Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Angelaki
Journal of the Theoretical Humanities

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cang20

"ABOVE AND BEYOND THE MARKET"

the family, social reproduction, and conservatism in bernard stiegler's politics of work

Ben Turner

To cite this article: Ben Turner (2021) "ABOVE AND BEYOND THE MARKET", Angelaki, 26:6, 68-85, DOI: 10.1080/0969725X.2021.1988379

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/0969725X.2021.1988379

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Check for updates

ANGELAKI
journal of the theoretical humanities
volume 26 number 6 december 2021

Tortise by S. Eileen Oberlin.

ben turner

"ABOVE AND BEYOND THE MARKET"
the family, social reproduction, and conservatism in bernard stiegler's politics of work

Automation, we are told, is going to transform the world of work beyond recognition.[1] Proponents of what Aaron Benanav refers to as "automation discourse" argue that unprecedented opportunities for the reorganization of work lie in the potentials of artificial intelligence, robotics, and automated production.[2] These developments do not only offer opportunities; if we do not respond appropriately, changes in the composition of the labor market and rising technological unemployment will have devastating consequences. While oft associated with the left, responses to this problem also include those on the right that seek to pursue doggedly neoliberal policies in response to automation[3] and those who seek a more moderate "reinvention of capitalism."[4] Automation and technological unemployment are heralded by left-wing critics of work as both an opportunity to transform work itself, and to pitch proposals for a post-work vision of society that moves beyond the integrating function that work currently plays.[5]

ISSN 0969-725X print/ISSN 1469-2899 online/21/060068-18 © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

https://doi.org/10.1080/0969725X.2021.1988379

One distinguishing feature of many left-wing responses to automation is the absence of any romanticization of work. Instead, one finds critiques of both the obligation that "one must work to 'earn a living'" and the philosophical underpinnings of this duty, in which work is seen as "part of the natural order rather than as a social convention."[6] To make these claims, left-wing critics of work adopt a strategy of denaturalization that renders the phenomenon of work as "an object for critical discussion."[7] If work is no longer natural, then claims that it is a source of moral superiority and a necessary method for integrating individuals into "social, political, and familial modes of co-operation" are open to challenge.[8] Political imaginaries that espouse post-work ideals rely on this denaturalizing gesture in order to outline proposals that would displace the centrality of the "ideology of work," and to generate theoretical accounts of how society should be reorganized to facilitate a post-work political vision.[9]

However, as James Chamberlain has noted, "denaturalization does not necessarily entail rejecting or modifying norms or practices."[10] If automation poses the opportunity for the wholesale reinvention of society and not just work, then it is pertinent to inquire into the relationship between denaturalization as a critical strategy and the normative frameworks that lie behind technological development. To what extent is it possible to theorize the reorganization of society through the denaturalization of work without reproducing and naturalizing the ideological underpinnings of current models of employment? To answer this question this article will give a critical account of the politics of work advocated by Bernard Stiegler. It will argue that Stiegler falls short of his goal of theorizing a reorganization of society on the basis of the denaturalizing gesture as he reproduces elements of the understanding of work that he seeks to move beyond. In his account of contributory work, he distinguishes between an image of work as a creative and critical activity, and private, caring labor which is not perceived as work. Consequently, his account reproduces the divide between work and social reproductive labor that has long been criticized by social reproduction theorists.[11] While Stiegler adopts the strategy of denaturalization he also retains, and unwittingly naturalizes, the background conditions of contemporary work and the gendered biases that characterize them, which have largely gone unaddressed in automation discourse.[12] This claim will be made by reading Stiegler's account of work in *Automatic Society Vol. 1: The Future of Work* alongside his discussion of the family in *Taking Care of Youth and the Generations* and *What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology*. Once Stiegler's proposals regarding the future of work are situated in the context of his understanding of the family, we will see that responses to contemporary challenges in the world of work that adopt the strategy of denaturalization must pay close heed to the normative assumptions that underpin the social background of technological development. If they do not, then such critiques run the risk of reproducing and naturalizing those assumptions.

Two caveats must be added here. We will not be addressing the question of the reality of technological unemployment. What is at stake here is an assessment of the philosophical underpinnings of political responses to the *possibility* of widespread automation.[13] It is also recognized that Stiegler's work is not strictly representative of all left-wing thinkers engaged in automation discourse, for his discussion is embedded within his own philosophical and political project. Across his work, Stiegler applies principles derived from his broader philosophy of technology to a critique of capitalism, the culture industry, and climate change.[14] Even though he is at somewhat of a remove from automation discourse and discussions of work because of the primacy of his wider philosophy of technology, Stiegler should be considered as participating in the same broad intellectual project. He will be taken as an ideal figure for analyzing the pitfalls of the strategy of denaturalization due to the exacerbated role this theoretical trope plays in his work and because he shares many of the positions of left automation theorists. These

points of connection will be highlighted in the course of the argument. This will unfold as follows. First, the article will introduce Stiegler's philosophy of technology in order to, second, introduce his account of the impact of automation upon work. Third, the article will then proceed to reconstruct Stiegler's understanding of the family and show how it underpins his proposal for a system of contributory work. Fourth, the article will then demonstrate how Stiegler reproduces and naturalizes the division between work and care, by drawing on social reproduction theory and accounts of the moral position of the family under neoliberal regimes of work. In conclusion, consequences will be drawn from this critique for our understanding of Stiegler's political philosophy and for the politics of work more broadly.

stiegler's philosophy of technology

Stiegler's account of the threat to work adopts some of the basic assumptions of automation discourse. He assumes that developments in artificial intelligence and automation will lead to growing technological unemployment,[15] a claim made by most major proponents of left-wing accounts of automation.[16] He also takes the position that employment must be "*de-naturalized*" in order to facilitate the transition to a new understanding of work and a reorganization of society (AS 30), which is, again, widely shared.[17] Stiegler's use of denaturalization is perhaps the most extensive of the thinkers currently responding to challenges facing work due to its central role in his broader philosophy of technology. Consequently, it is necessary to summarize some of the basic principles of his philosophy to properly introduce his understanding of denaturalization and its relationship to automation, work, and the family.

