How Racial Minorities Evaluate Trade-offs between Descriptive and Partisan Representation[*]

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Abstract

Despite the alignment between racial minorities and the Democratic Party, racial minorities often confront tensions between their racial and partisan group interests. How do cross-pressured minorities navigate such trade-offs? Examining the case of racial redistricting using original data from a nationally representative survey of over 2,400 Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans, I designed a novel experiment to assess how minorities evaluate trade-offs between their preferences for descriptive racial and Democratic representation that potentially arise when creating majority-minority districts. I find that cross-pressured minorities perceive decreasing returns in the number of costly majority-minority districts and instrumentally view Democratic (Republican) legislative majorities as beneficial (harmful) to their welfare. These results inform broader questions about how individuals with multiple political group identities evaluate trade-offs involving competing group interests, and shed light on how cross-pressured minorities navigate conflicts between their racial and partisan interests to form political preferences in a racially polarized party system.

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Despite the general alignment between racial minorities and the Democratic Party in the United States' racially polarized two-party system today, racial minorities with an affinity for the Democratic Party routinely encounter conflicts between their racial and partisan group interests. When these conflicts arise, how do cross-pressured racial minorities navigate trade-offs between competing racial and partisan group interests?

Such tensions exist for multiple minority groups across a range of contexts. In specific policy domains, minorities encounter these trade-offs when the policy positions and actions of Democrats are at odds with how minorities perceive their racial and ethnic group interests. Examples from contemporary American politics include when, as both presidential candidate and later as president, Bill Clinton courted white conservatives at the expense of Black interests and welfare by advancing punitive welfare reform and criminal justice policies[1]; when, up until that point in time in 2014, President Barack Obama had overseen the largest number of deportations in the nation's history, disproportionately affecting immigrant communities, and was called out as the "deporter-in-chief" by Janet Murguía, president of the National Council of La Raza[2]; and, while not a majority opinion among Asian Americans, some Asian Americans interpret affirmative action policies championed by Democratic politicians as antithetical to their perceived ethnoracial group interests.[3] Tensions between racial and partisan group interests also arise in political domains, such as when some racial minorities fault Democrats for running deracialized campaigns that fail to engage and mobilize minority voters and for taking minority voters for granted[4]; and in the context of racial redistricting, when creating Democratic majority-minority districts increases minority representation but potentially at a partisan cost by simultaneously increasing the number of Republican seats created.

Research studying how racial minorities evaluate trade-offs involving their racial group interests is relatively nascent. Building on and departing from research on the use of racial group interest as a heuristic for self interest among Blacks (Dawson 1994), recent experimental work has examined

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[1] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-36020717

[2] https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/03/04/285907255/national-council-of-la-raza-dubs-obama-deporter-in-chief; https://www.npr.org/2017/01/20/510799842/obama-leaves-office-as-deporter-in-chief

[3] http://aapidata.com/blog/asianam-affirmative-action-surveys/

[4] https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/07/the-democratic-party-apologizes-to-black-voters/565697/; https://newrepublic.com/article/150453/democrats-taking-latino-voters-granted

how Black Americans navigate explicit trade-offs involving Black group interests, showing that in-group norms and expectations of social sanctioning encourage compliance against pursuing self-interested behavior that conflicts with group-interested behavior (White, Laird and Allen 2014) and compliance with the in-group norm of identifying with the Democratic Party (Laird et al. 2018). Other existing research studying minority preferences for descriptive representation have shown that these preferences are more likely to dominate competing representational preferences among those with strong racial group identification and strong linked fate (e.g., McConnaughy et al. 2010).

However, existing studies employ theoretical frameworks that define group interests, pressures, and identification only as a function of an individual's racial group. This approach, while useful for understanding theories about how singular group interests and attachments affect political attitudes and behavior, is incomplete for understanding how individuals navigate conflicts between *multiple* group interests and attachments. As the two major parties in the United States have undergone social sorting and polarization, understanding how identities—in particular overlapping social and partisan identities—affect one's political views requires considering "how a collection of identities is working in concert, rather than isolating each one and examining them in turn," because overlapping identities can "have significantly different effects when understood in relation to each other" (Mason 2018, 19). Accordingly, I depart from existing work by arguing that a theory of how individuals navigate trade-offs involving competing racial and partisan interests must explicitly account for both racial and partisan group identities and must examine how cross-pressured individuals weigh conflicting group interests. Moreover, existing research on minority evaluations of trade-offs involving their preferences for descriptive representation yield mixed empirical conclusions about whether those preferences dominate conflicting preferences for partisan or substantive representation.

To address these theoretical shortcomings and ongoing empirical debates in the literature, I examine the specific case of trade-offs between preferences for descriptive racial and partisan representation that arise in racial redistricting. Using this case, I develop a simple decision-theoretic framework to understand how racial minorities who are cross-pressured in this setting form pref-

erences about Democratic majority-minority districts that come at a partisan cost. Specifically I develop predictions about how preferences are affected by the quantity of costly majority-minority districts proposed, the marginal cost of each majority-minority district, and the pivotality of a majority-minority district. This framework is also used to explore whether trade-off evaluations are shaped by perceptions of the welfare effects of alternative redistricting proposals. Further, building on prior work on the moderating effect of racial identity strength, I extend the model to explore whether trade-off evaluations vary by the strength of one's racial and partisan group identification.

I test hypotheses derived from this framework for multiple racial minority groups using a novel survey experiment fielded on over 2,400 Black, Latino, and Asian American adults. In the experiment, subjects are asked to evaluate counterfactual redistricting plans involving costly co-racial majority-minority districts[5], where the quantity of costly majority-minority districts, the marginal cost of each majority-minority district, and the condition under which the marginal majority-minority district is pivotal are randomized.

For Black, Latino, and Asian Americans facing a trade-off, I find that preferences for increased descriptive representation do not dominate when majority-minority districts come at a partisan cost. Blacks facing a trade-off perceive decreasing returns in the number of costly majority-minority districts proposed, a pattern that is explained by use of a Black group utility heuristic. Latinos and Asian Americans facing a trade-off perceive decreasing returns in the number of costly majority-minority districts only after the first majority-minority district is proposed, and trade-off evaluations appear to be associated with perceived effects on self—but not racial group—interest. For all minorities facing a trade-off, preferences toward costly majority-minority districts are invariant to changes in the marginal cost of each majority-minority district. Importantly, I find strong evidence that minorities facing a trade-off are much less supportive of marginal majority-minority districts that are pivotal and cause Republicans to gain majority control, a preference that is driven by their view that Democratic (Republican) legislative majorities are instrumental for producing public policies that are welfare-improving (welfare-reducing). Finally, focusing on Black, Latino,

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[5]For example, Black subjects evaluate plans involving majority-Black districts.

and Asian Democrats facing a trade-off, exploratory analyses show suggestive evidence that the interaction between racial and partisan identity strength moderates trade-off evaluations. I conclude by discussing implications for the study of constrained preference formation by cross-pressured minorities in a racially polarized party system and for the study of minority politics more generally.

1   Background: Trade-offs between Racial and Partisan Interests in Racial Redistricting

Scholars of racial representation long have argued that creating Democratic majority-minority districts may have a "perverse effect" by reducing minority population shares in adjacent districts, which consequently reduces the aggregate liberalism of elected chambers or delegations (Erikson 1972; Cain 1984; Lublin 1997; Epstein et al. 2007).[6] More recent work by Chen (2016) further shows that this effect is most likely occur—and thus the prospect for extreme Republican gerrymandering is greatest—when the level of residential clustering by race and party is high.[7]

Historically, the strategy of creating Democratic majority-minority districts (by packing racial minorities into as few districts as possible, often in growing metropolitan areas) in order to create additional Republican districts (at the expense of elected white Democrats) has been one that Republicans have sought to realize, often in Southern states, going as far back as the late 1970s (Butler and Cain 1992). Beginning in the 1991 redistricting cycle, numerous so-called "unholy alliances" between Black or Latino Democrats and white Republicans were attempted to maximize the number of districts held by both groups, and some successfully materialized (e.g., King and Smith 2011; Berman 2012; Toobin 2003). This strategy was attempted again by Republicans in the 2011 redistricting cycle across the South and was met with resistance from some elected minority Democrats (Berman 2012), but not from others who electorally benefitted from representing safe majority-minority districts (Weiner 2011).

Much political science research on racial redistricting has focused on the extent to which unholy

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[6]But see Washington (2012) who examines congressional delegations of states during the 1990 redistricting and finds the opposite effect using a differences-in-differences design.

[7]Brown and Enos (2018) document the existence of these conditions using fine-grained data on the residential location of every voter in the United States.

alliances have been attempted and were successful (King and Smith 2011) as well as the policy effects of racial redistricting proposals (Erikson 1972; Cain 1984; Lublin 1997; Epstein et al. 2007; Washington 2012). However, almost no scholarly attention has been directed at questions about how these and other trade-offs in the racial redistricting setting are evaluated by racial minorities who perceive and face them.[8] In America's ideologically and racially polarized two-party system (Carmines and Stimson 1989; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006), the share of minorities who hold racial and Democratic group attachments and thus face this trade-off is arguably non-trivial.

I address this fundamental gap in the study of minority public opinion by focusing on how racial minorities navigate explicit trade-offs between their racial and partisan group interests that arise in racial redistricting.[9] In addition to providing empirical insights into the contours of racial minorities' representational and institutional preferences, answering this question has important normative implications for the study of democratic theory and minority politics. Political elites who directly control the redistricting process often purport to represent the interests of racial minority groups when re-drawing district lines, but assessing whether elite redistricting behavior in fact reflects the will of racial minorities requires empirical data on how minorities form preferences over redistricting alternatives. Moreover, as electoral reform activists have begun employing the initiative process to have voters decide on redistricting plans in some jurisdictions[10], minorities' preferences for alternative redistricting plans will likely be directly relevant to actual redistricting decisions and outcomes.

2   Minority Evaluations of Trade-offs between Descriptive and Partisan Representation

A vast and established literature argues that descriptive representation is symbolically important to racial minorities and that the demand for descriptive representation among racial minorities is

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[8]A key exception is Tate (2003*b*), who uses data from the 1996 National Black Election Study to examine Black opinion toward racial redistricting and finds that Blacks prefer increasing minority representation via the creation of majority-minority districts (over color-blind redistricting practices), a preference that is correlated with strong racial identification and education.

[9]To do so, I abstract away specific trade-offs reflected in actual proposals and the political contexts in which they arise.

[10]http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-politics/2011/08/redistricting-plan-opponents-given-ok-to-begin-referendum-drive.html

driven by factors including strong racial group identification and linked fate (e.g., Tate 2003*a*,*b*; Stokes-Brown 2006; Manzano and Sanchez 2010; Barreto 2010; Schildkraut 2013; Wallace 2014*a*; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010). However, despite calls from normative theorists to do so (Dovi 2002; Mansbridge 1999), scholars have not adequately examined the political conditions under which racial minorities' prefer (or do not prefer) co-racial descriptive representation. Understanding the contours of minority preferences for descriptive representation—particularly the conditions under which such preferences are conditional—is important both to avoid reifying stereotypes about minority political preferences and to better understand how minorities form political preferences under constraint.

Scholarship on how racial minorities evaluate trade-offs involving their racial group interests is relatively nascent. White, Laird and Allen (2014), for example, study how Blacks navigate conflicts between racial group interest and self interest using multiple behavioral experiments and find that racialized social pressure and beliefs in group solidarity constrain Blacks from pursuing self-interested behavior instead of behavior that most Blacks prefer. Similarly, Laird et al. (2018) show that among Blacks, both positive and negative social sanctions encourage compliance with the racial ingroup norm of identifying with the Democratic Party.

Other existing research on how racial minorities navigate trade-offs between their racial group interests and their partisan group interests have primarily focused on trade-off evaluations between preferences for descriptive racial representation and partisan descriptive representation in a dyadic representation context when assessing candidates and incumbents. When considered as a whole, this body of work generates competing conclusions about whether preferences for descriptive representation dominate preferences for partisan representation, or vice versa.

