

How Racial Minorities Evaluate Trade-offs between Descriptive and Partisan Representation

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Abstract

How do politically cross-pressured racial minorities navigate trade-offs between their racial and partisan group interests when they come into conflict? I examine this question using the case of racial redistricting when preferences for descriptive racial and Democratic representation can conflict when creating majority-minority districts. Analyzing data from an experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey of over 2,400 Black, Latino, and Asian Americans, I challenge conventional accounts that minorities' preferences for descriptive representation dominate. Instead, I find strong evidence that cross-pressured minorities are willing to forgo increasing descriptive representation via the creation of majority-minority districts if doing so decreases Democratic power or causes Republican legislative majorities. These results inform broader questions about how cross-pressured racial minorities navigate political decisions involving competing group interests. These findings also provide an empirical basis to evaluate legal and political efforts to protect minority voting rights and political power in a racially polarized party system.

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Despite the general alignment between racial minorities and the Democratic Party in the United States today, racial minorities with an affinity for the Democratic Party routinely encounter conflicts between their racial and partisan group interests. When these conflicts arise, how do cross-pressured racial minorities navigate trade-offs between competing racial and partisan group interests?

This paper examines this question using the case of racial redistricting, assessing how racial minorities navigate cross-pressures between their racial and partisan group interests when creating majority-minority districts to increase minority descriptive representation comes at a partisan cost. Historically, the strategy of creating Democratic majority-minority districts (by packing racial minorities into as few districts as possible, often in growing metropolitan areas) in order to create additional Republican districts (at the expense of elected white Democrats) has been one that Republicans have sought to realize, often in Southern states, going as far back as the late 1970s (Butler and Cain 1992). Beginning in the 1991 redistricting cycle, numerous so-called “unholy alliances” between Black or Latino Democrats and white Republicans were attempted to maximize the number of districts held by both groups, and some successfully materialized (e.g., King and Smith 2011; Berman 2012; Toobin 2003). This strategy was attempted again by Republicans in the 2011 redistricting cycle across the South and was met with resistance from some elected minority Democrats (Berman 2012), but not from others who electorally benefitted from representing safe majority-minority districts (Weiner 2011).

Scholars of racial representation long have argued that creating Democratic majority-minority districts in this way can have a “perverse effect” by reducing minority population shares in adjacent districts, which consequently reduces the aggregate liberalism of elected chambers or delegations (Erikson 1972; Cain 1984; Lublin 1997; Epstein et al. 2007).¹ More recent work by Chen (2016) further shows that this effect is most likely occur—and thus the prospect for extreme Republican gerrymandering is greatest—when the level of residential clustering by race and party is high.² In the contemporary United States, where the two major political parties are ideologically and racially

¹But see Washington (2012) who examines congressional delegations of states during the 1990 redistricting and finds the opposite effect using a differences-in-differences design.

²Brown and Enos (2018) document the existence of these conditions using fine-grained data on the residential location of every voter in the United States.

polarized (Carmines and Stimson 1989; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006; Cain and Zhang 2016; Mason 2018), the share of minorities who hold racial and Democratic group attachments and thus face this trade-off in the context of racial redistricting is arguably non-trivial.

A great deal of political science research on racial redistricting has focused on the extent to which unholy alliances have been attempted and were successful (King and Smith 2011) as well as the policy effects of racial redistricting proposals (Erikson 1972; Cain 1984; Lublin 1997; Epstein et al. 2007; Washington 2012). However, almost no scholarly attention has been directed at questions about how these and other trade-offs in the racial redistricting setting are evaluated by racial minorities who perceive, face, and are affected by them.³ While some may argue that these questions are trivial because in no state do citizens directly decide how district lines should be drawn, empirically understanding how racial minorities evaluate this trade-off is nonetheless crucial for preserving minority voting rights and has major political, legal, and normative implications for minority representation more generally. Political elites who directly control the redistricting process often purport to represent the interests of racial minority groups when re-drawing district lines, but assessing whether elite redistricting behavior in fact reflects the will of racial minorities requires empirical data on how minorities form preferences over redistricting alternatives. Moreover, existing redistricting legal doctrines, which *assume* that racial and ethnic minorities prefer to elect co-racial and co-ethnic candidates of their choice, are unable to protect minority voting rights when the parties are racially polarized (e.g., Cain and Zhang 2016). Although there have been attempts to craft new legal doctrines in response to this dilemma (e.g., Hasen 2018), these efforts and existing doctrines have largely ignored how minorities themselves would form preferences over redistricting institutions to preserve their voting rights and political power when these trade-offs arise. Empirical evidence documenting how racial minorities navigate these trade-offs—and minority preferences over electoral institutions more generally—is necessary to define the standard against which legal

³Tate (2003b) uses data from the 1996 National Black Election Study to examine Black Americans' opinion toward racial redistricting and finds that Black Americans prefer increasing minority representation (via the creation of majority-minority districts) over color-blind redistricting practices, a preference that is correlated with strong racial identification and education. However, this work does not measure how respondents navigate an explicit trade-off between descriptive and partisan representation in the racial redistricting context.

and political efforts to protect minority representation are evaluated.

I address this fundamental gap in the study of minority public opinion by focusing on how racial minorities navigate explicit trade-offs between their racial and partisan group interests that arise in racial redistricting.⁴ First, I develop a simple decision-theoretic framework to understand how racial minorities who are cross-pressured in this setting form preferences about Democratic majority-minority districts that come at a partisan cost. I test predictions derived from this framework for multiple racial minority groups using a novel survey experiment fielded on nationally representative samples of over 2,400 Black, Latino, and Asian American adults. In the experiment, subjects are asked to evaluate counterfactual redistricting plans involving costly co-racial majority-minority districts⁵, where the quantity of costly majority-minority districts, the marginal cost of each majority-minority district, and the condition under which the marginal majority-minority district is pivotal are randomized.

For Black, Latino, and Asian Americans facing a trade-off, I find that preferences for increased descriptive representation do not dominate when majority-minority districts come at a partisan cost. Black Americans facing a trade-off perceive decreasing returns in the number of costly majority-minority districts proposed, a pattern that is explained by the use of a Black group utility heuristic. Latino and Asian Americans facing a trade-off perceive decreasing returns in the number of costly majority-minority districts only after the first majority-minority district is proposed, and trade-off evaluations appear to be associated with perceived effects on self—but not racial group—interest. For all minorities facing a trade-off, preferences toward costly majority-minority districts are invariant to changes in the marginal cost of each majority-minority district. Importantly, I find strong evidence that minorities facing a trade-off are much less supportive of marginal majority-minority districts that are pivotal and cause Republicans to gain majority control, a preference that is driven by their view that Democratic (Republican) legislative majorities are instrumental for producing public policies that are welfare-improving (welfare-reducing). I conclude by discussing implications for the study of constrained preference formation by cross-pressured minorities in a racially

⁴To do so, I abstract away specific trade-offs reflected in actual proposals and the political contexts in which they arise.

⁵For example, Black American subjects evaluate plans involving majority-Black districts.

polarized party system and for the study of minority politics more generally.

1 Minority Evaluations of Trade-offs between Descriptive and Partisan Representation

A vast and established literature argues that descriptive representation is symbolically important to racial minorities and that the demand for descriptive representation among racial minorities is driven by factors including strong racial group identification and linked fate (e.g., Tate 2003*a,b*; Stokes-Brown 2006; Manzano and Sanchez 2010; Barreto 2010; Schildkraut 2013; Wallace 2014*a*; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010). However, despite calls from normative theorists to do so (Dovi 2002; Mansbridge 1999), scholars have not adequately examined the political conditions under which racial minorities' prefer (or do not prefer) co-racial descriptive representation. Understanding the contours of minority preferences for descriptive representation—particularly the conditions under which such preferences are conditional—is important both to avoid reifying stereotypes about minority political preferences and to better understand how minorities form political preferences under constraint.

Scholarship on how racial minorities evaluate trade-offs involving their racial group interests is relatively nascent.⁶ White, Laird and Allen (2014), for example, study how Black Americans navigate conflicts between racial group interest and self interest using multiple behavioral experiments and find that racialized social pressure and beliefs in group solidarity constrain Black Americans from pursuing self-interested behavior instead of group-conforming behavior. Similarly, Laird et al. (2018) show that among Black Americans, both positive and negative social sanctions encourage compliance with the racial ingroup norm of identifying with the Democratic Party.

Other existing research on how racial minorities navigate trade-offs between their racial group interests and their partisan group interests have primarily focused on trade-off evaluations between preferences for descriptive racial representation and partisan representation in a dyadic represen-

⁶While there is a longstanding literature on the psychology of individual response to social and political cross-pressures (see, e.g., Hovland, Janis and Kelley 1953; Horan 1971; Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982; Burke 1991; Tetlock 2000; Mutz 2002; Margolis 2018), social scientific studies on how individuals navigate cross-pressures in the domain of racial and ethnic politics remain a new and burgeoning area of research.

tation context when assessing candidates and incumbents. When considered as a whole, this body of work generates competing expectations about whether preferences for descriptive representation dominate preferences for partisan representation, or vice versa.

On the one hand, some scholars argue that cross-pressured racial and ethnic minorities have stronger preferences for descriptive representation. In an early controlled field study that varied the party label of a putatively co-ethnic candidate (as signaled by the candidate's surname), Lorinskas, Hawkins and Edwards (1969) find that ethnic voters, particularly those from urban ethnic enclaves, are more willing to support a co-ethnic candidate regardless of the candidate's party label. Other research suggests that the preference for descriptive representation over partisan representation is only concentrated among racial minorities possessing strong racial group identification. Manzano and Sanchez (2010) analyze observational data from the 2004 National Survey of Latinos and find that Latino Americans with stronger levels of ethnic attachment are more likely to support Latino candidates even when that candidate is less qualified than a non-Latino alternative. Experimental research by McConnaughy et al. (2010) corroborates this view. In an experiment where subjects from a student research pool were randomly assigned to view a campaign website for a hypothetical candidate who is either putatively Latino or Anglo, McConnaughy et al. (2010) find that among Latinos, subjects with stronger Latino linked fate were more likely to vote for the Latino candidate than the Anglo candidate. Moving beyond studies about candidate evaluations, Hayes and Hibbing (2017) find a similar result, arguing that preferences for descriptive representation both dominate and shape preferences for substantive representation. Using two survey experiments where subjects are presented with a vignette in which a local government committee is deciding between a pro-Black and a race-neutral proposal and where the level of Black representation and the policy proposal chosen are randomized, Hayes and Hibbing (2017) find that Black Americans evaluate the negative policy outcome (i.e., the race-neutral policy) negatively when the level of Black representation is low but positively when the level of Black representation is high.

On the other hand, a burgeoning line of research argues that preferences for partisan representation are expected to dominate when they come into conflict with preferences for descriptive

representation. Drawing on a combination of in-depth interviews with constituents and analyses of public opinion data, Michelson (2005) analyzes how Latino Californians weighed competing partisan and ethnic group identification cues when choosing between a Latino Republican and an Anglo Democrat in California’s 20th congressional district election in 2000, only a few years after Republicans in the state championed an anti-Latino and anti-immigrant policy agenda. She finds that partisan cues dominated ethnic cues, with most Latinos choosing to support the Democratic Anglo candidate in this setting. More recent observational research offer evidence consistent with the argument that preferences for descriptive representation are secondary to preferences for partisan preferences. Analyzing public opinion data from the 2008 and 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, Ansolabehere and Fraga (2016) find that Black and Hispanic Democrats are indifferent between minority and white incumbents conditional on the incumbent being a Democrat.

How cross-pressured racial minorities evaluate trade-offs involving competing racial and partisan group interests remains a set of open questions requiring additional theoretical and empirical research. Importantly, how cross-pressured minorities navigate these trade-offs and form preferences may also vary by the domain of the trade-off and the options being considered, thereby necessitating domain-specific theoretical predictions and empirical analyses. Against this theoretical and empirical backdrop, this study contributes to this literature by examining the case of trade-offs between descriptive and partisan representation that arise in racial redistricting.

2 Theoretical Framework and Main Hypotheses

I present a simple decision-theoretic model to formalize hypotheses about how minorities trade-offs between their preferences for descriptive and partisan representation in racial redistricting contexts.

2.1 Base Model

Consider a state with N single member districts and two political parties, Democrats and Republicans. In all districts, assume either Democrats or Republicans (and no third party) will have majority support. In n of these districts, district lines have yet to be drawn. For simplicity, assume each of the

n districts is either a Democratic majority-minority district, a Democratic majority-white district, or a Republican majority-white district, and that there are, respectively, m , d , and r of each type where $m + d + r = n$; $m, d, r \geq 0$; and $m \in \mathbb{Z}^+$. To formalize the notion that creating majority-minority districts comes at a partisan cost, let $r = cm$ where $c \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ is the number of Republican majority-white districts created for each Democratic majority-minority district that is created. Let person i 's payoff u_i from a given redistricting plan $\mathcal{P}(m, d, r)$ is $u_i(d, m) = P_i(d + m) + R_i(m)$, the sum of the expected returns from the level of partisan representation proposed by the plan, $P_i(d + m)$, and the expected returns from the level of descriptive representation proposed by the plan, $R_i(m)$. By substitution, individual payoffs are $u_i(m, c|n) = P_i(n - mc) + R_i(m)$, a function of the number of costly majority-minority districts m and the cost of each majority-minority district c . Understanding how payoffs are affected when m and c vary is of primary substantive interest.

Let person i have payoffs $u_{1i} = P_{1i}(n - m_1c_1) + R_{1i}(m_1)$ and $u_{2i} = P_{2i}(n - m_2c_2) + R_{2i}(m_2)$ for alternative plans $\mathcal{P}_1(m_1, c_1|n)$ and $\mathcal{P}_2(m_2, c_2|n)$, respectively. Comparing utilities, i prefers $\mathcal{P}_1 \succ \mathcal{P}_2$ if and only if $u_{1i} - u_{2i} > 0$, or:

$$\underbrace{[P_{1i}(n - m_1c_1) - P_{2i}(n - m_2c_2)]}_{\Delta P} + \underbrace{[R_{1i}(m_1) - R_{2i}(m_2)]}_{\Delta R} > 0$$

Individuals can be classified into one of four strata defined by one's baseline preferences for descriptive representation and for partisan representation: (1) individuals who prefer to elect more minorities and more Democrats and thus could potentially face a trade-off between descriptive and partisan representation; (2) individuals who only prefer to elect more Democrats; (3) individuals who only prefer to elect more minorities; and (4) individuals who prefer neither, which is a compound category that consists of a mixture of types who either have no preference for either or are opposed to either or both. As the theoretical question of interest principally concerns racial minorities who face a trade-off, the main hypotheses and empirical analyses focus on racial minorities in the stratum who prefer to elect more minorities and to elect more Democrats.

For individuals in strata defined by unidimensional representational preferences (i.e., those who

care about electing only more minorities or only more Democrats), payoffs reduce to either P_i or R_i such that a comparative static prediction about how payoffs are affected by m or c is unambiguous. Those who only prefer to elect more Democrats are expected to be less supportive of redistricting plans as the number or the marginal cost of costly majority-minority districts (m and c , respectively) increase. Those who only prefer to elect more minorities are expected to be more supportive of redistricting plans as the number of costly majority-minority districts (m) increases, but are unaffected by changes in the marginal cost of a majority-minority district c .

By contrast, for those who face a trade-off, there is no clear prediction for how payoffs are affected by changes in m and c . Given any two plans, how changes in m affect P_i and R_i —and by extension how ΔP and ΔR are signed—is unknown. Importantly, it is theoretically possible for the relationship between the number of costly majority-minority districts and payoffs to be non-monotonic if, for example, a person perceives the gains from increased descriptive representation to outweigh the partisan costs incurred up to a certain number of majority-minority districts, beyond which the partisan costs of creating majority-minority districts begin to outweigh the benefits obtained from the marginal majority-minority district. It is also possible for cross-pressured individuals to avoid resolving the trade-off altogether if their psychological response to cross-pressure is one of stress and ambivalence (Hovland, Janis and Kelley 1953; Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982; Burke 1991; Tetlock 2000). I therefore test these competing expectations:

- **H1:** *Among racial minorities facing a trade-off, (a) preferences for descriptive representation strictly dominate preferences for partisan representation (u increases in m); (b) preferences for partisan representation strictly dominate preferences for descriptive representation (u decreases in m); or (c) neither set of preferences strictly dominate the other (the relationship between u and m is non-monotonic).*

There is also no clear directional prediction of how changes in c affect payoffs. On the one hand, because c acts as a positive multiplier on m , increasing c is expected to reduce the number of Democratic seats proposed and thus reduce payoffs through P_i . On the other hand, as scholars of consumer judgment and decision-making have shown, individuals facing a trade-off between two

options primarily rely on the identities and values of the attributes as accessible heuristics to form preferences (e.g., Luce, Bettman and Payne 2001) and trade-off evaluations may be insensitive to changes in marginal cost. Thus I test these competing expectations:

- **H2:** *Racial minorities facing a trade-off (a) prefer redistricting plans where majority-minority districts are less costly relative to when they are costlier (u decreases in c) or (b) are indifferent between redistricting plans where the cost of a majority-minority district varies (u is unaffected by c).*

If support for redistricting plans with costly majority-minority districts decreases in the marginal cost of each majority-minority district, the effect may be more pronounced when the proposed number of costly majority-minority districts is higher because the perceived loss is larger and more salient. Thus, I test whether:

- **H3:** *Among racial minorities facing a trade-off, the negative effect of increases in the marginal cost of a costly majority-minority district on preferences is larger in magnitude when the proposed number costly majority-minority district is greater.*

2.2 Extension: Pivotal Majority-Minority Districts Causing Republican Majority Control

Building on the base model, I also consider the case where the marginal majority-minority district is pivotal and causes Republicans to become the likely majority party. In this case, preferences for partisan representation are not only a function of the number of seats held by a party but may also be affected by which party is the likely majority party in a legislature. Formally, I reparameterize the expected partisan returns from a redistricting plan as:

$$P_i(\cdot) = \begin{cases} P_i(n - mc) + M_i(\mathbb{1}[D > \frac{N}{2}]) & \text{if Democrats are the likely majority party} \\ P_i(n - mc) + M_i(\mathbb{1}[D < \frac{N}{2}]) & \text{if Republicans are the likely majority party} \\ P_i(n - mc) + M_i(\mathbb{1}[D = \frac{N}{2}]) & \text{if the legislature is tied} \end{cases}$$

where D is the likely number of Democratic seats and M_i denotes additional returns from either party or neither party being the likely majority party.

Citizens plausibly care about which party has majority control in a legislature because the majority party has agenda-setting power that affects the public policies the legislature proposes and produces. By definition, minorities facing this trade-off are expected to prefer a Democratic majority over a Republican majority. Moreover, given present-day ideological, racial, and affective polarization between the two major parties (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006; Mason 2018), racial minorities facing this trade-off are also expected to be opposed to Republican majorities. Thus:

- **H4:** *Racial minorities facing a trade-off dislike a redistricting plan in which the marginal majority-minority district causes Republicans to become the likely majority party, relative to the counterfactual plan (that does not include that pivotal majority-minority district) where Republicans are not the likely majority party.*

2.3 Mechanisms: Perceived Effects on Group and Individual Welfare

I additionally test whether trade-off evaluations are explained in part by minorities' perceptions of the welfare effects of each legislature proposed, vis-à-vis the bundle of legislative actions and policies each legislature would produce. Prior research has shown that increases in co-racial descriptive representation has a positive impact on substantive racial representation through agenda-setting (e.g., Sinclair Chapman 2002; Wallace 2014b) and oversight-related activities of minority legislators (e.g., Minta 2011; Swers and Rouse 2011). Thus when increasing the number of minority legislators elected is *not* costly, one might expect racial minorities to view the marginal minority legislator to be welfare improving. However, when increasing the number of minority Democratic legislators also increases the number of white Republican legislators, the expected gains from increasing the number of minority Democrats elected must be weighed against the expected harms from also increasing the number of white Republicans elected.

In the base model, how minorities facing a trade-off perceive the net expected gains from the

marginal costly majority-minority district is an open empirical question in the same way that their trade-off evaluations are an open empirical question. However, if perceived welfare effects are a relevant consideration in their trade-off evaluations, then I expect:

- **H5a:** *The effects of changes in the marginal price or in the number of costly majority-minority districts on both plan-specific support and perceived welfare effects to be identically signed.*

When the marginal majority-minority district is also pivotal, minorities facing a trade-off weigh expected welfare gains from electing more minority Democratic legislators against expected welfare losses from both electing more white Republican legislators *and* having a Republican-controlled legislature. A change in the likely majority party is arguably more salient in this scenario and acts as a dominant heuristic, as the proposed compositional change to the legislature alters not only the *relative* influence of racial and partisan groups in the legislature, but also which party is likely to control the institution and *negatively* constrain the feasible set of policy actions available to subjects' co-racial and co-partisan legislators. Thus:

- **H5b:** *Racial minorities facing this trade-off perceive redistricting plans that include pivotal majority-minority districts will harm (a) the racial group interests and (b) their self interest.*

For both of these hypotheses, I separately assess subjects' perceptions of effects on racial group and self interest as outcomes. This approach provides leverage to directly test whether minorities facing a trade-off rely on linked fate—the substitution of racial group utility for individual utility (Dawson 1994)—when evaluating trade-offs between racial and partisan representation. Effects on both group and individual welfare in the same direction would offer evidence consistent with the theory of linked fate. Unlike prior approaches that typically examine whether subjects' expressed linked fate moderates treatment effects, this inferential strategy contributes a new method to reveal whether linked fate likely occurs in preference formation processes in a specific choice context.

Finally, I evaluate these main hypotheses using two types of samples: a pooled cross-racial sample of minorities who face a trade-off and separate samples by racial group (i.e., Black, Latino,

and Asian Americans). The pooled sample is useful for conducting comparative cross-racial analyses to test theoretical expectations while preserving statistical power. At the same time, there is considerable variation in lived experiences between racial and ethnic minority groups in the United States that may generate differences between Black, Latino, and Asian Americans in their preferences for co-racial descriptive representation, their preferences for Democratic representation, and their evaluations of potential trade-offs between the two. In particular, whereas Black political identity is closely intertwined with Democratic identity and loyalty (e.g., Laird et al. 2018) and thus would be more likely to lead Black Americans facing a trade-off to weight considerations about partisan representation over those about descriptive representation, the same cannot be said for Latino and Asian Americans. Prior research has shown that racial and partisan group attachments exhibit considerable within-group variability and are more malleable across social contexts for Latino and Asian Americans (e.g., Barreto and Pedraza 2009; Junn and Masuoka 2008; Masuoka 2005). If racial and partisan identities are less intertwined and crystallized for Latino and Asian Americans than for Black Americans, then Latino and Asian Americans may be more willing than Black Americans to trade off some Democratic representation for some co-racial descriptive representation. Alternatively, it may be the case that in a context characterized by a racially polarized party system, minorities facing a trade-off possess integrated racial and partisan political identities that lead them to evaluate potential trade-offs similarly regardless of their race. Accordingly, I also test each of the main hypotheses separately for Black, Latino, and Asian Americans who face trade-offs in order to empirically understand whether and how trade-off evaluations differ between racial minority groups.

3 Design

To test these hypotheses, I designed and analyze data from a novel survey experiment fielded on large samples of U.S. adults who identify as Black, Latino, or Asian American. In the experiment, subjects evaluate hypothetical pairs of counterfactual redistricting plans.⁷ Within each pair of plans,

⁷Winburn, Henderson and Dowling (2017) and Christenson and Makse (2015) employ similar experimental approaches where individuals evaluate hypothetical plans to study how citizens form preferences over districting plans that alter

key features of the redistricting plans are randomly varied such that each pair involves a trade-off between descriptive and partisan representation.

3.1 Subject Recruitment and Sample Definition

Subjects are recruited from two Internet-based respondent pools: Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and Lucid. I briefly describe the subject recruitment process for each.

Subject recruitment on MTurk. Subjects recruited from the MTurk worker pool are U.S. adult residents who consented to complete an academic survey on their views and opinions. Sampling and subject recruitment occurred in three waves. In the first two waves, which occurred on June 16 and 19, 2017, 455 subjects were recruited from a convenience sample of MTurk workers.⁸ In the third wave of sampling, which occurred between July 4-12, 2017, Black and Latino respondents who had previously completed unrelated MTurk surveys I conducted, who had reported their racial identification in a prior survey, and who were not a subject in the first two waves were recontacted to take the survey and were given one week to complete the survey.⁹ No information about the study's content was communicated in the recontact attempt and no additional incentives other than standard payment for completing the survey was offered. Of the 661 Black and Latino-identified respondents recontacted in this third wave, 403 (60.9%) began the survey. In total, 432 minority respondents from MTurk entered the experiment as subjects.

Subject recruitment on Lucid. Subjects who identify either as non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic or Latino, or non-Hispanic Asian were recruited via Lucid, an online vendor providing respondents from multiple online respondent pools.¹⁰ Each of the racial subsamples were census balanced such that target sample marginals match group-specific population marginals from the 2016 American Community Survey 1-year estimates by age, sex, region, and income.

the representation of “communities of interest.”

⁸101 subjects were recruited on June 16th and 354 subjects were recruited on June 19th. Subjects from the first wave were not allowed to enter the study in the second wave.

⁹The recruitment procedure employed in the third wave of recruitment on MTurk is similar to that used by Gay, Hochschild and White (2016).

¹⁰Coppock and McClellan (2019) provide additional details about Lucid's respondent pool, as well as analyses showing that demographic and experimental results replicated on samples from Lucid track well with benchmark results using national probability samples.

Sample definition. The experiment includes 2,868 subjects pooling across the MTurk and Lucid samples (815 from MTurk and 2,053 from Lucid; Online Appendix Table A2 summarizes the number of subjects by respondent pool and by racial identification). Our main analyses focus on the 2,485 subjects who identify as a racial minority, of whom 990 are Black, 879 are Latino, and 616 are Asian American. Each group-specific sample is demographically similar to its population analog from the 2016 American Community Survey 1-year estimates (see Online Appendix Tables A3, A4, and A5).

3.2 Measuring Baseline Representational Preferences

To identify subjects who likely face a trade-off between their preferences for greater descriptive minority representation and for greater Democratic representation in racial redistricting scenarios, subjects are asked two key pre-treatment questions. First, subjects are asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement that members of their racial in-group are underrepresented in government today (5-point scale: Strongly disagree to Strongly agree). This question is designed to capture subjects' beliefs about whether there are not enough racial in-group members elected to government and whether there should be more racial in-group members elected.¹¹ Second, subjects are asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement, "I support electing as many Democrats as possible." (5-point scale: Strongly disagree to Strongly agree). Responses to these two items are recoded as two binary indicators (coded 1 if original response is "Strongly agree" or "Agree", and 0 otherwise) measuring whether the subject prefers more descriptive representation and more Democratic representation. Subjects coded 1 on both binary indicators are classified as facing a trade-off.

¹¹I assess demand for co-racial descriptive representation in this way, instead of asking whether they support electing as many co-racial politicians as possible, because the latter may lead to an underestimate if they think that overrepresentation could induce backlash from outgroups.

3.3 Comparison Tasks: Setup, Treatments, and Randomization

Subjects are then provided with background information about the potential trade-off between descriptive and partisan representation that arises in racial redistricting. The full text of this information is provided in Online Appendix A. This background information is provided to all subjects to ensure that all subjects explicitly know about the trade-off before being asked to evaluate it.

Next, subjects are introduced to the task and are told that they will evaluate several pairs of redistricting scenarios.¹² Subjects are told that, for each pair, they are to consider a hypothetical U.S. state where a nonpartisan and independent commission is charged with redrawing district lines for the state legislature, which has 80 single member districts. Of the 80 districts in the state, 65 districts' lines have been drawn and 15 districts' lines have not yet been drawn. Subjects are told that within any pair of plans, the 65 districts that have been drawn will be the same but that the 15 districts not yet drawn will differ across plans and may either be (a) a *Democratic majority-white* district, (b) a *Democratic majority-minority district* (where the minority group is the subject's own racial in-group), or (c) a *Republican majority-white* district. Subjects are presented with the summary of possible districts types shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Possible District Types for 15 Districts Not Yet Drawn

| District Type | Majority of Voters in District Are | Racial Composition of District | Likely to Elect a |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|---|
| Democratic, Majority-White | Democrats | Over 60% White | White Democrat |
| Democratic, Majority-Minority | Democrats | 50-60% belong to a given racial or ethnic minority group | Democrat who belongs to that racial or ethnic group |
| Republican, Majority-White | Republicans | Over 60% White | White Republican |

Subjects then proceed to evaluate multiple pairs of redistricting plans that pose a trade-off between descriptive and partisan representation.¹³ Table 2 presents a sample table with two randomly ordered redistricting plans that subjects see in each comparison task. In each comparison table, subjects are presented with the likely partisan distribution of the 65 districts already drawn (which are the same across the two plans) and different distributions of Democratic majority-white, Democratic

¹²The full text of the instructions is shown in Online Appendix A.

¹³In the MTurk sample, subjects evaluated three pairs of redistricting plans. In the Lucid sample, subjects evaluated four pairs of plans. See Online Appendix A.4 for more details.

majority-minority, and Republican majority-white districts among the 15 districts not yet drawn. To reduce the cognitive load involved with the comparison task, the likely number of Democratic and Republican seats and the likely majority party are presented for each plan.

Table 2: Sample Comparison Table

| | Plan A | Plan B |
|--|------------|------------|
| Districts already defined (same for both) | | |
| Number of districts, Democratic advantage | 30 | 30 |
| Number of districts, Republican advantage | 35 | 35 |
| Districts not yet defined (different across plans) | | |
| Democratic, Majority-White | 9 | 6 |
| Democratic, Majority-Black | 2 | 3 |
| Republican, Majority-White | 4 | 6 |
| Likely partisan distribution of seats (same for both) | | |
| Likely Number of Democratic Seats | 41 | 39 |
| Likely Number of Republican Seats | 39 | 41 |
| Likely Party in Control of Legislature | Democratic | Republican |

At the pair level, two features of the plans are randomized. First, the cost of each Democratic majority-minority district is randomly assigned to be equal to either 1, 2, or 3 Republican majority-white districts. Second, the point at which the additional Democratic majority-minority district flips likely majority control to Republicans is randomly assigned (i.e., the chamber flips to Republican control when moving from 0 to 1, 1 to 2, or 2 to 3 Democratic majority-minority districts, or the chamber is always under Democratic or Republican control regardless of the number of majority-minority districts proposed). This randomization is operationalized by varying the number of Democratic and Republican advantage districts (among the 65 districts already drawn) as a function of the marginal cost of a majority-minority district.¹⁴ Across plans within each pair, the number of costly Democratic majority-minority districts is randomized such that each plan proposes either 0, 1, 2, or 3 majority-minority districts and no two plans within any pair propose the same number of majority-minority districts.

¹⁴Online Appendix Table A1 summarizes this mapping.

3.4 Outcome Measures

The primary outcome of interest is the subject's rating of how much she likes each plan, which is measured using a 101-point scale from 0 (strongly dislike) to 100 (strongly like). In the Lucid sample, subjects are also asked two questions to understand the how racial minorities perceive the welfare implications of each redistricting proposal. One of these questions asks: "If you were a resident of this state, how would the policies produced by the legislature proposed in Plan [A/B] affect your interests?" The other question is worded identically but concerns how the policies produced by the legislature proposed in each plan affects the interests of the subject's racial group (e.g., "affects the interests of Blacks"). For both of these questions, responses are measured on a 5-point scale ranging from -2 (harms a great deal) to 2 (advances a great deal).

4 How Many Racial Minorities Potentially Face a Trade-off?


How many Black, Latino, and Asian Americans potentially faces a trade-off between descriptive and partisan representation in racial redistricting contexts? Figure 1 displays mosaic plots that summarizes, for each racial minority group, the distribution of baseline preferences for electing more co-racial minorities and more Democrats by subjects' partisan identification, with the share facing a trade-off shown in the darkest shading.¹⁵ The analysis presented in Figure 1 includes all minority respondents from the Lucid and MTurk samples and is weighted using raking weights.¹⁶

By race, a majority of Black Americans and pluralities of Latino and Asian Americans potentially face this trade-off. Among Black Americans, 51.6% prefer to elect more co-racial representatives and more Democrats and thus potentially face a trade-off, 22.4% only prefer to elect more Black Americans, 10.72% only prefer to elect more Democrats, and 15.3% prefer neither. Among Latino Americans, about equal shares potentially face a trade-off and prefer neither (32.1% and 32.2%, respectively), 24.2% only prefer to elect more Latino representatives, and 11.4% only pre-

¹⁵Leaners are coded as partisans. Numeric results summarizing the joint and marginal distributions are shown in Online Appendix Tables A6, A7, and A8.

¹⁶Data are weighted such that the sample marginals by racial subgroup match group-specific population marginals for age, sex, education, and income in the 2016 ACS 1-year estimates. The results are qualitatively similar if unweighted and if conditioning on the Lucid sample (see Online Appendix Tables A6, A7, and A8).

Figure 1: Distribution of baseline preferences for electing more co-racial minorities and for electing more Democrats, by race and party. Weighted analysis using raking weights.



for electing more Democrats. Among Asian Americans, 34.8% potentially face a trade-off, 28.4% prefer neither, 27.3% only prefer to elect more Asian Americans, and 9.6% only prefer to elect more Democrats.

By party, racial minorities are most likely to face this trade-off if they identify as Democrats. Among racial minorities identifying as Democrats, 62.1% face this trade-off, 13.6% only prefer to elect more Democrats, 13.2% only prefer to elect more co-racial minorities, and 11.1% prefer neither. Among minorities identifying as Independents, a plurality (44.5%) prefer neither and 35.4% only prefer to elect more co-racial minorities only. By contrast, only 13.6% of minority Independents prefer both and potentially face a trade-off and 6.5% only prefer to elect more Democrats. Among minority Republicans, a plurality (40.0%) only prefer to elect more co-racial minorities only, 36.2% prefer neither, 15.9% prefer both, and 8.0% only prefer to elect more Democrats.¹⁷

Consistent with the expectation that trade-offs involving competing group interests are relevant to those identifying with those groups, these results show that majorities of racial and ethnic minorities identifying as Democrats potentially face this trade-off. With high levels of Democratic identification among Black Americans and growing levels of Democratic identification among Latino


¹⁷It is unclear why Republicans would state that they prefer to elect more Democrats. To avoid potential measurement error, subsequent analyses that focus on minorities facing a trade-off exclude those who identify as Republican.

and Asian Americans, the potential for tension between preferences for descriptive and partisan representation is already—and is expected to remain—a central feature of racial and ethnic politics in the United States.

5 Do Minorities Facing a Trade-off Prefer More Majority-Minority Districts that are Costly?

Focusing on racial minorities who potentially face a trade-off and who do not identify as Republicans¹⁸, I first turn to the question of whether changes in the number of costly Democratic majority-minority districts affects preferences over redistricting plans involving such districts. Figure 2 presents mean plan-specific favorability ratings by the number of costly majority-minority districts proposed with 95% confidence intervals.¹⁹

Figure 2: Mean preferences by the number of costly Democratic majority-minority districts proposed, among racial minorities facing a trade-off



Support for redistricting plans decreases in the number of costly majority-minority districts proposed when pooling across racial minority groups (Figure 2, far-left panel). For Black Americans facing a trade-off (middle-left panel), support is strictly decreasing in the number of costly majority-minority districts proposed. This lends support to hypothesis 1b for cross-pressured Black

¹⁸This additional sample restriction of excluding Republican identifiers provides a cleaner test and is applied to the remaining analyses presented in the paper.

¹⁹Confidence intervals are calculated from standard errors clustered at the subject level.

Americans. By contrast, for Latino and Asian Americans facing a trade-off (middle- and far-right panels, respectively), the relationship between the proposed number of costly majority-minority districts and plan-specific support is non-monotonic, increasing from 0 to 1 and decreasing thereafter. These findings lend support to hypothesis 1c for cross-pressured Latino and Asian Americans.

To formally test competing expectations about the relationship between the number of costly majority-minority districts proposed and plan-specific support, I regress plan-specific favorability ratings on the number of costly majority-minority districts using ordinary least squares with subject fixed effects, and estimate cluster standard errors at the subject level. I estimate this model pooling across racial minority groups in the sample and separately for Black, Latino, and Asian Americans. Table 3 shows that on average, each additional costly Democratic majority-minority district proposed reduces plan-specific support by 2.02 points (s.e.=0.36, $p<0.01$) in the pooled sample (column 1), 2.08 points (s.e.=0.46, $p<0.01$) among Black Americans (column 2), 1.90 points (s.e.=0.67, $p<0.01$) among Latino Americans (column 3), and 1.90 points (s.e.=0.98, $p=0.054$) among Asian Americans (column 5). To test whether a non-monotonic relationship exists for Latino and Asian Americans, I re-estimate this model adding a term for the squared number of costly majority-minority districts and find strong evidence that the relationship is non-monotonic for Latinos with a coefficient on the squared term of -2.19 (s.e.=0.64, $p<0.01$, column 4). For Asian Americans, I find suggestive evidence of a non-monotonic relationship (estimate on squared term= -1.30 , s.e.=0.80, $p=0.11$, column 6). Future research with larger samples of Asian Americans is recommended to precisely test whether the non-monotonic pattern observed for Asians in Figure 2 exists.

These findings provide strong evidence ruling out the hypothesis that preferences for descriptive racial representation dominate (hypothesis 1a), and show that for racial minorities who face and are evaluating this trade-off in a racial redistricting context, preferences for Democratic partisan representation strictly dominate for Black Americans (hypothesis 2a) and dominate after one majority-minority district is proposed for Latino and Asian Americans (hypothesis 2c).

Table 3: Plan-specific support decreases in the number of costly Democratic majority-minority districts proposed among racial minorities facing trade-off

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| | Outcome: Favors proposed plan (0-100) | | | | | |
| | Pooled | Black | Latino | Latino | Asian Am. | Asian Am. |
| Num. majority-min. districts | -2.016*** (0.356) | -2.083*** (0.463) | -1.903*** (0.666) | 4.678** (2.045) | -1.909* (0.983) | 2.022 (2.580) |
| Num. majority-min. districts squared | | | | -2.191*** (0.637) | | -1.295 (0.800) |
| N observations (subject-ratings) | 5894 | 3596 | 1566 | 1566 | 732 | 732 |
| N subjects | 950 | 494 | 290 | 290 | 166 | 166 |
| R ² | 0.459 | 0.435 | 0.441 | 0.448 | 0.597 | 0.599 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.355 | 0.345 | 0.314 | 0.322 | 0.478 | 0.480 |
| Subject fixed effects? | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses.

6 Do Minorities Facing a Trade-off Like Costlier Majority-Minority Districts Less?

Are racial minorities facing this trade-off more averse to redistricting plans when the marginal Democratic majority-minority district comes at a greater partisan cost?

Figure 3 clearly shows that for all racial minority groups examined, changes in the marginal partisan cost of Democratic majority-minority districts has no effect on levels of plan-specific support. This finding is confirmed in Table 4, which shows estimates from OLS regressions of plan-specific ratings on the marginal cost with subject-level fixed effects and subject-level clustered standard errors. While the coefficients on marginal cost are all negative for the pooled sample of minorities facing a trade-off and for cross-pressured Black, Latino, and Asian Americans when analyzed separately (columns 1-4), none of the estimates are statistically distinguishable from zero. Results are similar when using binary indicators for the value of the marginal cost instead of a continuous variable (columns 5-8).

The lack of an average price effect may obscure the possibility that racial minorities facing this trade-off are sensitive to price effects but only when the number of majority-minority districts proposed is higher. To test whether plan-specific support is affected by the interaction between the marginal cost and number of costly majority-minority districts proposed (hypothesis 3), I first plot in Figure 4, separately by the marginal cost of each majority-minority district, mean levels of plan-

Figure 3: Mean preferences by the marginal cost of each Democratic majority-minority district proposed, among racial minorities facing a trade-off




Table 4: Plan-specific support is unaffected by changes in the marginal cost of each Democratic majority-minority districts proposed among racial minorities facing trade-off


| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Outcome: Favors proposed plan (0-100) | | | | | | | |
| | Pooled | Black | Latino | Asian Am. | Pooled | Black | Latino | Asian Am. |
| Marginal cost (continuous) | -0.417 (0.401) | -0.452 (0.526) | -0.421 (0.696) | -0.112 (1.023) | | | | |
| Marginal cost = 2 | | | | | -0.180 (0.717) | -0.296 (0.889) | 0.345 (1.465) | -0.753 (1.995) |
| Marginal cost = 3 | | | | | -0.790 (0.803) | -0.876 (1.047) | -0.705 (1.419) | -0.381 (2.133) |
| N observations (subject-ratings) | 5894 | 3596 | 1566 | 732 | 5894 | 3596 | 1566 | 732 |
| N subjects | 950 | 494 | 290 | 166 | 950 | 494 | 290 | 166 |
| R ² | 0.452 | 0.427 | 0.435 | 0.590 | 0.452 | 0.427 | 0.435 | 0.590 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.347 | 0.336 | 0.306 | 0.470 | 0.347 | 0.336 | 0.306 | 0.469 |
| Subject fixed effects? | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses.

specific support at each quantity of costly majority-minority districts proposed. If the hypothesized interaction effect exists, preference curves would diverge as the number of costly majority-minority districts increases (i.e., moving rightward along the x-axis), with costlier proposals garnering lower levels of support.

I find no evidence of an interaction effect. For the pooled minority sample and for separate samples of Black, Latino, and Asian Americans facing a trade-off, there are no apparent differ-

Figure 4: Mean preferences by the number and marginal cost of Democratic majority-minority districts proposed, among racial minorities facing a trade-off




ences between the preference curves by the marginal cost of a majority-minority district.²⁰ In sum, for racial minorities facing this trade-off, preferences toward redistricting plans involving costly majority-minority districts are not sensitive to changes in marginal cost either on average or when the quantity of costly majority-minority districts proposed is higher. I therefore find support for hypothesis 2b and fail to find support for hypotheses 2a and 3. Moreover, comparing the price effect estimates (in Table 4) to the quantity effect estimates (in Table 3), the magnitudes of the latter are larger than the former, which suggests that for racial minorities facing this trade-off, preferences over redistricting plans appear to be more sensitive to changes in the number of costly majority-minority districts proposed than to changes in the marginal cost of these districts.

²⁰In Online Appendix Table A9, I present estimates from OLS models regressing plan-specific support on either continuous or binary cost variables, the number of majority-minority districts proposed, and their interactions. Whether using a continuous marginal cost variable (columns 1-4) or a set of binary cost indicators (columns 5-8), I find no statistically significant interaction effects in the pooled sample of minorities or when analyzing each minority group separately.

7 Preferences for Pivotal Majority-Minority Districts that Cause Republican Majorities

Do cross-pressured racial minorities oppose plans where the marginal majority-minority district is pivotal and causes Republicans to gain majority control of legislative institutions? Figure 5 presents mean plan-specific ratings by the number of costly majority-minority districts proposed and the condition under which the marginal majority-minority district causes Republicans to become the likely majority party in the institution.

Figure 5: Plan-specific support decreases when the marginal majority-minority district proposed causes likely Republican majority control, among racial minorities facing trade-off



The far-left and far-right panels of Figure 5 show conditions where Republicans and Democrats, respectively, are always the likely majority party regardless of the number of likely majority-minority districts proposed. When Republicans are always the likely majority party, Black Americans facing

a trade-off never rate redistricting plans favorably, and both Latino and Asian Americans who face a trade-off exhibit a non-monotonic relationship between the number of costly majority-minority districts proposed and plan-specific support. When Democrats are always the likely majority party, racial minorities consistently rate plans favorably regardless of the number of costly majority-minority districts proposed.

In the middle three columns of Figure 5, the solid black lines highlight the change in mean preferences when adding a pivotal majority-minority district causes the chamber to flip to Republican control. For Black Americans facing a trade-off, adding this marginal majority-minority district decreases plan-specific support when that marginal district is the first, second, or third costly majority-minority district proposed. For Latino and Asian Americans facing a trade-off, adding this marginal majority-minority district decreases plan-specific support only when that district is the second or third costly majority-minority district proposed, but preferences appear unchanged when moving from zero to one costly majority-minority district.

To formally assess the effect of pivotal majority-minority districts that cause Republicans to gain a legislative majority, I first create a “treatment” plan indicator coded 1 if the additional majority-minority district causes a likely Republican majority and 0 otherwise (for example, if Republicans become the majority when moving from 1 to 2 districts given the distribution of already-defined districts, plans proposing 2 majority-minority districts are coded as treatment plans, plans proposing 1 majority-minority district are coded as counterfactual plans, and plans proposing either 0 or 3 majority-minority districts are excluded from the analysis). I then regress plan-specific favorability ratings on this treatment indicator and subject fixed effects, and report standard errors clustered at the subject level. For these analyses, I apply two sample restrictions. First I estimate this model using a sample of subject-ratings involving any plan coded as a treatment or counterfactual plan (Table 5 Panel A). Pooling across all racial minorities in the sample who face a trade-off, plan-specific support decreases by 9.69 points (s.e.=1.88, one-sided $p<0.001$) when the adding a majority-minority district causes Republicans to gain majority control (column 1). Columns 2-4 present separate analyses by racial minority group. A pivotal majority-minority district decreases support by 9.18

points (s.e.=2.11, one-sided $p<0.001$) for Black Americans facing at trade-off, decreases support by 11.55 points (s.e.=4.77, one-sided $p=0.008$) for Latino Americans facing a trade-off, and decreases support by -9.02 points (s.e.=6.45, one-sided $p=0.082$) for Asian Americans facing a trade-off.

Table 5: Plan-specific support decreases when the marginal majority-minority district proposed is pivotal and causes likely Republican majority control, among racial minorities facing trade-off

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|--|--|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| | Outcome: Favors proposed plan (0-100) | | | | | | | |
| | A. All ratings of treatment and counterfactual plans | | | | B. Only paired ratings of treatment and counterfactual plans | | | |
| | Pooled | Black | Latino | Asian Am. | Pooled | Black | Latino | Asian Am. |
| Pivotal majority-min. district | -9.689*** (1.880) | -9.180*** (2.105) | -11.547** (4.766) | -9.017 (6.446) | -11.899*** (2.595) | -10.199*** (3.237) | -16.231*** (5.771) | -11.125* (6.195) |
| N observations (subject-ratings) | 1687 | 1055 | 418 | 214 | 496 | 302 | 130 | 64 |
| N subjects | 809 | 450 | 226 | 133 | 223 | 134 | 61 | 28 |
| R ² | 0.680 | 0.658 | 0.679 | 0.791 | 0.583 | 0.547 | 0.630 | 0.611 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.385 | 0.403 | 0.299 | 0.443 | 0.241 | 0.183 | 0.298 | 0.299 |
| Subject fixed effects? | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| p-value, $H_0: \beta_{treatment} \geq 0$ | < 0.001 | < 0.001 | 0.008 | 0.082 | < 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.003 | 0.042 |

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses.

Second, to provide a cleaner test of trade-off evaluations, I use a more restrictive sample of subject-ratings from paired treatment and counterfactual plans where the subject sees and is directly comparing the treatment plan to the counterfactual plan. As Table 5 Panel B shows, the negative effect of the pivotal majority-minority district causing Republican majority control is larger when racial minorities directly compare paired treatment and counterfactual plans that vary only in whether a pivotal majority-minority district is proposed. Support decreases by 11.90 points (s.e.=2.60, one-sided $p<0.001$) when pooling across all minorities facing a trade-off, decreases by 10.20 points (s.e.=3.24, one-sided $p=0.001$) among Black Americans facing a trade-off, decreases by 16.23 points (s.e.=5.77, one-sided $p=0.003$) among Latino Americans facing a trade-off, and decreases by 11.13 points (s.e.=6.20, one-sided $p=0.042$) among Asian Americans facing a trade-off.

8 Mechanisms: The Role of Perceived Welfare Effects on Racial Group and Self Interest

Are racial minorities' trade-off evaluations explained by their perceptions of how their self and racial group interests would be affected by the legislatures proposed? Using data from the Lucid subsample that includes outcome measures of subjects' welfare effect perceptions, I examine

whether changes in the quantity, marginal cost, and pivotality of majority-minority districts proposed affects perceptions of how the proposed legislatures would affect subjects' welfare vis-à-vis the policies the legislatures would produce.

First, I assess whether increases in the number of costly majority-minority districts affects perceived group and individual welfare among minorities facing a trade-off. Because the treatment is bundled (i.e., increasing both Democratic majority-minority districts and Republican majority-white districts) and given observed negative effects on plan-specific support (Table 3), observing negative effects on perceived welfare would imply that the policy-related benefits from the likely election of more Democratic co-racial legislators from majority-minority districts are outweighed by the policy-related harms caused by an increase in legislators elected from Republican majority-white districts. Positive effects on perceived welfare would suggest the reverse.

Table 6 Panel A presents estimates from OLS models regressing subjects' perceptions of whether their group and self interest would be harmed or advanced by the policies produced by the proposed legislature on the number of costly majority-minority districts proposed and subject fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the subject level.

Across all racial groups and for both outcome measures of perceived welfare effects, the estimated effect of an additional costly majority-minority district is consistently negative. Pooling across minority groups, each additional costly majority-minority district proposed causes a decrease in the perceived returns to one's racial ingroup by 0.047 points (s.e.=0.016, $p<0.01$) and a decrease in the perceived returns to one's self interest by 0.072 points (s.e.=0.016, $p<0.01$). These negative effects are largest for cross-pressured Black Americans, reducing the perceived returns to Black group interest by 0.071 points (s.e.=0.02, $p<0.01$) and the perceived returns to self interest by 0.081 points (s.e.=0.02, $p<0.01$). For cross-pressured Latino Americans, the estimated effects are negative but not distinguishable from zero (for group interest: -0.012 points, s.e.=0.032, $p=0.71$; for self-interest: -0.043 , s.e.=0.033, $p=0.20$). For cross-pressured Asian Americans, each additional costly majority-Asian district proposed has no effect on perceived returns to the interests of Asians as a group (-0.001 , s.e.=0.036, $p=0.979$) but reduces perceived returns to self interest by

Table 6: Quantity and price effects on perceived returns to racial group interest and self-interest (Lucid sample only)

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| | Pooled | | Black | | Latino | | Asian Am. | |
| | Group | Self | Group | Self | Group | Self | Group | Self |
| | Interest | Interest | Interest | Interest | Interest | Interest | Interest | Interest |
| A. Welfare effects of changes in the number of costly majority-minority districts | | | | | | | | |
| Num. majority-min. districts | -0.047*** (0.016) | -0.072*** (0.016) | -0.071*** (0.020) | -0.081*** (0.020) | -0.012 (0.032) | -0.043 (0.033) | -0.001 (0.036) | -0.077** (0.039) |
| N observations (subject-ratings) | 4696 | 4696 | 2848 | 2848 | 1088 | 1088 | 760 | 760 |
| N subjects | 739 | 739 | 356 | 356 | 210 | 210 | 173 | 173 |
| R ² | 0.507 | 0.486 | 0.465 | 0.448 | 0.565 | 0.538 | 0.571 | 0.545 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.414 | 0.390 | 0.389 | 0.369 | 0.461 | 0.427 | 0.444 | 0.411 |
| Subject fixed effects? | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| B. Welfare effects of changes in the marginal cost of a majority-minority district | | | | | | | | |
| Marginal cost | -0.014 (0.025) | -0.004 (0.024) | -0.025 (0.032) | -0.017 (0.030) | 0.025 (0.049) | 0.053 (0.045) | -0.027 (0.057) | -0.036 (0.060) |
| N observations (subject-ratings) | 4696 | 4696 | 2848 | 2848 | 1088 | 1088 | 760 | 760 |
| N subjects | 739 | 739 | 356 | 356 | 210 | 210 | 173 | 173 |
| R ² | 0.505 | 0.482 | 0.461 | 0.442 | 0.566 | 0.537 | 0.571 | 0.540 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.412 | 0.385 | 0.384 | 0.363 | 0.462 | 0.426 | 0.444 | 0.404 |
| Subject fixed effects? | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses.

0.077 points (s.e.=0.039, $p=0.048$).

These findings provide strong evidence that for Black Americans facing a trade-off, increases in the number of costly majority-Black districts (and thus the Republican majority-white districts) decrease support for redistricting proposals due to the perception that having more legislators from Republican, majority-white districts would result in policies that yield greater harm both to Black group interest and to the self interest of Black Americans. These results also provide evidence consistent with the theory that Black linked fate plays an important role in how Black Americans evaluate trade-offs between descriptive and partisan representation in this racial redistricting context.

Increasing the number of costly majority-minority districts has negative and statistically significant effects on perceived self interest for cross-pressured Asian Americans and negative but underpowered effects on perceived self interest for cross-pressured Latino Americans. The direction of these estimates suggests that among those facing a trade-off in both groups, the expected costs of electing more white Republicans outweigh the expected gains from electing more minority

Democrats. However, for both groups, effects on perceived racial group interest are null. I briefly speculate why this may be the case. Because Latino and Asian Americans are pan-ethnic racial groups with considerable within-group preference heterogeneity (e.g. Barreto and Pedraza 2009; Junn and Masuoka 2008; Masuoka 2005), some Latinos and Asian Americans may not perceive their racial ingroup to possess homogeneous and common interests, which would lead them to interpret the question as nonsensical because it assumes that pan-ethnic racial group interests are well defined. If that were the case, then those Latino and Asian American subjects would be more likely to select the middle category, “neither harm nor advance” (coded 0) regardless of the redistricting plan proposed, which would yield a null effect. Another possibility is that the estimated null effect averages out and masks intra-group heterogeneity in effects on group interest.

I then consider price effects on perceptions of group and individual welfare. Because changes in the marginal cost of a majority-minority district has no effect on plan-specific support (Table 4), I expect null effects on perceived welfare effects as well. The results shown in Table 6 Panel B, which presents estimates from OLS regressions of perceived welfare effects on the marginal cost of a majority-minority district with subject-level fixed effects and subject-level clustered standard errors, confirms this expectation.

Next, I assess how pivotal majority-minority districts causing a Republican majority affects group and self interest. For this analysis, negative effects provide evidence that the expected harms from a likely Republican legislative majority outweigh any potential benefits from the expected gains from electing a minority legislator from the marginal (and pivotal) majority-minority district. Positive effects imply the reverse.

As the consistently negative treatment effect estimates in Table 7 show, pivotal majority-minority districts that cause a Republican majority are broadly viewed as harming group and self interest among racial minorities facing this trade-off. Because estimates are qualitatively similar across sample restrictions, we focus on the first set of results in panel A. For the pooled minority sample facing a trade-off, adding a pivotal majority-minority district that causes a Republican majority is viewed as harming both racial group interest (-0.313 , $s.e.=0.09$, one-tailed $p<0.001$) and self inter-

est (-0.389 , s.e.= 0.09 , one-tailed $p<0.001$). This result is driven by cross-pressured Black Americans in the sample, for whom creating a pivotal majority-minority district that causes a Republican majority is viewed as harming Black interests by 0.40 points (s.e.= 0.11 , one-tailed $p<0.001$) and harming self interest by 0.44 points (s.e.= 0.10 , one-tailed $p<0.001$).

For cross-pressured Latino and Asian Americans, I find negative, smaller, and underpowered effects. For Latino Americans, pivotal majority-minority districts are perceived as harming Latino group interest by 0.18 points (s.e.= 0.21 , one-tailed $p=0.20$) and harming self interest by 0.26 points (s.e.= 0.19 , one-tailed $p=0.085$). For Asian Americans, pivotal majority-minority districts causing Republican majorities are perceived as harming self interest by 0.33 points (s.e.= 0.24 , one-tailed $p=0.083$) but the effect on perceived racial group interest is substantively small and not statistically significant (-0.05 , s.e.= 0.24 , one-tailed $p=0.414$).

Table 7: The effect of pivotal majority-minority districts causing Republican majority control on perceived returns to racial group interest and self-interest (Lucid sample only)

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | Pooled | | Black | | Latino | | Asian Am. | |
| | Group Interest | Self Interest | Group Interest | Self Interest | Group Interest | Self Interest | Group Interest | Self Interest |
| A. All ratings of treatment and counterfactual plans | | | | | | | | |
| Pivotal majority-min. district | -0.313^{***} (0.090) | -0.389^{***} (0.087) | -0.399^{***} (0.107) | -0.437^{***} (0.104) | -0.175 (0.207) | -0.259 (0.187) | -0.052 (0.241) | -0.333 (0.240) |
| N observations (subject-ratings) | 1385 | 1385 | 851 | 851 | 310 | 310 | 224 | 224 |
| N subjects | 640 | 640 | 336 | 336 | 164 | 164 | 140 | 140 |
| R ² | 0.688 | 0.698 | 0.642 | 0.648 | 0.745 | 0.769 | 0.815 | 0.817 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.419 | 0.437 | 0.409 | 0.418 | 0.456 | 0.507 | 0.503 | 0.509 |
| Subject fixed effects? | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| p-value, $H_0: \beta_{treatment} \geq 0$ | < 0.001 | < 0.001 | < 0.001 | < 0.001 | 0.199 | 0.085 | 0.414 | 0.083 |
| B. Only paired ratings of treatment and counterfactual plans | | | | | | | | |
| Pivotal majority-min. district | -0.352^{***} (0.121) | -0.394^{***} (0.114) | -0.477^{***} (0.155) | -0.469^{***} (0.154) | -0.283 (0.263) | -0.264 (0.211) | 0.031 (0.245) | -0.313 (0.257) |
| N observations (subject-ratings) | 426 | 426 | 256 | 256 | 106 | 106 | 64 | 64 |
| N subjects | 186 | 186 | 110 | 110 | 48 | 48 | 28 | 28 |
| R ² | 0.651 | 0.673 | 0.641 | 0.659 | 0.652 | 0.710 | 0.687 | 0.657 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.380 | 0.419 | 0.368 | 0.400 | 0.358 | 0.466 | 0.437 | 0.383 |
| Subject fixed effects? | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| p-value, $H_0: \beta_{treatment} \geq 0$ | 0.002 | < 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.144 | 0.109 | 0.550 | 0.117 |

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses.

9 Conclusion

Tensions between racial and partisan group interests are a central feature of minority politics for multiple minority groups in the contemporary United States, where the two major parties are racially and ideologically polarized and where racial minorities sometimes find their racial and partisan allegiances in conflict (e.g., Frymer 1999). Existing research, however, has not adequately theorized how racial minorities navigate explicit trade-offs between *multiple* competing group-based interests and has generated competing conclusions about the conditions under which racial group interests are expected to dominate. I address this theoretical shortcoming and empirical debate in the literature by examining minority evaluations of trade-offs in racial redistricting contexts where creating Democratic majority-minority districts comes at a partisan cost of simultaneously creating Republican majority-white districts, and cross-pressured racial minorities face a trade-off between their preferences for descriptive and partisan representation.

Analyzing data from nationally representative samples of over 2,400 Black, Latino, and Asian Americans respondents, I find that a sizable share of racial minorities—a majority of Black Americans and near pluralities of Latino and Asian Americans—are cross-pressured and face trade-offs in this racial redistricting context. Using a novel survey experiment, I then examined how cross-pressured Black, Latino, and Asian American subjects explicitly navigated trade-offs between their preferences for descriptive and partisan representation through the evaluation of counterfactual redistricting plans. Contra expectations in the literature that racial group interests are expected to dominate other representational preferences, I find that among racial minorities facing a trade-off between increasing descriptive and partisan representation, preferences for greater partisan representation tend to dominate preferences for marginal gains in descriptive representation. Black Americans facing a trade-off are less supportive of redistricting plans as the number of costly majority-Black districts increases. For Latino and Asian Americans facing a trade-off, support for redistricting plans decrease as the number of costly majority-minority districts increases, but only after the first costly majority-minority district is proposed. Furthermore, for cross-pressured Black, Latino, and Asian Americans, decreases in support for the marginal majority-minority dis-

trict are larger if that district is pivotal and causes Republicans to gain majority control. This finding suggests that cross-pressured minorities hold sophisticated beliefs about how party control of legislative institutions affects their interests and use these beliefs to form preferences over partisan control of institutions more broadly.

To explore these explanations for how cross-pressured minorities form these preferences, I show that trade-off evaluations by cross-pressured racial minorities appear to be driven by perceived welfare effects, specifically perceptions of how the proposed legislatures would affect policy development and how those policies would in turn affect one's interests. For cross-pressured Black Americans, the expected policy gains from creating costly majority-minority districts are outweighed by the expected policy losses from simultaneously creating Republican majority-white districts. Moreover, among cross-pressured Black Americans, perceived welfare effects are construed as impacting both Black group interest as well as self interest, offering evidence consistent with narratives that Black Americans employ a group utility heuristic to form preferences. For cross-pressured Latino and Asian Americans, I find suggestive results of similar patterns, although perceived welfare effects on self interest appear to be more important than perceived welfare effects on racial group interest. This result for Latino and Asian Americans is consistent with the fact that there is considerable heterogeneity in political interests among Latino and Asian Americans. These results also hold when cross-pressured minorities are evaluating trade-offs involving pivotal majority-minority districts.

While this study focused on evaluations by cross-pressured Black, Latino, and Asian Americans of trade-offs between descriptive and partisan representation in racial redistricting, the results speak more broadly to the politics of how cross-pressured racial minorities form constrained political preferences when faced with trade-offs between racial group and partisan group interests across multiple domains. This work also provides a theoretical and empirical blueprint for future research on trade-off evaluations involving competing group interests, and can be adapted to explore theoretical extensions such as assessing heterogeneity in trade-off evaluations by varying levels of group-specific identification and consciousness, by variation in the content of competing in-group

norm perceptions, and by the degree of group-specific social pressure subjects experience.

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Supplementary Information for:

How Racial Minorities Evaluate Trade-offs between Descriptive and Partisan Representation

June 10, 2019

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A Survey Instrument

A.1 Background Information about Trade-off

Page 1:

Please read the following carefully:

A central question in politics is who should hold office and govern. The process that determines who governs is determined by how electoral district lines are drawn, which happens in every U.S. state every 10 years.

When redrawing district lines, all states are bound by two main requirements:

1. Every district in a state must have the same number of people, and
2. Every district must be a single, unbroken shape.

A major implication of these requirements is that if you move one person from a district into an adjacent district, you have to move another person from that adjacent district back into the initial district.

This is important because creating a district with more people who belong to one group (such as Republicans, African Americans, or rural Americans) means that there are fewer people from that group who can be distributed across the remaining districts.

As a result, any two proposals for how to draw district lines in any given state could involve trade-offs about the political and demographic composition of districts.

On the next page, you will read more about a specific and common example of such a trade-off.

Page 2:

Since the mid-20th century, racial and ethnic minorities in the United States have relied on the Voting Rights Act to create majority-minority districts, which are districts where a majority of the population belongs to a historically underrepresented racial group (like African Americans or Latinos) so that members of that group can elect minority representatives of their choice.

Over time, the share of racial and ethnic minorities that support the Democratic Party has grown steadily. Now, overwhelming majorities of Blacks, Latinos, and Asians are more likely to identify as and vote for Democrats instead of Republicans. Consequently, majority-minority districts have become a way to increase the number of Black, Latino, and Asian American Democrats elected at the local, state, and federal levels.

One possible consequence of creating Democratic majority-minority districts is that it results in the creation of Republican majority-white districts. This is because when people are residentially clustered by race and by party, requiring districts to have the same number of people means that putting more Democratic racial minorities into one district also means that the remaining districts are more likely to contain white Republicans.

To summarize this trade-off:

Increasing the number of Democratic majority-minority districts potentially increases the number of Republican majority-white districts.

A.2 Instructions for Comparison Task

On each of the next few pages, you will see a pair of redistricting scenarios to compare and evaluate.

In each pair of scenarios:

- You will be asked to think about a U.S. state.
- In that state, a **nonpartisan** and **independent** commission is charged with redrawing the lines for the state's legislative districts.
- The legislature has 80 districts and each district elects 1 representative.
- Most of the districts (65 of 80) have been drawn, but 15 of the 80 districts have yet to be drawn.

The remaining 15 districts could be one of the following 3 types:

| District Type | Majority of Voters in District Are | Racial Composition of District | Likely to Elect a |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|---|
| Democratic, Majority-White | Democrats | Over 60% White | White Democrat |
| Democratic, Majority-Minority | Democrats | 50-60% belong to a given racial or ethnic minority group | Democrat who belongs to that racial or ethnic group |
| Republican, Majority-White | Republicans | Over 60% White | White Republican |

How district lines are drawn for these remaining 15 districts will not affect any of the 65 districts whose lines have already been drawn.

Within any pair of scenarios:

- The 65 districts that have been drawn will be the **same**.
- For the remaining districts, the number of districts by district type will be **different**.

When you are ready to proceed, click the >> button.

A.3 Additional Treatment Details

Table A1: Mapping between the condition under which the marginal majority-minority district causes Republican legislative control and the number of Democratic- and Republican-advantage districts among 65 districts already drawn, as a function of the marginal cost of a majority-minority district

| Marginal cost of each Democratic majority-minority district (# of Republican majority-white districts) | Condition when additional majority-minority district causes GOP majority control | Number of Democratic districts | Number of Republican districts |
|---|--|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1 | Never (always R control) | 23 | 42 |
| | 0 → 1 majority-minority districts | 25 | 40 |
| | 1 → 2 majority-minority districts | 26 | 39 |
| | 2 → 3 majority-minority districts | 27 | 38 |
| | Never (always D control) | 36 | 29 |
| 2 | Never (always R control) | 23 | 42 |
| | 0 → 1 majority-minority districts | 26 | 39 |
| | 1 → 2 majority-minority districts | 28 | 37 |
| | 2 → 3 majority-minority districts | 30 | 35 |
| | Never (always D control) | 36 | 29 |
| 3 | Never (always R control) | 23 | 42 |
| | 0 → 1 majority-minority districts | 27 | 38 |
| | 1 → 2 majority-minority districts | 30 | 35 |
| | 2 → 3 majority-minority districts | 33 | 32 |
| | Never (always D control) | 36 | 29 |

A.4 Details on the Number of Comparison Tasks Completed

In the MTurk subsample, all subjects were given 3 comparison tasks.

In the Lucid subsample, all subjects were given 4 comparison tasks. However, some subjects (all Black subjects and some Latino and Asian American subjects) completed 4 comparison tasks relating to trade-offs between co-racial descriptive representation and partisan representation whereas other subjects (other Latino and Asian American subjects) completed only 2 comparison tasks relating to this type of trade-off. This is because, in order to investigate whether Latinos and Asians vary in their trade-off evaluations involving *pan-ethnic racial* versus *ethnic* descriptive representation, Latino and Asian subjects in the Lucid sample who identified with one of the ten largest Latino or Asian ethnic groups in the United States were shown 2 comparison tasks where majority-minority districts were defined in pan-ethnic racial minority terms (i.e., majority-Latino or majority-Asian) and 2 comparison tasks where majority-minority districts were defined in ethnic terms (e.g., majority-Mexican or majority-Chinese). The order of these pairs were randomized. All other subjects in the Lucid sample (i.e., Black subjects and Latino and Asian subjects who did not report an ethnic identification with one of the 10 largest Latino or Asian ethnic groups in the U.S.) evaluated four pairs involving pan-ethnic majority-minority districts.

Analyses of trade-off evaluations between these subjects' preferences for co-ethnic descriptive representation and their preferences for partisan representation are beyond the scope of this study.

B Summary Statistics

Table A2: Number of subjects by respondent pool and by racial self-identification

| Sample | Black | Latino | Asian | White | Total (Minorities only) | Total (All) |
|----------------------|-------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------------|----------------|
| MTurk (Jun-Jul 2017) | 250 | 182 | - | 383 | 432 | 815 |
| Lucid (Apr-May 2018) | 740 | 697 | 616 | - | 2053 | 2053 |
| Total | 990 | 879 | 616 | 383 | 2485 | 2868 |

Note: Black, Asian, and White respondents do not identify as Hispanic or Latino.

Table A3: Sample Characteristics: Black Subjects

| Covariate | Full Sample | | | | Lucid Subsample | | | | Population* | |
|--|-----------------|--------------------|-----------------|--------------------|-----------------|--------------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------|---------|
| | Unweighted N | Weighted (Prop) | Unweighted N | Weighted (Prop) | Unweighted N | Weighted (Prop) | Unweighted N | Weighted (Prop) | N | (Prop) |
| Age: 18-24 | 149 | (0.151) | 149.936 | (0.151) | 117 | (0.158) | 112.078 | (0.151) | 4629577 | (0.151) |
| Age: 25-44 | 443 | (0.447) | 368.718 | (0.372) | 272 | (0.368) | 275.620 | (0.372) | 11387105 | (0.372) |
| Age: 45-64 | 301 | (0.304) | 326.910 | (0.330) | 260 | (0.351) | 244.347 | (0.330) | 10096171 | (0.330) |
| Age: 65+ | 97 | (0.098) | 144.436 | (0.146) | 91 | (0.123) | 107.955 | (0.146) | 4461416 | (0.146) |
| Female | 637 | (0.643) | 526.950 | (0.532) | 471 | (0.636) | 393.870 | (0.532) | 16274422 | (0.532) |
| Household income: <\$25k | 300 | (0.303) | 359.494 | (0.363) | 300 | (0.405) | 318.198 | (0.430) | 4984074 | (0.341) |
| Household income: \$25k to \$49k | 214 | (0.216) | 242.119 | (0.245) | 214 | (0.289) | 217.216 | (0.294) | 3836675 | (0.262) |
| Household income: \$50k to \$74k | 93 | (0.094) | 91.234 | (0.092) | 93 | (0.126) | 85.773 | (0.116) | 2385598 | (0.163) |
| Household income: \$75k to \$99k | 55 | (0.056) | 50.213 | (0.051) | 55 | (0.074) | 50.960 | (0.069) | 1397224 | (0.095) |
| Household income: \$100k to \$124k | 33 | (0.045) | 28.675 | (0.029) | 33 | (0.045) | 29.311 | (0.040) | 828311 | (0.057) |
| Household income: \$125k and up | 45 | (0.045) | 40.437 | (0.041) | 45 | (0.061) | 38.543 | (0.052) | 1199868 | (0.082) |
| Highest education: Less than high school | 40 | (0.040) | 140.528 | (0.142) | 40 | (0.054) | 109.157 | (0.148) | 3827071 | (0.148) |
| Highest education: High school degree | 243 | (0.245) | 300.779 | (0.304) | 220 | (0.297) | 230.691 | (0.312) | 8113148 | (0.313) |
| Highest education: Some college | 343 | (0.346) | 319.953 | (0.323) | 274 | (0.370) | 244.263 | (0.330) | 8590059 | (0.331) |
| Highest education: 4-year college degree | 243 | (0.245) | 125.632 | (0.127) | 149 | (0.201) | 96.852 | (0.131) | 3395685 | (0.131) |
| Highest education: Post-graduate degree | 83 | (0.084) | 71.811 | (0.073) | 53 | (0.072) | 55.710 | (0.075) | 2018729 | (0.078) |
| Highest education: Unknown | 38 | (0.038) | 31.297 | (0.032) | 4 | (0.005) | 3.326 | (0.004) | 0 | (0.000) |
| Region: Midwest | | | | | 156 | (0.211) | 156.798 | (0.212) | 5160520 | (0.169) |
| Region: Northeast | | | | | 131 | (0.177) | 128.859 | (0.174) | 5088666 | (0.167) |
| Region: South | | | | | 384 | (0.519) | 381.549 | (0.516) | 17600848 | (0.576) |
| Region: West | | | | | 69 | (0.093) | 72.795 | (0.098) | 2711123 | (0.089) |
| Party ID: Strong Democrat | 444 | (0.448) | 460.880 | (0.466) | 368 | (0.497) | 367.516 | (0.497) | 4202 | (0.530) |
| Party ID: Democrat | 198 | (0.200) | 185.146 | (0.187) | 130 | (0.176) | 124.097 | (0.168) | 1523 | (0.192) |
| Party ID: Lean Democrat | 51 | (0.052) | 49.217 | (0.050) | 51 | (0.069) | 46.738 | (0.063) | 683 | (0.086) |
| Party ID: Independent | 198 | (0.200) | 201.669 | (0.204) | 119 | (0.161) | 130.444 | (0.176) | 1078 | (0.136) |
| Party ID: Lean Republican | 39 | (0.039) | 34.771 | (0.035) | 25 | (0.034) | 23.930 | (0.032) | 141 | (0.018) |
| Party ID: Republican | 13 | (0.013) | 8.791 | (0.009) | 9 | (0.012) | 6.725 | (0.009) | 139 | (0.018) |
| Party ID: Strong Republican | 47 | (0.047) | 49.527 | (0.050) | 38 | (0.051) | 40.551 | (0.055) | 147 | (0.019) |

* = Population data are from the 2016 American Community Survey 1-year estimates for all covariates except partisanship, which are estimates from the 2016 CCES Common Content.

Weights are racial group and sample specific raking weights calculated to match sample marginals for age, sex, education, and income to population marginals from the 2016 ACS 1-year estimates

Geographic data needed to code census region were not collected for the MTurk subsample and is only available for the Lucid subsample

Table A4: Sample Characteristics: Latino Subjects

| Covariate | Full Sample | | | | Lucid Subsample | | | | Population* | |
|--|-----------------|--------------------|-----------------|--------------------|-----------------|--------------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------|---------|
| | Unweighted N | Weighted (Prop) | Unweighted N | Weighted (Prop) | Unweighted N | Weighted (Prop) | Unweighted N | Weighted (Prop) | N | (Prop) |
| Age: 18-24 | 177 | (0.201) | 155.038 | (0.176) | 148 | (0.212) | 121.311 | (0.174) | 6746927 | (0.173) |
| Age: 25-44 | 442 | (0.503) | 395.831 | (0.450) | 308 | (0.442) | 309.352 | (0.444) | 17251562 | (0.441) |
| Age: 45-64 | 207 | (0.235) | 249.406 | (0.284) | 189 | (0.271) | 199.375 | (0.286) | 11142328 | (0.285) |
| Age: 65+ | 53 | (0.060) | 78.725 | (0.090) | 52 | (0.075) | 66.962 | (0.096) | 3937852 | (0.101) |
| Female | 497 | (0.565) | 447.130 | (0.509) | 414 | (0.594) | 349.540 | (0.501) | 19469861 | (0.498) |
| Household income: <\$25k | 240 | (0.273) | 336.457 | (0.383) | 240 | (0.344) | 296.499 | (0.425) | 3893052 | (0.254) |
| Household income: \$25k to \$49k | 190 | (0.216) | 194.275 | (0.221) | 190 | (0.273) | 177.909 | (0.255) | 4193062 | (0.273) |
| Household income: \$50k to \$74k | 127 | (0.144) | 127.744 | (0.145) | 127 | (0.182) | 115.538 | (0.166) | 2902621 | (0.189) |
| Household income: \$75k to \$99k | 63 | (0.072) | 56.074 | (0.064) | 63 | (0.090) | 53.915 | (0.077) | 1747733 | (0.114) |
| Household income: \$100k to \$124k | 29 | (0.042) | 17.376 | (0.020) | 29 | (0.042) | 18.772 | (0.027) | 1055323 | (0.069) |
| Household income: \$125k and up | 48 | (0.055) | 33.029 | (0.038) | 48 | (0.069) | 34.367 | (0.049) | 1562939 | (0.102) |
| Highest education: Less than high school | 52 | (0.059) | 268.695 | (0.306) | 50 | (0.072) | 221.209 | (0.317) | 10632841 | (0.329) |
| Highest education: High school degree | 222 | (0.253) | 242.970 | (0.276) | 210 | (0.301) | 194.084 | (0.278) | 8986570 | (0.278) |
| Highest education: Some college | 279 | (0.317) | 210.643 | (0.240) | 231 | (0.331) | 166.720 | (0.239) | 7750580 | (0.240) |
| Highest education: 4-year college degree | 232 | (0.264) | 93.217 | (0.106) | 155 | (0.222) | 73.475 | (0.105) | 3385826 | (0.105) |
| Highest education: Post-graduate degree | 70 | (0.080) | 43.062 | (0.049) | 46 | (0.066) | 34.227 | (0.049) | 1575925 | (0.049) |
| Highest education: Unknown | 24 | (0.027) | 20.412 | (0.023) | 5 | (0.007) | 7.284 | (0.010) | 0 | (0.000) |
| Region: Midwest | | | | | 104 | (0.149) | 96.489 | (0.138) | 1620688 | (0.116) |
| Region: Northeast | | | | | 119 | (0.171) | 113.002 | (0.162) | 2902111 | (0.207) |
| Region: South | | | | | 245 | (0.352) | 243.202 | (0.349) | 3173201 | (0.226) |
| Region: West | | | | | 229 | (0.329) | 244.307 | (0.351) | 6320935 | (0.451) |
| Party ID: Strong Democrat | 199 | (0.226) | 186.238 | (0.212) | 158 | (0.227) | 148.111 | (0.212) | 1444 | (0.276) |
| Party ID: Democrat | 171 | (0.195) | 133.652 | (0.152) | 123 | (0.176) | 97.305 | (0.140) | 1093 | (0.209) |
| Party ID: Lean Democrat | 66 | (0.075) | 62.631 | (0.071) | 66 | (0.095) | 57.779 | (0.083) | 504 | (0.096) |
| Party ID: Independent | 218 | (0.248) | 252.244 | (0.287) | 169 | (0.242) | 192.696 | (0.276) | 1078 | (0.206) |
| Party ID: Lean Republican | 44 | (0.050) | 34.194 | (0.039) | 31 | (0.044) | 23.557 | (0.034) | 273 | (0.052) |
| Party ID: Republican | 75 | (0.085) | 85.760 | (0.098) | 53 | (0.076) | 66.497 | (0.095) | 412 | (0.079) |
| Party ID: Strong Republican | 106 | (0.121) | 124.281 | (0.141) | 97 | (0.139) | 111.055 | (0.159) | 428 | (0.082) |

* = Population data are from the 2016 American Community Survey 1-year estimates for all covariates except partisanship, which are estimates from the 2016 CCES Common Content.

Weights are racial group and sample specific raking weights calculated to match sample marginals for age, sex, education, and income to population marginals from the 2016 ACS 1-year estimates

Geographic data needed to code census region were not collected for the MTurk subsample and is only available for the Lucid subsample

Table A5: Sample Characteristics: Asian American Subjects

| Covariate | Full Sample (Lucid only) | | | | Population* | |
|--|--------------------------|---------|---------------|---------|-------------|---------|
| | Unweighted N | (Prop) | Weighted N | (Prop) | N | (Prop) |
| Age: 18-24 | 87 | (0.141) | 75.697 | (0.123) | 1694450 | (0.121) |
| Age: 25-44 | 286 | (0.464) | 259.405 | (0.421) | 5838346 | (0.416) |
| Age: 45-64 | 176 | (0.286) | 190.711 | (0.310) | 4392383 | (0.313) |
| Age: 65+ | 67 | (0.109) | 90.187 | (0.146) | 2103393 | (0.150) |
| Female | 344 | (0.558) | 328.900 | (0.534) | 7503642 | (0.535) |
| Household income: <\$25k | 149 | (0.242) | 163.076 | (0.265) | 930072 | (0.169) |
| Household income: \$25k to \$49k | 135 | (0.219) | 116.680 | (0.189) | 847361 | (0.154) |
| Household income: \$50k to \$74k | 114 | (0.185) | 125.884 | (0.204) | 809823 | (0.147) |
| Household income: \$75k to \$99k | 90 | (0.146) | 84.922 | (0.138) | 683511 | (0.124) |
| Household income: \$100k to \$124k | 57 | (0.093) | 53.617 | (0.087) | 581256 | (0.105) |
| Household income: \$125k and up | 71 | (0.115) | 71.821 | (0.117) | 1663009 | (0.302) |
| Highest education: Less than high school | 12 | (0.019) | 74.903 | (0.122) | 1652736 | (0.134) |
| Highest education: High school degree | 99 | (0.161) | 93.249 | (0.151) | 1842042 | (0.149) |
| Highest education: Some college | 144 | (0.234) | 115.729 | (0.188) | 2280769 | (0.185) |
| Highest education: 4-year college degree | 249 | (0.404) | 188.100 | (0.305) | 3719644 | (0.302) |
| Highest education: Post-graduate degree | 111 | (0.180) | 143.188 | (0.232) | 2838931 | (0.230) |
| Highest education: Unknown | 1 | (0.002) | 0.831 | (0.001) | 0 | (0.000) |
| Region: Midwest | 72 | (0.117) | 70.663 | (0.115) | 1620688 | (0.116) |
| Region: Northeast | 127 | (0.206) | 119.384 | (0.194) | 2902111 | (0.207) |
| Region: South | 169 | (0.274) | 190.114 | (0.309) | 3173201 | (0.226) |
| Region: West | 248 | (0.403) | 235.839 | (0.383) | 6320935 | (0.451) |
| Party ID: Strong Democrat | 103 | (0.167) | 110.922 | (0.180) | 425 | (0.187) |
| Party ID: Democrat | 110 | (0.179) | 105.417 | (0.171) | 497 | (0.218) |
| Party ID: Lean Democrat | 64 | (0.104) | 60.698 | (0.099) | 284 | (0.125) |
| Party ID: Independent | 149 | (0.242) | 153.362 | (0.249) | 573 | (0.252) |
| Party ID: Lean Republican | 34 | (0.055) | 33.607 | (0.055) | 121 | (0.053) |
| Party ID: Republican | 75 | (0.122) | 78.403 | (0.127) | 229 | (0.101) |
| Party ID: Strong Republican | 81 | (0.131) | 73.591 | (0.119) | 148 | (0.065) |

* = Population data are from the 2016 American Community Survey 1-year estimates for all covariates except partisanship, which are estimates from the 2016 CCES Common Content

Weights are racial group and sample specific raking weights calculated to match sample marginals for age, sex, education, and income to population marginals from the 2016 ACS 1-year estimates

Table A6: Distribution of baseline representational preferences, by subject's racial identification

| Race | Unweighted | | | | | | | | Weighted | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------|----------|------------|----------|---------|----------|-------------------|-----------------|------------|--------|------------|--------|----------|--------|----------|--------|
| | Prefers Both | | Elect More | | Elect More | | Prefers | | Prefers Both | | Elect More | | Elect More | | Prefers | | | |
| | (Faces Trade-off) | Minorities Only | | | Dems Only | | Neither | | (Faces Trade-off) | Minorities Only | | | Dems Only | | Neither | | | |
| | N | (Pct) | N | (Pct) | N | (Pct) | N | (Pct) | Total | N | (Pct) | N | (Pct) | N | (Pct) | N | (Pct) | Total |
| A. FULL SAMPLE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Asian American | 208 | (33.77%) | 178 | (28.90%) | 63 | (10.23%) | 167 | (27.11%) | 616 | 214.31 | (34.79%) | 168.12 | (27.29%) | 58.91 | (9.56%) | 174.66 | (28.35%) | 616.00 |
| Black | 530 | (53.54%) | 224 | (22.63%) | 103 | (10.40%) | 133 | (13.43%) | 990 | 510.35 | (51.55%) | 221.81 | (22.40%) | 106.14 | (10.72%) | 151.70 | (15.32%) | 990.00 |
| Latino | 328 | (37.32%) | 229 | (26.05%) | 97 | (11.04%) | 225 | (25.60%) | 879 | 282.47 | (32.14%) | 212.86 | (24.22%) | 100.48 | (11.43%) | 283.19 | (32.22%) | 879.00 |
| White | 152 | (39.69%) | 98 | (25.59%) | 43 | (11.23%) | 90 | (23.50%) | 383 | 139.36 | (36.39%) | 87.05 | (22.73%) | 43.24 | (11.29%) | 113.35 | (29.60%) | 383.00 |
| B. LUCID SUBSAMPLE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Asian American | 208 | (33.77%) | 178 | (28.90%) | 63 | (10.23%) | 167 | (27.11%) | 616 | 214.31 | (34.79%) | 168.12 | (27.29%) | 58.91 | (9.56%) | 174.66 | (28.35%) | 616.00 |
| Black | 375 | (50.68%) | 156 | (21.08%) | 93 | (12.57%) | 116 | (15.68%) | 740 | 366.22 | (49.49%) | 159.10 | (21.50%) | 90.25 | (12.20%) | 124.44 | (16.82%) | 740.00 |
| Latino | 241 | (34.58%) | 170 | (24.39%) | 87 | (12.48%) | 199 | (28.55%) | 697 | 213.70 | (30.66%) | 157.90 | (22.65%) | 81.66 | (11.72%) | 243.73 | (34.97%) | 697.00 |

Cells contain frequencies with row percents in parentheses.

Table A7: Distribution of baseline representational preferences, by subject's partisan identification

| Party | Unweighted | | | | | | | | Weighted | | | | | | | | | |
|--|-------------------|-----------------|------------|----------|------------|----------|---------|----------|-------------------|-----------------|------------|--------|------------|--------|----------|--------|----------|---------|
| | Prefers Both | | Elect More | | Elect More | | Prefers | | Prefers Both | | Elect More | | Elect More | | Prefers | | | |
| | (Faces Trade-off) | Minorities Only | | | Dems Only | | Neither | | (Faces Trade-off) | Minorities Only | | | Dems Only | | Neither | | | |
| | N | (Pct) | N | (Pct) | N | (Pct) | N | (Pct) | Total | N | (Pct) | N | (Pct) | N | (Pct) | N | (Pct) | Total |
| A. FULL SAMPLE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 991 | (63.57%) | 214 | (13.73%) | 211 | (13.53%) | 143 | (9.17%) | 1559 | 945.18 | (63.16%) | 186.93 | (12.49%) | 206.94 | (13.83%) | 157.32 | (10.51%) | 1496.37 |
| Independent | 128 | (19.39%) | 253 | (38.33%) | 47 | (7.12%) | 232 | (35.15%) | 660 | 110.12 | (15.69%) | 254.75 | (36.29%) | 46.91 | (6.68%) | 290.29 | (41.35%) | 702.08 |
| Republican | 99 | (15.25%) | 262 | (40.37%) | 48 | (7.40%) | 240 | (36.98%) | 649 | 91.20 | (13.62%) | 248.15 | (37.06%) | 54.91 | (8.20%) | 275.29 | (41.12%) | 669.55 |
| B. BLACKS, LATINOS, AND ASIAN AM. ONLY (MTURK AND LUCID) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 881 | (62.66%) | 202 | (14.37%) | 185 | (13.16%) | 138 | (9.82%) | 1406 | 841.42 | (62.11%) | 178.64 | (13.19%) | 184.49 | (13.62%) | 150.25 | (11.09%) | 1354.80 |
| Independent | 96 | (16.99%) | 216 | (38.23%) | 39 | (6.90%) | 214 | (37.88%) | 565 | 82.52 | (13.59%) | 215.21 | (35.44%) | 39.44 | (6.50%) | 270.10 | (44.48%) | 607.28 |
| Republican | 89 | (17.32%) | 213 | (41.44%) | 39 | (7.59%) | 173 | (33.66%) | 514 | 83.19 | (15.91%) | 208.95 | (39.96%) | 41.59 | (7.95%) | 189.20 | (36.18%) | 522.92 |
| B. LUCID SUBSAMPLE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 689 | (58.74%) | 178 | (15.17%) | 172 | (14.66%) | 134 | (11.42%) | 1173 | 664.88 | (59.44%) | 157.45 | (14.08%) | 160.48 | (14.35%) | 135.77 | (12.14%) | 1118.58 |
| Independent | 50 | (11.44%) | 157 | (35.93%) | 34 | (7.78%) | 196 | (44.85%) | 437 | 50.76 | (10.65%) | 156.11 | (32.76%) | 30.24 | (6.35%) | 239.40 | (50.24%) | 476.50 |
| Republican | 85 | (19.19%) | 169 | (38.15%) | 37 | (8.35%) | 152 | (34.31%) | 443 | 78.60 | (17.16%) | 171.57 | (37.47%) | 40.09 | (8.75%) | 167.66 | (36.61%) | 457.92 |

Cells contain frequencies with row percents in parentheses.

Table A8: Distribution of baseline representational preferences, by subject's racial and partisan identification

| Race | Party | Unweighted | | | | | | | | Weighted | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|-------------|-------------------|----------|-----------------|----------|------------|----------|---------|----------|-------------------|--------|-----------------|-------|------------|-------|----------|--------|----------|--------|
| | | Prefers Both | | Elect More | | Elect More | | Prefers | | Prefers Both | | Elect More | | Elect More | | Prefers | | | |
| | | (Faces Trade-off) | | Minorities Only | | Dems Only | | Neither | | (Faces Trade-off) | | Minorities Only | | Dems Only | | Neither | | | |
| | | N | (Pct) | N | (Pct) | N | (Pct) | N | (Pct) | Total | N | (Pct) | N | (Pct) | N | (Pct) | N | (Pct) | Total |
| A. FULL SAMPLE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Asian American | Democrat | 155 | (55.96%) | 44 | (15.88%) | 40 | (14.44%) | 38 | (13.72%) | 277 | 166.83 | (60.22%) | 43.17 | (15.58%) | 35.29 | (12.74%) | 31.74 | (11.46%) | 277.04 |
| Asian American | Independent | 18 | (12.08%) | 50 | (33.56%) | 11 | (7.38%) | 70 | (46.98%) | 149 | 17.10 | (11.15%) | 46.51 | (30.33%) | 11.65 | (7.59%) | 78.11 | (50.93%) | 153.36 |
| Asian American | Republican | 35 | (18.42%) | 84 | (44.21%) | 12 | (6.32%) | 59 | (31.05%) | 190 | 30.38 | (16.37%) | 78.44 | (42.26%) | 11.97 | (6.45%) | 64.81 | (34.92%) | 185.60 |
| Black | Democrat | 464 | (66.96%) | 90 | (12.99%) | 86 | (12.41%) | 53 | (7.65%) | 693 | 457.49 | (65.80%) | 83.46 | (12.00%) | 92.47 | (13.30%) | 61.82 | (8.89%) | 695.24 |
| Black | Independent | 45 | (22.73%) | 88 | (44.44%) | 11 | (5.56%) | 54 | (27.27%) | 198 | 34.25 | (16.99%) | 90.66 | (44.95%) | 9.10 | (4.51%) | 67.66 | (33.55%) | 201.67 |
| Black | Republican | 21 | (21.21%) | 46 | (46.46%) | 6 | (6.06%) | 26 | (26.26%) | 99 | 18.61 | (19.99%) | 47.69 | (51.23%) | 4.57 | (4.90%) | 22.23 | (23.88%) | 93.09 |
| Latino | Democrat | 262 | (60.09%) | 68 | (15.60%) | 59 | (13.53%) | 47 | (10.78%) | 436 | 217.10 | (56.76%) | 52.01 | (13.60%) | 56.73 | (14.83%) | 56.68 | (14.82%) | 382.52 |
| Latino | Independent | 33 | (15.14%) | 78 | (35.78%) | 17 | (7.80%) | 90 | (41.28%) | 218 | 31.17 | (12.36%) | 78.04 | (30.94%) | 18.70 | (7.41%) | 124.34 | (49.29%) | 252.24 |
| Latino | Republican | 33 | (14.67%) | 83 | (36.89%) | 21 | (9.33%) | 88 | (39.11%) | 225 | 34.20 | (14.00%) | 82.82 | (33.91%) | 25.05 | (10.26%) | 102.17 | (41.83%) | 244.24 |
| White | Democrat | 110 | (71.90%) | 12 | (7.84%) | 26 | (16.99%) | 5 | (3.27%) | 153 | 103.75 | (73.29%) | 8.29 | (5.86%) | 22.45 | (15.86%) | 7.07 | (5.00%) | 141.57 |
| White | Independent | 32 | (33.68%) | 37 | (38.95%) | 8 | (8.42%) | 18 | (18.95%) | 95 | 27.60 | (29.12%) | 39.55 | (41.72%) | 7.47 | (7.88%) | 20.18 | (21.29%) | 94.80 |
| White | Republican | 10 | (7.41%) | 49 | (36.30%) | 9 | (6.67%) | 67 | (49.63%) | 135 | 8.01 | (5.46%) | 39.21 | (26.74%) | 13.32 | (9.08%) | 86.09 | (58.72%) | 146.63 |
| B. LUCID SUBSAMPLE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Asian American | Democrat | 155 | (55.96%) | 44 | (15.88%) | 40 | (14.44%) | 38 | (13.72%) | 277 | 166.83 | (60.22%) | 43.17 | (15.58%) | 35.29 | (12.74%) | 31.74 | (11.46%) | 277.04 |
| Asian American | Independent | 18 | (12.08%) | 50 | (33.56%) | 11 | (7.38%) | 70 | (46.98%) | 149 | 17.10 | (11.15%) | 46.51 | (30.33%) | 11.65 | (7.59%) | 78.11 | (50.93%) | 153.36 |
| Asian American | Republican | 35 | (18.42%) | 84 | (44.21%) | 12 | (6.32%) | 59 | (31.05%) | 190 | 30.38 | (16.37%) | 78.44 | (42.26%) | 11.97 | (6.45%) | 64.81 | (34.92%) | 185.60 |
| Black | Democrat | 343 | (62.48%) | 75 | (13.66%) | 79 | (14.39%) | 52 | (9.47%) | 549 | 336.71 | (62.54%) | 69.89 | (12.98%) | 78.19 | (14.52%) | 53.57 | (9.95%) | 538.35 |
| Black | Independent | 13 | (10.92%) | 54 | (45.38%) | 9 | (7.56%) | 43 | (36.13%) | 119 | 11.49 | (8.81%) | 57.99 | (44.46%) | 7.57 | (5.80%) | 53.39 | (40.93%) | 130.44 |
| Black | Republican | 19 | (26.39%) | 27 | (37.50%) | 5 | (6.94%) | 21 | (29.17%) | 72 | 18.02 | (25.30%) | 31.22 | (43.85%) | 4.49 | (6.31%) | 17.47 | (24.54%) | 71.21 |
| Latino | Democrat | 191 | (55.04%) | 59 | (17.00%) | 53 | (15.27%) | 44 | (12.68%) | 347 | 161.34 | (53.21%) | 44.39 | (14.64%) | 47.01 | (15.50%) | 50.46 | (16.64%) | 303.20 |
| Latino | Independent | 19 | (11.24%) | 53 | (31.36%) | 14 | (8.28%) | 83 | (49.11%) | 169 | 22.17 | (11.50%) | 51.60 | (26.78%) | 11.03 | (5.72%) | 107.90 | (55.99%) | 192.70 |
| Latino | Republican | 31 | (17.13%) | 58 | (32.04%) | 20 | (11.05%) | 72 | (39.78%) | 181 | 30.20 | (15.02%) | 61.91 | (30.79%) | 23.62 | (11.75%) | 85.38 | (42.45%) | 201.11 |

Cells contain frequencies with row percents in parentheses.

C Additional Analyses

Table A9: Plan-specific support is unaffected by the interaction between the number and marginal cost of costly Democratic majority-minority districts among racial minorities facing trade-off

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|---------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Outcome: Favors proposed plan (0-100) | | | | | | | |
| | Pooled | Black | Latino | Asian Am. | Pooled | Black | Latino | Asian Am. |
| Number of costly Dem. majority-minority districts | -1.040 (0.901) | -0.480 (1.120) | -2.295 (1.854) | -1.226 (2.608) | -2.185*** (0.626) | -2.005** (0.792) | -2.204* (1.280) | -3.298** (1.499) |
| Marginal cost of each Dem. majority-minority district | 0.309 (0.708) | 0.698 (0.881) | -0.648 (1.377) | 0.437 (2.310) | | | | |
| Number of districts * Marginal cost | -0.446 (0.376) | -0.732 (0.462) | 0.182 (0.750) | -0.316 (1.272) | | | | |
| Marginal cost = 2 | | | | | -1.574 (1.282) | -1.503 (1.598) | -0.339 (2.729) | -4.856* (2.931) |
| