
# **Network Topology**



## This is the IT Security Final project

## A. Accessing internal website


As background, I am accessing the webserver site (192.168.6.25) using the fileserver (192.168.3.25).

SC#1 – screenshot of accessing the webserver site

| NO. | TIME         | Jource       | Desurranori  | FIULUCUI | Lengar Inno   |
|-----|--------------|--------------|--------------|----------|---|
|     | 1 0.000000   | 192.168.3.25 | 192.168.5.30 | NBSS     | 55 NBSS Continuation Message                            |
|     | 2 0.000517   | 192.168.5.30 | 192.168.3.25 | TCP      | 66 49756 → 445 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=2 Win=8210 Len=0 SLE=1 S |
|     | 3 0.192828   | 192.168.5.30 | 192.168.3.25 | TCP      | 60 [TCP Keep-Alive] 49756 → 445 [ACK] Seq=0 Ack=2 Win=8 |
|     | 4 0.192869   | 192.168.3.25 | 192.168.5.30 | TCP      | 66 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] 445 → 49756 [ACK] Seq=2 Ack=1 W |
|     | 5 0.286727   | 192.168.5.30 | 192.168.3.25 | SMB2     | 178 Ioctl Request FSCTL_QUERY_NETWORK_INTERFACE_INFO    |
|     | 6 0.287048   | 192.168.3.25 | 192.168.5.30 | SMB2     | 474 Ioctl Response FSCTL_QUERY_NETWORK_INTERFACE_INFO   |
|     | 7 0.334283   | 192.168.5.30 | 192.168.3.25 | TCP      | 60 49756 → 445 [ACK] Seq=125 Ack=422 Win=8209 Len=0     |
| Г   | 8 0.465952   | 192.168.3.25 | 192.168.6.25 | TLSv1.2  | 102 Application Data                                    |
|     | 9 0.466564   | 192.168.3.25 | 192.168.6.25 | TLSv1.2  | 102 Application Data                                    |
| +   | 10 0.466842  | 192.168.6.25 | 192.168.3.25 | TLSv1.2  | 1383 Application Data                                   |
|     | 11 0.466893  | 192.168.3.25 | 192.168.6.25 | TCP      | 54 49868 → 443 [ACK] Seq=97 Ack=1330 Win=32768 Len=0    |
|     | 12 0.467335  | 192.168.6.25 | 192.168.3.25 | TLSv1.2  | 1360 Application Data                                   |
|     | 13 0.467384  | 192.168.3.25 | 192.168.6.25 | TCP      | 54 49868 → 443 [ACK] Seq=97 Ack=2636 Win=32604 Len=0    |
|     | 14 18.345052 | 192.168.3.25 | 192.168.6.25 | TLSv1.2  | 152 Application Data                                    |
|     | 15 18.345809 | 192.168.3.25 | 192.168.6.25 | TLSv1.2  | 162 Application Data                                    |
|     | 16 18.345936 | 192.168.3.25 | 192.168.6.25 | TLSv1.2  | 92 Application Data                                     |
|     | 17 18.346304 | 192.168.6.25 | 192.168.3.25 | TCP      | 60 443 → 49868 [ACK] Seq=2636 Ack=341 Win=2048 Len=0    |
|     | 18 18.349289 | 192.168.6.25 | 192.168.3.25 | TLSv1.2  | 109 Application Data                                    |
|     | 19 18.349341 | 192.168.3.25 | 192.168.6.25 | TCP      | 54 49868 → 443 [ACK] Seq=341 Ack=2691 Win=32597 Len=0   |
|     | 20 18.400732 | 192.168.6.25 | 192.168.3.25 | TCP      | 66 49759 → 3306 [SYN, ECN, CWR] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MS |
|     | 21 18.400816 | 192.168.3.25 | 192.168.6.25 | TCP      | 66 3306 → 49759 [SYN, ACK, ECN] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=8192 L∈ |
|     | 22 18.401244 | 192.168.6.25 | 192.168.3.25 | TCP      | 60 49759 → 3306 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=525568 Len=0      |
|     | 23 18.402607 | 192.168.3.25 | 192.168.6.25 | MySQL    | 132 Server Greeting proto=10 version=8.0.25             |
|     | 24 18.403129 | 192.168.6.25 | 192.168.3.25 | MySQL    | 208 Login Request user=root db=user_info                |
|     | 25 18.403383 | 192.168.3.25 | 192.168.6.25 | MySQL    | 102 Auth Switch Request                                 |
|     | 26 18.403772 | 192.168.6.25 | 192.168.3.25 | MySQL    | 78 Auth Switch Response                                 |
| <   |              |              |              |          | >   |

