

COMMUNICATION IN GLOBAL GAMES: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT*

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Abstract

The paper introduces communication as a strategic choice in a regime change coordination game with incomplete information. Communication makes agents more aggressive and they take on the regime more often than they would without communicating. Moreover, the agents attack the regime even more than they would if they acted based on their combined information. Richer the message space more coordinated the attacks are with less unsuccessful attempts. The effect of communication on welfare is two-fold: (i) it reduces one sided attempts on the regime, reducing wasted cost; (2) it increases the rate of coordinated attacks. The experimental results show that communication does reduce miscoordination, however, the subjects are not strategic with their messages and they miss out on the opportunity to increase their welfare by being more aggressive as predicted by the theory. This result highlights how the effects of communication are different in the environments with incomplete information, in contrast with the overwhelming experimental evidence that shows that communication is beneficial in coordination games with complete information.

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1 Introduction

As a society, we consistently face situations where our actions need to be coordinated. Many of these settings are considered as a regime change game in which an existing status quo can be disrupted but only if sufficiently large number of individuals coordinate their actions against it. For example, oligarchic political regimes can be toppled but only if enough people join a protest. A currency can be devalued but only if sufficiently large number of individuals attack it. A well-established structure to study these phenomena is global games, where there is breakdown in common knowledge and individuals have private information about the state of the world.¹ This paper builds on global games by introducing the possibility for individuals to communicate before taking an action. Such communication occurs in many circumstances. For example, in political crises, people take to social media to signal their intention to protest. During currency crises, banks many times issue statements about what their intentions are. Furthermore, in both cases, parties are not committed to their communicated intentions. In this paper, I introduce communication as a strategic choice between similarly informed participants in a global games setting. The implications of the theory are then tested in an experimental setting.

The classic game studied in the global games literature considers a coordination game involving two actions and two players, that suffers from multiplicity of equilibria under full information (Obstfeld (1986, 1996)). There are two pure strategy equilibria: payoff-dominant and risk dominant (Harsanyi and Selten (1988)). Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) introduce incomplete information to this setting so that individuals observe a noisy signal of the true state of the world. This perturbation provides a unique equilibrium selection.² Equilibrium in this game is characterized by a threshold strategy such that, for the signals above the cutoff, individuals choose the Pareto efficient equilibrium profile, and for signals below the cutoff, they choose a risk-dominant profile. Hence, under a natural assumption of imperfect information, global games methodology provides a unique-equilibrium selection.

Two types of inefficiencies are present in global games. First, individuals coordinate on the risk-dominant as opposed to the payoff-dominant equilibrium. Second, individuals may mis-coordinate. The communication equilibrium induced by cheap-talk communication improves welfare by reducing both types of inefficiencies. The paper first considers binary message space, where agents can send two messages implying an intention to join the regime change or abstain. The communication equilibrium exists, it preserves the global games structure

¹ Among many other papers, see Morris and Shin (1998, 2002) and Corsetti et al. (2004) for currency attacks, Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) and Rochet and Vives (2004) for bank runs, Dasgupta (2007) for delayed FDI investments, Corsetti et al. (2006) and Zwart (2007) for debt crises, Edmond (2013) for information manipulation by the regime, and Angeletos et al. (2007), Chassang (2010) and Mathevet and Steiner (2013) for a more dynamic setting. Heinemann et al. (2004, 2009) find experimental support for the theoretical predictions.

² Morris and Shin (1998, 2002) advance the work of Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) and apply the approach to currency attack settings.

and improves agents' side welfare.³ In communication equilibrium agents are more aggressive and attack the regime more often. Communication swings the types that would like to join the regime change but their information alone would not have been enough. These types are on the fence and they get persuaded by a positive message from the other side that nudges them to join in.

There are two stages in this environment: communication stage, where agents interact and then the actions stage, where agents join the regime change or abstain. The communication equilibrium involves threshold strategies in communication stage in which an agent states the willingness to participate in an attack if the private information is above a threshold. Intuitively, when messages agree, actions simply follow the messages. If there is a disagreement, then the magnitude of signals becomes important. If an agent send a message with an intention to attack and the other agent disagreed, then two things can happen. If agent's private information is extremely strong, then agent will still go through and single-handedly take on the regime. However, if agent's private information is not so extreme, even though agent stated an intention to attack agent will abstain from attacking. Communication equilibrium results in an interesting structure where even after stating an intention to attack, agents may not follow their message in equilibrium.

The welfare implications of communication depend on the side that we consider. If we examine the consequences of communication from central bank's point of view who might want to keep the currency peg intact then communication is not beneficial, since it increases the probability of coordinated attacks. Consider political protests, if we evaluate communication from protesters point of view then it is beneficial. However, a dictator who would like to stay in power would want to prevent and obstruct communication, since it increases the probability of a successful revolution. This is something we see in different parts of the world, where access to internet is tailored by the government or even access to social media is completely banned. The bottom line is that, the theory provides a very clear answer to whether the consequences of communication are beneficial or not. And the answer is, it depends on which side of the battle one is on.

Two sided communication improves welfare for agents over the case without communication; however, the communication equilibrium does not lead to the first best outcome. The paper introduces richer message space to study whether widening the message space would induce higher welfare. Richer the message space more coordinated the attacks are with less unsuccessful attempts, achieving the highest welfare when the message space is as rich as the state space. The second part of this paper reports the results of an experiment that closely replicates the theoretical setting to examine whether differences in message spaces affect the subjects' strategies and consequently, the welfare.

³ Certainly, as is common with many cheap-talk communication games, there are two types of equilibria: informative and uninformative (or babbling) equilibrium, where messages are ignored and the actions are the same as in the game without communication. This paper focuses on the informative equilibrium.

The experiment consists of four treatments: one *control* where no communication takes place, and three communication treatments, each testing a different communication protocol specified in the theory. In each treatment, the game is played between two subjects. In the control treatment, which replicates the baseline game without communication, subjects observe a private signal about the true state of the world and then make a decision between two alternatives. The remaining treatments introduce communication.

Communication can take many forms and it can be implemented in various ways. In the experiment, the first communication protocol follows an intuitive structure that comes from the equilibrium. In this treatment, called the *letter-messages* treatment, subjects are allowed to use two letters corresponding to their two possible intended actions. Here, since each letter could correspond to a different intended action, a common language (letters corresponding to actions) about the intended actions of players is easy to envision. To possibly allow subjects to convey more information over the intended action, the next treatment is introduced.

In the second treatment, called *number-messages* treatment, after subjects have observed their private signal (a number), they are able to send any number message to the other individual. In this treatment, the message space is the same as the signal space. Subjects need to find some common language using numbers to signal their intentions to the other subject. Though, this treatment allows for more information transmission, it is also harder without commonly understood messages. Hence, the *number-and-letter* treatment is introduced, which allows subjects to send both a number and a letter (intended action) message. While in equilibrium, the ability to send a letter message is redundant, the treatment is introduced because behaviorally, it might help clarify subject's planned actions.

The experimental data demonstrates that the vast majority of the subjects use communication protocols to convey information. Moreover, in the treatments where subjects can use letters corresponding to two alternatives, they use threshold strategies to transmit information. In the informative equilibrium (non-babbling) described in the theory section, following the information exchange, if individuals agree on an intended action, they should follow through with their initial intentions. The experimental data provides strong supports for this qualitative features of the equilibrium. In the experiment, if both subjects agree on an intended action, they follow through with their initial intentions in over 99% of the cases. However, the subjects set much more demanding cutoff levels than the theory predicts. The thresholds they use to send a message are too conservative and they are similar to the one they would use in the action stage in the absence of communication. Hence, they state what they would have done in the absence of communication, and they miss out on the welfare improvement through reduction of the threshold.

Although all communication treatments reduce miscoordination observed in the control treatment, the aggregate effect of communication on payoffs is not statistically significant. This evidence goes against the beneficial effects of communication found in coordination

games with complete information, highlighting the disruption of communication benefits in the environment where communication transmits information and is not simply affirming the intentions. While the experimental data provides strong support for qualitative features of the communication equilibrium, quantitatively, subjects' are far from the theoretical predictions. Subjects use communication to convey their intentions and they do not take into account the strategic information that is conveyed by their message. Further research and multi-round communication could be considered to observe whether subjects' may become more strategic with their messages over time.

2 Related Literature

This paper introduces communication as a strategic choice between similarly informed participants in global games. The potential positive aspects of communication in global games was briefly discussed in [Morris and Shin \(2003\)](#). Apart from this discussion, communication in global games, if considered, is of "top-down" approach, where additional information is provided through a public signal, either directly or through a public choice.⁴ Communication incentives in this paper differ from an environment where one policy maker communicates to all agents or in the case in which communication combines two signals resulting in an action based on common information, as in [Shadmehr and Bernhardt \(2017\)](#) or [Shadmehr et al. \(2017\)](#). The robust communication equilibrium in this paper is partially informative one in which the positive message is pooled.

The paper contributes to the literature that studies the effects of communication in coordination games with incomplete information. [Baliga and Morris \(2002\)](#) study one-sided communication in a two player, two state game where the cost of taking a risky action can be high or low. One player is fully informed and can send a cheap-talk message to the other player who has a low cost of attacking. The authors show that full revelation of the cost type cannot be supported in equilibrium, similar to the intuition of communication in the Battle of the Sexes game as discussed in [Banks and Calvert \(1992\)](#). In [Baliga and Morris \(2002\)](#), in contrast to global games structure, the types are not correlated. While in their setting, assuming independence of types could be a valid assumption, in the environments studied by global games, the underlying fundamental state is crucial for all sides involved. Type independence assumption results in existence of communication equilibrium which is non-monotonic in Example 4 of [Baliga and Morris \(2002\)](#) and similarly in [Baliga and Sjöström \(2004\)](#). In both of these papers, the very high types mimic the messages of very low types. This equilibrium is sustainable by exploiting medium types who care the most about coordination. See appendix B.1.4, where Example 4 of [Baliga and Morris \(2002\)](#) is modified to fit the environment studied

⁴ [Hellwig \(2002\)](#) was the first to introduce public signals to the model of [Morris and Shin \(1998\)](#) and characterize the equilibria in global games with public and private signals. For aggregation of information through prices or interest rates see [Angeletos et al. \(2006\)](#), [Hellwig et al. \(2006\)](#) and [Ozdenoren and Yuan \(2008\)](#). For information manipulation through biased media see [Edmond \(2013\)](#). [Chen et al. \(2016\)](#) model a rumor as a public signal.

in this paper and I show that the type of non-monotonic equilibria does not exist. However, the monotone equilibrium characterized in the current paper can not be sustained in their setting (see [Baliga and Sjöström \(2004\)](#), page 360).

[Baliga and Sjöström \(2012\)](#) expand on [Baliga and Sjöström \(2004\)](#) where a third party public communication is introduced through an extremists who can be one of the two types: “provocateur” or “pacifist.” The paper considers binary messages and shows how this assumption is without loss of generality, in contrast to the current paper, where richer message space alters an equilibrium and welfare. If the third party is a “hawkish extremist” and actions are strategic complements, the extremist’s messages can increase the likelihood of a conflict and decrease welfare. [Evdokimov and Garfagnini \(2018\)](#) experimentally studies the model considered in [Baliga and Sjöström \(2012\)](#). The experimental evidence finds no support for either most informative equilibrium or uninformative equilibrium. [Evdokimov and Garfagnini \(2018\)](#) find that third-party communication is not strategic.

