Table 1
 Microeconomic Model Calibration

| Calibrated Parameters | | | |
|---------------------------------------|------------------|-------|----------------------|
| Description | Parameter | Value | Source |
| Permanent Income Growth Factor | Γ | 1.03 | PSID: Carroll (1992) |
| Interest Factor | R | 1.04 | Conventional |
| Time Preference Factor | β | 0.96 | Conventional |
| Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion | ρ | 2 | Conventional |
| Probability of Zero Income | \wp | 0.005 | PSID: Carroll (1992) |
| Std Dev of Log Permanent Shock | σ_{ψ} | 0.1 | PSID: Carroll (1992) |
| Std Dev of Log Transitory Shock | $\sigma_{	heta}$ | 0.1 | PSID: Carroll (1992) |

 Table 2
 Model Characteristics Calculated from Parameters

| | | | | Approximate |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------|---|-------------|
| | | | | Calculated |
| Description | Syr | nbol | and Formula | Value |
| Finite Human Wealth Factor | \mathcal{R}^{-1} | = | Γ/R | 0.990 |
| PF Finite Value of Autarky Factor | ⊐ | \equiv | $eta\Gamma^{1- ho}$ | 0.932 |
| Growth Compensated Permanent Shock | $\underline{\psi}$ | \equiv | $(\mathbb{E}[\psi^{-1}])^{-1}$ | 0.990 |
| Uncertainty-Adjusted Growth | Γ | = | $\Gamma \underline{\psi}$ | 1.020 |
| Utility Compensated Permanent Shock | $\underline{\underline{\psi}}$ | ≡ | $(\mathbb{E}[\psi^{1-\rho}])^{1/(1-\rho)}$ | 0.990 |
| Utility Compensated Growth | $\overline{\underline{\Gamma}}$ | = | $\Gamma \underline{\psi}$ | 1.020 |
| Absolute Patience Factor | Þ | \equiv | $(R\beta)^{1/ ho}$ | 0.999 |
| Return Patience Factor | \mathbf{p}_{R} | \equiv | \mathbf{P}/R | 0.961 |
| Growth Patience Factor | \mathbf{b}_{Γ} | \equiv | \mathbf{p}/Γ | 0.970 |
| Normalized Growth Patience Factor | $\mathbf{b}_{\underline{\Gamma}}$ | \equiv | $\mathbf{P}/\underline{\Gamma}$ | 0.980 |
| Finite Value of Autarky Factor | I⊒ | \equiv | $\beta\Gamma^{1-\rho}\underline{\psi}^{1-\rho}$ | 0.941 |
| Weak Impatience Factor | $\wp^{1/ ho}\mathbf{p}$ | = | $(\wp \beta R)^{\overline{1/\rho}}$ | 0.071 |

