectures addressing vulnerabilities across the edge stack. A promising direction is a three-layer framework combining hardware-rooted trust, intelligent orchestration, and decentralized management.

The outer layer enforces fine-grained, context-aware access control and dynamic authorization, evaluating authentication based on user identity, location, and operational context.

The middleware layer integrates software-defined networking (SDN) and network function virtualization (NFV) enhanced with autonomous threat response. Using federated learning, edge nodes collaboratively detect DDoS or anomaly patterns without centralizing data, preserving bandwidth and privacy. Lightweight, unsupervised anomaly detection models must be optimized for constrained edge resources while ensuring accuracy against evolving malware.

The inner layer establishes hardware-based trust through Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs), and Memory Protection Units (MPUs). These mechanisms safeguard sensitive operations in secure enclaves and create isolation boundaries that resist firmware tampering and zero-day attacks.

### **4.8.3 Cross-Cutting Security Imperatives:**

Privacy and cryptographic resilience are key challenges. Homomorphic encryption and differential privacy must be adapted for edge analytics to enable secure computation on encrypted data without revealing sensitive information. With quantum computing on the horizon, research should advance post-quantum cryptography and crypto-agility frameworks, ensuring smooth algorithm migration across heterogeneous devices. Another priority is cross-layer vulnerability management—using formal verification to assess risks from task offloading and maintaining consistent protection through unified security policies. Scalable, automated patch management must ensure timely updates across diverse edge ecosystems to prevent widespread exploitation.

### **4.8.4 Implementation Challenges and Research Trajectories:**

Achieving these paradigms requires solving real-world challenges. The performance-security tradeoff must be quantified, ensuring minimal latency impact for real-time systems such as autonomous vehicles and industrial IoT. Research should also emphasize interoperability standards,

enabling consistent security across different edge platforms, and energy-efficient protection mechanisms to suit battery-constrained devices.

#### **4.8.5 Conclusion: Toward Comprehensive Edge Security:**

The evolution of edge computing security demands a shift from isolated countermeasures to integrated, intelligent, and adaptive defense frameworks. Advancing research in hardware-rooted trust, autonomous orchestration, privacy-preserving computation, and cross-layer resilience will enable trustworthy, large-scale edge ecosystems. These innovations are essential for the secure adoption of edge computing in critical domains such as autonomous systems, industrial IoT, and smart cities.