While the theoretical literature on global games is vast, the experimental literature on the topic is more scarce.⁵ [Heinemann et al. \(2004, 2009\)](#) experimentally study a speculative attack model under perfect and noisy private information, while [Cabrales et al. \(2007\)](#) test the theory in a more discrete state space and two-players. These studies show that subjects’ behavior is consistent with the theoretical predictions and the vast majority of subjects use threshold strategies. [Cornand and Heinemann \(2008\)](#) consider a combination of private and public signals, and in another treatment, two noisy public signals. one private and one public signal case provides higher probability of an attack compared to case with two noisy public signals. Subjects seem to overreact to the public signal when they also observe a private one. Similar results are found by [Cornand and Heinemann \(2014\)](#), where subjects overweight the public signal. [Duffy and Ochs \(2012\)](#) study a dynamic global game and find no significant differences between dynamic and static game thresholds.⁶

[Qu \(2013\)](#) experimentally studies the effect of endogenous information acquisition through market prices (see the theoretical model in [Angeletos and Werning \(2006\)](#)). An additional treatment introduced in the paper is cheap-talk protocol, which is similar to the intention-sharing treatment in the current paper. In [Qu \(2013\)](#), an experimenter acts as a mediator, collecting the intentions to attack and reports back to the group the percentage of subjects that have showed interest in investing. The experimental results provide evidence that informative equilibria are played and cheap-talk interaction improves coordination, which is in contrast to the results in this paper.

[Szkup and Trevino \(2012\)](#) experimentally study costly information acquisition model introduced in [Szkup and Trevino \(2015\)](#). The authors show that subject behavior is consistent

⁵ See [Duffy \(2008\)](#) for a survey of experimental work in macroeconomics.

⁶ [Shurchkov \(2013\)](#) tests a two-period version of the model in [Angeletos et al. \(2007\)](#) and provides support for most of theoretical predictions. The experimental results indicate that knowledge about the survival of the status quo in the first stage discourages the attack in the second stage.

with the theoretical predictions of a threshold strategy usage; however, in the information acquisition phase, subjects invest too much in the precision. The experiment in this paper adds communication stages to the base game of [Szkup and Trevino \(2012\)](#), keeping all relevant parameters the same. This allows comparisons of the control treatment in the current paper with the control treatment in their paper.⁷

An extensive experimental literature studies the effects of communication in coordination games with complete information and demonstrates that cheap talk can facilitate coordination on an efficient equilibrium (for a critical survey see [Devetag and Ortmann \(2007\)](#)). [Van Huyck et al. \(1990\)](#) showed a strong tendency of play to diverge towards inefficient risk-dominant equilibrium in the minimum-effort game, which prompted a vast literature on the issue. [Cooper et al. \(1992\)](#) find that with one-way communication the payoff-dominant equilibrium is chosen more often in a 2×2 Stag and Hunt game, but two-way communication does so to a greater extent. [Blume and Ortmann \(2007\)](#) test the effect of cheap talk communication about actions both in the minimum-effort and median games. They find that messages facilitate high rates of convergence to the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.⁸ In contrast with this literature, in this paper, similar one-round communication treatments fail to significantly improve welfare. This result could be due to the fact that coordination games with incomplete information have more layers of difficulty, since the messages provide the intentions to play and information on the underlying fundamental state. Further research and experimental treatments need to be conducted to understand non-strategic communication in incomplete information coordination games.

3 Model

The section first introduces the baseline game without any communication. Subsequently information sharing protocols are considered. The framework for the underlying game is similar to the 2×2 model of global games introduced by [Carlsson and Van Damme \(1993\)](#) and further advanced by [Morris and Shin \(1998, 2002\)](#).

3.1 The Baseline Framework without Communication

The state of the world is characterized by a fundamental $\theta \in \Theta$. In the currency attack example, θ describes the net gain from a devaluation, and in the regime overturning example, it describes the strength of the government. Players, indexed by $i \in I = \{1, 2\}$, are ex-ante identical and simultaneously choose between two actions: they can either attack the status quo ($a_i = 1$) or refrain from attacking ($a_i = 0$). Thus, the action space for player i is $A_i = \{0, 1\}$. Attacking has a fixed cost of $c > 0$, which could be interpreted as a direct transaction cost,

⁷ See [Trevino \(2017\)](#) for a two country model of contagion.

⁸ See also [Berninghaus and Ehrhart \(2001\)](#), [Burton and Sefton \(2004\)](#), [Devetag \(2005\)](#), [Charness \(2000\)](#), [Brandts and Cooper \(2006\)](#), and [Chaudhuri et al. \(2009\)](#).

or simply the opportunity cost. Let $k(\theta)$ be the minimum number of agents needed for the attack to be successful when the fundamental is θ . Higher the fundamental θ , weaker is the underlying state. Let $\underline{\theta} := k^{-1}(2)$ and $\bar{\theta} := k^{-1}(1)$. A player's incentive to attack increases with the aggregate size of an attack; hence, players' actions a_i are strategic complements.

All players start with a common prior for θ , they believe θ is drawn from a normal distribution with mean θ_0 and variance σ_θ^2 .⁹ Each player i receives a private signal $x_i = \theta + \sigma_i \varepsilon_i$, where $x_i \in X_i$ and $\varepsilon_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$ is a noise, independent and identically distributed across players and independent of θ . Given the realization of player i 's signal, x_i , the posterior distribution of θ is normally distributed with mean $\tilde{\theta}_i$ and variance $\tilde{\sigma}_i^2$, where $\tilde{\theta} = \frac{x_i \sigma_\theta^2 + \theta_0 \sigma_i^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_i^2}$ and $\tilde{\sigma}_i^2 = \frac{\sigma_\theta^2 \sigma_i^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_i^2}$.

Player i 's action strategy is $a_i : X_i \rightarrow A_i$ and player i 's utility is $u_i : A \times \Theta \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, where $A = A_i \times A_j$ and

$$u_i(a; \theta) = (\mathbb{1}_{\{\theta > k(\theta)\}} \theta - c) a_i.$$

The payoffs can be summarized in a matrix form, see Figure 12:

	<i>Success</i>	<i>Failure</i>
<i>Attack</i>	$\theta - c$	$-c$
<i>Not Attack</i>	0	0

Figure 1: Payoff Matrix

The game with common knowledge of the state of the fundamental θ (complete information game) serves as an intuitive baseline to the game with private information. For $\theta < \underline{\theta}$, the regime change will not happen even if both players attack; hence, the dominant strategy is to refrain from attacking and to keep the status quo. If $\theta \geq \bar{\theta}$, one player choosing to attack is sufficient to abandon the status quo; hence, the dominant strategy is to attack. The case of interest is when $\theta \in [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta})$, where two pure-strategy equilibria are sustainable: (i) all players attack and the status quo is abandoned; and (ii) all players refrain from attacking and the status quo is preserved.

Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) have shown that the multiplicity of equilibria described above is due to complete information of the payoff function. If players don't observe the true value θ but rather a noisy private signal of it, then there is a unique equilibrium. This equilibrium is characterized by a symmetric threshold strategy such that player i attacks the status quo if and only if the signal realization is greater than the threshold x_{NC}^* ; that is the

⁹ Alternatively, we could have assumed an improper uniform prior for θ on \mathbb{R} and common public signal.

players $i \in \{1, 2\}$ follow a symmetric threshold strategy

$$a_i(x_i) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{iff } x_i \geq x_{NC}^* \\ 0, & \text{iff } x_i < x_{NC}^* \end{cases}$$

For completeness of the baseline framework, this section is finished by solving for the latent threshold x_{NC}^* . Let $g(\theta, x_j^*)$ be player i 's payoff given θ and the other player's threshold x_j^* . Player i 's expected payoff conditional on taking an attack action is (details are in Appendix A.1):

$$\mathbb{E}[g(\theta, x_j^*)|x_i] = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta [\Pr(x_j \geq x_j^*|x_i, \theta)] p(\theta|x_i) d\theta + \int_{\bar{\theta}}^{\infty} \theta p(\theta|x_i) d\theta - c$$

Player i will choose to attack the status quo if, and only if, the expected payoff is greater than zero, $\mathbb{E}[g(\theta, x_j^*)|x_i] \geq 0$. To solve for an optimal threshold x_{NC}^* , all we need is to find a signal for which player i is indifferent between attacking the status quo and refraining from attacking, that is $\mathbb{E}[g(\theta, x_j^*)|x_{NC}^*] = 0$, given the optimal threshold of player j , x_j^* . There exists a unique, dominance solvable equilibrium in which both players use threshold strategies with cutoff x_{NC}^* .

3.2 Cheap Talk Communication

This section introduces communication in the baseline framework presented in Section 3.1 and characterizes the resulting equilibria. First, binary messages are introduced and then, richer message spaces are examined. Without cost of sending messages, the restriction to binary message is with loss of generality.

3.2.1 Binary Messages

The focus of this section is characterizing the equilibria with two messages. Let the message space of player i be $M_i = \{0, 1\}$. Once player i has observed their private signal $x_i \in X_i$ they send a message $m_i : X_i \rightarrow M_i$ to the other player before deciding to either attack the status quo or refrain from attacking, $a_i : X_i \times M \rightarrow A_i$, $M = M_i \times M_j$. All messages are sent and received simultaneously and sending a message bears no cost.¹⁰ The timing of the whole game is given in Figure 2.

This game has two types of communication equilibria:

- (i) *Informative equilibrium*, a two partition equilibrium in which there is pooling into two types, say “intention to attack” and “intention not to attack”; and
- (ii) *Uninformative equilibrium*, babbling equilibrium in which messages are ignored and the

¹⁰ Costly messages are introduced in section 3.3.




Figure 2: The Timing of the Game

whole game reduces to the baseline framework without communication as in Section 3.1.

One can interpret this pooling into two types as players sharing their intentions to get involved or not, so that receiving a message $m_j = 1$ or $m_j = 0$ is interpreted as “I plan to attack” or “I do not plan to attack.”

Below is the description of the communication equilibrium, its implications and then welfare analysis.

Theorem 1 (Communication Equilibrium with Binary Messages) *There is symmetric pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The equilibrium is monotone in the sense that there exist thresholds (x_C^*, \bar{x}^*) such that in the communication stage player i sends a message $m_i(x_i)$ and in the action stage player i takes an action $a_i(x_i; x_C^*, \mathcal{I})$, where*

$$m_i(x_i) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } x_i \geq x_C^* \\ 0, & \text{if } x_i < x_C^* \end{cases} \quad (1)$$


$$a_i(x_i; x_C, \mathcal{I}) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } x_i, x_j \geq x_C \text{ or } x_i \geq \bar{x}^* \\ 0, & \text{o.w.} \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

$\mathcal{I} = (m_i, m_j)$, for $x_i \in X_i$ and $i \in I, i \neq j$.

Let us look at the outcomes of communication under the partially informative equilibrium for all combinations of signal realizations $(x_i, x_j) \in \mathbb{R}^2$. Figure 3 summarizes the messages and the actions of Theorem 1. If both players receive signals below threshold x_C^* , then they send a message not to attack and then both abstain from attacking in the action stage and keep the status quo. Similarly, if both players receive signals above threshold x_C^* , then players send a message to attack and they both attack. Thus, if players agree on an intended action, they follow through with their initial intentions.

If the intended actions disagree, players use a significantly more demanding cutoff. Consider the case when realized signals are in the gray dotted areas of Figure 3a, area (A, N) and (N, A) represents the case where one player has signal greater than x_C^* , while the other has a signal less than x_C^* . Depending on how high the attack signal is, a player who received a no

Figure 3: Informative Equilibrium Messages and Actions




attack message might still decide to unilaterally take on the status quo. In particular, player i attacks the status quo if their realized signal x_i is greater than threshold \bar{x}^* .

Notice that if a player's message conveys an intention not to attack, that player can not be persuaded to switch and attack in the action stage. The intuition behind the statement is that if a player has information under which he would choose to attack if the other player were to attack, then this player would have sent an attack message ("A"). An attack message (weakly) increases the probability of the other player following and the expected payoff is higher. Hence, the communication threshold x_C^* is based on the most optimistic case where the other individual has positive information and is going to attack.

To evaluate the welfare effects of communication under the informative equilibrium, let us first look at the outcome changes, Figure 4 presents the equilibrium outcomes with and without communication. In the left panel: after receiving private signals, x_i and x_j , player i and player j take an attack action if, and only if, their private signal is greater than x_{NC}^* . Since there is no communication, the actions are based solely on own private signals. If both signals are greater than x_{NC}^* , both players attack and successfully abandon the status quo. Similarly, if both signals are less than x_{NC}^* , both players choose not to attack and the status quo remains in place. If only one player attacks and the other does not, we get mismatched actions, the gray regions of the left panel.

The right panel of Figure 4 presents the equilibrium outcomes of the game with communication. There are two main types of improvements arising from communication: (i) switches to (A, A) from (N, N) ; and (ii) increased coordination from switches from (A, N) and (N, A) . For a sizable range of the inefficient selection in the baseline framework, the equilibrium switches from risk-dominant to payoff-dominant. That is, if realized signals

Figure 4: Equilibria Outcomes without and with Communication



were in the region $[x_C^*, x_{NC}^*) \times [x_C^*, x_{NC}^*)$, then, without communication the outcome would be (N, N) . However, with communication the outcome is (A, A) . Let us focus on the area $[x_{NC}^*, \infty) \times [0, x_{NC}^*)$ where, without communication the outcome is (A, N) . Adding communication divides this area into three regions. Communication enables coordination on attack-action and not-attack action, where there used to be mismatched actions without communication. Notice, the area $[\bar{x}^*, \infty) \times [0, x_C^*)$ remains as miscoordination. The next section provides more details on the quantitative gains of these changes.

3.2.2 Rich Message Space

This section examines the case in which the message space is as large as the signal space $|M_i| = |S_i|$. In particular, without loss of generality let $M_i = S_i$. This section focuses on equilibria that preserve the global games structure in the second stage; however, there exists a fully revealing equilibrium of the communication stage where players send the signal they receive and take an attack action if the combined message provides enough evidence. This equilibrium induces common posterior of the state of the world breaking the global games structure of the action stage. Moreover, fully revealing equilibrium is not robust to small residual uncertainty. In section 3.3, it is shown that fully revealing equilibrium is not robust to small noise in message transmission.

Richer message space allows players to reduce the cases of miscoordination. However, it does not increase the probability of a coordinated attacks, it only reduces the cases of unsuccessful unilateral attacks. The most informative equilibrium among the partially informative equilibria is identical to binary message equilibria when there is a possibility for both of the players to attack or when both player are not attacking for sure. The full characterization of

the most informative equilibrium among partially informative equilibria is in Theorem 2.

Theorem 2 (Communication Equilibrium with Rich Message Space) *There is symmetric pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The equilibrium is monotone in the sense that there exist thresholds $(x_C^*, \bar{x}^*(\cdot))$ such that in the communication stage player i sends a message $m_i(x_i)$ and in the action stage player i takes an action $a_i(x_i; x_C^*, \mathcal{I})$, where*

$$m_i(x_i) = \begin{cases} x_C^*, & \text{if } x_i \geq x_C^* \\ x_i, & \text{if } x_i < x_C^* \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

$$a_i(x_i; x_C, \mathcal{I}) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } x_i, x_j \geq x_C \text{ or } x_i \geq \bar{x}^*(x_j) \\ 0, & \text{o.w.} \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

$\mathcal{I} = (m_i, m_j)$, for $x_i \in X_i$ and $i \in I, i \neq j$.

Note that the “positive message,” an intention to attack, is pooled as in case of binary signals. That is, if $x_i \geq x_C^*$, then $m_i = x_C^*$.¹¹ The richness of messages reduces the cases of miscoordination. When $x_i < x_C^*$, player i will never attack, hence this player is indifferent between sending any message. Therefore, we can let the message be anything but the positive message that states $x_i \geq x_C^*$. By setting $m_i(x_i) = x_i$, the probability of mistakes (unsuccessful attacks) for player j is reduced, leading to the best partially informative equilibria with the least miscoordination in the action stage.

3.3 Costly messages and noisy communication

This section presents the results of introducing costly messages and noisy communication into the setting described in the previous section. If there is a small cost of messages, there exists a communication equilibrium and for partially informative equilibria an assumption of binary message space is without loss of generality. That is, if messages are costly, there exists unique communication equilibrium which coincides with the equilibrium characterized in Theorem 1 with the alternation that instead of sending “no attack” message, players just send empty message. In addition, at the end of the section, small noise in communication stage is introduced and examined. Even small distortion to messages disrupts the fully revealing equilibrium, leaving only partially informative communication equilibria. The distortions considered in this section highlight the robustness of the two-partition equilibria.

When message space is enriched from binary to signal space, the changes in equilibrium and consecutive payoff implications are driven by the cases where one player is completely indifferent at the communication stage and will abstain from attacking in the action stage. This indifference is only present because the messages are costless. If message bears any cost, then

¹¹ For $x_i \geq x_C^*$, messages are pooled and without loss of generality, let $m_i = x_C^*$.

there are no benefits of sending any message to such player, since they are going to abstain in the action stage. Therefore, the player would send an empty costless message.¹² However, note that introduction of message cost does not influence the players' best responses, and the analysis is unchanged up to the slight change of thresholds. Instead of attacking cost of c , the analysis is as if the cost was $c + \varepsilon$. The benefit of enriching the message space beyond binary messages is lost with any message cost $\varepsilon > 0$.

Let us proceed by examining the effect of introducing message cost in binary message environment. While message cost distorts some informative equilibria as described above, it strengthens the binary message communication equilibrium, highlighting its robustness. The equilibrium in binary message case provides unique outcome in action stage; however, the communication stage can be slightly modified without affecting the equilibrium or its consequences. For example, consider some signal $x_N \in X_i$, for which player i will abstain from attacking irrespective of the received messages. Since messages are costless and the final action is $a_i = 0$, this player is indifferent between sending any message. Because of that, we can construct the following equilibrium. For all signals $x_i \in X_i \setminus \{x_N\}$, players follow the equilibrium described in the Theorem 1, but $x_i = x_N$ sends a message $m(x_N) = 1$. Since, $x_i = x_N$ is a measure zero event, it will not affect the best responses or the thresholds. We have constructed an informative equilibrium that is payoff equivalent to the equilibrium described in Theorem 1, but has different communication stage. This type of communication stage equilibria are not sustainable with costly messages and the only equilibrium surviving costly message distortion is the one characterized in Theorem 1.

Let us proceed by considering the effects of message distortions on communication equilibria. Suppose the messages sent are the signal realizations $m_i = x_i$ and messages received are taken at face value. This communication stage induces common posterior $\theta|x_i, m_j \sim \mathcal{N}(\check{\theta}, \check{\sigma}^2)$. To calculate $\check{\theta}, \check{\sigma}^2$, let the average of the two signals be $\bar{x} := \frac{1}{2}(x_1 + x_2)$. Since the average signal is a sufficient statistic, we will refer to it as the player i 's combined signal. Using the standard approach, the prior belief is updated with the combined signal \bar{x} , which induces a common posterior $\theta|\bar{x} \sim \mathcal{N}(\check{\theta}, \check{\sigma}^2)$, where $\check{\theta} = \frac{\bar{x}\sigma_\theta^2 + \theta_0\sigma^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma^2}$, $\check{\sigma}^2 = \frac{\sigma_\theta^2\sigma^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma^2}$ and $\sigma^2 := \frac{1}{4}(\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_2^2)$. The *first-best outcome* of the game is for both players to take an attack action, if posterior mean, $\check{\theta}$, is greater than the cost of attacking c and abstain otherwise.

Suppose the messages sent are the signal realizations $m_i = x_i$ and messages received are taken at face value. This communication stage induces common posterior $\theta|x_i, m_j \sim \mathcal{N}(\check{\theta}, \check{\sigma}^2)$. To calculate $\check{\theta}, \check{\sigma}^2$, let the average of the two signals be $\bar{x} := \frac{1}{2}(x_1 + x_2)$. Since the average signal is a sufficient statistic, we will refer to it as the player i 's combined signal. Using the standard approach, the prior belief is updated with the combined signal \bar{x} , which induces a common posterior $\theta|\bar{x} \sim \mathcal{N}(\check{\theta}, \check{\sigma}^2)$, where $\check{\theta} = \frac{\bar{x}\sigma_\theta^2 + \theta_0\sigma^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma^2}$, $\check{\sigma}^2 = \frac{\sigma_\theta^2\sigma^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma^2}$ and $\sigma^2 :=$

¹² While introducing costly messages, the message space is augmented with an empty message that has no cost. That is, let $\tilde{M}_i = M_i \cup \{\emptyset\}$ and let $m_i = \emptyset$ be costless.

$\frac{1}{4}(\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_2^2)$. The first-best outcome of the game is for both players to take an attack action, if posterior mean, $\tilde{\theta}$, is greater than the cost of attacking c and abstain otherwise.

Note, player weakly prefers the other player to always attack. If there is no noise, fully revealing the signals is an equilibrium, since once signals are combined, players' preferences are perfectly aligned. However, suppose there is some residual uncertainty, that is, for example, let messages get distorted in the receiving process with noise ξ that is independent of the state and signals. Then, player i would exaggerate the signal fearing a negative distortion in message sending process. This slight misalignment distorts the fully revealing equilibrium.; however, it has no effect on partially informative two-partition equilibrium.

4 Experimental design

The experimental sessions were conducted at the Center for Experimental Social Science (CESS) laboratory at New York University (NYU), using the software z-Tree ([Fischbacher \(2007\)](#)). Subjects were recruited from the general population of NYU students. The experiment lasted about 50 minutes and, on average, subjects earned \$21 that included a \$10 dollar show-up fee. In each session, written instructions were distributed to the subjects and also read aloud.