Stiegler's philosophy of technology rests on a single key principle: that there is no human without the technical object. He claims that the "artificialization of life" is "the starting point of hominization" and that human nature is the product of a constantly transforming relationship between humans and technical objects (AS 9). Human nature is not a constant but a process within which behaviors are subjected to persistent naturalization and denaturalization alongside technological transformations. Technical objects, therefore, are not simply a means for achieving ends or extensions of existing human capacities. They are an externalized form of human experience that have a constitutive role in shaping any future experience. Stiegler bases this argument on the philosophical claim that technical objects are a form of memory. He defines technics as tertiary retention, distinguished from primary and secondary retentions.[18] Primary retention refers to experience of the passing present whereas secondary retentions are memories of these primary retentions. Our anticipation of the future is informed by these memories, and hence secondary retentions color the manner in which we experience primary retentions. By producing tertiary retentions, or technical objects, individuals "spatialize what they are living through or have lived through temporally" in the interplay of primary and secondary retention (AS 35). A diary entry might spatialize one's experience as a text but a more concrete technical invention, such as a hammer or a computer, is also a repository of experience. These tertiary retentions allow individuals to pass on primary and secondary retentions, and in doing so they form a field of memories that individuals experience as primary retentions and transform into secondary retentions, and so on.

It is important for Stiegler that this relationship between the human and the technical is not understood as one in which individuals are the passive products of their technological environments. On the one hand, internalized tertiary retentions are "automatisms that have been socialized" (AS 12). Human behavior is constituted by the internalization and repetition of previous experiences and the expectations that they form. On the other hand, the repetition of these automatisms transforms them. An individual will anticipate the future through their own set of secondary retentions, and so the repetition of spatialized tertiary retentions will never be exact. Each repetition holds the

potential for "dis-automatization" (AS 7). While the language of exteriorization suggests that Stiegler does define technology as a mere supplement to interior experience, he is insistent on the co-constitutive relationship between exterior and interior memories, seen here in the interplay between primary, secondary, and tertiary retentions.

Consequently, technology and technological progress form a collective fund of externalized memory that does not simply imprint itself upon individuals. Instead, by reinteriorizing tertiary retentions individuals transform this fund. Stiegler develops this claim by adopting the concept of psychic and collective individuation from Gilbert Simondon.[19] For Simondon, individuation is a philosophical principle that explains the genesis of an individual entity with reference to the potentials of the preindividual reality from which it is generated, and which it does not exhaust. From this perspective, the

> individual would then be grasped as a relative reality, a certain phase of being that supposes a preindividual reality, and that, even after individuation, does not exist on its own, because individuation does not exhaust with one stroke the potentials of preindividual reality.[20]

For the philosopher of individuation, the nature of entities must be understood with reference to how they activate the potentials of a particular preindividual reality. Repetitions of tertiary retentions are but one form that this individuation of preindividual potential takes.

This means that as technology changes so does the nature of individual experience. Stiegler summarizes:

> As consequences of the evolution of tertiary retention, these changes in the *play* between primary retentions and secondary retentions, and therefore between memory and perception, that is, between imagination and reality, produce *processes of transindividuation* that are each time different, that is, specific epochs of what Simondon called the *transindividual*. (AS 31)

Stiegler's use of the term "transindividuation" and "transindividual" here refers to Simondon's claim that individual experience draws on the individuation of others. Any relationship between an individual and their collective is characterized by this transindividuality: changes in one of the terms also transforms the other. In Stiegler's words, "The individuation of the *I* is that of the *We*, and vice versa, even though *I* and *We* differ."[21] Individual experiences that are spatialized as tertiary retentions constitute a collective preindividual fund that guides individuation. Hence, "the meanings formed in the course of transindividuation processes constitute the transindividual as an ensemble of collective secondary retentions within which collective protentions form – which are the *expectations* typical of an epoch" (AS 31–32). To be human, according to Stiegler, is to participate in this ongoing production and transformation of collective memory and inheritance that he calls psychic and collective individuation.

The concept of psychic and collective individuation has both anthropological and political consequences within Stiegler's philosophy of technology. It provides the basis of Stiegler's understanding of humanity's relationship to technology and his politics of contributory work, as it foregrounds that the participation in, and contribution to, psychic and collective individuation is a normative good. Both of these insights underpin Stiegler's response to what he sees as the threat posed by automation to both work and the family. How does Stiegler articulate these claims as part of his critique of the relationship between automation and work?

automation, proletarianization, and the crisis of work

As stated above, Stiegler claims that technological unemployment is the most immediate consequence of automation. It must be noted that he is not a technophobe opposed in principle to the replacement of employment with machines – he defines human existence as constituted, and not disrupted, by technological

denaturalization. Moreover, he understands technology as a *pharmakon*: it is characterized by both curative and poisonous tendencies between which there is a relationship of indeterminacy.[22] This position rules out either technophilia or technophobia for there is no necessity that underpins how these tendencies unfold. Technological development can facilitate contribution to a psychic and collective process of individuation or induce what will be referred to below as proletarianization. It is the role of pharmacological analysis to denaturalize claims that treat the latter as a natural inevitability and to propose uses of technology that develop opportunities to contribute to individuation. This task informs ideology critique for Stiegler, insofar as it requires both the unmasking of the contingency of the *pharmakon* and the proposal of alternative ways of organizing our relationship to technology in a manner that draws on the indeterminacy of the technical object. There is not room here for an all-encompassing account of Stiegler's theory of ideology, but we will return to it briefly in our conclusions.[23] For now, it is sufficient to note that his approach to ideology critique requires the denaturalization of supposedly natural institutions and arrangements that neglect the contingency of the *pharmakon*.

Within this pharmacological perspective, it is not inevitable that automation will have disastrous consequences. Automation represents both a threat and an unprecedented opportunity that "must lead […] to a *rebirth of work* made possible by the *disappearance of employment*, employability, wage labor and governance according to the imperative to increase purchasing power" (AS 51). Stiegler is on the side of those critics that see automation as an opportunity to reorganize society more broadly, rather than as a threat to work that must simply be fended off. To introduce his vision, we must first understand how he develops a conception of work from his philosophy of technics and his commitment to a philosophy of denaturalization. This will allow us to recognize how he uses this understanding of work to diagnose the dangers of not responding to automation. Of particular importance here is the distinction between work and employment and Stiegler's interpretation of the concept of proletarianization.

The threat of technological unemployment presents an opportunity for Stiegler because he distinguishes between employment and work. Not only is work "not employment" but "*employment has disintegrated work*" (AS 155). How is this the case? For Stiegler, "*Work is above all, in all its forms ('manual' or 'intellectual'), a producer of retention*" (AS 158). That is, work produces tertiary retentions, or technical repositories of memory. This means that work requires an engagement with, and transformation of, a process of psychic and collective individuation: "Work, beyond the potential for the transformation of raw materials in which it indeed consists, and by which it is generally characterized, is also and more profoundly the invention of new possibilities of psychic and collective individuations" (AS 201). Employment, in contrast, is simply occupied time without the possibility for this transformation. Moreover, employment is susceptible to automation because it involves repetition without invention. According to Stiegler, if we continue to conflate employment and work we will never solve the problem of automation: "Unemployment will remain so long as employment remains the standard of work" (AS 201). Automation provides an opportunity to free time for engagement in *work* rather than simply *employment*, but only on the condition that we denaturalize our conception of both. Once denaturalized, work can be redefined as contribution to the ongoing transformation of psychic and collective individuation, whereas employment is simply occupied time. It is the former activity that underpins Stiegler's understanding of contributory work.

