

Long Polling

(a)

$$ALLD \rightarrow \{0, 0, 0, 0\}$$

$$TFT \rightarrow \{1, 0, 1, 0\}$$


$$ALLC \rightarrow \{1, 1, 1, 1\}$$

Look at payoff for each combination.

ALLD - TFT, ALLD - ALLC, ALLD - ALLD,
TFT - ALLC, TFT - TFT, ALLC - ALLC.

ALLD-TFT


$$M_{ALLD-TFT} = \begin{matrix} & CC & CD & DC & DD \\ \begin{matrix} C \\ D \end{matrix} & \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \end{matrix}$$



DD is an absorbing state. The expected payoff is then zero.

ALLD-ALLC


$$M_{ALLD-ALLC} = \begin{matrix} & CC & CD & DC & DD \\ \begin{matrix} C \\ D \end{matrix} & \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \end{matrix}$$



DD is absorbing state. Payoff is: $\frac{B}{2}$.

ALLD-ALLD


$$M_{ALLD-ALLD} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$



DD is absorbing. Payoff is 0.
(2016)

TFT-ALLC


$$M_{TFT-ALLC} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$



CC is absorbing. Payoff is (B-C).

TFT-TFT

$$M_{TFT-TFT} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$



If initial is CC → payoff is (B-C).


If initial is DD → payoff is 0.

If initial is CD or DC → payoff is $\left(\frac{B}{2} + \frac{b}{2} - C\right) / 2 = \left(\frac{B-C}{2}\right)$

on avg

ALLC-ALLC

$$M_{ALLC-ALLC} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$



CC is absorbing. Payoff is (B-C).

(a)

	ALLD	TFT
ALLD	0, 0	0, 0
TFT	0, 0	(b-c), (b-c)

assuming mutual
stop is (c, c).

	ALLC	TFT
ALLC	(b-c), (b-c)	b-c, b-c
TFT	b-c, b-c	b-c, b-c

	ALLD	ALLC
ALLD	0, 0	$\frac{b}{2}, \frac{b}{2} - c$
ALLC	$\frac{b}{2} - c, \frac{b}{2}$	b-c, b-c.

(a) Write down the payoffs & fitness.

In general,

$$\begin{array}{cc} & \begin{matrix} A & B \end{matrix} \\ \begin{matrix} A \\ B \end{matrix} & \begin{pmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{pmatrix} \end{array}$$

i individuals of A
($N-i$) in n a B.

Expected payoff:

$$\text{to A} \rightarrow F_i = \frac{a(i-1) + b(N-i)}{N-1}$$

$$\text{to B} \rightarrow G_i = \frac{c \cdot i + d(N-i-1)}{N-1}$$

Let's look at the 6 possible combinations:

• ALLD-TFT.

$$\text{Exp. payoffs} \begin{cases} F_{\text{ALLD}} = \frac{0 \cdot (i-1) + 0(N-i)}{N-1} = 0 \\ G_{\text{TFT}} = \frac{0 \cdot i + (B-C)(N-i-1)}{N-1} = \frac{(B-C)(N-i-1)}{N-1} \end{cases}$$

$$\text{Fitnesses} \begin{cases} f_{\text{ALLD}} = 1 - w + w(0) = 1 - w \\ g_{\text{TFT}} = 1 - w + w \left[\frac{(B-C)(N-i-1)}{N-1} \right] \end{cases}$$

• ALLD - ~~ALLC~~

$$F_{\text{ALLD}} = \frac{0 \cdot (\bar{n}-1) + \left(\frac{B}{2}\right) (N-\bar{n})}{N-1} = \frac{\frac{B}{2} (N-\bar{n})}{N-1}$$

$$G_{\text{ALLC}} = \frac{\left(\frac{B}{2}-C\right) \bar{n} + (B-C) (N-\bar{n}-1)}{N-1}$$

$$f_{\text{ALLD}} = 1 - w + w \cdot \left[\frac{\frac{B}{2} (N-\bar{n})}{N-1} \right]$$

$$g_{\text{ALLC}} = 1 - w + w \cdot \left[\frac{\left(\frac{B}{2}-C\right) \bar{n} + (B-C) (N-\bar{n}-1)}{N-1} \right]$$

• ALLD - ALLD

$$F_{\text{ALLD}} = 0$$

$$G_{\text{ALLD}} = 0$$

$$f_{\text{ALLD}} = 1 - w$$

$$g_{\text{ALLD}} = 1 - w$$

• ~~ALLC~~ ALLC - TFT

$$F_{\text{ALLC}} = \frac{(B-C) (\bar{n}-1) + (B-C) (N-\bar{n})}{N-1}$$

~~ALLC~~

$$G_{TFT} = \frac{(B-c)\bar{i} + (B-c)(N-\bar{i}-1)}{N-1} = B-c$$

$$f_{ALLC} = 1-w + w \left[\frac{(B-c)(\bar{i}-1) + (B-c)(N-\bar{i})}{N-1} \right]$$

$$g_{TFT} = 1-w + w \left[\frac{(B-c)\bar{i} + (B-c)(N-\bar{i}-1)}{N-1} \right]$$

• TFT - TFT

$$F_{TFT} = \frac{(B-c)\bar{i} + (B-c)(N-\bar{i}-1)}{N-1} = B-c$$

$$G_{TFT} = B-c$$

$$f_{TFT} = 1-w + w(B-c)$$

$$g_{TFT} = 1-w + w(B-c)$$

• ALLC - ALLC

$$F_{ALLC} = B-c$$

$$G_{ALLC} = B-c$$

} Same cancellations
as above.

$$f_{ALLC} = 1-w + w(B-c)$$

$$g_{ALLC} = 1-w + w(B-c)$$