 ${\bf Table~3}~~{\bf Definitions~and~Comparisons~of~Conditions}$

| | Uncertainty Versions | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| | - 1 1 1 - 4 1 - 1 | | | | |
| | Finite Human Wealth Condition (FHWC) | | | | |
| $\Gamma/R < 1$ | $\Gamma/R < 1$ | | | | |
| The growth factor for permanent income | The model's risks are mean-preserving | | | | |
| Γ must be smaller than the discounting | spreads, so the PDV of future income is | | | | |
| factor R for human wealth to be finite. | unchanged by their introduction. | | | | |
| Absolute Impatiend | ce Condition (AIC) | | | | |
| p < 1 | p < 1 | | | | |
| P < 1 | P < 1 | | | | |
| The unconstrained consumer is | If wealth is large enough, the expectation | | | | |
| sufficiently impatient that the level of | of consumption next period will be | | | | |
| consumption will be declining over time: | smaller than this period's consumption: | | | | |
| $\mathbf{c}_{t+1} < \mathbf{c}_t$ | $\lim_{m_t 	o \infty} \mathbb{E}_t[\mathbf{c}_{t+1}] < \mathbf{c}_t$ | | | | |
| $c_{t+1} < c_t$ | $\lim_{t\to\infty} \mathbb{E}_t[\mathcal{C}_{t+1}] \setminus \mathcal{C}_t$ | | | | |
| Return Impatie | ence Conditions | | | | |
| Return Impatience Condition (RIC) | Weak RIC (WRIC) | | | | |
| $\mathbf{P}/R < 1$ | $\wp^{1/\rho}\mathbf{P}/R<1$ | | | | |
| The growth factor for consumption ${f p}$ | If the probability of the zero-income | | | | |
| must be smaller than the discounting | event is $\wp = 1$ then income is always zero | | | | |
| factor R, so that the PDV of current and | and the condition becomes identical to | | | | |
| future consumption will be finite: | the RIC. Otherwise, weaker. | | | | |
| $\mathbf{c}'(m) = 1 - \mathbf{P}/R < 1$ | $c'(m) < 1 - \wp^{1/\rho} \mathbf{P}/R < 1$ | | | | |
| Crowth Impati | ence Conditions | | | | |
| GIC | GIC-Nrm | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| $\mathbf{p}/\Gamma < 1$ | $\mathbf{P}\mathbb{E}[\psi^{-1}]/\Gamma < 1$ | | | | |
| For an unconstrained PF consumer, the | By Jensen's inequality stronger than GIC. | | | | |
| ratio of c to p will fall over time. For | Ensures consumers will not expect to | | | | |
| constrained, guarantees the constraint eventually binds. Guarantees | accumulate m unboundedly. | | | | |
| * | | | | | |
| $\lim_{t \uparrow \infty} \mathbb{E}_t[\psi_{t+1} m_{t+1} / m_t] = \mathbf{F}_{\Gamma}$ | $\lim_{m_t \to \infty} \mathbb{E}_t[m_{t+1}/m_t] = \mathbf{P}_{\underline{\Gamma}}$ | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | T | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| 1 | $\beta \Gamma^{1-\rho} \mathbb{E}[\psi^{1-\rho}] < 1$ | | | | |
| equivalently $\mathbf{P} < R^{1/\rho} \Gamma^{1-1/\rho}$ | | | | | |
| The discounted utility of constrained | By Jensen's inequality, stronger than the | | | | |
| consumers who spend their permanent | PF-FVAC because for $\rho > 1$ and | | | | |
| income each period should be finite. | nondegenerate ψ , $\mathbb{E}[\psi^{1-\rho}] > 1$. | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| $\lim_{m_t \uparrow \infty} \mathbb{E}_t [\psi_{t+1} m_{t+1} / m_t] = \mathbf{p}_{\Gamma}$ Finite Value of Au PF-FVAC $\beta \Gamma^{1-\rho} < 1$ equivalently $\mathbf{p} < R^{1/\rho} \Gamma^{1-1/\rho}$ | utarky Conditions $\frac{\text{FVAC}}{\beta \Gamma^{1-\rho} \mathbb{E}[\psi^{1-\rho}] < 1}$ | | | | |