Directed to mo.11 is the beginning of when we are accessing the site. You can see that I am sending a TCP packet that has a ACK flag to the port 443. The port 443 is for sites with an ssl certificate, because I built the site with ssl the ports we are looking for is 443 as opposed to port 80 (which is more unsecure).

### SC#2 - Screenshot of the form being submitted to the fileserver




No.20 is when the form is being submitted to the database, we can see that the webserver is accessing the fileserver. When following the data stream we can see that there is information being inserted into the table. The data is being inserted into the table user\_info, in the order of name, email, comment. In particular the "amy amy@gmail.com.MESSAGES EVERYWHERE" is indicative that it is being sent to the database.

From the screenshot we can conclude that the order of values being sent to the use info table is:

| User_info |                     |  |  |  |
|-----------|---------------------|--|--|--|
| name      | Amy                 |  |  |  |
| email     | amy@gmail.com       |  |  |  |
| comment   | MESSAGES EVERYWHERE |  |  |  |

No.36 is when we see that the handshake is finished because of the FIN flag.

#### SC#3 – Screenshot of the form values being retrieved from the fileserver




The above Screenshot shows the form values being retrieved from the database. when following the TCP stream for packet 47 we can see that we SQL code I particular we can see SELECT \* FROM user\_info, this means that from the table user\_info select the following data. The following data is defined by user\_info.id.id, user\_info.name.name, user\_info.email.email, and user\_info.comment.comment. We can then see all of the values entered using the website form.

This could be potentially problematic because we can get the MySQL username in this case which is root which can be seen in packet 51. The password is encrypted using SHA2, but it can be cracked if we compare hash strings of known passwords. In an enterprise it would be better to have a more complex password.

Being able to see the data also means that individuals can steal private and personal data. For example, if the table was instead user\_info.password.password, user\_info.address.address, user\_info.dob.dob, etc. then this means someone can potentially steal data and use sql injections.

#### B. Accessing document on fileserver

As background I am accessing the fileserver (192.168.3.25) using the adminpc (192.168.5.30) as Annie Hanson



SC#4 - screenshot of the adminpc accessing a file on the file server

Above we can see an abundance of information. If we follow the streams of any of the packets most of the data that we can see is ineligible for humans. However we can see that the adminpc creates a request file, the request files and its response is what gives the adminpc allowance to work in those files requested. We can also see the server of what we are trying to reach which is \\fileserver\IPC\\$. we can also see that there is a request file for ip.txt in packet no.23 what this means is that adminpc is trying to get access to ip.txt. So the file server sends a GetInfo Request to verify if the adminpc has appropriate permissions. When the GetInfo Response is finished the request and response is then closed, and now the adminpc has access to the file.

We can also export files, in the example above we exported all of the files. When opening %5cip(1) we can see the new text added which is:

"192.168.10.30


This is for the FP PDF"

What this means is that we can see the file before edits and after edits.

### C. Accessing the internet website

To access the internet website I am going to use pcb to access the site www.youtube.com

## SC#5 – screenshot of pcb accessing the internet site wikipedia.com



Packet no.3 shows pcb accessing the Wikipedia site. When packet no.3 is followed we can see that en.wikipedia.com is being accessed. The reason for the sizable pcap file is because of the loading of resources. The pcap file has 295 packets, and while the site was loading it needed to access the images, links, etc. which took longer than usual.