On the one hand, some scholars argue that cross-pressured racial and ethnic minorities have stronger preferences for descriptive representation. In an early controlled field study that varied the party label of a putatively co-ethnic candidate (as signaled by the candidate's surname), Lorinskas, Hawkins and Edwards (1969) find that ethnic voters, particularly those from urban ethnic enclaves, are more willing to support a co-ethnic candidate regardless of the candidate's party label. Other

research suggests that the preference for descriptive representation over partisan representation is only concentrated among racial minorities possessing strong racial group identification. Manzano and Sanchez (2010) analyze observational data from the 2004 National Survey of Latinos and find that Latinos with stronger levels of ethnic attachment are more likely to support Latino candidates even when that candidate is less qualified than a non-Latino alternative. Experimental research by McConnaughy et al. (2010) corroborates this view. In an experiment where subjects from a student research pool were randomly assigned to view a campaign website for a hypothetical candidate who is either putatively Latino or Anglo, McConnaughy et al. (2010) find that among Latinos, subjects with stronger Latino linked fate were more likely to vote for the Latino candidate than the Anglo candidate. Moving beyond studies about candidate evaluations, Hayes and Hibbing (2017) find a similar result, arguing that preferences for descriptive representation both dominate and shape preferences for substantive representation. Using two survey experiments where subjects are presented with a vignette in which a local government committee is deciding between a pro-Black and a race-neutral proposal and where the level of Black representation and the policy proposal chosen are randomized, Hayes and Hibbing (2017) find that Blacks evaluate the negative policy outcome (i.e., the race-neutral policy) negatively when the level of Black representation is low but positively when the level of Black representation is high.

On the other hand, a burgeoning line of research argues that preferences for partisan representation are expected to dominate when they come into conflict with preferences for descriptive representation. Drawing on a combination of in-depth interviews with constituents and analyses of public opinion data, Michelson (2005) analyzes how Latinos weighed competing partisan and ethnic group identification cues when choosing between a Latino Republican and an Anglo Democrat in California's 20th congressional district election in 2000, only a few years after Republicans in the state championed an anti-Latino and anti-immigrant policy agenda. She finds that partisan cues dominated ethnic cues, with most Latinos choosing to support the Democratic Anglo candidate in this setting. More recent observational research offer evidence consistent with the argument that preferences for descriptive representation are secondary to preferences for partisan preferences.

Analyzing public opinion data from the 2008 and 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, Ansolabehere and Fraga (2016) find that Black and Hispanic Democrats are indifferent between minority and white incumbents conditional on the incumbent being a Democrat.

How cross-pressured racial minorities evaluate trade-offs involving competing racial and partisan group interests remains a set of open questions requiring additional theoretical and empirical research. Importantly, how cross-pressured minorities navigate these trade-offs and form preferences may also vary by the domain of the trade-off and the options being considered, thereby necessitating domain-specific theoretical predictions and empirical analyses. Against this theoretical and empirical backdrop, this study contributes to this literature by examining the case of trade-offs between descriptive and partisan representation that arise in racial redistricting.

3 Theoretical Framework and Main Hypotheses

I present a simple decision-theoretic model to formalize hypotheses about how minorities trade-offs between their preferences for descriptive and partisan representation in racial redistricting contexts.

3.1 Base Model

Consider a state with N single member districts and two political parties, Democrats and Republicans. In all districts, assume either Democrats or Republicans (and no third party) will have majority support. In n of these districts, district lines have yet to be drawn. For simplicity, assume each of the n districts is either a Democratic majority-minority district, a Democratic majority-white district, or a Republican majority-white district, and that there are, respectively, m, d, and r of each type where $m + d + r = n$; $m, d, r \geq 0$; and $m \in \mathbb{Z}^+$. To formalize the notion that creating majority-minority districts comes at a partisan cost, let $r = cm$ where $c \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ is the number of Republican majority-white districts created for each Democratic majority-minority district that is created. Let person i's payoff u_i from a given redistricting plan $\mathcal{P}(m, d, r)$ is $u_i(d, m) = P_i(d + m) + R_i(m)$, the sum of the expected returns from the level of partisan representation proposed by the plan, $P_i(d + m)$, and the expected returns from the level of descriptive representation proposed by the

plan, $R_i(m)$. By substitution, individual payoffs are $u_i(m, c|n) = P_i(n - mc) + R_i(m)$, a function of the number of costly majority-minority districts m and the cost of each majority-minority district c. Understanding how payoffs are affected when m and c vary is of primary substantive interest.

Let person i have payoffs $u_{1i} = P_{1i}(n - m_1 c_1) + R_{1i}(m_1)$ and $u_{2i} = P_{2i}(n - m_2 c_2) + R_{2i}(m_2)$ for alternative plans $\mathcal{P}_1(m_1, c_1|n)$ and $\mathcal{P}_2(m_2, c_2|n)$, respectively. Comparing utilities, i prefers $\mathcal{P}_1 \succ \mathcal{P}_2$ if and only if $u_{1i} - u_{2i} > 0$, or:

$$\underbrace{[P_{1i}(n - m_1 c_1) - P_{2i}(n - m_2 c_2)]}_{\Delta P} + \underbrace{[R_{1i}(m_1) - R_{2i}(m_2)]}_{\Delta R} \quad > \quad 0$$

Individuals can be classified into one of four strata defined by one's baseline preferences for descriptive representation and for partisan representation: (1) individuals who prefer to elect more minorities and more Democrats and thus could potentially face a trade-off between descriptive and partisan representation; (2) individuals who only prefer to elect more Democrats; (3) individuals who only prefer to elect more minorities; and (4) individuals who prefer neither, which is a compound category that consists of a mixture of types who either have no preference for either or are opposed to either or both. As the theoretical question of interest principally concerns racial minorities who face a trade-off, the main hypotheses and empirical analyses focus on racial minorities in the stratum who prefer to elect more minorities and to elect more Democrats.

For individuals in strata defined by unidimensional representational preferences (i.e., those who care about electing only more minorities or only more Democrats), payoffs reduce to either P_i or R_i such that a comparative static prediction about how payoffs are affected by m or c is unambiguous. Those who only prefer to elect more Democrats are expected to be less supportive of redistricting plans as the number or the marginal cost of costly majority-minority districts (m and c, respectively) increase. Those who only prefer to elect more minorities are expected to be more supportive of redistricting plans as the number of costly majority-minority districts (m) increases, but are unaffected by changes in the marginal cost of a majority-minority district c.

By contrast, for those who face a trade-off, there is no clear prediction for how payoffs are af-

fected by changes in m and c. Given any two plans, how changes in m affect P_i and R_i—and by extension how ΔP and ΔR are signed—is unknown. Importantly, it is theoretically possible for the relationship between the number of costly majority-minority districts and payoffs to be non-monotonic if, for example, a person perceives the gains from increased descriptive representation to outweigh the partisan costs incurred up to a certain number of majority-minority districts, beyond which the partisan costs of creating majority-minority districts begin to outweigh the benefits obtained from the marginal majority-minority district. I therefore test these competing expectations:

- **H1:** *Among racial minorities facing a trade-off, (a) preferences for descriptive representation strictly dominate preferences for partisan representation (u increases in m); (b) preferences for partisan representation strictly dominate preferences for descriptive representation (u decreases in m); or (c) neither set of preferences strictly dominate the other (the relationship between u and m is non-monotonic).*

There is also no clear directional prediction of how changes in c affect payoffs. On the one hand, because c acts as a positive multiplier on m, increasing c is expected to reduce the number of Democratic seats proposed and thus reduce payoffs through P_i. On the other hand, as scholars of consumer judgment and decision-making have shown, individuals facing a trade-off between two options primarily rely on the identities and values of the attributes as accessible heuristics to form preferences (cf. Luce, Bettman and Payne 2001) and trade-off evaluations may be insensitive to changes in marginal cost. Thus I test these competing expectations:

- **H2:** *Racial minorities facing a trade-off (a) prefer redistricting plans where majority-minority districts are less costly relative to when they are costlier (u decreases in c) or (b) are indifferent between redistricting plans where the cost of a majority-minority district varies (u is unaffected by c).*

If support for redistricting plans with costly majority-minority districts decreases in the marginal cost of each majority-minority district, the effect may be more pronounced when the proposed

number of costly majority-minority districts is higher because the perceived loss is larger and more salient. Thus, I test whether:

- **H3:** *Among racial minorities facing a trade-off, the negative effect of increases in the marginal cost of a costly majority-minority district on preferences is larger in magnitude when the proposed number costly majority-minority district is greater.*

3.2 Extension: Pivotal Majority-Minority Districts Causing Republican Majority Control

Building on the base model, I also consider the case where the marginal majority-minority district is pivotal and causes Republicans to become the likely majority party. In this case, preferences for partisan representation are not only a function of the number of seats held by a party but may also be affected by which party is the likely majority party in a legislature. Formally, I reparameterize the expected partisan returns from a redistricting plan as:

$$
P_i(\cdot) = \begin{cases} P_i(n - mc) + M_i(\mathbb{1}[D > \frac{N}{2}]) & \text{if Democrats are the likely majority party} \\ P_i(n - mc) + M_i(\mathbb{1}[D < \frac{N}{2}]) & \text{if Republicans are the likely majority party} \\ P_i(n - mc) + M_i(\mathbb{1}[D = \frac{N}{2}]) & \text{if the legislature is tied} \end{cases}
$$

where D is the likely number of Democratic seats and M_i denotes additional returns from either party or neither party being the likely majority party.

Citizens plausibly care about which party has majority control in a legislature because the majority party has agenda-setting power that affects the public policies the legislature proposes and produces. By definition, minorities facing this trade-off are expected to prefer a Democratic majority over a Republican majority. Moreover, given present-day ideological, racial, and affective polarization between the two major parties (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006; Mason 2018), racial minorities facing this trade-off are also expected to *be opposed to* Republican majorities. Thus:

- **H4:** *Racial minorities facing a trade-off dislike a redistricting plan in which the marginal*

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majority-minority district causes Republicans to become the likely majority party, relative to the counterfactual plan (that does not include that pivotal majority-minority district) where Republicans are not the likely majority party.

3.3 Mechanisms: Perceived Effects on Group and Individual Welfare

I additionally test whether trade-off evaluations are explained in part by minorities' perceptions of the welfare effects of each legislature proposed, vis-à-vis the bundle of legislative actions and policies each legislature would produce. Prior research has shown that increases in co-racial descriptive representation has a positive impact on substantive racial representation through agenda-setting (e.g., Sinclair Chapman 2002; Wallace 2014*b*) and oversight-related activities of minority legislators (e.g., Minta 2011; Swers and Rouse 2011). Thus when increasing the number of minority legislators elected is *not* costly, one might expect racial minorities to view the marginal minority legislator to be welfare improving. However, when increasing the number of minority Democratic legislators also increases the number of white Republican legislators, the expected gains from increasing the number of minority Democrats elected must be weighed against the expected harms from also increasing the number of white Republicans elected.

In the base model, how minorities facing a trade-off perceive the net expected gains from the marginal costly majority-minority district is an open empirical question in the same way that their trade-off evaluations are an open empirical question. However, if perceived welfare effects are a relevant consideration in their trade-off evaluations, then I expect:

- **H5a:** *The effects of changes in the marginal price or in the number of costly majority-minority districts on both plan-specific support and perceived welfare effects to be identically signed.*

When the marginal majority-minority district is also pivotal, minorities facing a trade-off weigh expected welfare gains from electing more minority Democratic legislators against expected welfare losses from both electing more white Republican legislators *and* having a Republican-controlled legislature. A change in the likely majority party is arguably more salient in this scenario and acts as a dominant heuristic, as the proposed compositional change to the legislature alters not only the

relative influence of racial and partisan groups in the legislature, but also which party is likely to control the institution and *negatively* constrain the feasible set of policy actions available to subjects' co-racial and co-partisan legislators. Thus:

- **H5b:** *Racial minorities facing this trade-off perceive redistricting plans that include pivotal majority-minority districts will harm (a) the racial group interests and (b) their self interest.*

For both of these hypotheses, I separately assess subjects' perceptions of effects on racial group and self interest as outcomes. This approach provides leverage to directly test whether minorities facing a trade-off rely on linked fate—the substitution of racial group utility for individual utility (Dawson 1994)—when evaluating trade-offs between racial and partisan representation. Effects on both group and individual welfare in the same direction would offer evidence consistent with the theory of linked fate. Unlike prior approaches that typically examine whether subjects' expressed linked fate moderates treatment effects, this inferential strategy contributes a new method to reveal whether linked fate likely occurs in preference formation processes in a specific choice context.

3.4 *Heterogeneous Trade-off Evaluations by Racial and Partisan Identity Strength*

Thus far, the model examines the role of group-based interests in trade-off evaluations, but does not account how one's subjective attachment to group identities shape trade-off evaluations. To explicitly integrate identity as a variable in this framework, I build on social identity theory, which posits that individuals who have strong subjective group identification, when compared to individuals with weak subjective group identification, have a stronger desire to distinguish the in-group from out-groups, exhibit greater in-group bias, and have stronger interests to maintain positive group status and dominance over out-groups in order to maximize in-group esteem (Tajfel 1981; Huddy 2001). Subsequent experimental research has shown that for racial minorities, identity strength is a key factor moderating attitude formation and behavioral change in politics (e.g., Pérez 2015; Valenzuela and Michelson 2016).

