IRODS Security

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Outline

- General Comments
- What Guarding Against
- Authentication
- Trust Model
- IRODS Counter-Measures
- Administrator Responsibilities
- Future















Overview

- Computer Software Never Completely Secure
 - Ease-of-use vs. security
 - Ease-of-Implementation, cost/benefit
 - Encryption time
 - Attacks/Counter-Measures
- Open Source Tends to be More Secure
 - Vulnerabilities must be Handled Responsibly
 - Needs to be Collaborative















What We Are Guarding Against

- IRODS Does What It Should
 - Users Are Who They Say
 - Access Controls Enforced (Read/Write)
 - Resist Denial-Of-Service Attacks
 - Resist SQL Injection Attacks
- Host OS Remains Secure















Protect OS

- Running as non-root helps
- Buffer Overflows Avoided
 - Rstrcpy, etc
- Open Source















Authentication

- □ IRODS Password/GSI/Kerberos Network Secure
 - Have to be
- Keys Can Be Stolen and Used
 - Host/NFS Needs to be Secure
 - GSI Credentials Time-Limited
- IRODS Credentials
 - Not Plain-text Credential (iinit)
 - But Source to Unscramble Is Open
 - NFS May Expose on Network















Trust

- Client Code Not Trusted
 - Can't be (Network Often Not Secure)
- Server Code Is Trusted
 - Has To Be
- ☐ Micro-Service Is Server Code
- □ IRODS Admins Are Trusted
- □ ICAT DB/Admins Are Trusted















Some iRODS Counter-Measures

- □ Buffer Overflow Checks Throughout
 - OSX 10.6 Noticed Some Inconsistencies;
 - Fixed in 2.3
- ☐ Client/Server Call (rc/rs) Privilege Levels
 - Some Admin-only (e.g. chlSimpleQuery)
- Server/Agent Fork/Exec Mechanism
 - Planned Addition of Multi-Threading
- Use of Bind-Variables
 - DB Treats as Name; avoid SQL injection















IRODS Admin Responsibilities

- □ Keep Server Access Secure
 - Good passwords, OS Patches, etc
- □ Keep IRODS source code secure
 - Proper user-level access control
- Check Added Micro-Services
- □ Keep Passwords Secure
- Optionally:
 - Configure remoteZoneSID (man-in-middle)
 - User irodsServerDN if using GSI















Future Work

- Ongoing Security Analysis (UNC, Simon Spero)
- University Analysis U of Wisconsin (Barton Miller/ James Kupsch)
 - Collaborative Project as done with SRB; Highly Effective
- □ Bug Fixes
- Continue On-Going; Balanced with Other Needs/ Requirements
 - Enough For Most Instances
 - Without Placing Too Much Burden on Users/ Admins/Developers