The conflation of work and employment is not the only barrier to this transformation. Proletarianization is the second element of Stiegler's diagnosis of the problems of contemporary work. Stiegler does not define proletarianization as the constitution of a particular class. Instead, proletarianization is the stripping of individuals of their knowledge

and capacities by technical development. Above we saw that psychic and collective individuation requires that individuals contribute to a collective fund of memory by internalizing it, repeating its automatisms, and in turn dis-automating them. Proletarianization represents a passive engagement with these collective behavioral automatisms that repeats them without individuating them. Technological unemployment is simply the latest episode in a long history of forms of proletarianization: all technical objects harbor the risks of automation without dis-automation and therefore the destruction of knowledge. This particular juncture in the history of proletarianization is unique due to its generalized form: "the initial automatization that gave rise to the proletariat" has now given rise to the possible "disappearance of the proletariat itself" because of the tendency towards automating labor (AS 50). Stiegler is no Luddite: this moment of dispossession is internal to the relationship between humans and technology. Nevertheless, he argues that under capitalist conditions proletarianization is exacerbated by the replacement of knowledge and reinteriorization with predictable and profitable forms of behavior. These new forms of production proletarianize the knowledge of the worker, whilst the proliferation of objects and services for consumption proletarianize the life-skills of the consumer.

According to Stiegler proletarianization has three main stages. He describes these as follows:

> The proletarianization of the gestures of work (of producing works) amounts to the proletarianization of the conditions of the worker's *subsistence*.
>
> The proletarianization of sensibility and the affects and, *through that*, the proletarianization of the social relation – which is thus being replaced by conditioning – amounts to the proletarianization of the conditions of the citizen's *existence*.
>
> The proletarianization of minds and spirits, that is, of the noetic faculties enabling theorization and deliberation, is the proletarianization of the conditions of *consistence* of the life of the rational spirit in general.
> (AS 30–31)

The automation of manual activity is the most immediately recognizable of these three forms of proletarianization, as it leads directly to the technological unemployment predicted by automation discourse. While this process begins with manual and routine tasks, automation and artificial intelligence are now perceived to have the potential to automate non-manual and non-routine tasks, and to proletarianize a wider section of the workforce than previously thought possible.[24] The second and third forms of proletarianization, in social and cognitive realms, represent the attempt to replace conscious social engagement and rational activity with automated processes and decisions. Where psychic and collective individuation would usually involve the oscillation between automated and dis-automating behaviors, the "automatization of the collection and treatment of data, based on the automatic extraction of correlations […] short-circuits all social normativity in that it '*shunts*' *or* '*bypasses*' *categories and conventions*" (AS 107). The proletarianization of social, affective, and rational capacities short-circuits the ability to participate in the transformation of psychic and collective individuation.

This conception of proletarianization is central to Stiegler's analysis of the crisis of work in two ways. The automation, and proletarianization, of work tasks endangers employment to the extent that the work necessary to earn subsistence wages is being eradicated. More extensively, the automation of increasingly large aspects of social life in pursuit of the goal of rendering it predictable and profitable leads to the eradication of the capacity to engage in the dis-automation of automated behaviors. Thus, "What is at stake here is transindividuation – and, more precisely, the *destruction of the permanent oscillation between synchronizing and diachronizing tendencies*," both within work and in society at large (AS 113). Within Stiegler's framework, any response to automation requires both a rethinking of work to respond to the rise of

technological unemployment induced by the eradication of subsistence labor and the reinvention of the place of work in society more broadly.

Stiegler's response to this challenge is, admittedly, abstract. He seeks an understanding of automation "in the service not of calculations that disindividuate and disintegrate both the social and the psychic, but of a calculation leading the *subjects* of this calculation to *dis-automatization by expanding the experience of individuation beyond all calculation*" (AS 57). Dis-automating activity constitutes a contribution to a process of individuation, and it is this form of activity that underpins contributory work. While they are expressed in Stiegler's own terminology, there are three claims here that are characteristic of automation discourse. First, these concerns regarding the future of work stem from a critique of technological unemployment. This can be found in Stiegler's account of proletarianization. Second, he is committed to the denaturalization of society writ large insofar as "dis-automation" entails a commitment to the persistent transformation of psychic and collective individuation. A system of contributory work would entail integrating the space for dis-automation into the basic structures of society. Third, Stiegler makes concrete suggestions to facilitate these changes, however, they are not extensive. These proposals are intended to facilitate a reduction of occupied time and to support a form of work defined as dis-automated or free time (AS 171–79). Here he adds his voice to a range of defenses of a Universal Basic Income in post-work thought[25] in the form of "guaranteed minimum income" to support subsistence, and a "*contributory income*" to support the intermittent work of dis-automation (AS 179–80). Whereas this is rarely defined *as* work across automation discourse and is instead seen as leisure time or free time, Stiegler concurs with the sentiment that work as free time is not simply lazy or morally reprehensible but in fact time available for the investment of effort in the process of individuation. Contributory work must be considered as a use of free time, because the dis-automation of, and contribution to, processes of individuation cannot be reduced to the determined and repetitive use of time in employment. While there is much to be said about the contradictions between free time and the implied obligations of contributory work, of greatest importance for the argument being made here is the link that Stiegler implicitly establishes between work and social reproduction in his advocation of a basic income. A full understanding of his account of the crisis of work induced by automation must consider how proletarianization also induces a crisis in the family insofar as it is where the capacity for dis-automating, transformative and contributory work is formed.

the crisis of the family and the problem for contributory work

Proletarianization also underpins Stiegler's analysis of the family. While his most extensive account of family life in *Taking Care of Youth and the Generations* predates *Automatic Society*, this discussion rests on the same principles as his analysis of work. In *Taking Care* Stiegler argues that the transmission of heritage and tradition by the family is supported by technical objects, and that this transmission has hitherto constituted the difference between generations. He claims that this link between generations is being short-circuited by the proletarianization of adults induced by the provision of automated services and cultural products aimed at children. The integration of a younger generation into psychic and collective individuation is disrupted by the marketization of childhood, the targeting of minors by advertising, and the automatization of culture which de-responsibilizes adults by replacing parental authority with consumer services.[26] It is through these means that proletarianization, most often associated with the world of labor, is extended to parental authority.