I extend this framework by conceptualizing racial minorities as possessing multiple subjective group identities—racial and partisan group identities—of varying identity strength. I assess

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whether trade-off evaluations—and preference formation more broadly—is moderated by the strength of one's subjective identification with groups relevant to the trade-off vis-à-vis variation in the importance and salience of group-specific considerations. Accordingly, group identity strength is incorporated into the framework by re-conceptualizing payoffs associated with a redistricting plan as $u_i(m, c|n) = \omega_p P_i + \omega_r R_i$, where $\omega_p, \omega_r \in [0, 1]$ denote the strength of an individual's partisan and racial subjective group identification, respectively, and act as weights on the expected returns from the level of partisan and racial representation provided by a given plan.

Trade-off evaluations are expected to vary as a function of the absolute and relative strength of one's partisan and racial group identifications. For those with strong racial but weak partisan identification, $\omega_r > \omega_p$, and preferences for greater racial representation are expected to dominate preferences for greater partisan representation. Conversely, for those with weak racial but strong partisan identification, $\omega_p > \omega_r$ and preferences for partisan representation are expected to be stronger. Accordingly, I expect that:

- **H6:** *Among racial minorities facing this trade-off, relative to those with **high** racial and **high** partisan identification, (a) the marginal returns to costly majority-minority districts will be greater for those with **high** racial and **low** partisan identification and (b) lower for those with **low** racial and **high** partisan identification.*[11]

Finally, I evaluate these main hypotheses using two types of samples: a pooled cross-racial sample of minorities who face a trade-off and separate samples by race (i.e., Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans). The pooled sample is useful for conducting comparative cross-racial analyses to test theoretical expectations while preserving statistical power. At the same time, there is considerable variation in lived experiences between racial and ethnic minority groups in the United States that may generate differences between Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans in their preferences for co-racial descriptive representation, their preferences for Democratic representation, and their evaluations of potential trade-offs between the two. In particular, whereas Black political identity

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[11]Among minorities facing this trade-off, possessing low racial and low partisan group identification is rare; this subgroup is therefore not examined in this study.

is closely intertwined with Democratic identity and loyalty (e.g., Laird et al. 2018) and thus would be more likely to lead Blacks facing a trade-off to weight considerations about partisan representation over those about descriptive representation, the same cannot be said for Latinos and Asian Americans. Prior research has shown that racial and partisan group attachments exhibit considerable within-group variability and are more malleable across social contexts for Latinos and Asian Americans (e.g., Barreto and Pedraza 2009; Junn and Masuoka 2008; Masuoka 2005). If racial and partisan identities are less intertwined and crystallized for Latinos and Asian Americans than for Blacks, then Latinos and Asian Americans may be more willing than Blacks to trade off some Democratic representation for some co-racial descriptive representation. Alternatively, it may be the case that in a context characterized by a racially polarized party system, minorities facing a trade-off possess integrated racial and partisan political identities that lead them to evaluate potential trade-offs similarly regardless of their race. Accordingly, I also test each of the main hypotheses separately for Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans who face trade-offs in order to empirically understand whether and how trade-off evaluations differ between racial minority groups.

4 Design

To test these hypotheses, I designed and analyze data from a novel survey experiment fielded on large samples of U.S. adults who identify as Black, Latino, and Asian American. In the experiment, subjects evaluate hypothetical pairs of counterfactual redistricting plans.[12] Within each pair of plans, key features of the redistricting plans are randomly varied such that each pair involves a trade-off between descriptive and partisan representation.

4.1 Subject Recruitment and Sample Definition

Subjects are recruited from two Internet-based respondent pools: Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and Lucid. I briefly describe the subject recruitment process for each.

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[12]Winburn, Henderson and Dowling (2017) and Christenson and Makse (2015) employ similar experimental approaches where individuals evaluate hypothetical plans to study how citizens form preferences over districting plans that alter the representation of "communities of interest."

Subject recruitment on MTurk. Subjects recruited from the MTurk worker pool are U.S. adult residents who consented to complete an academic survey on their views and opinions. Sampling and subject recruitment occurred in three waves. In the first two waves, which occurred on June 16 and 19, 2017, 455 subjects were recruited from a convenience sample of MTurk workers.[13] In the third wave of sampling, which occurred between July 4-12, 2017, Black and Latino respondents who had previously completed unrelated MTurk surveys I conducted, who had reported their racial identification in a prior survey, and who were not a subject in the first two waves were recontacted to take the survey and were given one week to complete the survey.[14] No information about the study's content was communicated in the recontact attempt and no additional incentives other than standard payment for completing the survey was offered. Of the 661 Black and Latino-identified respondents recontacted in this third wave, 403 (60.9%) began the survey and entered the experiment as subjects.

Subject recruitment on Lucid. Subjects who identify either as non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic or Latino, or non-Hispanic Asian were recruited via Lucid, an online vendor providing respondents from multiple online respondent pools.[15] Each of the racial subsamples were census balanced such that target sample marginals match group-specific population marginals from the 2016 American Community Survey 1-year estimates by age, sex, region, and income.

Sample definition. The experiment includes 2,806 subjects pooling across the MTurk and Lucid samples (813 from MTurk and 1,993 from Lucid; Online Appendix Table A2 summarizes the number of subjects by respondent pool and by racial identification). Our main analyses focus on the 2,423 subjects who identify as a racial minority, of whom 966 are Black, 869 are Latino, and 598 are Asian American. Each group-specific sample is demographically similar to its population analog from the 2016 American Community Survey 1-year estimates (see Online Appendix Tables A3, A4, and A5).

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[13] 101 subjects were recruited on June 16th and 354 subjects were recruited on June 19th. Subjects from the first wave were not allowed to enter the study in the second wave.

[14] The recruitment procedure employed in the third wave of recruitment on MTurk is similar to that used by Gay, Hochschild and White (2016).

[15] Coppock and McClellan (2017) provide additional details about Lucid's respondent pool, as well as analyses showing that demographic and experimenta results replicated on samples from Lucid track well with benchmark results using national probability samples.

4.2 Measuring Baseline Representational Preferences

To identify subjects who likely face a trade-off between their preferences for greater descriptive minority representation and for greater Democratic representation in racial redistricting scenarios, subjects are asked two key pre-treatment questions. First, subjects are asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement that members of their racial in-group (e.g., Blacks, Latinos, Asian Americans) are underrepresented in government today (5-point scale: Strongly disagree to Strongly agree). This question is designed to capture subjects' beliefs about whether there are not enough racial in-group members elected to government and whether there should be more racial in-group members elected. Second, subjects are asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement, "I support electing as many Democrats as possible." (5-point scale: Strongly disagree to Strongly agree). Responses to these two items are recoded as two binary indicators (coded 1 if original response is "Strongly agree" or "Agree", and 0 otherwise) measuring whether the subject prefers more descriptive representation and more Democratic representation. Subjects coded 1 on both binary indicators are classified as facing a trade-off.

4.3 Comparison Tasks: Setup, Treatments, and Randomization

Subjects are then provided with background information about the potential trade-off between descriptive and partisan representation that arises in racial redistricting. The full text of this information is provided in Online Appendix A. This background information is provided to all subjects to ensure that all subjects explicitly know about the trade-off before being asked to evaluate it.

Next, subjects are introduced to the task and are told that they will evaluate several pairs of redistricting scenarios.[16] Subjects are told that, for each pair, they are to consider a hypothetical U.S. state where a nonpartisan and independent commission is charged with redrawing district lines for the state legislature, which has 80 single member districts. Of the 80 districts in the state, 65 districts' lines have been drawn and 15 districts' lines have not yet been drawn. Subjects are told that within any pair of plans, the 65 districts that have been drawn will be the same but that the 15

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[16]The full text of the instructions is shown in Online Appendix A.

districts not yet drawn will differ across plans and may either be (a) a *Democratic majority-white* district, (b) a *Democratic majority-minority district*, or (c) a *Republican majority-white* district. Subjects are presented with the summary of possible districts types shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Possible District Types for 15 Districts Not Yet Drawn

District Type	Majority of Voters in District Are	Racial Composition of District	Likely to Elect a
Democratic, Majority-White	Democrats	Over 60% White	White Democrat
Democratic, Majority-Minority	Democrats	50-60% belong to a given racial or ethnic minority group	Democrat who belongs to that racial or ethnic group
Republican, Majority-White	Republicans	Over 60% White	White Republican

Subjects then proceed to evaluate multiple pairs of redistricting plans that pose a trade-off between descriptive and partisan representation.[17] Table 2 presents a sample table with two randomly ordered redistricting plans that subjects see in each comparison task. In each comparison table, subjects are presented with the likely partisan distribution of the 65 districts already drawn (which are the same across the two plans) and different distributions of Democratic majority-white, Democratic majority-minority, and Republican majority-white districts among the 15 districts not yet drawn. To reduce the cognitive load involved with the comparison task, the likely number of Democratic and Republican seats and the likely majority party are presented for each plan.

At the pair level, two features of the plans are randomized. First, the cost of each Democratic majority-minority district is randomly assigned to be equal to either 1, 2, or 3 Republican majority-white districts. Second, the point at which the additional Democratic majority-minority district flips likely majority control to Republicans is randomly assigned (i.e., the chamber flips to Republican control when moving from 0 to 1, 1 to 2, or 2 to 3 Democratic majority-minority districts, or the chamber is always under Democratic or Republican control regardless of the number of majority-minority districts proposed). This randomization is operationalized by varying the number of Democratic and Republican advantage districts (among the 65 districts already drawn) as a function of the marginal cost of a majority-minority district.[18] Across plans within each pair, the

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[17]In the MTurk sample, subjects evaluated three pairs of redistricting plans. In the Lucid sample, subjects evaluated four pairs of plans. See Online Appendix A.4 for more details.

[18]Online Appendix Table A1 summarizes this mapping.

Table 2: Sample Comparison Table

	Plan A	Plan B
Districts already defined (same for both)		
Number of districts, Democratic advantage	30	30
Number of districts, Republican advantage	35	35
Districts not yet defined (different across plans)		
Democratic, Majority-White	9	6
Democratic, Majority-Black	2	3
Republican, Majority-White	4	6
Likely partisan distribution of seats (same for both)		
Likely Number of Democratic Seats	41	39
Likely Number of Republican Seats	39	41
Likely Party in Control of Legislature	Democratic	Republican

number of costly Democratic majority-minority districts is randomized such that each plan proposes either 0, 1, 2, or 3 majority-minority districts and no two plans within any pair propose the same number of majority-minority districts.

4.4 Outcome Measures

The primary outcome of interest is the subject's rating of how much she likes each plan, which is measured using a 101-point scale from 0 (strongly dislike) to 100 (strongly like). In the Lucid sample, subjects are also asked two questions to understand the how racial minorities perceive the welfare implications of each redistricting proposal. One of these questions asks: "If you were a resident of this state, how would the policies produced by the legislature proposed in Plan [A/B] affect your interests?" The other question is worded identically but concerns how the policies produced by the legislature proposed in each plan affects the interests of the subject's racial group (e.g., "affects the interests of Blacks"). For both of these questions, responses are measured on a 5-point scale ranging from -2 (harms a great deal) to 2 (advances a great deal).

5 How Many Racial Minorities Potentially Face a Trade-off?

How many Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans potentially faces a trade-off between descriptive and partisan representation in racial redistricting contexts? Figure 1 displays mosaic plots that summarizes, for each racial minority group, the distribution of baseline preferences for electing more co-racial minorities and more Democrats by subjects' partisan identification, with the share facing a trade-off shown in the darkest shading.[19] The analysis presented in Figure 1 includes all minority respondents from the Lucid and MTurk samples and is weighted using post-stratification raking weights.[20]

Figure 1: Distribution of baseline preferences for electing more co-racial minorities and for electing more Democrats, by race and party. Weighted analysis using post-stratification raking weights.

By race, a majority of Blacks and pluralities of Latinos and Asian Americans potentially face this trade-off. Among Blacks, 51.6% prefer to elect more Blacks and more Democrats and thus potentially face a trade-off, 22.4% only prefer to elect more Blacks, 10.72% only prefer to elect more Democrats, and 15.3% prefer neither. Among Latinos, about equal shares potentially face a trade-off and prefer neither (32.1% and 32.2%, respectively), 24.2% only prefer to elect more Latinos,

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[19] Leaners are coded as partisans. Numeric results summarizing the joint and marginal distributions are shown in Online Appendix Tables A6, A7, and A8.

[20] Data are weighted such that the sample marginals by racial subgroup match group-specific population marginals for age, sex, education, and income in the 2016 ACS 1-year estimates. The results are qualitatively similar if unweighted and if conditioning on the Lucid sample (see Online Appendix Tables A6, A7, and A8).

and 11.4% only prefer electing more Democrats. Among Asian Americans, 34.8% potentially face a trade-off, 28.4% prefer neither, 27.3% only prefer to elect more Asian Americans, and 9.6% only prefer to elect more Democrats.

