IIT PALAKKAD

COMPUTER SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING

Indian Institute of Technology, Palakkad

CS4501: Game Theory Test I (11 September, 2018)

Time: 08:00 - 09:00 hrs Max Marks: 20

1. There is a communication channel of maximum capacity 1 unit. There are n users who simultaneously use this channel. User i wishes to send $x_i \in [0, 1]$ units of data on this channel. The payoff of user i has the following form

$$u_i(x_i, x_{-i}) = \begin{cases} 1 + x_i(a - \sum_{j=1}^n x_j) & \text{if } \sum_{j=1}^n x_j \le a \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

where $a \in [0, 1]$ is fixed by the network operator to cap the amount of data transmitted by the users.

- (a) Does the above problem have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) for all values of $a \in [0, 1]$? Compute the PSNE when it exists.
- (b) Does the above problem have a *dominant strategy equilibrium* for any value of a? Provide proper steps/arguments to justify your answer.
- 2. Given an example for each of the following
 - (a) A 2-player game with **one** dominant strategy equilibrium and **no** pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
 - (b) A 2-player game with ${\it two}$ pure strategy Nash equilibrium and ${\it no}$ dominant strategy equilibrium.
 - (c) A 2-player game with **at-least** one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and **no** pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

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