For Stiegler this is, again, made possible by the technical condition. Human behavior emerges through the persistent naturalization and denaturalization engendered by changes

in technical systems. A child's development is not innate but is guided by the parental care that leads them through the acquisition of this inheritance. The capacity to critique and disautomate these inherited processes of psychic and collective individuation is not an a-historical capacity. For Stiegler, "thought is not a faculty of the intellect localized in the brain any more than the heart or the liver: it is the product of social organization" (TC 167). The family is a crucial part of the social processes in which thought is formed because the capacity to critique processes of individuation is developed within the primary process of individuation found in the home. The claim that the formation of this critical faculty is disrupted is repeated in *Automatic Society* where Stiegler argues that parents are "dispossessed of the possibility of educating their own children." He continues:

> in our epoch this is what they are less and less able to do: they are prevented by the control that has been taken of protentions, and from the earliest phases of life, through systems that capture the attention of both young and old alike, installing proletarianization, ruining attention and generating immense misery. (AS 214)

Stiegler sees the private home – the place of the formation of the capacity for critical attention, thought, and knowledge – as encroached upon by the public realm of consumption because parental knowledge has been replaced by services. The family, therefore, is a key site in a "battle *for* intelligence" which pitches contribution against consumption (TC 30). Any new system of work presupposes the protection of the family from calculation insofar as it is where the ability to engage in contributory work is formed.

This link between familial care and contributory work is solidified by Stiegler's adoption of the concepts of the transitional object and transitional space from Donald Winnicott. In Winnicott's theory of childhood development a transitional object is an intermediary between parents and children – such as a teddy bear or a blanket – which facilitates the formation of a sense of self and the capacity for imagination and independent thought. These objects mediate between internal and external realities forming, first, the child–parent relationship and, second, the entire cultural field. In *What Makes Life Worth Living* Stiegler presents the transitional object in the life of the child as the exemplar of the transitional role of all technical objects. They form a "relation of care" that becomes a more general "transitional space, an intermediate area of experience where objects of culture, the arts, religion and science are formed" (WMLWL 20). Healthy individuals and the public space they inhabit are produced through the relationship to technical objects that is first formed by the transitional object.

Central to Winnicott's account of childhood transitional space is the maternal figure. A "good-enough mother" is characterized by an "almost complete adaption to her infant's needs."[27] In constituting the transitional space required for psychological development the mother must be totally attuned to the needs of her infant:

> *at the start* adaption needs to be almost exact, and unless this is so it is not possible for the infant to begin to develop a capacity to experience a relationship to external reality, or even to form a conception of external reality.[28]

Stiegler reiterates Winnicott's understanding of the maternal constitution of the transitional space: "A mother […] by taking care of her infant, even before the child is old enough to speak, teaches it that life is worth living. She instils in the child the *feeling* that life is worth living" (WMLWL 1). Automation disrupts this transitional role of the familial realm. In *What Makes Life Worth Living* Stiegler formalizes earlier comments in *Taking Care* regarding this disruption. He claims that "allowing psycho-technologies to take control of the child's developing attention means letting the culture industry destroy those transitional spaces" (TC 15). The development of the rational and critical faculties of infants

requires the protection of transitional spaces against the incursions of the culture industry.

Stiegler's conceptualization of work rests upon this definition of reason as formed through care. If work is not simply occupied time but the creative transformation of psychic and collective individuation, then it requires the deployment of the intellectual characteristics developed by maternal care. In his words: "If work lies at the heart of rationality […] this is precisely because *reason* […] *is the consistent motive of all existent motives* of any social form whatsoever" (AS 175). Work does not just involve labor, production, and remuneration but a more fundamental form of contribution to social life. Hence, Stiegler's claims regarding work draw on *What Makes Life Worth Living*. "Transitional adoption," in the sense that Winnicott gives to the transitional space, "constitutes the re-arming of a relational critical faculty" (WMLWL 45). It is this faculty that constitutes the transformative and contributory work that Stiegler wants to posit as necessary in *Automatic Society* precisely because it forms the capacities for "the *production of society*" as a "transitional space" (AS 215).

When understood within the context of his broader philosophy of technology and his analysis of the family, it is clear that Stiegler's solution to the crisis of work presupposes both denaturalization as a critical principle and a commitment to a broader transformation of society in tandem with any transformation of work. Automation must be used to promote dis-automating activity understood as free, contributory work that is supported by an understanding of the family as "above and beyond the market" (AS 214). Stiegler's dual form of the basic income, labelled as a guaranteed minimum income and a contributory income, supports this distinction between work and care. His adoption of denaturalization can be questioned by considering the consequences of such a distinction. Does Stiegler successfully break with the relationship between work and the family that is presupposed by the model of work that he seeks to overcome?

the naturalization of social reproduction in stiegler's politics of work

This question can be answered by reconceiving the link between the transformation of work and its relationship to the family as a relationship between productive and social reproductive labor. Social reproduction theory attempts to address the broad-ranging consequences that arise from a single question: "If workers' labor produces all the wealth in society, who then produces the worker?"[29] The worker that arrives at the doors of the factory, the office, or the coffee shop each morning requires the replenishments of sustenance, sleep, and love. Despite this, within a capitalist conception of work it is only "productive labor for the market" that is recognized as "legitimate 'work.'" In contrast, Tithi Bhattacharya continues, "the tremendous amount of familial as well as communitarian work that goes on to sustain and reproduce the worker, or more specifically her labor power, is naturalized into nonexistence."[30] From the perspective of social reproduction theory, any politics of work requires a consideration of the relationship between employment and the care work necessary for the maintenance of the workforce. A foundational assumption for this perspective is that the distinction between these forms of work is based upon gendered divisions produced by historical shifts in the relationship between work and the reproduction of the labor force. These divisions lie between typically masculine productive work and feminine reproductive labor and care work. From this perspective, the private labor necessary for a stable workforce and body of consumers is not a static, isolated realm of activity, but a product of a history of forms of production and reproduction, striated by gender, race, and class relations.[31]

Any politics of work must consider care labor and the history of its relationships with other types of labor that constitute it for two reasons. First, because care labor is not simply productive of use-value but also exchange-value, insofar as it produces labor

power as a commodity.[32] Second, because capitalism undermines its own conditions by putting pressures on the realm of social reproduction.[33] At first glance, Stiegler's critique of capitalism's proletarianization of the family seems in tune with these two dimensions of social reproduction theory. He claims that the family is central to producing the subject who engages in contributory work and that contemporary capitalism undermines care labor. In contrast, social reproduction theory does not take the nature of the family and of care relationships for granted.[34] The challenge this poses to Stiegler's account of work is as follows: if he proposes a clear separation between contributory work and familial care, does he not also reproduce the background conditions of a system of work that he otherwise seeks to critique? There are two issues at stake here: whether Stiegler reproduces the gendered division of labor presupposed by twentieth-century models of work, and the extent to which his analysis of the family mischaracterizes the pressures that contemporary, neoliberal forms of work place upon it. We will focus on both by identifying the naturalization of the family in his use of Winnicott, his a-historical approach to the relationship between productive and reproductive labor, and his reproduction of the discourse of family responsibility that underpins neoliberal accounts of work to the neglect of structural and economic pressures on the family.