By party, racial minorities are most likely to face this trade-off if they identify as Democrats. Among racial minorities identifying as Democrats, 62.1% face this trade-off, 13.6% only prefer to elect more Democrats, 13.2% only prefer to elect more co-racial minorities, and 11.1% prefer neither. Among minorities identifying as Independents, a plurality (44.5%) prefer neither and 35.4% only prefer to elect more co-racial minorities only. By contrast, only 13.6% of minority Independents prefer both and potentially face a trade-off and 6.5% only prefer to elect more Democrats. Among minority Republicans, a plurality (40.0%) only prefer to elect more co-racial minorities only, 36.2% prefer neither, 15.9% prefer both, and 8.0% only prefer to elect more Democrats.[21]

Consistent with the expectation that trade-offs involving competing group interests are relevant to those identifying with those groups, these results show that majorities of racial and ethnic minorities identifying as Democrats potentially face this trade-off. With high levels of Democratic identification among Blacks and growing levels of Democratic identification among Latinos and Asian Americans, the potential for tension between preferences for descriptive and partisan representation is already—and is expected to remain—a central feature of racial and ethnic politics in the United States.

6 Do Minorities Facing a Trade-off Prefer More Majority-Minority Districts that are Costly?

Focusing on racial minorities who potentially face a trade-off and who do not identify as Republicans[22], I first turn to the question of whether changes in the number of costly Democratic majority-minority districts affects preferences over redistricting plans involving such districts. Figure 2 presents mean plan-specific favorability ratings by the number of costly majority-minority

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[21]It is unclear why Republicans would state that they prefer to elect more Democrats. To avoid potential measurement error, subsequent analyses that focus on minorities facing a trade-off exclude those who identify as Republican.

[22]This additional sample restriction of excluding Republican identifiers provides a cleaner test and is applied to the remaining analyses presented in the paper.

districts proposed with 95% confidence intervals.[23]

Figure 2: Mean preferences by the number of costly Democratic majority-minority districts proposed, among racial minorities facing a trade-off

Support for redistricting plans decreases in the number of costly majority-minority districts proposed when pooling across racial minority groups (Figure 2, far-left panel). For Blacks facing a trade-off (middle-left panel), support is strictly decreasing in the number of costly majority-minority districts proposed. This lends support to hypothesis 1b for cross-pressured Blacks. By contrast, for Latinos and Asian Americans facing a trade-off (middle- and far-right panels, respectively), the relationship between the proposed number of costly majority-minority districts and plan-specific support is non-monotonic, increasing from 0 to 1 and decreasing thereafter. These findings lend support to hypothesis 1c for cross-pressured Latinos and Asian Americans.

To formally test competing expectations about the relationship between the number of costly majority-minority districts proposed and plan-specific support, I regress plan-specific favorability ratings on the number of costly majority-minority districts using ordinary least squares with subject fixed effects, and estimate cluster standard errors at the subject level. I estimate this model pooling across racial minority groups in the sample and separately for Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans. Table 3 shows that on average, each additional costly Democratic majority-minority

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[23]Confidence intervals are calculated from standard errors clustered at the subject level.

district proposed reduces plan-specific support by 2.02 points (s.e.=0.36, $p<0.01$) in the pooled sample (column 1), 2.08 points (s.e.=0.46, $p<0.01$) among Blacks (column 2), 1.90 points (s.e.=0.67, $p<0.01$) among Latinos (column 3), and 1.90 points (s.e.=0.98, $p=0.054$) among Asian Americans (column 5). To test whether a non-monotonic relationship exists for Latinos and Asian Americans, I re-estimate this model adding a term for the squared number of costly majority-minority districts and find strong evidence that the relationship is non-monotonic for Latinos with a coefficient on the squared term of -2.19 (s.e.=0.64, $p<0.01$, column 4). For Asian Americans, I find suggestive evidence of a non-monotonic relationship (estimate on squared term=-1.30, s.e.=0.80, $p=0.11$, column 6). Future research with larger samples of Asian Americans is recommended to precisely test whether the non-monotonic pattern observed for Asians in Figure 2 exists.

Table 3: Plan-specific support decreases in the number of costly Democratic majority-minority districts proposed among racial minorities facing trade-off

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Outcome: Favors proposed plan (0-100)			
	Pooled	Black	Latino	Latino	Asian Am.	Asian Am.
Num. majority-min. districts	-2.016^{***}	-2.083^{***}	-1.903^{***}	4.678^{**}	-1.909^{*}	2.022
	(0.356)	(0.463)	(0.666)	(2.045)	(0.983)	(2.580)
Num. majority-min. districts squared				-2.191^{***}		-1.295
				(0.637)		(0.800)
N observations (subject-ratings)	5894	3596	1566	1566	732	732
N subjects	950	494	290	290	166	166
R^2	0.459	0.435	0.441	0.448	0.597	0.599
Adj. R^2	0.355	0.345	0.314	0.322	0.478	0.480
Subject fixed effects?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses.

These findings provide strong evidence ruling out the hypothesis that preferences for descriptive racial representation dominate (hypothesis 1a), and show that for racial minorities who face and are evaluating this trade-off in a racial redistricting context, preferences for Democratic partisan representation strictly dominate for Blacks (hypothesis 2a) and dominate after one majority-minority district is proposed for Latinos and Asian Americans (hypothesis 2c).

7 Do Minorities Facing a Trade-off Like Costlier Majority-Minority Districts Less?

Are racial minorities facing this trade-off more averse to redistricting plans when the marginal Democratic majority-minority district comes at a greater partisan cost?

Figure 3 clearly shows that for all racial minority groups examined, changes in the marginal partisan cost of Democratic majority-minority districts has no effect on levels of plan-specific support. This finding is confirmed in Table 4, which shows estimates from OLS regressions of plan-specific ratings on the marginal cost with subject-level fixed effects and subject-level clustered standard errors. While the coefficients on marginal cost are all negative for the pooled sample of minorities facing a trade-off and for cross-pressured Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans when analyzed separately (columns 1-4), none of the estimates are statistically distinguishable from zero. Results are similar when using binary indicators for the value of the marginal cost instead of a continuous variable (columns 5-8).

Figure 3: Mean preferences by the marginal cost of each Democratic majority-minority district proposed, among racial minorities facing a trade-off

The lack of an average price effect may obscure the possibility that racial minorities facing this trade-off are sensitive to price effects but only when the number of majority-minority districts proposed is higher. To test whether plan-specific support is affected by the interaction between the marginal cost and number of costly majority-minority districts proposed (hypothesis 3), I first plot

Table 4: Plan-specific support is unaffected by changes in the marginal cost of each Democratic majority-minority districts proposed among racial minorities facing trade-off

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Outcome: Favors proposed plan (0-100)							
	Pooled	Black	Latino	Asian Am.	Pooled	Black	Latino	Asian Am.
Marginal cost (continuous)	−0.417	−0.452	−0.421	−0.112				
	(0.401)	(0.526)	(0.696)	(1.023)				
Marginal cost = 2					−0.180	−0.296	0.345	−0.753
					(0.717)	(0.889)	(1.465)	(1.995)
Marginal cost = 3					−0.790	−0.876	−0.705	−0.381
					(0.803)	(1.047)	(1.419)	(2.133)
N observations (subject-ratings)	5894	3596	1566	732	5894	3596	1566	732
N subjects	950	494	290	166	950	494	290	166
R^2	0.452	0.427	0.435	0.590	0.452	0.427	0.435	0.590
Adj. R^2	0.347	0.336	0.306	0.470	0.347	0.336	0.306	0.469
Subject fixed effects?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses.

in Figure 4, separately by the marginal cost of each majority-minority district, mean levels of plan-specific support at each quantity of costly majority-minority districts proposed. If the hypothesized interaction effect exists, preference curves would diverge as the number of costly majority-minority districts increases (i.e., moving rightward along the x-axis), with costlier proposals garnering lower levels of support.

I find no evidence of an interaction effect. For the pooled minority sample and for separate samples of Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans facing a trade-off, there are no apparent differences between the preference curves by the marginal cost of a majority-minority district.[24] In sum, for racial minorities facing this trade-off, preferences toward redistricting plans involving costly majority-minority districts are not sensitive to changes in marginal cost either on average or when the quantity of costly majority-minority districts proposed is higher. I therefore find support for hypothesis 2b and fail to find support for hypotheses 2a and 3. Moreover, comparing the price effect estimates (in Table 4) to the quantity effect estimates (in Table 3), the magnitudes of the latter are larger than the former, which suggests that for racial minorities facing this trade-off, preferences over redistricting plans appear to be more sensitive to changes in the number of costly majority-

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[24]In Online Appendix Table A9, I present estimates from OLS models regressing plan-specific support on either continuous or binary cost variables, the number of majority-minority districts proposed, and their interactions. Whether using a continuous marginal cost variable (columns 1-4) or a set of binary cost indicators (columns 5-8), I find no statistically significant interaction effects in the pooled sample of minorities or when analyzing each minority group separately.

Figure 4: Mean preferences by the number and marginal cost of Democratic majority-minority districts proposed, among racial minorities facing a trade-off

Number of costly Democratic majority–minority districts proposed
(higher values mean more Republican majority–white districts)

Marginal Cost ▪ 1 ● 2 ▲ 3

minority districts proposed than to changes in the marginal cost of these districts.

8 Preferences for Pivotal Majority-Minority Districts that Cause Republican Majorities

Do cross-pressured racial minorities oppose plans where the marginal majority-minority district is pivotal and causes Republicans to gain majority control of legislative institutions? Figure 5 presents mean plan-specific ratings by the number of costly majority-minority districts proposed and the condition under which the marginal majority-minority district causes Republicans to become the likely majority party in the institution.

The far-left and far-right panels of Figure 5 show conditions where Republicans and Democrats, respectively, are always the likely majority party regardless of the number of likely majority-minority districts proposed. When Republicans are always the likely majority party, Blacks facing a trade-off

Figure 5: Plan-specific support decreases when the marginal majority-minority district proposed causes likely Republican majority control, among racial minorities facing trade-off

never rate redistricting plans favorably, and both Latinos and Asian Americans who face a trade-off exhibit a non-monotonic relationship between the number of costly majority-minority districts proposed and plan-specific support. When Democrats are always the likely majority party, racial minorities consistently rate plans favorably regardless of the number of costly majority-minority districts proposed.

In the middle three columns of Figure 5, the solid black lines highlight the change in mean preferences when adding a pivotal majority-minority district causes the chamber to flip to Republican control. For Blacks facing a trade-off, adding this marginal majority-minority district decreases plan-specific support when that marginal district is the first, second, or third costly majority-minority dis-

trict proposed. For Latinos and Asian Americans facing a trade-off, adding this marginal majority-minority district decreases plan-specific support only when that district is the second or third costly majority-minority district proposed, but preferences appear unchanged when moving from zero to one costly majority-minority district.

To formally assess the effect of pivotal majority-minority districts that cause Republicans to gain a legislative majority, I first create a "treatment" plan indicator coded 1 if the additional majority-minority district causes a likely Republican majority and 0 otherwise (for example, if Republicans become the majority when moving from 1 to 2 districts given the distribution of already-defined districts, plans proposing 2 majority-minority districts are coded as treatment plans, plans propos-ing 1 majority-minority district are coded as counterfactual plans, and plans proposing either 0 or 3 majority-minority districts are excluded from the analysis). I then regress plan-specific fa-vorability ratings on this treatment indicator and subject fixed effects, and report standard errors clustered at the subject level. For these analyses, I apply two sample restrictions. First I estimate this model using a sample of subject-ratings involving any plan coded as a treatment or counterfac-tual plan (Table 5 Panel A). Pooling across all racial minorities in the sample who face a trade-off, plan-specific support decreases by 9.69 points (s.e.=1.88, one-sided $p<0.001$) when the adding a majority-minority district causes Republicans to gain majority control (column 1). Columns 2-4 present separate analyses by racial minority group. A pivotal majority-minority district decreases support by 9.18 points (s.e.=2.11, one-sided $p<0.001$) for Blacks facing at trade-off, decreases sup-port by 11.55 points (s.e.=4.77, one-sided $p=0.008$) for Latinos facing a trade-off, and decreases support by -9.02 points (s.e.=6.45, one-sided $p=0.082$) for Asian Americans facing a trade-off.

