Table 1
 Microeconomic Model Calibration

| Calibrated Parameters | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------|-------|----------------------|
| Description | Parameter | Value | Source |
| Permanent Income Growth Factor | Φ | 1.03 | PSID: Carroll (1992) |
| Interest Factor | R | 1.04 | Conventional |
| Time Preference Factor | β | 0.96 | Conventional |
| Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion | ρ | 2 | Conventional |
| Probability of Zero Income | \wp | 0.005 | PSID: Carroll (1992) |
| Std Dev of Log Permanent Shock | $\sigma_{f \Psi}$ | 0.1 | PSID: Carroll (1992) |
| Std Dev of Log Transitory Shock | $\sigma_{	heta}$ | 0.1 | PSID: Carroll (1992) |

 Table 2
 Model Characteristics Calculated from Parameters

| | | | | Approximate |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------|---|-------------|
| | | | | Calculated |
| Description | Syı | nbol | and Formula | Value |
| Finite Human Wealth Factor | \mathcal{R}^{-1} | = | Φ/R | 0.990 |
| PF Value of Autarky Factor | コ | \equiv | $eta oldsymbol{\Phi}^{1- ho}$ | 0.932 |
| Growth Compensated Permanent Shock | $\underline{\psi}$ | = | $(\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{\Psi}^{-1}])^{-1}$ | 0.990 |
| Uncertainty-Adjusted Growth | $\underline{\Phi}$ | \equiv | $oldsymbol{\Phi} \underline{\psi}$ | 1.020 |
| Utility Compensated Permanent Shock | $\underline{\underline{\psi}}$ | = | $(\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{\Psi}^{1- ho}])^{1/(1- ho)}$ | 0.990 |
| Utility Compensated Growth | $\overline{\Phi}$ | = | $oldsymbol{\Phi}\underline{\psi}$ | 1.020 |
| Absolute Patience Factor | Þ | \equiv | $(R\beta)^{1/ ho}$ | 0.999 |
| Return Patience Factor | \mathbf{p}_{R} | \equiv | \mathbf{b}/R | 0.961 |
| Growth Patience Factor | ${\bf b}_\Phi$ | \equiv | \mathbf{b}/Φ | 0.970 |
| Normalized Growth Patience Factor | ${f p}_{ar{\Phi}}$ | \equiv | $\mathbf{P}/\underline{\mathbf{\Phi}}$ | 0.980 |
| Value of Autarky Factor | ⊒ | ≡ | $\beta \Phi^{1-\rho} \underline{\underline{\psi}}^{1-\rho}$ | 0.941 |
| Weak Return Impatience Factor | $\wp^{1/ ho}\mathbf{p}$ | = | $(\wp\betaR)^{\overline{1/\rho}}$ | 0.071 |