First, by proposing a distinction between a guaranteed minimum income and a contributory income Stiegler naturalizes a version of the twentieth-century welfare state and the gendered division of labor that it entailed. The Fordist sexual contract can be seen to have been characterized by the provision of jobs for life and a stable wage that could support a family with a single, male parent in work, supplemented by welfare.[35] For Gal Gerson, Winnicott's understanding of the family is formed within the intellectual climate that underpins this understanding of the relationship between the wage, the welfare state, and family life. If, for Winnicott, "human society is structured by a natural division into two distinct and mutually complementing sexes," then healthy development requires the correct division of labor between these two sexes, with the social reproductive tasks of this division allocated to the category of the good enough mother.[36] Even if one conceives of the good enough mother as a *conceptual* image associated with a set of activities that are not necessarily tied to biological sex, the *historical* reality of this division of labor saw women allocated the task of child-rearing. Thus, for Gerson:

> Winnicott's model seems to consign women to a function within the home, and so strengthens confining gender roles […] This echoes the overall perception of the family that was promoted along with the welfare reforms of the mid-twentieth century, in which the nuclear and internally differentiated family was assumed as the main recipient of social entitlements.[37]

Winnicott's work reinforces a gendered division of labor through the normalizing of a particular model of child development and a mode of wage labor that supports it.

It is, on the face of it, not immediately clear that Stiegler's philosophy conforms to this model. For some, his philosophical anthropology translates Winnicott's a-historical conception of the family unit into a historical product of the progressive denaturalization and renaturalization of social forms.[38] However, while Stiegler is committed to the philosophical perspective of denaturalization, the family appears to be exempt from this broader commitment to a philosophy of human becoming. Proletarianization does not so much transform and denaturalize as *interrupt* the family. For Stiegler, it is the Winnicottian and Fordist model of family life "that proletarianization and employment interrupt in an increasingly serious way," leaving parents "dispossessed of the possibility of educating their own children" (AS 214). The guaranteed minimum income proposed by Stiegler appears to be a remedy, analogous to the welfare state's support of the family wage, to this invasion. However, Stiegler's distinction between this guaranteed minimum income

and a contributory income deepens the divide between work and care by differentiating between the support provided for social reproduction and the support of contributory work. Without challenging the normative background to automation, such as the gendered division of labor implied by the rigid distinction between public work and private care work, any form of basic income predicated upon technological change will simply reproduce these assumptions.[39] From this perspective, by proposing a dual form of basic income Stiegler naturalizes and reproduces the assumptions of welfare state liberalism regarding the relationship between the family and the world of work.

This is particularly clear given that the stability that the Winnicottian model of parenting requires is incompatible with the role of uncertainty and the dissolution of the self in Stiegler's conception of work. "Dis-automation" invokes uncertainty by "*expanding the experience of individuation beyond all calculation*" and by "*passing through a form of sacrifice*" (AS 57–58).[40] Given Stiegler's adoption of the certainties and commitment of the parent within the Winnicottian family, this model of work would appear to exclude care labor. For Stiegler care labor should not be subjected to the conditions of employment as it is not reducible to occupied time exchanged for a wage – it is "above and beyond the market." Parental care cannot be considered as employment as it is not undertaken as occupied time in exchange for a wage – for this would be to subject it to competition and marketization – but neither is it work, as in the Winnicottian vision it is to be sheltered from the uncertainties of the economy and from the dissolution of the self that Stiegler's model of work involves. While Stiegler may, in philosophical terms, reject a-historical images of human nature and embrace a project of denaturalization, he does not apply similar scrutiny to the model of the family that he uses to frame what he sees as a crisis of care. His use of Winnicottian psychoanalysis to conceptualize the functioning of the family makes it impossible to conceive of parental care as a form of work.

The second problem is that this gesture prevents him from situating this crisis within a historical perspective, deepening the issue with Stiegler's identification of the crisis of familial care with the disruption of an a-historical version of the private, heterosexual family represented by Winnicott's work. Nancy Fraser argues that changes in the realm of production entail a reorganization of social reproduction, leading to boundary struggles between the two realms on the part of those impacted by these transformations. The Fordist family wage that Winnicott advocates is a product of these struggles.[41] Instead of setting up a Winnicottian line between the private and public, Fraser suggests that production and social reproduction are mutually constitutive and that any division between them is subject to political contestation. Winnicott's model of development is isolated from these changes. While Winnicott himself should not be criticized for failing to predict changes in social reproduction, we may still claim that he does not provide an adequate model for coming to terms with their impact. By claiming the opposite, Stiegler neglects questions regarding the constitution and transformation of the family that he sees as disrupted by capital.

How does the Winnicottian model of the family fail to provide an adequate model for understanding the relationship between the family and contemporary work? Within Fordism and the welfare state the family wage relied upon a gendered division of labor and a racially selective approach to welfare and employment.[42] Post-Fordist and neoliberal forms of production have shifted responsibility for social reproduction from the public welfare state and the family wage to private households consisting of individuals who are equally suitable for care *and* inclusion within the workforce.[43] Work and social reproduction become increasingly difficult to disentangle as all individuals are considered to be latent workers awaiting activation. Stiegler abdicates the task of understanding this entanglement and the changes that the family undergoes within the shift from Fordism to post-Fordism and neoliberalism. He assumes the existence of a

sphere of autonomous familial care that is intruded upon by capital, to be repelled by the dual system of a guaranteed minimum income, to support social reproduction, and a contributory income, to support work in an economy of contribution. Such a response misses that the conceptual division between public work and private care labor elides the tensions between the needs of production and the demands of social reproduction that are integral to, rather than pathological versions of, the constitution of both realms. In the absence of any historical analysis of this relationship, and by "advocating the traditional family unit as a key organizing principle for contemporary society," Stiegler naturalizes a conception of work as a public matter to be separated from the realm of private social reproduction.[44] This conception of work is defanged of any critical purchase when considered in the face of changes to work beyond the welfare state model of capitalism.

