


# Analyzing security feature design leading to safety related failures



## A method for identifying inconsistencies between functional safety and cybersecurity of autonomous vehicles

Priyadarshini, Simon Greiner, Maïke Massierer, Oum-El-Kheir Aktouf

### 1. Background and context






#### Architectural design phase

- Functional safety feature design can introduce system vulnerabilities
- Cybersecurity feature design can lead to hazards

#### Research objective


Identify if cybersecurity features lead to safety related failures

### 2. Methodology



### 3. Results


#### Manual application on a driver assistance system



#### Main findings

- The security feature ‘secure onboard communication’ discards messages when freshness and authentication verification is unsuccessful.
- This could lead to the failure ‘no reception of messages’, i.e. unavailability of safety-critical messages.

### 4. Summary and future work



#### Advantages

- Optimal utilization of resources
- Early detection and resolution of inconsistencies through co-design and co-development

#### Future work

- Implementation of the method and automation to minimize manual analysis in complex projects
- Investigation of additional diagram types to support our analysis

Contact us

[priyadarshini.priyadarshini@de.bosch.com](mailto:priyadarshini.priyadarshini@de.bosch.com)  
[simon.greiner@de.bosch.com](mailto:simon.greiner@de.bosch.com)  
[maïke.massierer@de.bosch.com](mailto:maïke.massierer@de.bosch.com)  
[oum-el-kheir.aktouf@lcis.grenoble-inp.fr](mailto:oum-el-kheir.aktouf@lcis.grenoble-inp.fr)



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