Second, to provide a cleaner test of trade-off evaluations, I use a more restrictive sample of subject-ratings from paired treatment and counterfactual plans where the subject sees and is di-rectly comparing the treatment plan to the counterfactual plan. As Table 5 Panel B shows, the neg-ative effect of the pivotal majority-minority district causing Republican majority control is larger when racial minorities directly compare paired treatment and counterfactual plans that vary only in whether a pivotal majority-minority district is proposed. Support decreases by 11.90 points

Table 5: Plan-specific support decreases when the marginal majority-minority district proposed is pivotal and causes likely Republican majority control, among racial minorities facing trade-off

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Outcome: Favors proposed plan (0-100)							
	A. All ratings of treatment and counterfactual plans				B. Only paired ratings of treatment and counterfactual plans			
	Pooled	Black	Latino	Asian Am.	Pooled	Black	Latino	Asian Am.
Pivotal majority-min. district	−9.689***	−9.180***	−11.547**	−9.017	−11.899***	−10.199***	−16.231***	−11.125*
	(1.880)	(2.105)	(4.766)	(6.446)	(2.595)	(3.237)	(5.771)	(6.195)
N observations (subject-ratings)	1687	1055	418	214	496	302	130	64
N subjects	809	450	226	133	223	134	61	28
R^2	0.680	0.658	0.679	0.791	0.583	0.547	0.630	0.611
Adj. R^2	0.385	0.403	0.299	0.443	0.241	0.183	0.298	0.299
Subject fixed effects?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
p-value, $H_0: \beta_{treatment} \geq 0$	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.008	0.082	< 0.001	0.001	0.003	0.042

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses.

(s.e.=2.60, one-sided $p<0.001$) when pooling across all minorities facing a trade-off, decreases by 10.20 points (s.e.=3.24, one-sided $p=0.001$) among Blacks facing a trade-off, decreases by 16.23 points (s.e.=5.77, one-sided $p=0.003$) among Latinos facing a trade-off, and decreases by 11.13 points (s.e.=6.20, one-sided $p=0.042$) among Asian Americans facing a trade-off.

9 Mechanisms: The Role of Perceived Welfare Effects on Racial Group and Self Interest

Are racial minorities' trade-off evaluations explained by their perceptions of how their self and racial group interests would be affected by the legislatures proposed? Using data from the Lucid subsample that includes outcome measures of subjects' welfare effect perceptions, I examine whether changes in the quantity, marginal cost, and pivotality of majority-minority districts proposed affects perceptions of how the proposed legislatures would affect subjects' welfare vis-à-vis the policies the legislatures would produce.

First, I assess whether increases in the number of costly majority-minority districts affects perceived group and individual welfare among minorities facing a trade-off. Because the treatment is bundled (i.e., increasing both Democratic majority-minority districts and Republican majority-white districts) and given observed negative effects on plan-specific support (Table 3), observing negative effects on perceived welfare would imply that the policy-related benefits from the likely election of more Democratic co-racial legislators from majority-minority districts are outweighed

by the policy-related harms caused by an increase in legislators elected from Republican majority-white districts. Positive effects on perceived welfare would suggest the reverse.

Table 6 Panel A presents estimates from OLS models regressing subjects' perceptions of whether their group and self interest would be harmed or advanced by the policies produced by the proposed legislature on the number of costly majority-minority districts proposed and subject fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the subject level.

Table 6: Quantity and price effects on perceived returns to racial group interest and self-interest (Lucid sample only)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Pooled		Black		Latino		Asian Am.	
	Group Interest	Self Interest	Group Interest	Self Interest	Group Interest	Self Interest	Group Interest	Self Interest
A. Welfare effects of changes in the number of costly majority-minority districts								
Num. majority-min. districts	-0.047^{***}	-0.072^{***}	-0.071^{***}	-0.081^{***}	-0.012	-0.043	-0.001	-0.077^{**}
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.039)
N observations (subject-ratings)	4696	4696	2848	2848	1088	1088	760	760
N subjects	739	739	356	356	210	210	173	173
R^2	0.507	0.486	0.465	0.448	0.565	0.538	0.571	0.545
Adj. R^2	0.414	0.390	0.389	0.369	0.461	0.427	0.444	0.411
Subject fixed effects?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
B. Welfare effects of changes in the marginal cost of a majority-minority district								
Marginal cost	-0.014	-0.004	-0.025	-0.017	0.025	0.053	-0.027	-0.036
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.057)	(0.060)
N observations (subject-ratings)	4696	4696	2848	2848	1088	1088	760	760
N subjects	739	739	356	356	210	210	173	173
R^2	0.505	0.482	0.461	0.442	0.566	0.537	0.571	0.540
Adj. R^2	0.412	0.385	0.384	0.363	0.462	0.426	0.444	0.404
Subject fixed effects?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

$^{***}p<0.01$, $^{**}p<0.05$, $^{*}p<0.1$. OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses.

Across all racial groups and for both outcome measures of perceived welfare effects, the estimated effect of an additional costly majority-minority district is consistently negative. Pooling across minority groups, each additional costly majority-minority district proposed causes a decrease in the perceived returns to one's racial ingroup by 0.047 points (s.e.=0.016, $p<0.01$) and a decrease in the perceived returns to one's self interest by 0.072 points (s.e.=0.016, $p<0.01$). These negative effects are largest for cross-pressured Blacks, reducing the perceived returns to Black group interest by 0.071 points (s.e.=0.02, $p<0.01$) and the perceived returns to self interest by

0.081 points (s.e.=0.02, $p<0.01$). For cross-pressured Latinos, the estimated effects are negative but not distinguishable from zero (for group interest: -0.012 points, s.e.=0.032, $p=0.71$; for self-interest: -0.043, s.e.=0.033, $p=0.20$). For cross-pressured Asian Americans, each additional costly majority-Asian district proposed has no effect on perceived returns to the interests of Asians as a group (-0.001, s.e.=0.036, $p=0.979$) but reduces perceived returns to self interest by 0.077 points (s.e.=0.039, $p=0.048$).

These findings provide strong evidence that for Blacks facing a trade-off, increases in the number of costly majority-Black districts (and thus the Republican majority-white districts) decrease support for redistricting proposals due to the perception that having more legislators from Republican, majority-white districts would result in policies that yield greater harm both to Black group interest and to the self interest of Blacks. These results also provide evidence consistent with the theory that Black linked fate plays an important role in how Blacks evaluate trade-offs between descriptive and partisan representation in this racial redistricting context.

Increasing the number of costly majority-minority districts has negative and statistically significant effects on perceived self interest for cross-pressured Asian Americans and negative but underpowered effects on perceived self interest for cross-pressured Latinos. The direction of these estimates suggests that among those facing a trade-off in both groups, the expected costs of electing more white Republicans outweigh the expected gains from electing more minority Democrats. However, for both groups, effects on perceived racial group interest are null. I briefly speculate why this may be the case. Because Latinos and Asian Americans are pan-ethnic racial groups with considerable within-group preference heterogeneity (e.g. Barreto and Pedraza 2009; Junn and Masuoka 2008; Masuoka 2005), some Latinos and Asian Americans may not perceive their racial ingroup to possess homogeneous and common interests, which would lead them to interpret the question as nonsensical because it assumes that pan-ethnic racial group interests are well defined. If that were the case, then those Latino and Asian American subjects would be more likely to select the middle category, "neither harm nor advance" (coded 0) regardless of the redistricting plan proposed, which would yield a null effect. Another possibility is that the estimated null effect averages out and masks

intra-group heterogeneity in effects on group interest.

I then consider price effects on perceptions of group and individual welfare. Because changes in the marginal cost of a majority-minority district has no effect on plan-specific support (Table 4), I expect null effects on perceived welfare effects as well. The results shown in Table 6 Panel B, which presents estimates from OLS regressions of perceived welfare effects on the marginal cost of a majority-minority district with subject-level fixed effects and subject-level clustered standard errors, confirms this expectation.

Next, I assess how pivotal majority-minority districts causing a Republican majority affects group and self interest. For this analysis, negative effects provide evidence that the expected harms from a likely Republican legislative majority outweigh any potential benefits from the expected gains from electing a minority legislator from the marginal (and pivotal) majority-minority district. Positive effects imply the reverse.

As the consistently negative treatment effect estimates in Table 7 show, pivotal majority-minority districts that cause a Republican majority are broadly viewed as harming group and self interest among racial minorities facing this trade-off. Because estimates are qualitatively similar across sample restrictions, we focus on the first set of results in panel A. For the pooled minority sample facing a trade-off, adding a pivotal majority-minority district that causes a Republican majority is viewed as harming both racial group interest (-0.313, s.e.=0.09, one-tailed $p<0.001$) and self interest (-0.389, s.e.=0.09, one-tailed $p<0.001$). This result is driven by cross-pressured Blacks in the sample, for whom creating a pivotal majority-minority district that causes a Republican majority is viewed as harming Black interests by 0.40 points (s.e.=0.11, one-tailed $p<0.001$) and harming self interest by 0.44 points (s.e.=0.10, one-tailed $p<0.001$).

For cross-pressured Latinos and Asian Americans, I find negative, smaller, and underpowered effects. For Latinos, pivotal majority-minority districts are perceived as harming Latino group interest by 0.18 points (s.e.=0.21, one-tailed $p=0.20$) and harming self interest by 0.26 points (s.e.=0.19, one-tailed $p=0.085$). For Asian Americans, pivotal majority-minority districts causing Republican majorities are perceived as harming self interest by 0.33 points (s.e.=0.24, one-tailed $p=0.083$) but

the effect on perceived racial group interest is substantively small and not statistically significant (-0.05, s.e.=0.24, one-tailed p=0.414).

Table 7: The effect of pivotal majority-minority districts causing Republican majority control on perceived returns to racial group interest and self-interest (Lucid sample only)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Pooled		Black		Latino		Asian Am.	
	Group Interest	Self Interest	Group Interest	Self Interest	Group Interest	Self Interest	Group Interest	Self Interest
A. All ratings of treatment and counterfactual plans								
Pivotal majority-min. district	-0.313^{***}	-0.389^{***}	-0.399^{***}	-0.437^{***}	-0.175	-0.259	-0.052	-0.333
	(0.090)	(0.087)	(0.107)	(0.104)	(0.207)	(0.187)	(0.241)	(0.240)
N observations (subject-ratings)	1385	1385	851	851	310	310	224	224
N subjects	640	640	336	336	164	164	140	140
R^2	0.688	0.698	0.642	0.648	0.745	0.769	0.815	0.817
Adj. R^2	0.419	0.437	0.409	0.418	0.456	0.507	0.503	0.509
Subject fixed effects?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
p-value, H_0: $\beta_{treatment} \geq 0$	< 0.001	< 0.001	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.199	0.085	0.414	0.083
B. Only paired ratings of treatment and counterfactual plans								
Pivotal majority-min. district	-0.352^{***}	-0.394^{***}	-0.477^{***}	-0.469^{***}	-0.283	-0.264	0.031	-0.313
	(0.121)	(0.114)	(0.155)	(0.154)	(0.263)	(0.211)	(0.245)	(0.257)
N observations (subject-ratings)	426	426	256	256	106	106	64	64
N subjects	186	186	110	110	48	48	28	28
R^2	0.651	0.673	0.641	0.659	0.652	0.710	0.687	0.657
Adj. R^2	0.380	0.419	0.368	0.400	0.358	0.466	0.437	0.383
Subject fixed effects?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
p-value, H_0: $\beta_{treatment} \geq 0$	0.002	< 0.001	0.001	0.001	0.144	0.109	0.550	0.117

$^{***}p<0.01$, $^{**}p<0.05$, $^{*}p<0.1$. OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses.

10 Do Trade-off Evaluations Vary by Racial and Partisan Identity Strength?

Finally, I explore whether trade-off evaluations vary by racial and partisan identity strength. For these analyses, I further restrict the sample to Democrats to avoid ambiguous interpretations of partisan identity strength that arise when pooling Democrats with Independents. I also restrict the sample to the Lucid subsample, which was asked two sets of question items pre-treatment to construct each identity strength scale.[25] Following Huddy, Mason and Aarøe (2015), the items used to construct each group identification strength scale are: (1) "How important is being [GROUP] to

[25]The MTurk subsample was not asked these items.

you?" (Extremely important; Very important; Not very important; Not at all important); (2) "To what extent do you see yourself as a [GROUP]?" (A great deal; Somewhat; Very little; Not at all); (3) How well does the term [GROUP] describe you?" (Extremely well; Very well; Not very well; Not at all); and (4) When talking about [GROUP], how often do you say "we" instead of "they"? (A great deal; Somewhat; Very little; Not at all).[26] For each scale, item responses were coded in the same direction from 0 (weak) to 3 (strong), and then were averaged to create a group identity strength score ranging from 0 to 3. Subjects were classified into four subgroups defined by whether the strength of their racial and partisan group identity is high ($\geq$1.5) or low (<1.5). For ease of exposition, I label the four strata defined by subjects' racial and partisan identity strength as either high and high respectively (HH), high and low (HL), low and high (LH), or low and low (LL).

Among minority Democrats facing a trade-off in the sample analyzed, an overwhelming majority have high racial and high partisan (HH) identity strength (84.0% if Black, 77.5% if Latino, and 79.4% if Asian). For Black Democrats facing at trade-off, having high racial and low partisan (HL) identity strength is the next most common (14.3%), followed by low racial and high partisan (LH) identity strength (1.2%). By contrast, Latino and Asian American Democrats, having low racial and high partisan (LH) identity strength is the next most common (10.0% if Latino and 8.4% if Asian), followed by high racial and low partisan (HL) identity strength (8.4% if Latino and 7.7%). For all minority Democrats facing a trade-off, having low racial and low partisan (LL) identity strength is the least common (0.6% if Black, 4.2% if Latino, and 4.5% if Asian).[27] Because there are so few subjects in the LL stratum, we exclude them from the analysis. Moreover, because the likelihood that minority Democrats facing a trade-off have high racial and partisan identity strength and because there are objectively few subjects in the HL and LH strata, we treat these analyses as exploratory as they are all statistically underpowered. Accordingly, we only focus on the direction

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[26]For racial identification items, [GROUP] is either "Black," "Latino," or "Asian American" and is consistent with their stated group membership. For partisan identification items, [GROUP] is either "Democrat," "Independent," or "Republican" and is consistent with their stated party identification from the standard 7-point scale (leaners are coded as partisans).

[27]Online Appendix Table A10 presents numeric estimates among minority Democrats facing a trade-off. Online Appendix Figure A1 shows the distribution of racial and partisan identity strength (raw measures) among all racial minorities, and shows that conditional on facing a trade-off, one is most likely to be in the HH stratum.

of estimated differences between identity strength subgroups to assess whether there is suggestive evidence of heterogeneous effects.

Figure 6 presents mean levels of support by the number of costly majority-minority districts proposed for each sample (pooled, Black, Latino, or Asian) and by identity strength subgroup (HH: filled dots; HL: hollow squares; LH: hollow triangles). The plots also show a solid line showing the estimated linear fit between the two variables by stratum. The top panel of Figure 6 compares trade-off evaluations between the HH and HL subgroups. The difference in the slope of the fitted lines between the HL and HH subgroups is positive for the pooled sample and for Blacks; appears to be null for Latinos; and is negative for Asians. These results suggest that, among minority Democrats facing a trade-off, only Blacks with strong racial and partisan group identification (but not Latinos or Asians with strong racial and partisan group identification) evaluate the marginal costly majority-minority district more negatively than their counterparts with strong racial and weak partisan group identification.

Figure 6: Comparing Trade-off Evaluations between Subgroups with Varying Racial and Partisan Identity Strength, among Minority Democrats Facing a Trade-off (Lucid sample only)

The bottom panel of Figure 6 compares trade-off evaluations between the HH and LH sub-groups. Consistent with the expectation in hypothesis 6b, the difference in the slope of the fitted lines between the LH and HH subgroups is negative for Blacks, Latinos, and Asians. These results suggest that for Black, Latino, and Asian Democrats facing a trade-off, those with weak racial group identification and strong Democratic identification evaluate the marginal costly majority-minority district more negatively than their co-racial Democratic counterparts who have strong racial and strong partisan group identification.

11   Conclusion

Tensions between racial and partisan group interests are a central feature of minority politics for multiple minority groups in the contemporary United States, where the two major parties are racially and ideologically polarized and where racial minorities sometimes find their racial and partisan allegiances in conflict (Frymer 1999). Prior research, however, has not adequately theorized how racial minorities navigate explicit trade-offs between *multiple* competing group-based interests and has generated competing conclusions about the conditions under which racial group interests are expected to dominate. I address this theoretical shortcoming and empirical debate in the literature by examining minority evaluations of trade-offs in racial redistricting contexts where creating Democratic majority-minority districts comes at a partisan cost of simultaneously creating Republican majority-white districts, and cross-pressured racial minorities face a trade-off between their preferences for descriptive and partisan representation.

Analyzing data from nationally representative samples of over 2,400 Black, Latino, and Asian Americans respondents, I find that a sizable share of racial minorities—a majority of Blacks and near pluralities of Latinos and Asian Americans—are cross-pressured and face trade-offs in this racial redistricting context. Using a novel survey experiment, I then examined how cross-pressured Black, Latino, and Asian American subjects explicitly navigated trade-offs between their preferences for descriptive and partisan representation through the evaluation of counterfactual redistricting plans. Contra expectations in the literature that racial group interests are expected to dominate

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other representational preferences, I find that among racial minorities facing a trade-off between increasing descriptive and partisan representation, preferences for greater partisan representation tend to dominate preferences for marginal gains in descriptive representation. Blacks facing a trade-off are less supportive of redistricting plans as the number of costly majority-Black districts increases. For Latinos and Asian Americans facing a trade-off, support for redistricting plans decrease as the number of costly majority-minority districts increases, but only after the first costly majority-minority district is proposed. Furthermore, for cross-pressured Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans, decreases in support for the marginal majority-minority district are larger if that district is pivotal and causes Republicans to gain majority control. This finding suggests that cross-pressured minorities hold sophisticated beliefs about how party control of legislative institutions affects their interests and use these beliefs to form preferences over partisan control of institutions more broadly.

To explore these explanations for how cross-pressured minorities form these preferences, I show that trade-off evaluations by cross-pressured racial minorities appear to be driven by perceived welfare effects, specifically perceptions of how the proposed legislatures would affect policy development and how those policies would in turn affect one's interests. For cross-pressured Blacks, the expected policy gains from creating costly majority-minority districts are outweighed by the expected policy losses from simultaneously creating Republican majority-white districts. Moreover, among cross-pressured Blacks, perceived welfare effects are construed as impacting both the racial group interests of Blacks as well as self interests, offering evidence consistent with narratives that Blacks employ a group utility heuristic to form preferences. For cross-pressured Latinos and Asian Americans, I find suggestive results of similar patterns, although perceived welfare effects on self interest appear to be more important than perceived welfare effects on racial group interest. This result for Latinos and Asian Americans is consistent with the fact that there is considerable heterogeneity in political interests among Latinos and Asian Americans. These results also hold when cross-pressured minorities are evaluating trade-offs involving pivotal majority-minority districts.

Finally, integrating identity into a theoretical framework about navigating trade-offs between competing group interests, I explore whether trade-off evaluations vary by one's racial and partisan

identity strength. Doing so is important to understand how trade-off evaluations can vary systematically as a function of one's group allegiances, even among those who state they possess the multiple group-based interests that are in conflict. Results show that the interaction of racial and partisan identity strength moderates trade-off evaluations. Cross-pressured minorities with weak racial and strong Democratic identities evaluate the marginal costly majority-minority district more negatively (as compared to their counterparts with strong racial and Democratic identities). Moreover, Blacks—but not Latinos or Asians—with strong racial and weak Democratic identities evaluate the marginal costly majority-minority district more positively (relative to the same comparison group).

While this study focused on evaluations by cross-pressured Black, Latino, and Asian Americans of trade-offs between descriptive and partisan representation in racial redistricting, the results speak more broadly to the politics of how cross-pressured racial minorities form constrained political preferences when faced with trade-offs between racial group and partisan group interests across multiple domains. This work also provides a theoretical and empirical blueprint for future research on trade-off evaluations involving competing group interests, and can be adapted to explore theoretical extensions such as assessing heterogeneity in trade-off evaluations by varying levels of group-specific identification and consciousness, by variation in the content of competing in-group norm perceptions, and by the degree of group-specific social pressure subjects experience.

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ONLINE APPENDIX FOR:

How Racial Minorities Evaluate Trade-offs between Descriptive and Partisan Representation

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August 16, 2018

A   Survey Instrument

A.1   Background Information about Trade-off

Page 1:

Please read the following carefully:

A central question in politics is who should hold office and govern. The process that determines who governs is determined by how electoral district lines are drawn, which happens in every U.S. state every 10 years.

When redrawing district lines, all states are bound by two main requirements:
1. Every district in a state must have the same number of people, and
2. Every district must be a single, unbroken shape.

A major implication of these requirements is that if you move one person from a district into an adjacent district, you have to move another person from that adjacent district back into the initial district.

This is important because creating a district with more people who belong to one group (such as Republicans, African Americans, or rural Americans) means that there are fewer people from that group who can be distributed across the remaining districts.

As a result, any two proposals for how to draw district lines in any given state could involve trade-offs about the political and demographic composition of districts.

On the next page, you will read more about a specific and common example of such a trade-off.

Page 2:

Since the mid-20th century, racial and ethnic minorities in the United States have relied on the Voting Rights Act to create majority-minority districts, which are districts where a majority of the population belongs to a historically underrepresented racial group (like African Americans or Latinos) so that members of that group can elect minority representatives of their choice.

Over time, the share of racial and ethnic minorities that support the Democratic Party has grown steadily. Now, overwhelming majorities of Blacks, Latinos, and Asians are more likely to identify as and vote for Democrats instead of Republicans. Consequently, majority-minority districts have become a way to increase the number of Black, Latino, and Asian American Democrats elected at the local, state, and federal levels.

One possible consequence of creating Democratic majority-minority districts is that it results in the creation of Republican majority-white districts. This is because when people are residentially clustered by race and by party, requiring districts to have the same number of people means that putting more Democratic racial minorities into one district also means that the remaining districts are more likely to contain white Republicans.

To summarize this trade-off:

Increasing the number of Democratic majority-minority districts potentially increases the number of Republican majority-white districts.

A.2 Instructions for Comparison Task

On each of the next few pages, you will see a pair of redistricting scenarios to compare and evaluate.

In each pair of scenarios:

- You will be asked to think about a U.S. state.
- In that state, a **nonpartisan** and **independent** commission is charged with redrawing the lines for the state's legislative districts.
- The legislature has 80 districts and each district elects 1 representative.
- Most of the districts (65 of 80) have been drawn, but 15 of the 80 districts have yet to be drawn.

The remaining 15 districts could be one of the following 3 types:

District Type	Majority of Voters in District Are	Racial Composition of District	Likely to Elect a
Democratic, Majority-White	Democrats	Over 60% White	White Democrat
Democratic, Majority-Minority	Democrats	50-60% belong to a given racial or ethnic minority group	Democrat who belongs to that racial or ethnic group
Republican, Majority-White	Republicans	Over 60% White	White Republican

How district lines are drawn for these remaining 15 districts will not affect any of the 65 districts whose lines have already been drawn.

Within any pair of scenarios:

- The 65 districts that have been drawn will be the **same**.
- For the remaining districts, the number of districts by district type will be **different**.

When you are ready to proceed, click the >> button.

A.3 Additional Treatment Details

Table A1: Mapping between the condition under which the marginal majority-minority district causes Republican legislative control and the number of Democratic- and Republican-advantage districts among 65 districts already drawn, as a function of the marginal cost of a majority-minority district

Marginal cost of each Democratic majority-minority district (# of Republican majority-white districts)	Condition when additional majority-minority district causes GOP majority control	Number of Democratic districts	Number of Republican districts
1	Never (always R control)	23	42
	0 → 1 majority-minority districts	25	40
	1 → 2 majority-minority districts	26	39
	2 → 3 majority-minority districts	27	38
	Never (always D control)	36	29
2	Never (always R control)	23	42
	0 → 1 majority-minority districts	26	39
	1 → 2 majority-minority districts	28	37
	2 → 3 majority-minority districts	30	35
	Never (always D control)	36	29
3	Never (always R control)	23	42
	0 → 1 majority-minority districts	27	38
	1 → 2 majority-minority districts	30	35
	2 → 3 majority-minority districts	33	32
	Never (always D control)	36	29

A.4 Details on the Number of Comparison Tasks Completed

In the MTurk subsample, all subjects were given 3 comparison tasks.

In the Lucid subsample, all subjects were given 4 comparison tasks. However, some subjects (all Black subjects and some Latino and Asian American subjects) completed 4 comparison tasks relating to trade-offs between co-racial descriptive representation and partisan representation whereas other subjects (other Latino and Asian American subjects) completed only 2 comparison tasks relating to this type of trade-off. This is because, in order to investigate whether Latinos and Asians vary in their trade-off evaluations involving *pan-ethnic racial* versus *ethnic* descriptive representation, Latino and Asian subjects in the Lucid sample who identified with one of the ten largest Latino or Asian ethnic groups in the United States were shown 2 comparison tasks where majority-minority districts were defined in pan-ethnic racial minority terms (i.e., majority-Latino or majority-Asian) and 2 comparison tasks where majority-minority districts were defined in ethnic terms (e.g., majority-Mexican or majority-Chinese). The order of these pairs were randomized. All other subjects in the Lucid sample (i.e., Black subjects and Latino and Asian subjects who did not report an ethnic identification with one of the 10 largest Latino or Asian ethnic groups in the U.S.) evaluated four pairs involving pan-ethnic majority-minority districts.

Analyses of trade-off evaluations between these subjects' preferences for co-ethnic descriptive representation and their preferences for partisan representation are beyond the scope of this study.

B   Summary Statistics

Table A2: Number of subjects by respondent pool and by racial self-identification

Source	Asian American	Black	Latino	White	Total
Lucid (April-May 2018)	594	717	676	0	1987
MTurk (June-July 2017)	0	249	181	383	813
Total	594	966	857	383	2800

Cells contain frequencies. Black, Asian, and White subjects do not identify as Hispanic or Latino.

Table A3: Sample Characteristics: Black Subjects

| | Full Sample | | | | Lucid Subsample | | | | | |
| | Unweighted | | Weighted | | Unweighted | | Weighted | | Population* | |
Covariate	N	(Prop)	N	(Prop)	N	(Prop)	N	(Prop)	N	(Prop)
Age: 18-24	149	(0.151)	149.936	(0.151)	117	(0.158)	112.078	(0.151)	4629577	(0.151)
Age: 25-44	443	(0.447)	368.718	(0.372)	272	(0.368)	275.620	(0.372)	11387105	(0.372)
Age: 45-64	301	(0.304)	326.910	(0.330)	260	(0.351)	244.347	(0.330)	10096171	(0.330)
Age: 65+	97	(0.098)	144.436	(0.146)	91	(0.123)	107.955	(0.146)	4461416	(0.146)
Female	637	(0.643)	526.950	(0.532)	471	(0.636)	393.870	(0.532)	16274422	(0.532)
Household income: <$25k	300	(0.303)	359.494	(0.363)	300	(0.405)	318.198	(0.430)	4984074	(0.341)
Household income: $25k to $49k	214	(0.216)	242.119	(0.245)	214	(0.289)	217.216	(0.294)	3836675	(0.262)
Household income: $50k to $74k	93	(0.094)	91.234	(0.092)	93	(0.126)	85.773	(0.116)	2385598	(0.163)
Household income: $75k to $99k	55	(0.056)	50.213	(0.051)	55	(0.074)	50.960	(0.069)	1397224	(0.095)
Household income: $100k to $124k	33	(0.045)	28.675	(0.029)	33	(0.045)	29.311	(0.040)	828311	(0.057)
Household income: $125k and up	45	(0.045)	40.437	(0.041)	45	(0.061)	38.543	(0.052)	1199868	(0.082)
Highest education: Less than high school	40	(0.040)	140.528	(0.142)	40	(0.054)	109.157	(0.148)	3827071	(0.148)
Highest education: High school degree	243	(0.245)	300.779	(0.304)	220	(0.297)	230.691	(0.312)	8113148	(0.313)
Highest education: Some college	343	(0.346)	319.953	(0.323)	274	(0.370)	244.263	(0.330)	8590059	(0.331)
Highest education: 4-year college degree	243	(0.245)	125.632	(0.127)	149	(0.201)	96.852	(0.131)	3395685	(0.131)
Highest education: Post-graduate degree	83	(0.084)	71.811	(0.073)	53	(0.072)	55.710	(0.075)	2018729	(0.078)
Highest education: Unknown	38	(0.038)	31.297	(0.032)	4	(0.005)	3.326	(0.004)	0	(0.000)
Region: Midwest					156	(0.211)	156.798	(0.212)	5160520	(0.169)
Region: Northeast					131	(0.177)	128.859	(0.174)	5088666	(0.167)
Region: South					384	(0.519)	381.549	(0.516)	17600848	(0.576)
Region: West					69	(0.093)	72.795	(0.098)	2711123	(0.089)
Party ID: Strong Democrat	444	(0.448)	460.880	(0.466)	368	(0.497)	367.516	(0.497)	4202	(0.530)
Party ID: Democrat	198	(0.200)	185.146	(0.187)	130	(0.176)	124.097	(0.168)	1523	(0.192)
Party ID: Lean Democrat	51	(0.052)	49.217	(0.050)	51	(0.069)	46.738	(0.063)	683	(0.086)
Party ID: Independent	198	(0.200)	201.669	(0.204)	119	(0.161)	130.444	(0.176)	1078	(0.136)
Party ID: Lean Republican	39	(0.039)	34.771	(0.035)	25	(0.034)	23.930	(0.032)	141	(0.018)
Party ID: Republican	13	(0.013)	8.791	(0.009)	9	(0.012)	6.725	(0.009)	139	(0.018)
Party ID: Strong Republican	47	(0.047)	49.527	(0.050)	38	(0.051)	40.551	(0.055)	147	(0.019)

* = Population data are from the 2016 American Community Survey 1-year estimates for all covariates except partisanship, which are estimates from the 2016 CCES Common Content.

Weights are racial group and sample specific post-stratification raking weights calculated to match sample marginals for age, sex, education, and income to population marginals from the 2016 ACS 1-year estimates

Geographic data needed to code census region were not collected for the MTurk subsample and is only available for the Lucid subsample

Table A4: Sample Characteristics: Latino Subjects

| | Full Sample | | | | Lucid Subsample | | | | Population* | |
| | Unweighted | | Weighted | | Unweighted | | Weighted | | | |
Covariate	N	(Prop)	N	(Prop)	N	(Prop)	N	(Prop)	N	(Prop)
Age: 18-24	177	(0.201)	155.038	(0.176)	148	(0.212)	121.311	(0.174)	6746927	(0.173)
Age: 25-44	442	(0.503)	395.831	(0.450)	308	(0.442)	309.352	(0.444)	17251562	(0.441)
Age: 45-64	207	(0.235)	249.406	(0.284)	189	(0.271)	199.375	(0.286)	11142328	(0.285)
Age: 65+	53	(0.060)	78.725	(0.090)	52	(0.075)	66.962	(0.096)	3937852	(0.101)
Female	497	(0.565)	447.130	(0.509)	414	(0.594)	349.540	(0.501)	19469861	(0.498)
Household income: <$25k	240	(0.273)	336.457	(0.383)	240	(0.344)	296.499	(0.425)	3893052	(0.254)
Household income: $25k to $49k	190	(0.216)	194.275	(0.221)	190	(0.273)	177.909	(0.255)	4193062	(0.273)
Household income: $50k to $74k	127	(0.144)	127.744	(0.145)	127	(0.182)	115.538	(0.166)	2902621	(0.189)
Household income: $75k to $99k	63	(0.072)	56.074	(0.064)	63	(0.090)	53.915	(0.077)	1747733	(0.114)
Household income: $100k to $124k	29	(0.042)	17.376	(0.020)	29	(0.042)	18.772	(0.027)	1055323	(0.069)
Household income: $125k and up	48	(0.055)	33.029	(0.038)	48	(0.069)	34.367	(0.049)	1562939	(0.102)
Highest education: Less than high school	52	(0.059)	268.695	(0.306)	50	(0.072)	221.209	(0.317)	10632841	(0.329)
Highest education: High school degree	222	(0.253)	242.970	(0.276)	210	(0.301)	194.084	(0.278)	8986570	(0.278)
Highest education: Some college	279	(0.317)	210.643	(0.240)	231	(0.331)	166.720	(0.239)	7750580	(0.240)
Highest education: 4-year college degree	232	(0.264)	93.217	(0.106)	155	(0.222)	73.475	(0.105)	3385826	(0.105)
Highest education: Post-graduate degree	70	(0.080)	43.062	(0.049)	46	(0.066)	34.227	(0.049)	1575925	(0.049)
Highest education: Unknown	24	(0.027)	20.412	(0.023)	5	(0.007)	7.284	(0.010)	0	(0.000)
Region: Midwest					104	(0.149)	96.489	(0.138)	1620688	(0.116)
Region: Northeast					119	(0.171)	113.002	(0.162)	2902111	(0.207)
Region: South					245	(0.352)	243.202	(0.349)	3173201	(0.226)
Region: West					229	(0.329)	244.307	(0.351)	6320935	(0.451)
Party ID: Strong Democrat	199	(0.226)	186.238	(0.212)	158	(0.227)	148.111	(0.212)	1444	(0.276)
Party ID: Democrat	171	(0.195)	133.652	(0.152)	123	(0.176)	97.305	(0.140)	1093	(0.209)
Party ID: Lean Democrat	66	(0.075)	62.631	(0.071)	66	(0.095)	57.779	(0.083)	504	(0.096)
Party ID: Independent	218	(0.248)	252.244	(0.287)	169	(0.242)	192.696	(0.276)	1078	(0.206)
Party ID: Lean Republican	44	(0.050)	34.194	(0.039)	31	(0.044)	23.557	(0.034)	273	(0.052)
Party ID: Republican	75	(0.085)	85.760	(0.098)	53	(0.076)	66.497	(0.095)	412	(0.079)
Party ID: Strong Republican	106	(0.121)	124.281	(0.141)	97	(0.139)	111.055	(0.159)	428	(0.082)

* = Population data are from the 2016 American Community Survey 1-year estimates for all covariates except partisanship, which are estimates from the 2016 CCES Common Content.

Weights are racial group and sample specific post-stratification raking weights calculated to match sample marginals for age, sex, education, and income to population marginals from the 2016 ACS 1-year estimates

Geographic data needed to code census region were not collected for the MTurk subsample and is only available for the Lucid subsample

Table A5: Sample Characteristics: Asian American Subjects

| | Full Sample (Lucid only) | | | | | |
| | Unweighted | | Weighted | | Population* | |
Covariate	N	(Prop)	N	(Prop)	N	(Prop)
Age: 18-24	87	(0.141)	75.697	(0.123)	1694450	(0.121)
Age: 25-44	286	(0.464)	259.405	(0.421)	5838346	(0.416)
Age: 45-64	176	(0.286)	190.711	(0.310)	4392383	(0.313)
Age: 65+	67	(0.109)	90.187	(0.146)	2103393	(0.150)
Female	344	(0.558)	328.900	(0.534)	7503642	(0.535)
Household income: <$25k	149	(0.242)	163.076	(0.265)	930072	(0.169)
Household income: $25k to $49k	135	(0.219)	116.680	(0.189)	847361	(0.154)
Household income: $50k to $74k	114	(0.185)	125.884	(0.204)	809823	(0.147)
Household income: $75k to $99k	90	(0.146)	84.922	(0.138)	683511	(0.124)
Household income: $100k to $124k	57	(0.093)	53.617	(0.087)	581256	(0.105)
Household income: $125k and up	71	(0.115)	71.821	(0.117)	1663009	(0.302)
Highest education: Less than high school	12	(0.019)	74.903	(0.122)	1652736	(0.134)
Highest education: High school degree	99	(0.161)	93.249	(0.151)	1842042	(0.149)
Highest education: Some college	144	(0.234)	115.729	(0.188)	2280769	(0.185)
Highest education: 4-year college degree	249	(0.404)	188.100	(0.305)	3719644	(0.302)
Highest education: Post-graduate degree	111	(0.180)	143.188	(0.232)	2838931	(0.230)
Highest education: Unknown	1	(0.002)	0.831	(0.001)	0	(0.000)
Region: Midwest	72	(0.117)	70.663	(0.115)	1620688	(0.116)
Region: Northeast	127	(0.206)	119.384	(0.194)	2902111	(0.207)
Region: South	169	(0.274)	190.114	(0.309)	3173201	(0.226)
Region: West	248	(0.403)	235.839	(0.383)	6320935	(0.451)
Party ID: Strong Democrat	103	(0.167)	110.922	(0.180)	425	(0.187)
Party ID: Democrat	110	(0.179)	105.417	(0.171)	497	(0.218)
Party ID: Lean Democrat	64	(0.104)	60.698	(0.099)	284	(0.125)
Party ID: Independent	149	(0.242)	153.362	(0.249)	573	(0.252)
Party ID: Lean Republican	34	(0.055)	33.607	(0.055)	121	(0.053)
Party ID: Republican	75	(0.122)	78.403	(0.127)	229	(0.101)
Party ID: Strong Republican	81	(0.131)	73.591	(0.119)	148	(0.065)

* = Population data are from the 2016 American Community Survey 1-year estimates for all covariates except partisanship, which are estimates from the 2016 CCES Common Content Weights are racial group and sample specific post-stratification raking weights calculated to match sample marginals for age, sex, education, and income to population marginals from the 2016 ACS 1-year estimates

Table A6: Distribution of baseline representational preferences, by subject's racial identification

	Unweighted									Weighted								
	Prefers Both (Faces Trade-off)		Elect More Minorities Only		Elect More Dems Only		Prefers Neither			Prefers Both (Faces Trade-off)		Elect More Minorities Only		Elect More Dems Only		Prefers Neither		
Race	N	(Pct)	N	(Pct)	N	(Pct)	N	(Pct)	Total	N	(Pct)	N	(Pct)	N	(Pct)	N	(Pct)	Total
A. FULL SAMPLE																		
Asian American	208	(33.77%)	178	(28.90%)	63	(10.23%)	167	(27.11%)	616	214.31	(34.79%)	168.12	(27.29%)	58.91	(9.56%)	174.66	(28.35%)	616.00
Black	530	(53.54%)	224	(22.63%)	103	(10.40%)	133	(13.43%)	990	510.35	(51.55%)	221.81	(22.40%)	106.14	(10.72%)	151.70	(15.32%)	990.00
Latino	328	(37.32%)	229	(26.05%)	97	(11.04%)	225	(25.60%)	879	282.47	(32.14%)	212.86	(24.22%)	100.48	(11.43%)	283.19	(32.22%)	879.00
White	152	(39.69%)	98	(25.59%)	43	(11.23%)	90	(23.50%)	383	139.36	(36.39%)	87.05	(22.73%)	43.24	(11.29%)	113.35	(29.60%)	383.00
B. LUCID SUBSAMPLE																		
Asian American	208	(33.77%)	178	(28.90%)	63	(10.23%)	167	(27.11%)	616	214.31	(34.79%)	168.12	(27.29%)	58.91	(9.56%)	174.66	(28.35%)	616.00
Black	375	(50.68%)	156	(21.08%)	93	(12.57%)	116	(15.68%)	740	366.22	(49.49%)	159.10	(21.50%)	90.25	(12.20%)	124.44	(16.82%)	740.00
Latino	241	(34.58%)	170	(24.39%)	87	(12.48%)	199	(28.55%)	697	213.70	(30.66%)	157.90	(22.65%)	81.66	(11.72%)	243.73	(34.97%)	697.00

Cells contain frequencies with row percents in parentheses.

Table A7: Distribution of baseline representational preferences, by subject's partisan identification

	Unweighted									Weighted								
	Prefers Both (Faces Trade-off)		Elect More Minorities Only		Elect More Dems Only		Prefers Neither			Prefers Both (Faces Trade-off)		Elect More Minorities Only		Elect More Dems Only		Prefers Neither		
Party	N	(Pct)	N	(Pct)	N	(Pct)	N	(Pct)	Total	N	(Pct)	N	(Pct)	N	(Pct)	N	(Pct)	Total
A. FULL SAMPLE																		
Democrat	991	(63.57%)	214	(13.73%)	211	(13.53%)	143	(9.17%)	1559	945.18	(63.16%)	186.93	(12.49%)	206.94	(13.83%)	157.32	(10.51%)	1496.37
Independent	128	(19.39%)	253	(38.33%)	47	(7.12%)	232	(35.15%)	660	110.12	(15.69%)	254.75	(36.29%)	46.91	(6.68%)	290.29	(41.35%)	702.08
Republican	99	(15.25%)	262	(40.37%)	48	(7.40%)	240	(36.98%)	649	91.20	(13.62%)	248.15	(37.06%)	54.91	(8.20%)	275.29	(41.12%)	669.55
B. BLACKS, LATINOS, AND ASIAN AM. ONLY (MTURK AND LUCID)																		
Democrat	881	(62.66%)	202	(14.37%)	185	(13.16%)	138	(9.82%)	1406	841.42	(62.11%)	178.64	(13.19%)	184.49	(13.62%)	150.25	(11.09%)	1354.80
Independent	96	(16.99%)	216	(38.23%)	39	(6.90%)	214	(37.88%)	565	82.52	(13.59%)	215.21	(35.44%)	39.44	(6.50%)	270.10	(44.48%)	607.28
Republican	89	(17.32%)	213	(41.44%)	39	(7.59%)	173	(33.66%)	514	83.19	(15.91%)	208.95	(39.96%)	41.59	(7.95%)	189.20	(36.18%)	522.92
B. LUCID SUBSAMPLE																		
Democrat	689	(58.74%)	178	(15.17%)	172	(14.66%)	134	(11.42%)	1173	664.88	(59.44%)	157.45	(14.08%)	160.48	(14.35%)	135.77	(12.14%)	1118.58
Independent	50	(11.44%)	157	(35.93%)	34	(7.78%)	196	(44.85%)	437	50.76	(10.65%)	156.11	(32.76%)	30.24	(6.35%)	239.40	(50.24%)	476.50
Republican	85	(19.19%)	169	(38.15%)	37	(8.35%)	152	(34.31%)	443	78.60	(17.16%)	171.57	(37.47%)	40.09	(8.75%)	167.66	(36.61%)	457.92

Cells contain frequencies with row percents in parentheses.

Table A8: Distribution of baseline representational preferences, by subject's racial and partisan identification

| | | Unweighted | | | | | | | | | Weighted | | | | | | | | |
| | | Prefers Both (Faces Trade-off) | | Elect More Minorities Only | | Elect More Dems Only | | Prefers Neither | | | Prefers Both (Faces Trade-off) | | Elect More Minorities Only | | Elect More Dems Only | | Prefers Neither | | |
Race	Party	N	(Pct)	N	(Pct)	N	(Pct)	N	(Pct)	Total	N	(Pct)	N	(Pct)	N	(Pct)	N	(Pct)	Total
A. FULL SAMPLE																				
Asian American	Democrat	155	(55.96%)	44	(15.88%)	40	(14.44%)	38	(13.72%)	277	166.83	(60.22%)	43.17	(15.58%)	35.29	(12.74%)	31.74	(11.46%)	277.04
Asian American	Independent	18	(12.08%)	50	(33.56%)	11	(7.38%)	70	(46.98%)	149	17.10	(11.15%)	46.51	(30.33%)	11.65	(7.59%)	78.11	(50.93%)	153.36
Asian American	Republican	35	(18.42%)	84	(44.21%)	12	(6.32%)	59	(31.05%)	190	30.38	(16.37%)	78.44	(42.26%)	11.97	(6.45%)	64.81	(34.92%)	185.60
Black	Democrat	464	(66.96%)	90	(12.99%)	86	(12.41%)	53	(7.65%)	693	457.49	(65.80%)	83.46	(12.00%)	92.47	(13.30%)	61.82	(8.89%)	695.24
Black	Independent	45	(22.73%)	88	(44.44%)	11	(5.56%)	54	(27.27%)	198	34.25	(16.99%)	90.66	(44.95%)	9.10	(4.51%)	67.66	(33.55%)	201.67
Black	Republican	21	(21.21%)	46	(46.46%)	6	(6.06%)	26	(26.26%)	99	18.61	(19.99%)	47.69	(51.23%)	4.57	(4.90%)	22.23	(23.88%)	93.09
Latino	Democrat	262	(60.09%)	68	(15.60%)	59	(13.53%)	47	(10.78%)	436	217.10	(56.76%)	52.01	(13.60%)	56.73	(14.83%)	56.68	(14.82%)	382.52
Latino	Independent	33	(15.14%)	78	(35.78%)	17	(7.80%)	90	(41.28%)	218	31.17	(12.36%)	78.04	(30.94%)	18.70	(7.41%)	124.34	(49.29%)	252.24
Latino	Republican	33	(14.67%)	83	(36.89%)	21	(9.33%)	88	(39.11%)	225	34.20	(14.00%)	82.82	(33.91%)	25.05	(10.26%)	102.17	(41.83%)	244.24
White	Democrat	110	(71.90%)	12	(7.84%)	26	(16.99%)	5	(3.27%)	153	103.75	(73.29%)	8.29	(5.86%)	22.45	(15.86%)	7.07	(5.00%)	141.57
White	Independent	32	(33.68%)	37	(38.95%)	8	(8.42%)	18	(18.95%)	95	27.60	(29.12%)	39.55	(41.72%)	7.47	(7.88%)	20.18	(21.29%)	94.80
White	Republican	10	(7.41%)	49	(36.30%)	9	(6.67%)	67	(49.63%)	135	8.01	(5.46%)	39.21	(26.74%)	13.32	(9.08%)	86.09	(58.72%)	146.63
B. LUCID SUBSAMPLE																				
Asian American	Democrat	155	(55.96%)	44	(15.88%)	40	(14.44%)	38	(13.72%)	277	166.83	(60.22%)	43.17	(15.58%)	35.29	(12.74%)	31.74	(11.46%)	277.04
Asian American	Independent	18	(12.08%)	50	(33.56%)	11	(7.38%)	70	(46.98%)	149	17.10	(11.15%)	46.51	(30.33%)	11.65	(7.59%)	78.11	(50.93%)	153.36
Asian American	Republican	35	(18.42%)	84	(44.21%)	12	(6.32%)	59	(31.05%)	190	30.38	(16.37%)	78.44	(42.26%)	11.97	(6.45%)	64.81	(34.92%)	185.60
Black	Democrat	343	(62.48%)	75	(13.66%)	79	(14.39%)	52	(9.47%)	549	336.71	(62.54%)	69.89	(12.98%)	78.19	(14.52%)	53.57	(9.95%)	538.35
Black	Independent	13	(10.92%)	54	(45.38%)	9	(7.56%)	43	(36.13%)	119	11.49	(8.81%)	57.99	(44.46%)	7.57	(5.80%)	53.39	(40.93%)	130.44
Black	Republican	19	(26.39%)	27	(37.50%)	5	(6.94%)	21	(29.17%)	72	18.02	(25.30%)	31.22	(43.85%)	4.49	(6.31%)	17.47	(24.54%)	71.21
Latino	Democrat	191	(55.04%)	59	(17.00%)	53	(15.27%)	44	(12.68%)	347	161.34	(53.21%)	44.39	(14.64%)	47.01	(15.50%)	50.46	(16.64%)	303.20
Latino	Independent	19	(11.24%)	53	(31.36%)	14	(8.28%)	83	(49.11%)	169	22.17	(11.50%)	51.60	(26.78%)	11.03	(5.72%)	107.90	(55.99%)	192.70
Latino	Republican	31	(17.13%)	58	(32.04%)	20	(11.05%)	72	(39.78%)	181	30.20	(15.02%)	61.91	(30.79%)	23.62	(11.75%)	85.38	(42.45%)	201.11

Cells contain frequencies with row percents in parentheses.

C Additional Analyses

Table A9: Plan-specific support is unaffected by the interaction between the number and marginal cost of costly Democratic majority-minority districts among racial minorities facing trade-off

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Outcome: Favors proposed plan (0-100)							
	Pooled	Black	Latino	Asian Am.	Pooled	Black	Latino	Asian Am.
Number of costly Dem. majority-minority districts	-1.040	-0.480	-2.295	-1.226	-2.185***	-2.005**	-2.204*	-3.298**
	(0.901)	(1.120)	(1.854)	(2.608)	(0.626)	(0.792)	(1.280)	(1.499)
Marginal cost of each Dem. majority-minority district	0.309	0.698	-0.648	0.437				
	(0.708)	(0.881)	(1.377)	(2.310)				
Number of districts * Marginal cost	-0.446	-0.732	0.182	-0.316				
	(0.376)	(0.462)	(0.750)	(1.272)				
Marginal cost = 2					-1.574	-1.503	-0.339	-4.856*
					(1.282)	(1.598)	(2.729)	(2.931)
Marginal cost = 3					0.183	0.871	-1.246	-0.552
					(1.418)	(1.755)	(2.823)	(4.359)
(Marginal cost = 2) * Number of districts					0.965	0.874	0.390	2.755
					(0.708)	(0.896)	(1.473)	(1.695)
(Marginal cost = 3) * Number of districts					-0.564	-1.075	0.406	0.222
					(0.759)	(0.936)	(1.536)	(2.359)
Constant	57.258***	55.705***	58.280***	62.647***	58.499***	57.483***	57.478***	66.128***
	(1.653)	(2.096)	(3.214)	(4.682)	(1.089)	(1.371)	(2.201)	(2.566)
Subject Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Number of observations (subject-rating)	5,894	3,596	1,566	732	5,894	3,596	1,566	732
Number of subjects	950	494	290	166	950	494	290	166
R-squared	0.460	0.436	0.441	0.597	0.460	0.437	0.441	0.600

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses.

Table A10: Distribution of Racial and Partisan Group Identity Strength among Minority Democrats Facing a Trade-off

	Stratum: Racial and Partisan Identity Strength				
	(HH)	(HL)	(LH)	(LL)	
	High Racial	High Racial	Low Racial	Low Racial	
Sample	High Partisan	Low Partisan	High Partisan	Low Partisan	Total
Pooled	559	77	36	17	689
	(81.13%)	(11.18%)	(5.22%)	(2.47%)	(100.00%)
Black	288	49	4	2	343
	(83.97%)	(14.29%)	(1.17%)	(0.58%)	(100.00%)
Latino	148	16	19	8	191
	(77.49%)	(8.38%)	(9.95%)	(4.19%)	(100.00%)
Asian American	123	12	13	7	155
	(79.35%)	(7.74%)	(8.39%)	(4.52%)	(100.00%)

Cells report frequencies with row percentages in parentheses. Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. Sample restricted to subjects from Lucid who are racial minorities, identify as Democrats, and face a trade-off.

Figure A1: Variation in Racial and Partisan Identity Strength among Racial Minorities Facing a Trade-off. Plotted points are jittered.

● Faces trade-off (Prefers electing more co-racial minorities and more Democrats) ○ Does not face trade-off