Third, Stiegler conflates personal and structural responsibility for the crisis of social reproduction in a way which compounds this lack of critical power, and that reproduces elements of the moral and normative understanding of the relationship between work and the family that succeeds the Fordist welfare state model. There are two dimensions to the pressures on the family in Stiegler's account. On the one hand, individual parents are responsible for the psychic health of their infants, while on the other, the ruinous effects of marketization on family life are to blame for the crisis of social reproduction. Stiegler focuses on the first, personal dimension of the crisis of social reproduction, lamenting that "nobody eats with anyone else, the only meeting point being, eventually, the television news."[45] In contrast, one can also highlight the structural, economic pressures that are placed on social reproduction by precarious work, the necessity for two-income families, and downward pressure on wages, which occur at the same time as the shift of responsibility for social reproduction from the welfare state to the family.[46] Instead of these broader economic issues, Stiegler is focused on personal responsibility and its relationship to the marketized incursions of technology and of automation into the cultural and symbolic components of family life. It is this cultural, rather than economic, pressure that is ostensibly preventing parents from taking individual responsibility for their familial duties.

This emphasis privileges the apparent parental elision of responsibility over economic and structural pressures on social reproduction. It also exacerbates Stiegler's division between the public realm of work and the private realm of familial care by aligning his analysis with both neoliberal and conservative understandings of family responsibility. In Melinda Cooper's account of family values under neoliberalism the family is a realm of individual responsibility that complements market activity. Individualized responsibility in work goes hand in hand with the moralizing shift of responsibility for social reproduction to the family. For Cooper:

> neoliberals persistently exhort individuals to take responsibility for their own fate and yet the imperative of *personal responsibility* slides ineluctably into that of *family responsibility* when it comes to managing the inevitable problems of economic dependence (the care of children, the disabled, the elderly, or the unwaged).[47]

This is not just an unintended consequence of the expansion of the logic of marketization. Under neoliberal conditions the individual steps into the place of the welfare state. Cooper argues that this development is fundamental to the theoretical underpinnings of neoliberalism, for "the freedom of contractual relations in the marketplace cannot be sustained without the existence of noncontractual obligations in the family."[48] Market rationality and conservative kinship relations are not opposed: individual and familial economic responsibility are a product of the mutual transformation of the family and its relationship to the economy and to work.

If in Stiegler's account work is a public matter of contribution to psychic and collective individuation that is supported by a model of

the family that is "above and beyond" market relations, then he appears to reproduce a central assumption of the relationship between work and the family under neoliberalism. He neglects structural pressures on social reproduction by focusing on the restoration of parental responsibility in the face of proletarianization. This move is reminiscent of, in Lisa Adkins's words, the "reinvention of family responsibility" that "has […] been central to the crafting of the post-Fordist economic order."[49] Economic failure is not a result of structural causes but an inability to manage the economic pressures which are first and foremost the duty of families. The precarious logic of debt, credit, and individual entrepreneurship through which household finance is understood is not simply imposed upon the isolated family but a central part of the way in which individuals are formed as subjects within neoliberalism. By arguing for the restoration of responsibility over the adjustment of economic pressures on the family Stiegler echoes arguments that, in Cooper's words, "all too readily lend themselves to the social conservative argument that certain forms of (domestic, feminized) labor should remain unpaid" and is therefore beyond the scope of any analysis of work.[50] If the family is an isolated sphere of moral responsibility then the argument that one should protect it from the market leads to the claim that it cannot be analyzed with reference to the terms of the market – including wages, productivity, or the division of labor.

One might object to this critique by highlighting that Stiegler is committed to care as a political ideal that transcends the private realm. Care has transformative capacities and as such can be aligned with his definition of work. It is worth highlighting that where for Stiegler work *must* be transformative it is clear that social reproductive labor is not *necessarily* so. This is not to denigrate care labor for it clearly has a transformative impact upon those on giving and receiving it. Yet, its importance also lies in its role in maintaining and sustaining the structures in which we live. Insofar as these sustaining activities are central to familial work and social reproduction they would not meet Stiegler's criteria for being classed as true work insofar as they require constant, rather than intermittent and uncertain, activity. Family responsibility is opposed to, and excluded from, the realm of contributory work. Not only does Stiegler naturalize the gendered division of labor found in Winnicott's work and render it a-historical, missing the withering of the welfare state and the moralizing of the family. He also reproduces elements of the system of work he seeks to critique, blunting any critical edge that his account might have with respect to its normative underpinnings.

conclusion: the intertwinement of the politics of work and care

Our aim in the above has not been to address the veracity of the claim that changes to the world of work are certain to occur as a result of automation. Nor has it been to claim that Stiegler's focus on the family in the context of these changes is misplaced. The claim is in fact quite the opposite to this second point. Family life is absolutely central to any consideration of post-work politics. To this end, the critique of Stiegler's politics of work presented above is intended to demonstrate that any response to the problems posed by automation cannot simply treat the family as a naturalized space that is distinct from the world of work. We saw that in Stiegler's philosophy of technology it would appear that his adoption of the strategy of denaturalization would reject a-historical understandings of the family and a strict separation between work and care. This would appear to be in favor of a politics that is at the very least open to the radical transformation of existing political and social structures, the division of labor in the family included. Insofar as he tries to salvage work as contribution, implicitly responding to the criticism that post-work politics negates the value of work, he holds to this promise.[51] Nevertheless, this model of contributory work carries with it a conservatism within which traditional behaviors – a specific model of the family in particular – are naturalized as a

realm distinct from work. This gesture is depoliticizing and conservative insofar as the normative division between work and the family is spared from the denaturalizing thrust of Stiegler's argument, despite the apparent connection between the two.

Some have resisted the association of Stiegler with a conservatism of this kind due to his critique of metaphysical accounts of the origin of the human, here referred to as denaturalization.[52] Indeed, one might object to the reading given above because Stiegler historicizes the concept of the transitional space in his philosophy of technics. This may be the case when considering Stiegler's analysis of Winnicott alone. When it is situated within his politics of work a different image appears, for the Winnicottian model is not encompassed by the contributory model of creative, disruptive, and intermittent work that is "beyond all calculation." In proposing this model of contributory work Stiegler unwittingly perpetuates gendered assumptions about the nature and value of particular kinds of labor, for he excludes care labor from the category of work. The gendered division of labor that accompanies these assumptions is not subjected to a denaturalizing critique. Considered from the perspective of social reproduction theory, Stiegler's politics of work is conservative in a very simple way: he preserves a particular model of the family in the face of cultural change without due consideration for the inequalities that may exist within these relations. The philosophical claims of denaturalization that Stiegler begins from conflict with an image of work that relies on the naturalized and de-historicized presuppositions of Fordist, post-Fordist, and neoliberal forms of social reproductive labor. An understanding of work based on these assumptions *removes* the family and the labor that takes place within it from political debates around the future of work. Stiegler is complicit, therefore, with a narrative that intensifies the visibility of creative work made possible by digital technology and that diminishes the visibility of the care labor that supports these endeavors.[53] While some may wish to defend Stiegler from the accusation of conservatism on the grounds that his project is anti-metaphysical or anti-essentialist, his concrete proposals regarding work and the family are not treated in this manner.

Hence, our claim is not that the entirety of Stiegler's system should be rejected, but that within his account of the politics of work, care work is rendered conceptually invisible insofar as it is *not* work. The family is conserved as a site of invisible labor and is not subjected to the denaturalizing force of ideology critique he otherwise advocates. If, as noted briefly above, for Stiegler ideology critique is a denaturalizing gesture that highlights the contingency of normative assumptions, then to fail to recognize the historical contingency of a particular organization of the family and its connection to the historical development of contemporary understandings of work is to place it outside of the purview of ideological criticism. This is not to say that Stiegler devalues care *itself*. Rather, he devalues it *as a form of work*. Making invisible work visible can highlight the inequalities that exist within a particular division of labor. This recognition of invisible care labor is a crucial component of any political consideration of the future of work.[54] In Stiegler's case the potential for his philosophy of technics to denaturalize the invisible status of care work goes untapped. Denaturalization as a philosophical strategy is tethered to a politics of work with which it is in contradiction, due to the lack of any analysis of how the form of work that is being proposed interacts with the history of the familial space that it is distinguished from. This does not mean that we have to abandon Stiegler's account of work entirely, but that we should recognize that there are clear pitfalls in adopting it uncritically.

The lesson Stiegler represents for considerations of work more broadly is that the strategy of denaturalization comes into conflict with concrete political projects and policies insofar as they may retain normative content that they try to move beyond. In making this point visible, this account of Stiegler's philosophy of work suggests that in certain respects some critics of

work have not moved far beyond the criticisms of social reproduction theory. If the family is not simply an auxiliary space to work then it must play a role in responses to the challenges to work and social reproduction represented by automation. The strategy of denaturalization requires this role to be considered both historically and alongside other organizations of care. For philosophically inclined approaches to the question of work and care, represented here by Stiegler, this demonstrates the necessity of subjecting both work and care to the critical strategy of denaturalization.

disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

notes

1 While this paper was under review Bernard Stiegler tragically passed away. This work is indebted to both his philosophical project and his intellectual generosity. I am also grateful to comments on early versions of this paper from participants at the "Sapience, Aesthetics, Politics" online symposium organized by the University of Lincoln, and the "Political Theory and the Future of Work" workshop at the Manchester Workshops in Political Theory.

2 Benanav, "Automation and the Future of Work – 1."

3 Benanav, "Automation and the Future of Work – 2" 131–32.

4 Frey 345.

5 E.g., Danaher; Frase; Pettinger; Srnicek and Williams; Weeks.

6 Weeks 3.

7 Frayne 17.

8 Weeks 8.

9 Gorz 219.

10 Chamberlain 9.

11 E.g., Bhattacharya, *Social Reproduction Theory*; Dalla Costa and James; Federici.

12 Atanasoski and Vora; Howcroft and Rubery.

13 For an overview of some of the arguments made for and against the possibility of widespread technological unemployment, see Danaher 25–52.

14 Ross Abbinnett gives an excellent introduction to Stiegler's critique of capitalism (*The Thought of Bernard Stiegler*).

15 Stiegler, *Automatic Society* 4–5. Further citations of this text will be given in-text as AS.

16 E.g., Danaher; Frase; Srnicek and Williams 85–105.

17 Chamberlain 8–13; Frayne 17; Srnicek and Williams; Weeks 6–7.

18 Stiegler adopts the language of primary and secondary retentions from the work of Edmund Husserl. In lieu of a more extensive account of his reading of Husserl, see Turner, "Politicising the Epokhé."

19 For a more detailed account of Simondon's philosophy, see Muriel Combes.

20 Simondon 5.

21 Stiegler, *Technics and Time 3* 94.

22 Stiegler, *What Makes Life Worth Living* 4. Further citations of this text will be given in-text as WMLWL.

23 For a more extensive account of Stiegler's theory of ideology, see Turner, "Ideology and Post-Structuralism."

24 Frey and Osborne.

25 Frase; Srnicek and Williams 117–23; Weeks 113–50.

26 Stiegler, *Taking Care of Youth and the Generations* 4. Further citations of this text will be given in-text as TC.

27 Winnicott 14.

28 Ibid.

29 Bhattacharya, "Introduction" 1.

30 Ibid. 2.

31 E.g., Arruzza; Bhattacharya, "Introduction"; Ferguson.

32 Caffentzsis 268–69; Dalla Costa and James 35.

33 Federici 101–02; Fraser, "Crisis of Care?" 32.

34 Nor, for that matter, does it restrict its analysis of care to the family, but this topic is beyond the scope of this paper. See the collection edited by Bhattacharya for an assessment of a range of issues within social reproduction theory (Bhattacharya, *Social Reproduction Theory*).

35 Fraser, *Fortunes of Feminism* 111–12; Weeks 121.

36 Gerson, "Winnicott, Participation and Gender" 562.

37 Gerson, "Winnicott and the History of Welfare State Thought in Britain" 330.

38 Espinoza.

39 Howcroft and Rubery 223.

40 Maurice Blanchot's influence upon Stiegler demonstrates the importance of uncertainty to his conception of work (Turner, "From Resistance to Invention"). Drawing on Blanchot, Stiegler claims that work is a form of self-writing that engages with the impossible, or that which is beyond any and all calculation.

41 Fraser, "Crisis of Care?" 30.

42 Adkins, "Social Reproduction in the Neoliberal Era" 21–22.

43 Adkins, *The Time of Money* 69–70; Cooper 71; Weeks 51–53.

44 Fuggle 200–01.

45 Stiegler, *Acting Out* 50. This claim involves large inductive leaps from small numbers of statistics to the claim that the private, domestic sphere is being destroyed. These leaps include figures that claim between one-third and two-thirds of children in Europe have a television in their bedrooms (TC 56) and that conversation has "decreased by an average of 60 per cent in fifteen US states" (Stiegler, *States of Shock* 27). This is not the place to dissect the validity of the studies themselves, but it is worth noting the specious nature of the links Stiegler establishes between a small number of statistics and proletarianization.

46 Flynn and Schwartz; Huws 17–18; Mohandesi and Teitelman 63.

47 Cooper 71.

48 Ibid. 106.

49 Adkins, *The Time of Money* 69.

50 Cooper 23.

51 For the criticism that post-work politics neglects the importance of work, see Spencer 9.

52 Abbinnett 114–15; Howells.

53 Atanasoski and Vora 92.

54 Pettinger 49–60.

bibliography

Abbinnett, Ross. *The Thought of Bernard Stiegler: Capitalism, Technology and the Politics of Spirit*. London: Routledge, 2018. Print.

Adkins, Lisa. "Social Reproduction in the Neoliberal Era: Payments, Leverage and the Minskian Household." *Polygraph* 27 (2019): 19–33. Print.

Adkins, Lisa. *The Time of Money*. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2018. Print.

Arruzza, Cinzia. "Functionalist, Determinist, Reductionist: Social Reproduction Feminism and Its Critics." *Science and Society* 80.1 (2016): 9–30. Print.

Atanasoski, Neda, and Kalindi Vora. *Surrogate Humanity: Race, Robots, and the Politics of Technological Futures*. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2019. Print.

Benanav, Aaron. "Automation and the Future of Work – 1." *New Left Review* 119 (2019): 5–38. Print.

Benanav, Aaron. "Automation and the Future of Work – 2." *New Left Review* 120 (2019): 117–46. Print.

Bhattacharya, Tithi. "Introduction: Mapping Social Reproduction Theory." *Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentring Oppression*. Ed. Tithi Bhattacharya. London: Pluto, 2017. 1–20. Print.

Bhattacharya, Tithi, ed. *Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression*. London: Pluto, 2017. Print.

Caffentzsis, George. *In Letters of Blood and Fire: Work, Machines and the Crisis of Capitalism*. Oakland: PM, 2013. Print.

Chamberlain, James A. *Undoing Work, Rethinking Community: A Critique of the Social Function of Work*. Ithaca, NY: ILR, 2018. Print.

Combes, Muriel. *Gilbert Simondon and the Philosophy of the Transindividual.* Trans. Thomas LaMarre. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 2013. Print.

Cooper, Melinda. *Family Values: Between Neoliberalism and the New Social Conservatism*. New York: Zone, 2017. Print.

Dalla Costa, Mariarosa, and Selma James. *The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community*. Bristol: Falling Wall, 1975. Print.

Danaher, John. *Automation and Utopia: Human Flourishing in a World without Work*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2019. Print.

Espinoza, Tania. "The Technical Object of Psychoanalysis." *Stiegler and Technics*. Ed. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2013. 151–64. Print.

Federici, Silvia. *Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle*. Oakland: PM, 2012. Print.

Ferguson, Susan. "Intersectionality and Social-Reproduction Feminisms: Toward an Integrative Ontology." *Historical Materialism* 24.2 (2016): 38–60. Print.

Flynn, Lindsay B., and Herman Mark Schwartz. "No Exit: Social Reproduction in an Era of Rising Income Inequality." *Politics & Society* 45.4 (2017): 471–503. Print.

Frase, Peter. *Four Futures: Life After Capitalism*. London: Verso, 2016. Print.

Fraser, Nancy. "Crisis of Care? On the Social Reproductive Contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism." *Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentring Oppression*. Ed. Tithi Bhattacharya. London: Pluto, 2017. 21–36. Print.

Fraser, Nancy. *Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis*. London: Verso, 2013. Print.

Frayne, David. *The Refusal of Work: The Theory and Practice of Resistance to Work*. London: Zed, 2015. Print.

Frey, Carl Benedikt. *The Technology Trap: Capital, Labour, and Power in the Age of Automation*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2019. Print.

Frey, Carl Benedikt, and Michael A. Osborne. "The Future of Employment: How Susceptible are Jobs to Computerisation?" *Technological Forecasting and Social Change* 114 (2017): 254–80. Print.

Fuggle, Sophie. "Stiegler and Foucault: The Politics of Care and Self-Writing." *Stiegler and Technics*. Ed. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2013. 192–207. Print.

Gerson, Gal. "Winnicott and the History of Welfare State Thought in Britain." *D.W. Winnicott and Political Theory: Recentering the Subject*. Ed. Matthew H. Bowker and Amy Buzby. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. 311–32. Print.

Gerson, Gal. "Winnicott, Participation and Gender." *Feminism & Psychology* 14.4 (2004): 561–81. Print.

Gorz, André. *Critique of Economic Reason*. Trans. Gillian Handyside and Chris Turner. London: Verso, 1989. Print.

Howcroft, Debra, and Jill Rubery. "'Bias In, Bias Out': Gender Equality and the Future of Work Debate." *Labour & Industry: A Journal of the Social and Economic Relations of Work* 29.2 (2019): 213–27. Print.

Howells, Christina. "'Le Defaut d'origine': The Prosthetic Condition of Love and Desire." *Stiegler and Technics*. Ed. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2013. 137–50. Print.

Huws, Ursula. "The Hassle of Housework: Digitalisation and the Commodification of Domestic Labour." *Feminist Review* 123.1 (2019): 8–23. Print.

Mohandesi, Salar, and Emma Teitelman. "Without Reserves." *Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentring Oppression*. Ed. Tithi Bhattacharya. London: Pluto, 2017. 37–68. Print.

Pettinger, Lynne. *What's Wrong With Work?* Bristol: Policy, 2019. Print.

Simondon, Gilbert. "The Position of the Problem of Ontogenesis." *Parrhesia* 7 (2009): 4–16. Print.

Spencer, David A. "Fear and Hope in an Age of Mass Automation: Debating the Future of Work." *New Technology, Work and Employment* 33.1 (2018): 1–12. Print.

Srnicek, Nick, and Alex Williams. *Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work*. London: Verso, 2015. Print.

Stiegler, Bernard. *Acting Out*. Trans. David Barison et al. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2009. Print.

Stiegler, Bernard. *Automatic Society Vol. 1: The Future of Work*. Trans. Daniel Ross. Cambridge: Polity, 2016. Print.

Stiegler, Bernard. *States of Shock: Stupidity and Knowledge in the 21st Century*. Trans. Daniel Ross. Cambridge: Polity, 2015. Print.

Stiegler, Bernard. *Taking Care of Youth and the Generations*. Trans. Stephen Barker. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2010. Print.

Stiegler, Bernard. *Technics and Time 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise*. Trans. Stephen Barker. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2011. Print.

Stiegler, Bernard. *What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology*. Trans. Daniel Ross. Cambridge: Polity, 2013. Print.

Turner, Ben. "From Resistance to Invention in the Politics of the Impossible: Bernard Stiegler's Political Reading of Maurice Blanchot." *Contemporary Political Theory* 18.1 (2019): 43–64. Print.

Turner, Ben. "Ideology and Post-Structuralism After Bernard Stiegler." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 22.1 (2017): 92–110. Print.

Turner, Ben. "Politicising the Epokhé: Bernard Stiegler and the Politics of Epochal Suspension." *The Subject(s) of Phenomenology*. Ed. Iulian Apostolescu. Dordrecht: Springer, 2020. 341–54. Print.

Weeks, Kathi. *The Problem with Work Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries*. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2011. Print.

Winnicott, Donald W. *Playing and Reality*. London: Routledge, 2010. Print.

Ben Turner
School of Politics and International Relations
University of Kent
Canterbury
Kent CT2 7NZ
UK
E-mail: B.Turner@kent.ac.uk