The experiment consists of five different treatments. In each treatment, participants are randomly divided into pairs. These assignments are fixed for the duration of the experiment, which consists of 50 independent and identical rounds. In each round, all the subjects have to choose between two alternatives, A and B . Before the subjects make their A/B choice they receive a private signal about the true state X , which is a random variable that affects both players' payoff structure. The parameters used are similar to the ones in [Szkup and Trevino \(2012\)](#). In particular, the control treatment of this study as described below coincides with the direct-choice control treatment with exogenous precision level 4 in [Szkup and Trevino \(2012\)](#).

In all of this experiment's treatments, the true state X is randomly drawn from a normal distribution with mean 50 and standard deviation 50. This randomization is done once and it is used in every treatment. This choice ensures the differences between treatments are due to the changes in communication protocols and not the precedents caused by the particular order of realized values of X . The coordination region for which two pure-strategy equilibria are sustainable under complete information is $[0, 100)$. All subjects receive a private signal randomly drawn from a normal distribution that is centered at the true value of X and has standard deviation of 10. Choosing action A always bears a cost of 18 points, making the coordination interval effectively $[18, 100)$.

The first treatment in the experiment is the *control* treatment, T_0 , where the subjects observe their private signal and then proceed to make their A/B choice. Once both subjects in the same pair have made their selection, the round is over and they receive feedback. The subjects observe the realization of X in this round, their own private signal realization, the

choice made by the subject and the other pair member, and the individual payoff in the round. Note that no communication or any sort of interaction allowed in the control treatment. All the other treatments in the experiment involve some type of communication component.

In the *signal-sharing* treatment, T_S , once the subjects have observed their private signals about the true state X , but before they make their final decisions, they can send a message that can be any number $m_n \in \mathbb{R}$. These messages can be interpreted as “My signal is ____.” The message-sending stage is simultaneous, and once both subjects in the same pair receive the other’s message, they can proceed and decide between alternatives A and B . The round is over when both subjects make their A/B choice. According to the theoretical results, the informative equilibrium in this paper requires information withholding; subjects should pool themselves into two types and send signals accordingly.

A vast experimental literature observes over-communication and truth-telling in experiments on strategic information-transmission games. Some studies attribute truth-telling to the intrinsic cost of lying, or claim ethical types exist who would never lie for economic gain. Without identifying the source of over-communication, we introduce an intention-sharing treatment to mitigate these forces. In the *intention-sharing* treatment, T_I , once the subjects have observed their private signals but before they make their final decisions, they can send a message that can only be a letter $m_L \in \{A, B\}$. These messages can be interpreted as “I’m going to choose the alternative ____.” Note that while the theoretical predictions of this treatment are similar to the one for treatment T_S , we have reduced the difficulty by providing a common language about intentions.

We introduce the third communication protocol to test whether expanding the message space to sharing the intended action and their signals could help aid higher levels of coordination. In the *intention-and-signal-sharing* treatment, $T_{I\&S}$, once the subjects have observed their private signals but before they make their final decisions, they can send a message that can be any number $m_n \in \mathbb{R}$ and a letter $m_l \in \{A, B\}$. These messages can be interpreted as “My signal is ____” and “I’m going to choose the alternative ____.” Providing a letter message in addition to the number message is theoretically redundant. In equilibrium, when a player sends a number message, what that number implies in terms of intended actions is common knowledge. However, experimentally, the effect is not clear.

Treatments	Communication	Message Space
T_0	None	—
T_S	Cheap Talk	Signals
T_I	Cheap Talk	Actions
$T_{I\&S}$	Cheap Talk	Signals and Actions

Table 1: Experimental Design

In all the communication treatments, T_S , T_I , and $T_{I\&S}$, the end-of-the-round feedback

consists of the realized value of X , the subject's own signal realization, the message sent and the message received, the choice made by the subject and the other pair member, and the individual payoff in the round. After 50 rounds, subjects take a short survey and they receive their final payment that includes the show-up fee and the average of five rounds of the payoffs randomly chosen from all 50 rounds (survey results are summarized in Appendix C.3).

Table 1 summarizes the experiment treatments, communication protocols, and the message space available to the subjects.

4.1 Numerical Example

Consider the game with parameters as implemented in the experiment described in Section 4. For this example, we can calculate Type I and Type II errors and quantify the gains of communication.

The state of the world is governed by a normal distribution with mean 50 and standard deviation 50. The coordination region is $[0, 100)$, that is, if $\theta < 0$, attack can not be successful even if both players attack. If $\theta \geq 100$, one player is sufficient to induce successful attack and receive $\theta - c$, regardless of what the other player does. Choosing an attack action bears a cost of 18 points. All subjects receive a private signal randomly drawn from a normal distribution that is centered at θ and has standard deviation of 10.

Without communication, the game has a unique equilibrium which is monotone in type and it is characterized by a threshold $x_{NC}^* = 28.31$. With communication, message sending threshold is $x_C^* = 11.47$. Conditional on receiving an attack message, the action threshold is $\underline{x}^* = 11.47$, while the threshold for attacking conditional on receiving no-attack message is $\bar{x}^* = 178.24$. If we combine two signals and follow the best outcome, then both player should attack if the average of the two signals is greater than $x_{FB} = 17.36$.¹³

	No Communication	Communication	First-best
Type I Error	4.4%	2.4%	1.6%
Type II Error	9.8%	2.0%	1.8%

Table 2: Numerical Comparison

Table 2 presents the results of Type I and Type II errors for three cases. The data is simulated using the parameters above and calculations use the corresponding equilibria. Without communication, in 9.8% of the time, players would miss out on attacking while successful attack would have been possible, while with communication this type of error is reduced to 2%. Similarly, false attacks for which players pay the cost of attacking but receive no gain, is reduced from 4.4% to 2.4%.

¹³ For $\tilde{\theta} = \frac{\bar{x}\sigma_{\theta}^2 + \theta_0\sigma^2}{\sigma_{\theta}^2 + \sigma^2} \geq 18$, we need $\bar{x} \geq 17.36$.

5 Experimental Results

Testable predictions provided by the theory are used to guide the analysis of the experimental data in this section. Theory predicts that welfare should be improved through two channels: (i) a reduction in miscoordination; and (ii) lower thresholds used to switch from the not-attacking to attacking actions. The qualitative predictions are: (iii) if individuals' messages about intentions agree, their actions should coincide with their messages; and (iv) if individuals' messages disagree, they should employ a more demanding cutoff. Finally, the quantitative thresholds are calculated for the communication and action stages that can then be compared to estimates from the experimental data.¹⁴

Table 3: Average Payoffs

<i>Treatments</i>	T_0	T_S	T_I	$T_{I\&S}$
T_0	69.91	~ 70.00 (−0.114)	~ 70.75 (−2.298)	~ 69.31 (0.465)

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Welch t-statistic in parentheses.

We evaluate the experimental effects of communication treatments on welfare by looking at aggregate average payoffs for each of the treatments. Table 3 presents the mean payoffs in experimental currency units for each treatment and the results of binary hypothesis testing of the control treatment versus all other communication treatments (p-values are adjusted using Bonferroni correction for multiple hypotheses testing). Interestingly, one-stage communication treatments, T_S , T_I and $T_{I\&S}$, have no significant effect on average payoffs.


Allowing subjects to send cheap-talk messages corresponding to the actions has been shown to be effective in coordination games with complete information (see, e.g., [Blume and Ortmann \(2007\)](#)). However, no statistically significant differences exist for a similar one stage communication treatment in the coordination game with incomplete information studied in this paper. To further analyze this converse result, let us break down the effect of communication and look into two forces that drive the welfare improvement theoretically.

Consider first cases of miscoordination—subjects choosing different actions. For all the treatments, Figure 5 presents the frequency of mismatched actions. All the communication treatments provide less miscoordination compared to the control treatment.

Despite the decrease in miscoordination, one-stage communication protocols have insignificant effects on average payoffs. We proceed by examining the movement from messages to actions to find out if this difference in the effects of one- and multi-stage treatments is due to qualitative features. Figure 6, provides a transition of all possible message pairs to

¹⁴ In the experiment, we used neutral language and we denoted attack and not-attack actions by alternatives A and B , respectively. For the purposes of consistency with the previous sections, I will continue to use A and N in the experimental results, even though the subjects' answers were A and B .

Figure 5: Frequency of Miscoordination



actions for the treatment T_I and letter part of the treatment $T_{I\&S}$. Recall that, according to the informative equilibrium, if messages agree, the follow up actions should be the intended actions. The experimental results strongly support this theoretical prediction. As we can see in Figure 6, if both subjects send a message A or both send a message N , the outcome is (A, A) or (N, N) , respectively, more than 98% of the time. This result demonstrates that subjects' message to action behavior is highly consistent with the theoretical predictions.

		Action Pair			
		A,A	A,N	N,A	N,N
Message Pair	A,A	99	0.5	0.5	0
	A,N	12.6	20.5	16.5	50.4
	N,N	0	0	0	100
		Intention			
		A,A	A,N	N,A	N,N
Message Pair	A,A	99.2	0.3	0.3	0.2
	A,N	15.9	18.2	12.5	53.4
	N,N	0	0.9	0.9	98.2
		Intention and Signal			

Figure 6: Transition matrices for treatments T_I and $T_{I\&S}$

Theoretically, disagreement in messages should lead to either switching to the not-attacking action or following through on their communicated intentions if the positive signal is strong enough. Based on the experimental parameters, we should see zero-values in the elements of transition matrix when (A, N) turns into anything except (N, N) .¹⁵ Disagreements in messages result in all possible outcomes, but the largest mass, over 49%, is on (N, N) action pair.

¹⁵ If one player sends a message not to attack, then the other player should attack if their private signal is greater than 178.24. Since, the realized private signals and corresponding messages never appeared in that range then, theoretically, the second line of the transition matrix should be 0%, 0%, 0% and 100%.

And similar to the agreement cases, all three treatments favor the theoretical results in the same way.

5.1 Numeric Messages

Before analyzing the quantitative thresholds for all treatments, we examine numeric messages and classify them into four types: partition, truth-telling, mixed, and babbling. Figure 7 depicts the different strategy types on a graph where the x-axis is received signals, the y-axis is sent messages, the gray area depicts the coordination region, and the black line is the 45-degree line. The top part of Figure 7 presents the distribution of the types in two treatments: T_S , in which subjects' messages are numbers; and $T_{I\&S}$, in which subjects' messages are numbers and actions.




Figure 7: Sample Message Strategies

If a subject partitions their signals into two messages for most of the 50 rounds, we call this subject a *partition* type. For example, Figure 7a presents the behavior of a subject classified as a partition type; this subject used the number 150 to indicate high signals and -150 to indicate low signals. In the number-message treatment, T_S , 20% of subjects find a common language to signal intentions to the other subject (some subjects use 1 and 2, others employ large and small numbers, 150 and -150 , to indicate their intention for alternatives A and N , respectively). As the $T_{I\&S}$ treatment subjects are allowed to send numbers accompanied with the letter A and N , there is no need to construct a new common language using numbers; therefore, there are no partition types in this treatment.