 ${\bf Table~3}~~{\bf Definitions~and~Comparisons~of~Conditions}$

| Perfect Foresight Versions | Uncertainty Versions | | |
|---|--|--|--|
| Finite Human Wealth | Condition (FHWC) | | |
| $\Phi/R < 1$ | $\Phi/R < 1$ | | |
| The growth factor for permanent income Φ must be smaller than the discounting factor R for human wealth to be finite. | The model's risks are mean-preserving spreads, so the PDV of future income is unchanged by their introduction. | | |
| Absolute Impatience | ce Condition (AIC) | | |
| Þ < 1 | b < 1 | | |
| The unconstrained consumer is sufficiently impatient that the level of consumption will be declining over time: $\mathbf{c}_{t+1} < \mathbf{c}_t$ | If wealth is large enough, the expectation of consumption next period will be smaller than this period's consumption: $\lim_{m_t \to \infty} \mathbb{E}_t[\mathbf{c}_{t+1}] < \mathbf{c}_t$ | | |
| | ~ | | |
| Return Impatie | | | |
| Return Impatience Condition (RIC) | Weak RIC (WRIC) | | |
| $\mathbf{P}/R < 1$ | $\wp^{1/\rho}\mathbf{P}/R < 1$ | | |
| The growth factor for consumption D must be smaller than the discounting factor R, so that the PDV of current and future consumption will be finite: | If the probability of the zero-income event is $\wp=1$ then income is always zero and the condition becomes identical to the RIC. Otherwise, weaker. | | |
| $c'(m) = 1 - \mathbf{P}/R < 1$ | $c'(m) < 1 - \wp^{1/\rho} \mathbf{P}/R < 1$ | | |
| Growth Impatie | ence Conditions | | |
| GIC | GIC-Nrm | | |
| $\mathbf{p}/\mathbf{\Phi} < 1$ | $\mathbf{p}\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{\Psi}^{-1}]/\mathbf{\Phi} < 1$ | | |
| For an unconstrained PF consumer, the ratio of \mathbf{c} to \mathbf{p} will fall over time. For constrained, guarantees the constraint eventually binds. Guarantees $\lim_{m_t \uparrow \infty} \mathbb{E}_t[\Psi_{t+1} m_{t+1}/m_t] = \mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{\Phi}}$ | By Jensen's inequality stronger than GIC. Ensures consumers will not expect to accumulate m unboundedly. $\lim_{m_t \to \infty} \mathbb{E}_t[m_{t+1}/m_t] = \mathbf{P}_{\underline{\Phi}}$ | | |
| Finite Value of Autarky Conditions | | | |
| PF-FVAC | FVAC | | |
| $eta oldsymbol{\Phi}^{1- ho} < 1$ equivalently $oldsymbol{\Phi} < R^{1/ ho} oldsymbol{\Phi}^{1-1/ ho}$ | $\beta \mathbf{\Phi}^{1-\rho} \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{\Psi}^{1-\rho}] < 1$ | | |
| The discounted utility of constrained consumers who spend their permanent income each period should be finite. | By Jensen's inequality, stronger than the PF-FVAC because for $\rho > 1$ and nondegenerate Ψ , $\mathbb{E}[\Psi^{1-\rho}] > 1$. | | |

Table 4 Sufficient Conditions for Nondegenerate[‡] Solution

| Consumption Model(s) | Conditions | Comments |
|---|--------------|--|
| $\bar{\mathbf{c}}(m)$: PF Unconstrained | RIC, FHWC° | $RIC \Rightarrow v(m) < \infty; FHWC \Rightarrow 0 < v(m) $ |
| $\underline{\mathbf{c}}(m) = \underline{\kappa}m$ | | PF model with no human wealth $(h = 0)$ |
| Section 2.5.3: | | RIC prevents $\bar{\mathbf{c}}(m) = \underline{\mathbf{c}}(m) = 0$ |
| Section 2.5.3: | | FHWC prevents $\bar{\mathbf{c}}(m) = \infty$ |
| Eq (21) : | | $PF-FVAC+FHWC \Rightarrow RIC$ |
| Eq (22): | | $GIC+FHWC \Rightarrow PF-FVAC$ |
| $\grave{\mathrm{c}}(m)$: PF Constrained | GIC, RIC | FHWC holds ($\Phi < \Phi < R \Rightarrow \Phi < R$) |
| Section 2.5.6: | | $\grave{\mathbf{c}}(m) = \bar{\mathbf{c}}(m) \text{ for } m > m_{\#} < 1$ |
| | | (RHC would yield $m_{\#} = 0$ so $\grave{c}(m) = 0$) |
| Appendix A: | GIC,RIC | $\lim_{m\to\infty} \dot{c}(m) = \bar{c}(m), \lim_{m\to\infty} \dot{\boldsymbol{\kappa}}(m) = \underline{\kappa}$ |
| | | kinks where horizon to $b = 0$ changes* |
| Appendix A: | GIC,RIC | $\lim_{m\to\infty} \grave{\boldsymbol{\kappa}}(m) = 0$ |
| | | kinks where horizon to $b = 0$ changes* |
| c(m): Friedman/Muth | Section 3.1, | $\underline{\mathbf{c}}(m) < \mathbf{c}(m) < \bar{\mathbf{c}}(m)$ |
| | Section 3.2 | $\underline{\mathbf{v}}(m) < \mathbf{v}(m) < \overline{\mathbf{v}}(m)$ |
| Section 2.10: | FVAC, WRIC | Sufficient for Contraction |
| Section 2.12: | | WRIC is weaker than RIC |
| Figure 3: | | FVAC is stronger than PF-FVAC |
| Section 2.12.2: | | EHWC+RIC \Rightarrow GIC, $\lim_{m\to\infty} \kappa(m) = \underline{\kappa}$ |
| Section 2.12.1: | | RFC \Rightarrow EHWC, $\lim_{m\to\infty} \kappa(m) = 0$ |
| Section 3.3: | | "Buffer Stock Saving" Conditions |
| Section 3.3.2: | | GIC $\Rightarrow \exists \ \check{m} \text{ s.t. } 0 < \check{m} < \infty$ |
| Section 3.3.1: | | GIC-Nrm $\Rightarrow \exists \hat{m} \text{ s.t. } 0 < \hat{m} < \infty$ |

