Table 1
 Microeconomic Model Calibration

Calibrated Parameters				
Description	Parameter	Value	Source	
Permanent Income Growth Factor	Γ	1.03	PSID: Carroll (1992)	
Interest Factor	R	1.04	Conventional	
Time Preference Factor	β	0.96	Conventional	
Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion	$\rho$	2	Conventional	
Probability of Zero Income	$\wp$	0.005	PSID: Carroll (1992)	
Std Dev of Log Permanent Shock	$\sigma_{\psi}$	0.1	PSID: Carroll (1992)	
Std Dev of Log Transitory Shock	$\sigma_{ heta}$	0.1	PSID: Carroll (1992)	

 Table 2
 Model Characteristics Calculated from Parameters

				Approximate
				Calculated
Description	Syr	nbol	and Formula	Value
Finite Human Wealth Factor	$\mathcal{R}^{-1}$	=	$\Gamma/R$	0.990
PF Finite Value of Autarky Factor	⊐	$\equiv$	$eta\Gamma^{1- ho}$	0.932
Growth Compensated Permanent Shock	$\underline{\psi}$	$\equiv$	$(\mathbb{E}[\psi^{-1}])^{-1}$	0.990
Uncertainty-Adjusted Growth	$\Gamma$	=	$\Gamma \underline{\psi}$	1.020
Utility Compensated Permanent Shock	$\underline{\underline{\psi}}$	≡	$(\mathbb{E}[\psi^{1-\rho}])^{1/(1-\rho)}$	0.990
Utility Compensated Growth	$\overline{\underline{\Gamma}}$	=	$\Gamma \underline{\psi}$	1.020
Absolute Patience Factor	Þ	$\equiv$	$(R\beta)^{1/ ho}$	0.999
Return Patience Factor	$\mathbf{p}_{R}$	$\equiv$	$\mathbf{P}/R$	0.961
Growth Patience Factor	$\mathbf{b}_{\Gamma}$	$\equiv$	$\mathbf{p}/\Gamma$	0.970
Normalized Growth Patience Factor	$\mathbf{b}_{\underline{\Gamma}}$	$\equiv$	$\mathbf{P}/\underline{\Gamma}$	0.980
Finite Value of Autarky Factor	I⊒	$\equiv$	$\beta\Gamma^{1-\rho}\underline{\psi}^{1-\rho}$	0.941
Weak Impatience Factor	$\wp^{1/ ho}\mathbf{p}$	=	$(\wp \beta R)^{\overline{1/\rho}}$	0.071

 Table 3
 Definitions and Comparisons of Conditions

Perfect Foresight Versions	Uncertainty Versions	
Finite Human Wealt	Condition (FHWC)	
$\Gamma/R < 1$	$\Gamma/R < 1$	
The growth factor for permanent income	The model's risks are mean-preserving	
$\Gamma$ must be smaller than the discounting	spreads, so the PDV of future income is	
factor R for human wealth to be finite.	unchanged by their introduction.	
	ce Condition (AIC)	
<b>Þ</b> < 1	<b>p</b> < 1	
The unconstrained consumer is	If wealth is large enough, the expectation	
sufficiently impatient that the level of	of consumption next period will be	
consumption will be declining over time:	smaller than this period's consumption:	
$\mathbf{c}_{t+1} < \mathbf{c}_t$	$\lim_{m_t  o \infty} \mathbb{E}_t[\mathbf{c}_{t+1}] < \mathbf{c}_t$	
Return Impatie	ence Conditions	
Return Impatience Condition (RIC)	Weak RIC (WRIC)	
<b>1</b> /R < 1	$\wp^{1/\rho}\mathbf{p}/R < 1$	
The growth factor for consumption ${f p}$	If the probability of the zero-income	
must be smaller than the discounting	event is $\wp = 1$ then income is always zero	
factor R, so that the PDV of current and	and the condition becomes identical to	
future consumption will be finite:	the RIC. Otherwise, weaker.	
$c'(m) = 1 - \mathbf{P}/R < 1$	$c'(m) < 1 - \wp^{1/\rho} \mathbf{P}/R < 1$	
Growth Impati	ence Conditions	
GIC	GIC-Nrm	
$\mathbf{p}/\Gamma < 1$	$\mathbf{P}\mathbb{E}[\psi^{-1}]/\Gamma < 1$	
For an unconstrained PF consumer, the	, ,,	
ratio of $\mathbf{c}$ to $\mathbf{p}$ will fall over time. For	By Jensen's inequality stronger than GIC.	
constrained, guarantees the constraint	Ensures consumers will not expect to	
eventually binds. Guarantees	accumulate $m$ unboundedly.	
$\lim_{m_t \uparrow \infty} \mathbb{E}_t[\psi_{t+1} m_{t+1}/m_t] = \mathbf{P}_{\Gamma}$	$\lim_{m_t \to \infty} \mathbb{E}_t[m_{t+1}/m_t] = \mathbf{P}_{\underline{\Gamma}}$	
Finite Value of Autarky Conditions		
PF-FVAC	FVAC	
$eta \Gamma^{1- ho} < 1$ equivalently $\mathbf{P} < R^{1/ ho} \Gamma^{1-1/ ho}$	$\beta \Gamma^{1-\rho}  \mathbb{E}[\psi^{1-\rho}] < 1$	
The discounted utility of constrained	By Jensen's inequality, stronger than the	
consumers who spend their permanent	PF-FVAC because for $\rho > 1$ and	
income each period should be finite.	nondegenerate $\psi$ , $\mathbb{E}[\psi^{1-\rho}] > 1$ .	

