
SitePassword

A Different Kind of Password Manager



"Passwords are terrible, and we won't be using them in 10 years."

"Passwords are terrible, and we won't be using them in 10 years."


Everybody

"Passwords are terrible, and we won't be using them in 10 years."


Everybody


2013 2003 1993 1983 1973 1963

What's So Bad about Passwords?














Passwords are hard for people to remember and easy for computers to guess.

THROUGH 20 YEARS OF EFFORT, WE'VE SUCCESSFULLY TRAINED EVERYONE TO USE PASSWORDS THAT ARE HARD FOR HUMANS TO REMEMBER. BUT EASY FOR COMPUTERS TO GUESS.

Do You Use a Password Manager?

One of the top recommended security practices but only 40% use them

Do You Use a Password Manager?

One of the top recommended security practices but only 40% use them

- 1Password (\$36)
- LastPass (\$36)
- DashLane (\$60)
- Keeper (\$35)
- ZohoVault (Free or \$54)
- Avira (\$32)
- RememBear (Shutting down)

- PassBolt (Free)
- Bitwarden (Free or \$40)
- LogMeOnce (\$48)
- NordPass (Free or \$36)
- PasswordBoss (Free?)
- RoboForm (\$24)
- Your Browser (Free)

Password Manager Characteristics

- Requirements
 - Easy to use
 - Engenders trust
 - Secure
 - Use from anywhere

- Other desirable features
 - Strong passwords
 - Different for every site
 - Easy to change (Ask me why that's bad)

What is a Password Manager?

A software application designed to **store** and manage online credentials. It also generates passwords. Usually, the passwords are stored in an encrypted database locked behind a master password. — <u>malwarebytes.com</u>

A password manager is an app on your phone, tablet, or computer that **stores** your passwords, so you don't have to remember them. — <u>ncsc.gov</u>

A password manager is a service that helps you generate and **store** long, unique passwords for all your online accounts. — <u>consumerreports.org</u>

So What's So Bad about That?

- Where are your passwords stored?
 - On your machine?
 - In the cloud? Who's cloud?
 - How are they stored?
- It costs money
 - To manage your account
 - To pay for the cloud resources

And then There's This to Worry About



We recently detected unusual activity within a third-party cloud storage service, ...

We have determined that an unauthorized party, ...was able to gain access to certain elements of our customers' information. Our customers' passwords remain safely encrypted due to LastPass's Zero Knowledge architecture.

A Different Approach

A Different Kind of Password Manager Don't Remember Your Passwords, Calculate Them

- It is free
 - No accounts to manage
 - No password storage needed
- Can even be used without network access
- You are in control
 - Carry a piece of paper with everything you need to get your passwords.
 - It's not great if you lose it, but it isn't terrible either.

A Brief History of SitePassword


The Earliest Days 2003

The Earliest Days 2003



HP Anti-Phishing Toolbar for IE 2005


HP Anti-Phishing Toolbar for IE 2005



Chrome Extension 2012

Chrome Extension 2012

- Some Problems
 - No sync across machines
 - Unhappy with personas
 - Only finds 60% of password fields
- Only available for testers
- Only I used it for the next 10 years



And Then 2021

- Google says I have to update it.
- "No problem," I say to myself. "It'll only take a week or so."
- A year later

Why It Took So Long


- Google's changes
 - From a persistent background page to a transient service worker
 - Everything is async
- Fixed what I didn't like
 - Always(?) finds password field
 - Synchronizes across machines
 - Handles different personas





Let Google Do the Heavy Lifting

- Store settings in bookmarks
 - Every browser syncs bookmarks
 - But Google doesn't merge conflicts
- Supporting personas with Google Profiles
 - Switch Profile without logging out
 - Each Profile has its own bookmarks


A Taste of SitePassword








Ask the Guru




User name: alan

Password: Click here for password




Ask the Guru




User name: alan

Password:





Ask the Guru




User name: alan

Password: Click here for password







Usable Security

Usable Security

No system can be secure if users don't understand the implications of their actions.

Ping's 10 Princples for a Secure UX

- 1. Path of Least Resistance: Make the easy way the secure way.
- 2. Appropriate Boundaries: Make distinctions matter to the user.
- 3. Explicit Authorization: Authorize only by explicit user action.
- 4. Visibility: All security related decisions must be viewable.
- 5. Revocability: Make it easy to revoke granted permissions.
- 6. Expected Ability: Don't make user think the tool will do what it can't
- 7. Trusted Path: It should not be possible to spoof the UI.
- 8. Identifiability: Give each object an identifer that the user understands.
- 9. Expressiveness: Allow users to express policies that they want.
- 10. Clarity. Make effects of actions apparent to the user before acting.

My User Experience Goals

Make it as easy to use as Candy Crush

- A Help button is a crutch for developers
- Can't break anything by experimenting
- Encourage good practices
 - Warn on weak master password
 - Use clipboard only when needed and warn after use
- Choose a readable font, particularly for site password
- Focus the field the user will be needing next

My User Experience Goals

Where I failed

- Can't always make "Click here for password" show up
 - Resorted to tooltip, but it takes a second or so to appear
- Forgetting settings for a domain
 - Delete the corresponding bookmark
- Closing the popup

Password Manager Security

Mobile Devices

- Situation is really bad
- Too easy to spoof app identity
- iframes inside Android WebView can spoof messages
- One password manager pulled their app

Built into the Browser

- Pluses
 - Better than not using a password manager
 - Never resorts to the clipboard
 - Always finds password field
- Minuses
 - Not as secure
 - Some don't generate passwords, only store them
 - Many don't detect the password policy