[‡]For feasible m satisfying $0 < m < \infty$, a nondegenerate limiting consumption function defines a unique optimal value of c satisfying $0 < c(m) < \infty$; a nondegenerate limiting value function defines a corresponding unique value of $-\infty < \mathrm{v}(m) < 0$.

[°]RIC, FHWC are necessary as well as sufficient for the perfect foresight case. *That is, the first kink point in c(m) is $m_{\#}$ s.t. for $m < m_{\#}$ the constraint will bind now, while for $m > m_{\#}$ the constraint will bind one period in the future. The second kink point corresponds to the m where the constraint will bind two periods in the future, etc.

^{**}In the Friedman/Muth model, the RIC+FHWC are sufficient, but not necessary for nondegeneracy

 Table 5
 Taxonomy of Perfect Foresight Liquidity Constrained Model Outcomes

 For constrained \grave{c} and unconstrained \bar{c} consumption functions

| Main Condition | | | | |
|----------------|----------------------------|------|----------------------------|--|
| Subcondition | | Math | | Outcome, Comments or Results |
| SIC | | 1 < | $\mathbf{P}/\mathbf{\Phi}$ | Constraint never binds for $m \geq 1$ |
| and RIC | ⊅ /R | < 1 | | FHWC holds $(R > \Phi)$; |
| | | | | $\grave{\mathbf{c}}(m) = \bar{\mathbf{c}}(m) \text{ for } m \ge 1$ |
| and RIC | | 1 < | \mathbf{P}/R | $\grave{c}(m)$ is degenerate: $\grave{c}(m) = 0$ |
| GIC | $\mathbf{p}/\mathbf{\Phi}$ | < 1 | • | Constraint binds in finite time $\forall m$ |
| and RIC | Þ /R | < 1 | | FHWC may or may not hold |
| | , | | | $\lim_{m\uparrow\infty} \bar{\mathbf{c}}(m) - \grave{\mathbf{c}}(m) = 0$ |
| | | | | $\lim_{m\uparrow\infty} \hat{\boldsymbol{\kappa}}(m) = \underline{\kappa}$ |
| and RHC | | 1 < | \mathbf{P}/R | EHWC |
| | | | • | $\lim_{m\uparrow\infty} \dot{\boldsymbol{\kappa}}(m) = 0$ |

Conditions are applied from left to right; for example, the second row indicates conclusions in the case where GIC and RIC both hold, while the third row indicates that when the GIC and the RIC both fail, the consumption function is degenerate; the next row indicates that whenever the GICholds, the constraint will bind in finite time.