 Table 4
 Sufficient Conditions for Nondegenerate<sup>‡</sup> Solution

Consumption Model(s)	Conditions	Comments
$\bar{\mathbf{c}}(m)$ : PF Unconstrained	RIC, FHWC°	$RIC \Rightarrow  v(m)  < \infty; FHWC \Rightarrow 0 <  v(m) $
$\underline{\mathbf{c}}(m) = \underline{\kappa}m$		PF model with no human wealth $(h = 0)$
Section 2.4.2:		RIC prevents $\bar{\mathbf{c}}(m) = \underline{\mathbf{c}}(m) = 0$
Section 2.4.2:		FHWC prevents $\bar{\mathbf{c}}(m) = \infty$
Eq (26):		$PF-FVAC+FHWC \Rightarrow RIC$
Eq (27):		$GIC+FHWC \Rightarrow PF-FVAC$
c(m): PF Constrained	GIC, RIC	FHWC holds $(\Gamma < \mathbf{P} < R \Rightarrow \Gamma < R)$
Section 2.4.3:		$\grave{c}(m) = \bar{c}(m) \text{ for } m > m_{\#} < 1$
		(RHC would yield $m_{\#} = 0$ so $\grave{\mathbf{c}}(m) = 0$ )
Appendix A:	GIC,RIC	$\lim_{m\to\infty} \dot{c}(m) = \bar{c}(m), \lim_{m\to\infty} \dot{\boldsymbol{\kappa}}(m) = \underline{\kappa}$
		kinks where horizon to $b = 0$ changes*
Appendix A:	GIC,RIC	$\lim_{m\to\infty} \dot{\boldsymbol{k}}(m) = 0$
		kinks where horizon to $b = 0$ changes*
c(m): Friedman/Muth	Section 3.1,	$\underline{\mathbf{c}}(m) < \mathbf{c}(m) < \overline{\mathbf{c}}(m)$
	Section 3.2	$\underline{\mathbf{v}}(m) < \mathbf{v}(m) < \overline{\mathbf{v}}(m)$
Section 2.9:	FVAC, WRIC	Sufficient for Contraction
Section 2.11.1:		WRIC is weaker than RIC
Figure 3:		FVAC is stronger than PF-FVAC
Section 2.11.3:		$\text{EHWC+RIC} \Rightarrow \text{GIC}, \lim_{m \to \infty} \kappa(m) = \underline{\kappa}$
Section 2.11.2:		RHC $\Rightarrow$ EHWC, $\lim_{m\to\infty} \kappa(m) = 0$
Section 3.3:		"Buffer Stock Saving" Conditions
Section 3.3.2:		$GIC \Rightarrow \exists  0 < \check{m} < \infty$
Section 3.3.1:		GIC-Nrm $\Rightarrow \exists 0 < \hat{m} < \infty$

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>‡</sup>For feasible m satisfying  $0 < m < \infty$ , a nondegenerate limiting consumption function defines a unique optimal value of c satisfying  $0 < c(m) < \infty$ ; a nondegenerate limiting value function defines a corresponding unique value of  $-\infty < v(m) < 0$ . °RIC, FHWC are necessary as well as sufficient for the perfect foresight case. \*That is, the first kink point in c(m) is  $m_{\#}$  s.t. for  $m < m_{\#}$  the constraint will bind now, while for  $m > m_{\#}$  the constraint will bind one period in the future. The second kink point corresponds to the m where the constraint will bind two periods in the future, etc. \*\*In the Friedman/Muth model, the RIC+FHWC are sufficient, but not necessary for nondegeneracy

 Table 5
 Taxonomy of Perfect Foresight Liquidity Constrained Model Outcomes

 For constrained  $\grave{c}$  and unconstrained  $\bar{c}$  consumption functions

				±
Main Condition				
Subcondition		Math		Outcome, Comments or Results
SIC		1 <	$\mathbf{b}/\Gamma$	Constraint never binds for $m \geq 1$
and RIC	<b>Þ</b> /R	< 1		FHWC holds $(R > \Gamma)$ ; $\dot{c}(m) = \bar{c}(m)$ for $m \ge 1$
and RIC		1 <	$\mathbf{P}/R$	$\grave{\mathbf{c}}(m)$ is degenerate: $\grave{\mathbf{c}}(m) = 0$
GIC	$\mathbf{p}/\Gamma$	< 1		Constraint binds in finite time for any $m$
and RIC	<b>Þ</b> /R	< 1		FHWC may or may not hold
				$\lim_{m\uparrow\infty} \bar{\mathbf{c}}(m) - \grave{\mathbf{c}}(m) = 0$
				$\lim_{m\uparrow\infty} \grave{\boldsymbol{\kappa}}(m) = \underline{\kappa}$
and RIC		1 <	$\mathbf{P}/R$	EHWC
			•	$\lim_{m\uparrow\infty} \hat{\boldsymbol{\kappa}}(m) = 0$

Conditions are applied from left to right; for example, the second row indicates conclusions in the case where GIC and RIC both hold, while the third row indicates that when the GIC and the RIC both fail, the consumption function is degenerate; the next row indicates that whenever the GICholds, the constraint will bind in finite time.