 Table 4 Conditions for Nondegenerate[‡] Solution

| Consumption Model(s) | Conditions | Comments |
|---|--------------|---|
| $\bar{\mathbf{c}}(m)$: PF Unconstrained | RIC, FHWC° | $RIC \Rightarrow v(m) < \infty; FHWC \Rightarrow 0 < v(m) $ |
| $\underline{\mathbf{c}}(m) = \underline{\kappa}m$ | | PF model with no human wealth $(h = 0)$ |
| | | |
| Section 2.4.2: | | RICprevents $\bar{\mathbf{c}}(m) = \underline{\mathbf{c}}(m) = 0$ |
| Section 2.4.2: | | FHWCprevents $\bar{\mathbf{c}}(m) = \infty$ |
| Eq (25) : | | $PF-FVAC+FHWC \Rightarrow RIC$ |
| Eq (26): | | $GIC+FHWC \Rightarrow PF-FVAC$ |
| $\grave{\mathrm{c}}(m)$: PF Constrained | GIC, RIC | FHWC holds $(\Gamma < \mathbf{p} < R \Rightarrow \Gamma < R)$ |
| Section 2.4.3: | | $ \dot{c}(m) = \bar{c}(m) \text{ for } m > m_{\#} < 1 $ |
| | | (RIC would yield $m_{\#} = 0$ so $\grave{c}(m) = 0$) |
| Appendix A: | GIC,RIC | $\lim_{m\to\infty} \dot{c}(m) = \bar{c}(m), \lim_{m\to\infty} \dot{\boldsymbol{k}}(m) = \underline{\kappa}$ |
| | | kinks where horizon to $b = 0$ changes* |
| Appendix A: | GIC,R#C | $\lim_{m\to\infty} \grave{\boldsymbol{\kappa}}(m) = 0$ |
| | | kinks where horizon to $b = 0$ changes* |
| c(m): Friedman/Muth | Section 3.1, | $\underline{\mathbf{c}}(m) < \mathbf{c}(m) < \overline{\mathbf{c}}(m)$ |
| | Section 3.2 | $\underline{\mathbf{v}}(m) < \mathbf{v}(m) < \bar{\mathbf{v}}(m)$ |
| Section 2.9: | FVAC, WRIC | Sufficient for Contraction |
| Section 2.11.1: | | WRICis weaker than RIC |
| Figure 3: | | FVACis stronger than PF-FVAC |
| Section 2.11.3: | | EHWC+RIC \Rightarrow GIC, $\lim_{m\to\infty} \kappa(m) = \underline{\kappa}$ |
| Section 2.11.2: | | $RHC \Rightarrow EHWC, \lim_{m\to\infty} \kappa(m) = 0$ |
| Section 3.3: | | "Buffer Stock Saving" Conditions |
| Section 3.3.2: | | $\mathrm{GIC} \Rightarrow \exists 0 < \check{m} < \infty$ |
| Section 3.3.1: | | $GIC-Nrm \Rightarrow \exists 0 < \hat{m} < \infty$ |

[‡]For feasible m satisfying $0 < m < \infty$, a nondegenerate limiting consumption function defines a unique optimal value of c satisfying $0 < c(m) < \infty$; a nondegenerate limiting value function defines a corresponding unique value of $-\infty < \mathrm{v}(m) < 0$. °RIC, FHWCare necessary as well as sufficient for the perfect foresight case. *That is, the first kink point in c(m) is $m_{\#}$ s.t. for $m < m_{\#}$ the constraint will bind now, while for $m > m_{\#}$ the constraint will bind one period in the future. The second kink point corresponds to the m where the constraint will bind two periods in the future, etc.**In the Friedman/Muth model, the RIC+FHWC are sufficient, but not necessary for nondegeneracy

 Table 5
 Taxonomy of Perfect Foresight Liquidity Constrained Model Outcomes

 For constrained \grave{c} and unconstrained \bar{c} consumption functions

| | | | | ± |
|----------------|---------------------|------|---------------------|--|
| Main Condition | | | | |
| Subcondition | | Math | | Outcome, Comments or Results |
| SIC | | 1 < | \mathbf{b}/Γ | Constraint never binds for $m \geq 1$ |
| and RIC | Þ /R | < 1 | | FHWC holds $(R > \Gamma)$; $\dot{c}(m) = \bar{c}(m)$ for $m \ge 1$ |
| and RHC | | 1 < | \mathbf{P}/R | $\grave{\mathbf{c}}(m)$ is degenerate: $\grave{\mathbf{c}}(m) = 0$ |
| GIC | \mathbf{p}/Γ | < 1 | | Constraint binds in finite time for any m |
| and RIC | Þ /R | < 1 | | FHWC may or may not hold |
| | | | | $\lim_{m\uparrow\infty} \bar{\mathbf{c}}(m) - \grave{\mathbf{c}}(m) = 0$ |
| | | | | $\lim_{m\uparrow\infty} \grave{\boldsymbol{\kappa}}(m) = \underline{\kappa}$ |
| and RIC | | 1 < | \mathbf{P}/R | EHWC |
| | | | • | $\lim_{m\uparrow\infty} \hat{\boldsymbol{\kappa}}(m) = 0$ |

Conditions are applied from left to right; for example, the second row indicates conclusions in the case where GIC and RIC both hold, while the third row indicates that when the GIC and the RIC both fail, the consumption function is degenerate; the next row indicates that whenever the GICholds, the constraint will bind in finite time.