If a subject sends a message within five points of the true value in 45 out of 50 rounds, we classify this behavior as *truth-telling* and label the subject a *truth-telling* type. This is shown in Figure 7b. Consistent with the literature on information transmission in cheap-talk games, a fraction of subjects truthfully report their private information.¹⁶ However, in treatments T_S

¹⁶ See, for example, Cai and Wang (2006), where the authors implement a cheap talk game from Crawford and Sobel (1982) in the lab. Similar results on truth-telling have been observed in other studies: Blume et al. (1998, 2001), Evans III et al. (2001), Gneezy (2005), Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz (2007). For more examples see Zak (2008). There are few studies that provide evidence of strategic information concealment, for example, Agranov and Schotter (2013, 2012) show that a vast majority of subjects refrains from truth-telling, especially in a disagreement region, where leader and followers face potential conflicts of interest. In general, the authors find that vague or


and $T_{I\&S}$, 60% and 35% (resp.) of subjects employ strategies different from revealing the full information.

In Figure 7c, we see a case of partial truth-telling or, as we classify them, *mixed types*. These types tell the truth for some values of the realized signal; however, in other regions, they either partition or babble.¹⁷ Finally, we have babbling types that send messages that seem to be unrelated to underlying signals, see Figure 7d. In treatments T_S and $T_{I\&S}$, respectively, there are only 2.5% and 5% of subjects whose behavior can be classified as babbling, providing strong support for informative equilibrium.


To calculate the thresholds using the experimental data, we need some preliminary results. In the next subsection we provide all required definitions and tools.

5.2 Quantitative Thresholds

We say that behavior is consistent with a threshold strategy if subjects use a perfect or almost perfect threshold strategy. An example of a *perfect threshold strategy* usage is presented in Figure 8a, in which alternative N is chosen for low realizations of signals and alternative A is chosen for high realizations of signals with *exactly one* switching point. For signals less than 40, the subject has chosen an action N ($a_i = 0$ on the graph), whereas for signals above 40 the choice is A ($a_i = 1$ on the graph). A subject uses an *almost-perfect threshold strategy* if the threshold rule admits a few errors—more precisely, if the overlap is less than three signals.¹⁸ For example, Figure 8b provides an example of almost perfect threshold strategy with the overlap of two signal realizations.



(a) Perfect Threshold Strategy



(b) Almost Perfect Threshold Strategy

Result 1 summarizes the data. (For the breakdown of this result by each treatment and different periods, see Table 5 in Appendix C.) The data provide strong evidence of threshold strategy usage in both stages: while sending a binary message and, also, during the action stage.¹⁹ Note that threshold strategies are robust in that even if subject believes other subject

ambiguous language improves coordination in a region where preferences are misaligned.

¹⁷ The mixed types in this paper are similar to A and C types in Agranov and Schotter (2013).

¹⁸ The classification is similar to the one given in Szkup and Trevino (2012)

¹⁹ This result is consistent with previous literature, see Heinemann et al. (2004), Cornand and Heinemann (2014) and Szkup and Trevino (2012).

is using threshold strategy or randomizing, then the best response is still a threshold strategy.

Result 1 98.28% of the subjects use threshold strategies in the binary-message stage, and 99.01% of the subjects use threshold strategies in the action stage.²⁰

To estimate the thresholds for all subject who use threshold strategies, a logistic distribution is fitted to the data of each subject and then averaged to provide aggregate results. The threshold is interpreted as a signal for which there is 50% chance of choosing either alternative. Recall that the CDF of the logistic distribution is given by

$$\Pr(A) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(a - bx_i)}$$

with parameters $a \in \mathbb{R}$ and $b > 0$.

Following [Heinemann et al. \(2004\)](#), the ratio a/b can be interpreted as the mean threshold of the group. The standard deviation of the threshold estimate, $\pi/(b\sqrt{3})$, can be interpreted as a measure of coordination. Table 4 provides experimental and theoretical thresholds for sending binary messages and estimated thresholds for taking an attack action. For the action stage, the table provides unconditional thresholds (thresholds calculated using all of the data) and conditional thresholds (where thresholds are conditional on matching messages). In the rest of this section, using the information in the table 4, we provide results that shed light on the quantitative differences between theoretical and experimental thresholds.

Table 4: Estimated and Theoretical Thresholds

<i>Treatments</i>	<i>Communication Stage</i>		<i>Action Stage</i>		
	Experimental	Theoretical	Unconditional	Conditional	Theoretical
T_0	—	—	26.84 (1.653)	—	28.31
T_S	—	—	29.06 (4.196)	—	11.47
T_I	25.62 (3.214)	11.47	28.66 (3.855)	25.80 (0.752)	11.47
$T_{I\&S}$	24.56 (2.483)	11.47	27.08 (1.468)	25.76 (0.729)	11.47
T_{DCT}	23.52 (4.245)	11.47	24.70 (4.090)	24.68 (1.653)	11.47

Recall the average welfare effect of communication: the one-shot communication treatments provide no significant increase in average payoffs. Figure 9 illustrates the action thresholds on one line for all treatments. Theoretical thresholds are depicted by full bars and aver-

²⁰ The calculations for binary messages are based on treatment T_I , the letter part of treatment $T_{I\&S}$, and the initial choice of treatment T_{DCT} . Calculations for the action stage include all treatments. The analyses uses the last 25 rounds.

age experiment thresholds by dashed lines.²¹ Now we can identify where the experimental data departs from theory. The welfare increase from threshold reduction is not attained by subjects in one-shot treatments; the subjects set much more demanding cutoff levels than the theory predicts. Moreover, the estimated thresholds with one-stage communication are clustered around the control threshold and they are not significantly lower the control treatment.

Theoretically, threshold reduction is achieved by considering the communication stage strategically. If an individual has information under which they would choose to attack if the other person were to attack, they will send a message that they are going to attack. This reasoning pushes down the threshold for sending the attack message. Notice that this welfare improving outcome is due to individuals' strategic behavior in the communication stage, stating that they are going to attack even when they are unsure of whether they will follow through. In the experiment, subjects instead seem to follow a simple heuristic when sending a message. The thresholds they use to send a message are similar to the one they would use in the action stage in the absence of communication. Hence, they state what they would have done in the absence of communication, and they miss out on the welfare improvement from threshold reduction.




Figure 9: Threshold Comparisons

Result 2 *The threshold used to send binary messages, and the threshold used to take the attack action conditional on the other's message being attack, are statistically indistinguishable.*

We end this section with two further results on the quantitative thresholds. Theoretically, the threshold used to send a binary message should be identical to the threshold used to attack in the action stage given that the other player is attacking. Thus, the next conjecture concerns how consistent subjects are with setting their message and action thresholds, and whether they use the same cutoff for both decisions. No evidence is found to reject the hypothesis that the experimental estimates in the communication stage are statistically equivalent to conditional thresholds in the action stage (a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, which is a pairwise nonparametric test, cannot reject the hypothesis at the 5% significance level); hence, the next result.

Result 3 *The action thresholds used are statistically indistinguishable in treatments with intention sharing and with intention and signal sharing.*

²¹ Under the parameters of the experiment, the theoretical threshold for sending a binary message is $x_C^* = 11.47$, and the theoretical thresholds in the action stage are $x^* = 11.47$ and $\bar{x}^* = 178.24$. We hypothesize that experimental thresholds will be similar to the theoretical predictions.

For one-stage communication treatments, the theoretical thresholds for sending a message and then actions based on the messages are the same. However, these communication treatments might not be taken the same way behaviorally. Given the estimates in Table 4, we can test whether the communication treatments provide the same quantitative thresholds. The unconditional action-stage thresholds in treatments T_S , T_I , and $T_{I\&S}$ are statistically different with $p < 0.05$ (Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test, $\chi^2 = 6.6$). However, the conditional thresholds in the action stage and the binary-message thresholds in the communication stage are statistically indistinguishable in treatments T_I and $T_{I\&S}$.

6 Conclusion

Communication is a natural aspect of environments modeled by global games, and taking communication effects into account is important. In these environments, theoretically, communication can reduce global games' inherent inefficiency region and decrease miscoordination. The welfare gain is based on strategic behavior in the communication stage, and individuals need to understand they are better off by being strategic.

The experimental data supports qualitative features of the equilibrium. In the three treatments where subjects can use letters corresponding to two alternatives, if both subjects agree on an intended action, they follow through with their initial intentions in over 99% of the cases. This result is consistent with the theoretical prediction of using the same threshold for sending a message and then following through if the other individual agrees. Experimental results provide evidence that miscoordination is reduced; however, subjects miss out on significant payoff improvement through reduction of the thresholds. The thresholds they use to send a message are similar to the one they would use in the action stage in the absence of communication. Hence, they state what they would have done in the absence of communication, and they miss out on the welfare improvement through reduction of the threshold.

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Appendices

A Proofs and Details

A.1 Expected Payoff

Recall the payoff structure:

$$g(\theta, x_j) := \begin{cases} \theta & \text{if } A(\theta, x_j) \text{ or } B(\theta) \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} A(\theta, x_j) &:= \{x_j \geq x_j^*\} \text{ and } \{\theta \geq \underline{\theta}\} \\ B(\theta) &:= \{\theta \geq \bar{\theta}\} \text{ and } \{\theta \geq \underline{\theta}\} \end{aligned}$$

Condition $B(\theta)$ reduces to $\{\theta \geq \bar{\theta}\}$. Hence, we have

$$\mathbb{E}[g(\theta, x_j)|x_i] = \int g(\theta, x_j)p(\theta, x_j|x_i)d(\theta, x_j) = \int_{A \cup B} \theta p(\theta, x_j|x_i)d(\theta, x_j)$$

Using basic properties of conditional probability and addition rule of probability we get

$$\mathbb{E}[g(\theta, x_j)|x_i] = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta [\Pr(x_j \geq x_j^*|x_i, \theta)] p(\theta|x_i)d\theta + \int_{\bar{\theta}}^{+\infty} \theta p(\theta|x_i)d\theta$$

B Solving the Model

In this section we solve the model and give more details on the main theorem stated in Section 3.2.1. There is an equilibrium under which messages are ignored and we get babbling in the communication stage and the baseline framework in the action stage. The question is whether the informative equilibria of the game exists.

The outline of the proof is as follows. First, the communication strategy is a threshold rule. Then, the paper develops a way to update the prior using a combination of two types of signals. Consequently, we get an action stage which is similar to the standard global games. Under an assumption on the ratio of private and public signals, we get a unique solution in the action stage.

The following is a definition of the equilibrium of the whole game that includes the communication and action stages.

Definition 1 Communication strategy x_C^* , action strategy a^* , and belief rule p , constitute a pure strategy symmetric perfect Bayes equilibrium if

[i] For any $x_i \in X_i$,

$$x_C^*(x_i) \in \arg \max_{m \in M_i} \int_{\theta \in \Theta} u(a(x_i; (m(x_i), m_{-i}), a_{-i}; \theta) p(\theta | x_i, \mathcal{I}) d\theta$$

[ii] For a given $m \in M_i$,

$$a^*(x_i; \mathcal{I}) \in \arg \max_{a \in A_i} \int_{\theta \in \Theta} u(a, a_{-i}; \theta) p(\theta | x_i, \mathcal{I}) d\theta$$

[iii] p is obtained by Bayes rule

$$p(\theta | x_i, \mathcal{I}) = \frac{p(x_i, \mathcal{I} | \theta) p(\theta)}{\int_{\Theta} p(x_i, \mathcal{I} | \theta) p(\theta) d\theta},$$

where

$$m(x_i) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } x_i \geq x_C \\ 0, & \text{o.w.} \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

and

$$a(x_i; \mathcal{I}) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } (x_i \geq x_C \wedge x_j \geq x_C) \vee (x_i \geq \bar{x}) \\ 0, & \text{o.w.} \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

$\mathcal{I} \in M_i \times M_j$, $\mathcal{I}_1 = (m, 1)$, $\mathcal{I}_0 = (m, 0)$ and $i \in I, i \neq j$.

Lemma 1 The communication strategy $m_i : \Theta \rightarrow M_i$ is a threshold rule.

Proof. See Appendix B.1. ■

Given Lemma 1, consider the action stage of the game and note that for different communication stage equilibria the posterior distribution will be different. In particular, in the case of babbling equilibrium, since there is no learning from the messages, the posterior distribution will coincide with the one in the baseline framework of Section 3.1. The case of partially informative communication stage is more involved, and it is discussed below, but more details are in Appendix B.1.2.

Player i 's information set is (x_i, m_j) , where $x_i | \theta \sim N(\theta, \sigma_i^2)$ and $m_j | \theta \sim \text{Bern}(1 - q(\theta))$ with $q(\theta; x_C^*, \sigma_j^2) = \Phi(x_C^*; \theta, \sigma_j^2)$. Combining continuous and binary signals with a prior on θ , results in the following result (see Appendix B.1.2).

Lemma 2 *If the prior for θ is $N(\theta_0, \sigma_\theta^2)$, then the posterior distribution of θ is Extended Skew-Normal, with density*

$$p(\theta|x_i, m_j) = \frac{1}{\Phi(\tau_c)} \frac{1}{\omega_c} \phi\left(\frac{\theta - \xi_c}{\omega_c}\right) \Phi\left(\tau_c \sqrt{1 + \alpha_c^2} + \alpha_c \frac{\theta - \xi_c}{\omega_c}\right)$$

where

$$\xi_c = \frac{\sigma_i^2 \theta_0 + \sigma_\theta^2 x_i}{\sigma_i^2 + \sigma_\theta^2}, \quad \omega_c^2 = \frac{\sigma_i^2 \sigma_\theta^2}{\sigma_i^2 + \sigma_\theta^2}$$

and

$$\alpha_c = \frac{\alpha}{\sqrt{1 + \sigma_i^2 / \sigma_\theta^2}}$$

$$\tau_c = \tau \sqrt{\frac{1 + \alpha^2}{1 + \alpha_c^2}} + \frac{\alpha(\theta_0 - x_i)}{\sigma_i(1 + \sigma_\theta^2 / \sigma_i^2) \sqrt{1 + \alpha_c^2}}$$

In abbreviated form, this is written $ESN(\xi_c, \omega_c, \alpha_c, \tau_c)$.

For any distribution $ESN(\xi_c, \omega_c, \alpha_c, \tau_c)$, ξ_c is referred to as the location parameter, ω_c is the scale parameter, α_c is the slant parameter, and truncation parameter τ_c (Azzalini (2013)). Using Lemma 2, the posterior mean and variance are given by the following expressions (see B.1.2 for derivation):

$$\mu = \xi_c + \frac{\phi(\tau_c)}{\Phi(\tau_c)} (\delta_c \omega_c), \quad \sigma^2 = \omega_c^2 \left(1 - \delta_c^2 \frac{\phi(\tau_c)}{\Phi(\tau_c)} \left[\tau_c + \frac{\phi(\tau_c)}{\Phi(\tau_c)} \right] \right)$$

respectively, where $\delta_c := \frac{\alpha_c}{\sqrt{1 + \alpha_c^2}}$. Note that if $\delta_c = 0$, then the mean μ is the location parameter ξ_c and the variance σ^2 is the scale parameter ω_c^2 .

The action stage is similar to the baseline game with the difference that players have ESN posteriors. As indicated by Vives (2005) and Van Zandt and Vives (2007), global games belong to the class of supermodular games and the equilibrium selected in the perturbed game is the Harsanyi and Selten (1988) risk-dominant one. The result of Van Zandt and Vives (2007) provides the existence of greatest and least Bayesian Nash equilibria and these are monotone in type (see Appendix ??).²² First, let us find the conditions that will provide the least and greatest Bayesian Nash Equilibria in monotone strategies and then prove uniqueness by showing that these two equilibria coincide.

Conditional on the other player's message ($m_j = 0$ or $m_j = 1$) and communication thresh-

²² One of the conditions, boundedness of the utility function is violated since $u(\theta) \rightarrow \infty$ when $\theta \rightarrow \infty$. However, Szkup and Trevino (2012) extend Van Zandt and Vives (2007) result for unbounded utility functions that are still integrable by adding further assumptions, see online Appendix B for more details.

old x_C^* , we assume that players follow a symmetric threshold strategy

$$a_i(x_i; x_C^*, \mathcal{I}) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } x_i \geq x^*(\mathcal{I}) \\ 0, & \text{if } x_i < x^*(\mathcal{I}) \end{cases}$$

where $\mathcal{I} = (m_i, m_j)$. Based on whether $m_j = 0$ or $m_j = 1$, $x^*(\mathcal{I})$ will be different. Hence, there are two thresholds: the other player sent “attack” message, call it \underline{x}^* and the other player sent “no attack” message, call it \bar{x}^* .

Equation 7 provides the expected payoff in the action stage for a player i choosing to attack conditional on information $(x_i, x_C^*, \mathcal{I})$. In addition, player i assumes that player j follows a threshold strategy $x_j^*(\mathcal{I})$.

$$V_a(x_i, x_j^*, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}) = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta [\Pr(x_j \geq x_j^* | \theta, x_i, x_C^*, \mathcal{I})] p(\theta | x_i, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}) d\theta + \int_{\bar{\theta}}^{\infty} \theta p(\theta | x_i, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}) d\theta - c \quad (7)$$

where

$$p(\theta | x_i, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}) = \frac{p(x_i, x_C^*, \mathcal{I} | \theta) p(\theta)}{\int_{\Theta} p(x_i, x_C^*, \mathcal{I} | \theta) p(\theta) d\theta} \quad (8)$$

$\mathcal{I} \in M_i \times M_j$, $x_i \in X_i$ and $i \in I$, $i \neq j$. Next, the equilibrium of the action stage is defined.

Definition 2 Given messages $m = (m_i, m_j)$ and message thresholds $x_C^* = (m_i^*, m_j^*)$ from the communication stage, an equilibrium in monotone strategies for action stage of the game is a pure strategy profile $\mathbf{a}^* = (a_i^*, a_j^*)$ and corresponding thresholds $\mathbf{x}^* = (x_i^*, x_j^*)$ such that x_i^* solves

$$V_a(x_i^*, x_j^*; \mathcal{I}) = 0,$$

where

$$a_i^*(x_i; x_C^*, \mathcal{I}) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } x_i \geq x_i^*(\mathcal{I}) \\ 0, & \text{if } x_i < x_i^*(\mathcal{I}) \end{cases}$$

for all $i \in I$, $i \neq j$.

Conditional on the case of $m_j = 1$ or $m_j = 0$, $\underline{x}^* := x_i^*(\mathcal{I}_1)$ and $\bar{x}^* := x_i^*(\mathcal{I}_0)$ solve

$$V_a(\underline{x}^*, \underline{x}^*; x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1) = 0 \text{ and } V_a(\bar{x}^*, \bar{x}^*; x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_0) = 0,$$

where $\mathcal{I}_1 = (\cdot, 1)$ and $\mathcal{I}_0 = (\cdot, 0)$. The expected payoff of attack action with realized signal x_i , conditional on $m_j = 1$, $a_j = 1$ and $m_j = 0$, $a_j = 0$, can be written as

$$V_1 = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\infty} \theta p(\theta | x_i, x_i, \mathcal{I}_1) d\theta - c \quad (9)$$

$$V_0 = \int_{\bar{\theta}}^{\infty} \theta p(\theta|x_i, x_i, \mathcal{I}_0) d\theta - c \quad (10)$$

where $\mathcal{I}_1 = (\cdot, 1)$ and $\mathcal{I}_0 = (\cdot, 0)$. Observe that both equations, (9) and (10), are bounded from below by $-c$. In addition, recall that the utility function $u_i(a; \theta)$ is not bounded from above. Using Lemma 6 we get that V_1 and V_0 are increasing in x_i , and therefore, we have a single crossing for each case.

Similar to the literature on global games, there exists a unique solution of the action stage of the game given a condition on the relative informativeness of the private signal compared to the public signal. If σ_i/σ_θ is sufficiently small, that is, the private signal is sufficiently more precise than the public signal, then we get the following proposition.

Proposition 1 *There exists a unique, dominance solvable equilibrium of the actions stage of the game in which player $i \in I$ uses threshold strategies, characterized by $(\underline{x}^*, \bar{x}^*)$, if $\gamma(\sigma_\theta, \sigma_i) > \sqrt{2}$.*

Proof. See Appendix B.1.4. ■

If player j 's message conveys an intention to attack, then player i takes an attack action if his private signal is greater than \underline{x}^* . If player j 's message states an intention to abstain from attacking, player i is not able to persuade player j to switch and attack in the action stage. However, even if player j is not attacking, player i might still decide to challenge the status quo. If the private signal is greater than the cutoff \bar{x}^* then player i takes an attack action, as he believes the state of the world to be in the region where one player suffices to successfully overturn the status quo.

B.1 Proof of Theorem 1

B.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1

Proof. Recall that $m_i : X_i \rightarrow M_i$, $a_i : X_i \times M \rightarrow A_i$ and $u_i : A \times \Theta \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, where $M = M_i \times M_j$, $A = A_i \times A_j$, for $i \in I$ and $i \neq j$. The expected utility can be written as

$$\int_{\theta \in \Theta} a_i(x_i; (m_i(x_i), m_{-i})) \left[\theta \left(\mathbb{1}_{\{\theta \in [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]\}} a_j(x_j; (m_i(x_i), m_{-i})) + \mathbb{1}_{\{\theta \geq \bar{\theta}\}} \right) - c \right] p(\theta|x_i, (m_i(x_i), m_{-i})) d\theta \quad (11)$$

Let $\varsigma = (m, a, p)$ be a symmetric pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Take x_1 and $x_2 \in X_i$, such that $x_1 < x_2$ and $m_i(x_1) \neq m_i(x_2)$ and let

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{\theta \in \Theta} u(a(x_2; (m(x_2), m_{-i})), a_{-i}; \theta) p(\theta|x_2, (m(x_2), m_{-i})) d\theta &\geq \\ \int_{\theta \in \Theta} u(a(x_1; (m(x_1), m_{-i})), a_{-i}; \theta) p(\theta|x_1, (m(x_1), m_{-i})) d\theta \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

(The above conditions exclude the equilibria in which $m_i(x_i) = m_i(x_j)$ for all $x_i, x_j \in X_i$. Since, we are looking for an informative communication strategy, where some information is transmitted, the condition is without loss of generality.) Consider $x_3 \in X_i$, such that $x_3 > x_2$. Note, communication strategy m_i enters expected payoff function through $Pr(a_j = 1|\cdot, (m(\cdot), \cdot))$ and $p(\theta|\cdot, (m(\cdot), \cdot))$. Then, since $p(\theta|x_2, \mathcal{I}) > p(\theta|x_1, \mathcal{I})$, for any $\mathcal{I} \in M$ and given equation 12, we get

$$Pr(a_j = 1|x_2, (m(x_2), m_{-i})) \geq Pr(a_j = 1|x_1, (m(x_1), m_{-i})) \quad (13)$$

Then, equation 13 yields

$$\int_{\theta \in \Theta} u(a(x_3; (m(x_2), m_{-i})), a_{-i}; \theta) p(\theta|x_3, (m(x_2), m_{-i})) d\theta \geq \quad (14)$$

$$\int_{\theta \in \Theta} u(a(x_3; (m(x_1), m_{-i})), a_{-i}; \theta) p(\theta|x_3, (m(x_1), m_{-i})) d\theta \quad (15)$$

therefore, $m(x_3) = m(x_2)$. ■

B.1.2 Combining Binary and Continuous Signals

The state of the world θ is drawn from a normal distribution with mean θ_0 and variance σ_θ^2

$$\theta = \theta_0 + \varepsilon_\theta \sigma_\theta$$

player i 's private signal is draw from a normal distribution with mean θ and variance σ_i^2

$$x_i = \theta + \varepsilon_i \sigma_i$$

The player j 's signal is x_j and player i receives a message m_j

$$x_j = \theta + \varepsilon_j \sigma_j$$

$$m_j = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } x_j \geq x_C^* \\ 0, & \text{if } x_j < x_C^* \end{cases}$$

So the distribution of m_j is

$$m_j \sim \text{Bern}(1 - q(\theta))$$

where

$$q(\theta) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma_j} \int_{-\infty}^{x_C^*} \exp\left(-\frac{(y - \theta)^2}{2\sigma_j^2}\right) dy$$

Lemma 3 The density of m_j given θ can be written as

$$p(m_j|\theta) = \Phi(\zeta_j\theta; \zeta_jx_C^*, \sigma_j^2)$$

where $\zeta_j := \text{sgn}(2m_j - 1)$.

Proof. As m_j is a Bernoulli-distributed random variable,

$$p(m_j|\theta) = (1 - q(\theta))^{m_j} \times q(\theta)^{1-m_j}$$

where $q(\theta; x_C^*, \sigma_j^2) := \Phi(x_C^*; \theta, \sigma_j^2)$. First, notice that $\Phi(x_C^*; \theta, \sigma_j^2) = 1 - \Phi(\theta; x_C^*, \sigma_j^2)$.

When $m_j = 1$, we have

$$p(m_j = 1|\theta) = \Phi(\theta; x_C^*, \sigma_j^2)$$

When $m_j = 0$:

$$p(m_j = 0|\theta) = \Phi(x_C^*; \theta, \sigma_j^2) = \Phi(-\theta; -x_C^*, \sigma_j^2)$$

Thus

$$p(m_j|\theta) = \Phi(\zeta_j\theta; \zeta_jx_C^*, \sigma_j^2)$$

where $\zeta_j := \text{sgn}(2m_j - 1)$. ■

Lemma 4 The likelihood function of θ , with data (x_i, m_j) , is Extended Skew-Normal with parameters $ESN(X_i, \sigma_i, \alpha, \tau)$, and density

$$p(\theta) = \frac{1}{\Phi(\tau)} \frac{1}{\sigma_i} \phi\left(\frac{\theta - x_i}{\sigma_i}\right) \Phi\left(\alpha_0 + \alpha \frac{\theta - x_i}{\sigma_i}\right)$$

where

$$\alpha := \zeta_j \times \sigma_i / \sigma_j, \quad \alpha_0 := \zeta_j \times (x_i - x_C^*) / \sigma_j, \quad \tau := \frac{\alpha_0}{\sqrt{1 + \alpha^2}}$$

Proof. As x_i and m_j are conditionally independent, then, by Lemma 3,

$$p(x_i, m_j|\theta) = \phi(\theta; x_i, \sigma_i^2) \Phi(\zeta_j\theta; \zeta_jx_C^*, \sigma_j^2)$$

As a function of θ ,

$$p(\theta|x_i, m_j) \propto \phi(\theta; x_i, \sigma_i^2) \Phi(\zeta_j\theta; \zeta_jx_C^*, \sigma_j^2)$$

Let $\tau := \frac{\alpha_0}{\sqrt{1 + \alpha^2}}$. Then

$$\int \phi(\theta; x_i, \sigma_i^2) \Phi(\zeta_j\theta; \zeta_jx_C^*, \sigma_j^2) d\theta = \Phi(\tau)$$

Thus

$$p(\theta) = \frac{1}{\Phi(\tau)} \frac{1}{\sigma_i} \phi\left(\frac{\theta - X_i}{\sigma_i}\right) \Phi\left(\alpha_0 + \alpha \frac{\theta - X_i}{\sigma_i}\right)$$

which is the pdf of an Extended Skew-Normal (ESN) distribution. ■

The likelihood is extended skewed normal with parameters $ESN(X_i, \sigma_i, \alpha, \tau)$, and the prior is $N(\theta_0, \sigma_\theta)$.

Proof of Lemma 2. Lemma 4 establishes the likelihood function of θ . With a normal prior for θ , we use the updating formulae in Azzalini (2013). ■

Mean and Variance

The moment generating function (eq 2.40, Azzalini (2013)):

$$M(t) := \mathbb{E} \{ \exp(\xi t + \sigma_i Z t) \} = \exp(\xi t + 0.5 \sigma_i^2 t^2) \frac{\Phi(\tau + \delta \sigma_i t)}{\Phi(\tau)}$$

The mean is $\mu = \frac{d}{dt} M(t)|_{t=0}$. Let's take the derivative

$$\frac{d}{dt} M(t) = \exp(\xi t + 0.5 \sigma_i^2 t^2) \left[\xi + \sigma_i^2 t \right] \frac{\Phi(\tau + \delta \sigma_i t)}{\Phi(\tau)} + \exp(\xi t + 0.5 \sigma_i^2 t^2) \frac{\phi(\tau + \delta \sigma_i t)}{\Phi(\tau)} (\delta \sigma_i)$$

Evaluate at $t = 0$,

$$\mu = \frac{d}{dt} M(t)|_{t=0} = \xi + \frac{\phi(\tau)}{\Phi(\tau)} (\delta \sigma_i)$$

When $\tau = 0$

$$\frac{d}{dt} M(t)|_{t=0} = \xi + \sqrt{\frac{2}{\pi}} (\delta \sigma_i)$$

Note that, in our case, we actually have

$$\int \theta \phi(\theta; X_i, \sigma_i) \Phi(\theta; x_C^*, \sigma_j) d\theta$$

which is missing the normalizing term $\Phi(\tau)$. So

$$\int \theta \phi(\theta; X_i, \sigma_i) \Phi(\theta; x_C^*, \tau_j) d\theta = X_i \Phi(\tau) + \phi(\tau) \delta \sigma_i$$

Now for the variance. Need the second derivative of $M(t)$:

$$\frac{d^2}{dt^2} M(t)|_{t=0} = \xi^2 + \sigma_i^2 + \xi \frac{\phi(\tau)}{\Phi(\tau)} (\delta \sigma_i) + \xi \frac{\phi(\tau)}{\Phi(\tau)} (\delta \sigma_i) - \frac{\phi(\tau)}{\Phi(\tau)} \tau (\delta \sigma_i)^2$$

Then

$$\sigma^2 = \frac{d^2}{dt^2} M(t)|_{t=0} - \left[\frac{d}{dt} M(t)|_{t=0} \right]^2 = \sigma_i^2 - \frac{\phi(\tau)}{\Phi(\tau)} \tau (\delta \sigma_i)^2 - \left[\frac{\phi(\tau)}{\Phi(\tau)} (\delta \sigma_i) \right]^2$$

or

$$\sigma^2 = \sigma_i^2 \left(1 - \frac{\phi(\tau)}{\Phi(\tau)} \delta^2 \left[\tau + \frac{\phi(\tau)}{\Phi(\tau)} \right] \right)$$

When $\tau = 0$:

$$\sigma^2 = \sigma_i^2 \left(1 - \frac{1/(2\pi)}{0.5^2} \delta^2 \right)$$

or

$$\sigma^2 = \sigma_i^2 \left(1 - \frac{2}{\pi} \delta^2 \right)$$

So we say that θ with pdf

$$p(\theta) = \frac{1}{\Phi(\tau)} \phi(\theta; X_i, \sigma_i) \Phi(\theta; x_C^*, \sigma_j)$$

is a random variable with an extended Skew-Normal distribution, and parameters

$$\alpha := \sigma_i/\sigma_j, \quad \delta := \alpha/\sqrt{1+\alpha^2}, \quad \alpha_0 := (X_i - x_C^*)/\sigma_j, \quad \tau = \frac{\alpha_0}{\sqrt{1+\alpha^2}}$$

which yields the standard notation of

$$p(\theta) = \frac{1}{\Phi(\tau)} \frac{1}{\omega} \phi\left(\frac{\theta - \xi}{\omega}\right) \Phi\left(\alpha_0 + \alpha \frac{\theta - \xi}{\omega}\right)$$

where $\xi := X_i, \omega := \sigma_i$.

The CDF. Using Eq. 2.49, [Azzalini \(2013\)](#):

$$\Phi(x; \alpha, \tau) = \Phi(x) - \frac{1}{\Phi(\tau)} [H(x, \tau; \alpha) - H(\tau, x; \alpha)]$$

where I've defined

$$H(y, z; \alpha) = T\left(y, \alpha + y^{-1}z\sqrt{1+\alpha^2}\right) - T\left(y, y^{-1}\tau\right)$$

and T is Owen's T -function:

$$T(h, a) = \frac{1}{2\pi} \int_0^a \frac{\exp(-0.5h^2(1+x^2))}{1+x^2} dx$$

An alternative representation using the bivariate normal distribution:

$$\Phi(x; \alpha, \tau) = \frac{\Phi_B(x, \tau; -\delta)}{\Phi(\tau)}$$

where

$$\Phi_B(x, y; \rho) = \int_{-\infty}^x \int_{-\infty}^y \phi(t) \phi\left(\frac{u + \delta t}{\sqrt{1 - \delta^2}}\right) \frac{1}{\sqrt{1 - \delta^2}} du dt$$

B.1.3 ML Estimator

If we did not have a closed form solution for the updating rule, we would have used the following MLE.

Log-likelihood is

$$\ln p(\theta|x_i, m_j) \propto \ln \phi(\theta; x_i, \sigma_i) + \ln \Phi(\zeta_j \theta; \zeta_j x_C^*, \sigma_j)$$

Derivative of the log-likelihood:

$$\frac{d}{d\theta} \ln[p(\theta|x_i, m_j)] = (1/\sigma_i^2)(x_i - \theta) + \kappa'(\theta)$$

Set equal to zero and rearrange: the ML value of θ solves

$$\theta - \sigma_i^2 \kappa'(\theta) = X_i$$

where we define

$$\kappa(\theta; x_C^*, \sigma_j^2) := \ln [\Phi(\zeta_j \theta; \zeta_j x_C^*, \sigma_j)],$$

and so

$$\kappa'(\theta; x_C^*, \sigma_j^2) := \frac{\phi(\zeta_j \theta; \zeta_j x_C^*, \sigma_j)}{\Phi(\zeta_j \theta; \zeta_j x_C^*, \sigma_j)}$$

Variance of $\hat{\theta}$

The second derivative of the log-likelihood w.r.t. θ is:

$$\frac{d^2}{d\theta^2} \ln[p(\theta|x_i, m_j)] = -1/\sigma_i^2 + \kappa''(\theta)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \kappa''(\theta; x_C^*, \sigma_j^2) &= \frac{\phi(\zeta_j \theta; \zeta_j x_C^*, \sigma_j)}{\Phi(\zeta_j \theta; \zeta_j x_C^*, \sigma_j)} \zeta_j (x_C^* - \theta) \sigma_j^2 + (-1) \left(\frac{\phi(\zeta_j \theta; \zeta_j x_C^*, \sigma_j)}{\Phi(\zeta_j \theta; \zeta_j x_C^*, \sigma_j)} \right)^2 \\ &= \kappa'(\theta; x_C^*, \sigma_j^2) [\zeta_j (x_C^* - \theta) \sigma_j^2 - \kappa'(\theta; x_C^*, \sigma_j^2)] \end{aligned}$$

The asymptotic variance is the inverse of Fisher's information matrix.

$$\begin{aligned} I(\theta) &= -\mathbb{E}_\theta \left(\frac{d^2}{d\theta^2} \ln[p(\theta|x_i, m_j)] \right) \\ &= -\mathbb{E}_\theta \left(-(1/\sigma_i^2) + \kappa''(\theta) \right) \\ &= 1/\sigma_i^2 - \kappa''(\theta) \end{aligned}$$

B.1.4 Results on Expected Payoff

Action stage expected payoff can be written as

$$V((\tilde{x}^*, x^*)|x_C^*, \mathcal{I}) = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta Pr[x_j \geq x^*|\theta, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}] p(\theta|\tilde{x}^*, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}) d\theta + \int_{\bar{\theta}}^{\infty} \theta p(\theta|\tilde{x}^*, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}) d\theta - c$$

$$\mathcal{I} = (m(\tilde{x}^*), m(x^*)) \in M.$$

Posterior belief

$$p(\theta|\tilde{x}^*, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}) = \frac{p(\tilde{x}^*, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}|\theta)p(\theta)}{\int_{\Theta} p(\tilde{x}^*, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}|\theta)p(\theta)d\theta},$$

$\tilde{x}^* = x_C^*$ solves $V((\tilde{x}^*, x_C^*)|\mathcal{I}_1) = c$, where

$$\begin{aligned} V((\tilde{x}^*, x_C^*)|\mathcal{I}_1) &= \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta \underbrace{Pr[x_j \geq x_C^*|\theta, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1]}_{=1} p(\theta|\tilde{x}^*, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1) d\theta + \int_{\bar{\theta}}^{\infty} \theta p(\theta|\tilde{x}^*, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1) d\theta - c \\ &= \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\infty} \theta p(\theta|\tilde{x}^*, \mathcal{I}_1) d\theta - c \end{aligned}$$

$\tilde{x}^* = \bar{x}^*$ solves $V((\tilde{x}^*, x_C^*)|\mathcal{I}_0) = c$, where

$$\begin{aligned} V((\tilde{x}^*, x_C^*)|\mathcal{I}_0) &= \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta \underbrace{Pr[x_j \geq x_C^*|\theta, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_0]}_{=0} p(\theta|\tilde{x}^*, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_0) d\theta + \int_{\bar{\theta}}^{\infty} \theta p(\theta|\tilde{x}^*, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_0) d\theta \\ &= \int_{\bar{\theta}}^{\infty} \theta p(\theta|\tilde{x}^*, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_0) d\theta \end{aligned}$$

Consider the case when $\mathcal{I} = \mathcal{I}_1$ and symmetric action stage threshold is x^*

$$V((x^*, x^*)|x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1) = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta Pr[x_j \geq x^*|\theta, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1] p(\theta|x^*, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1) d\theta + \int_{\bar{\theta}}^{\infty} \theta p(\theta|x^*, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1) d\theta - c$$

If the expression $\frac{dV((x^*, x^*)|x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1)}{dx^*}$ is always positive, then there is a unique value of x^* solving $V(x^*, x^*|x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1) = 0$ and the unique strategy surviving iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies is a threshold rule with a cutoff x^* . In addition, since we know that $V((x_C^*, x_C^*)|x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1) = 0$, then we get the unique cutoff $x^* = x_C^*$.

Lemma 5 $\frac{dV((x^*, x^*)|x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1)}{dx^*} > 0$.

Proof.

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{dV((x^*, x^*)|x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1)}{dx^*} &= \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \theta \left(Pr[x_j \geq x^* | \theta, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1] \frac{\partial p(\theta | x^*, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1)}{\partial x^*} + p(\theta | x^*, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1) \frac{\partial p(\theta | x^*, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1)}{\partial x^*} \right) d\theta \\
&\quad + \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\infty} \theta \frac{\partial p(\theta | x^*, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1)}{\partial x^*} d\theta \\
&\geq \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\infty} \frac{\phi(\tau_c)}{\Phi(\tau_c)} \frac{\zeta}{\sqrt{1 + \alpha_c^2}} \underbrace{\left(\frac{1}{\sigma_j(1 + \sigma_\theta^2/\sigma_i^2)} - \frac{\sqrt{1 + \alpha^2}}{\sigma_i^2 + \sigma_j^2} \right)}_{> 0, \text{ if } \gamma(\sigma_i, \sigma_\theta) > \sqrt{2}} d\theta \\
&\quad + \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\infty} \zeta \frac{\phi(\tau_c \sqrt{1 + \alpha_c^2} + \alpha_c \frac{\theta - \xi_c}{\omega_c})}{\Phi(\tau_c \sqrt{1 + \alpha_c^2} + \alpha_c \frac{\theta - \xi_c}{\omega_c})} \underbrace{\left(\frac{\sqrt{1 + \alpha^2}}{\sigma_i^2 + \sigma_j^2} - \frac{1}{\sigma_j(1 + \sigma_\theta^2/\sigma_i^2)} \right)}_{> 0, \text{ if } \gamma(\sigma_i, \sigma_\theta) > \sqrt{2}} d\theta \\
&\quad \left(\text{If } \gamma(\sigma_i, \sigma_\theta) := \frac{r(r^2 + 1)}{\sigma_\theta} > \sqrt{2}, \text{ where } r := \frac{\sigma_\theta}{\sigma_i}, \text{ then} \right) \\
&> 0
\end{aligned}$$

■

Lemma 6 *Conditional on attacking in the action stage, restricted expected payoff function $V(x_i, x_j | x_C^*, \mathcal{I})$ is increasing in x_i and it is decreasing in x_j .*

Proof. First, consider the case of $\mathcal{I} = \mathcal{I}_1$, then

$$V((x, x^*) | x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1) = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\infty} \theta p(\theta | x, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1) d\theta - c$$

and

$$\frac{\partial V((x, x^*) | x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1)}{\partial x} = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\infty} \theta \frac{\partial p(\theta | x, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_1)}{\partial x} d\theta \geq 0$$

Similarly, if $\mathcal{I} = \mathcal{I}_0$, then

$$\frac{\partial V((x, x^*) | x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_0)}{\partial x} = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\infty} \theta \frac{\partial p(\theta | x, x_C^*, \mathcal{I}_0)}{\partial x} d\theta \geq 0$$

Finally, for any $\mathcal{I} \in M$

$$\frac{\partial V((x, x^*)|x_C^*, \mathcal{I})}{\partial x^*} = \int_{\bar{\theta}}^{\infty} \theta \frac{\partial p(\theta|x, x_C^*, \mathcal{I})}{\partial x^*} d\theta = 0 \leq 0$$

■

Simple Example to Illustrate the Intuition

Game

	I	N
I	-5	-5
N	0	0

Figure 10: Low type: *Dominant Strategy is not to Attack*

	I	N
I	10 - 5	-5
N	0	0

Figure 11: Medium type: *attack only if the other is attacking*

	I	N
I	10 - 5	10 - 5
N	0	0

Figure 12: High type: *Dominant Strategy is to Attack*

Suppose there are only two messages available, m and m'

Baliga and Morris (2002) Equilibrium:

Messages sent

$$\tilde{m}_i(t_i) = \begin{cases} m, & \text{if } t_i = L \text{ or } H \\ m', & \text{if } t_i = M \end{cases}$$

Actions taken

$$\tilde{a}_i(t_i, m_i, m_j) = \begin{cases} I, & \text{if } (t_i, m_i, m_j) = (L, m, m), (L, m', m') \text{ or } (M, m', m') \\ N, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Consider the following deviation: Suppose player i is type H and message profile is (m, m') . Equilibrium prescribes this type not to invest. However, the player gets 0 if the player does not invest and 5 if the player invests. The key difference is that sometimes, even if player i is sure that player j is not joining, then player i would still want to join. This difference is what drives the differences and allows for the results such as Lemma 1, that are not present in Baliga and Morris (2002). This is also a reason why the type of equilibria where communication strategy is non-monotonic such as Example 4 in Baliga and Morris (2002) is not present in this paper.

In addition, unlike in the example above, in incomplete information case, even when it is a dominant strategy to invest, the other player joining increases the probability of success. Therefore, the high types would never pretend to be low types. Baliga and Morris (2002) have independent types; however, in many environments that global games are used in, types are drawn from the same distribution.

C Extra Figures and Tables

C.1 Figures




Figure 13: Sample Screen of Instant Revisions

C.2 Tables

Breakdown of threshold strategies by rounds and types.

C.3 Survey Results

<i>Treatments</i>	Rounds	Threshold Strategy	Perfect	Almost Perfect
T_I	All 50	98.0%	28.0%	70.0%
	Last 25	98.0%	88.0%	10.0%
$T_{I\&S}$	All 50	87.5%	32.5%	55.0%
	Last 25	97.5%	90.0%	7.5%

Table 5: Threshold strategy usage

<i>Variable</i>	%
Gender: Female	44.44
Game Theory: Yes	15.66
GPA (self reported)	3.5
Major:	
Computer Science	17.68
Economics	10.61
Humanities	9.091
Math	5.051
Physics/Chemistry	2.525
Other	54.55

Table 6: Survey Summary