As Bad as it Gets Chrome does all 4 things a password manager should never do

- 1. Autofills with no user action
 - Make it easy to steal passwords
- 2. Can't customize generated password
 - Might not be able to use password generator
- 3. Has an option to show existing passwords
 - Encourages password reuse
- 4. Uses same password for alan.alanhkarp.com and allan.alanhkarp.com
 - You can be fished if alan and allan have different owners
- Plus it warns on weak passwords too late

It's More than Just Passwords Strength

- Autofill
 - Put the password into a form controlled by an attacker
- Storage Security
 - Stolen, didn't get the passwords but got the metadata
- User Communication
 - Allows weak/reused passwords
 - Generated passwords sometimes weak (oMMMMMT?m*m)

It's More than Just the Passwords

- Avoid using clipboard but sometimes the only viable backup
- Phishing sites and phishing the password manager password
- Domain name errors google.evil.com vs google.com
- Accessibility features
- Code size one password manager is over 200,000 lines of code
 - SitePassword 1,500 lines of JavaScript, 750 HTML, 250 CSS
- Worst of all Not using a password manager due to lack of trust

The Evil Coffee Shop Attack

Autofill with no user action

- 1. The user sets up several sites with a password manager.
- 2. User connects to a rogue router in a coffee shop.
 - The attacker can inject, block, and change network packets.
- 3. Attacker directs user's browser to a vulnerable page at the target site.
- 4. Attacker injects login form into the vulnerable page by modifying packets.
- 5. Your password manager fills it in.
- 6. Repeats for another site with a vulnerable page.

Related Attacks

- HTTP login page submits forms with HTTPS
 - Doesn't happen much now but (Schwab, eBay)
- Broken HTTPS
 - Usually an expired certificate (HP)
- HTTPS with active content fetched over HTTP
- XSS (Cross Site Scripting) on any page at the victim site
- Clickjacking

SitePassword Security

The Good

- Require click on password field
- Callback registered only on visible password fields
- Use iframe domain name if its password field clicked
- Use zxcvbn() from Dropbox for password strength meter
- Site name and user name act as salt to defeat pre-computation attacks
- Warn if password might still be on the clipboard

The Not So Good but for Good Reasons

- Settings in bookmarks
 - Not encrypted
 - Stored on disk and in Google cloud
- Site password visible by default
 - Gives you a sense of how random looking the site passwords are
 - Don't often open the popup
- 12-character passwords by default
- Doesn't handle dartmouth.edu/~alanhkarp

The Ugly

An Offline attack against master password

- 1. You create an account at a bad guy's site
- 2. Bad guy knows site password and username and can guess site name
- 3. Bad guy starts guessing master passwords
- Mitigation
 - Strong master password
 - Hash a minimum of 100 times to get site password
 - Any guesses that produce the known site password must be tried online
- Defeated by a hard to invert hash function that produces lots of collisions

War Stories

Finding the Password Field

Websites do some weird #%^@

- Put password field in an iframe with a different domain name than page
- Add password field dynamically
- Add password field with type=text and change to type=password
- Make password field visible only after you click a button
- Add CSS at runtime that makes password field visible

Finding the Password Field

Websites do some weird #%^@

- Change contents of page based on the fragment
- Password field in a shadow root (shadow DOM)
- Clears the field after I set it (Who the %#^@ knows why)
- Don't want to update password field at sitepassword.info

Is the Password Field Visible? Harder to figure out than you may think.

- Does window.computedStyle(element) say it's visible?
 - Correct most of the time but not always
- Is parent visible?
 - offsetParent != null if position != 'fixed'
- One clickjacking trick
 - element.style.opacity = "0" reported visible
- Other tests needed?

Finding the UserID Field

- Many password managers use the same algorithm
 - UserID field is the one immediately before the password field
 - Except when it's not
- Sometimes to the left
 - Arabic, Chinese, Hebrew to the right?
- Sometimes intervening fields
 - Some of them not visible

Crazy #%^@ Done by big companies with professional programmers

- Login form at a completely different domain
- Username and password fields have the same id
- A bunch of errors when the page loads
 - Failed cross domain accesses for data that's never used
 - Took 30 seconds to time out on 4 bad GETs myacm.acm.org
- Unnecessary dependencies
 - Many use jQuery on their login pages

How Bad Is It?

One password manager has special cases for over 200 sites.

Summary

Future Work

- User studies
- Other browsers
 - Brave, Edge, Opera Works
 - Firefox Should work but doesn't
 - Safari Need to figure out how to use Xcode properly
- IoS and Android apps
 - Monitoring a serious security issue

References

- Ping's 10 Principles http://zesty.ca/pubs/icics-2002-uidss.pdf
- Oesch Thesis https://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
 article=7785&context=utk graddiss
- Oesch Paper https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec20-oesch_0.pdf
- https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/158056/8/
 Revisiting Security Vulnerabilities in Commercial Password Managers 2.pdf
- https://www.usenix.org/system/files/soups2019-pearman.pdf
- https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/pubs/papers/pwdmgrBrowser.pdf


Takeaways

- Use a password manager a bad one is better than none at all
- Turn off any setting that fills in the password without a user action
- Prepare for the worst Some have gone out of business
- Use it wisely use strong passwords even if you don't have to

OR

Take control and use SitePassword


Demo








User name:

Password: Click SitePassword











User name: alan


Password: Click here for password






User name: alan

Password:








User name: alan


Password: Click here for password














Did you approve this \$1,000 purchase? Inbox × Demo ×



Alan Karp <alanh... Nov 11, 2022, 2:02 PM (11 days ago)








to me 🔻

Log into https://alantheguru.alanhkarp.com if you did not place this order.


Alan Karp








User name:

Password: Click SitePassword











User name: alan

Password: Click here for password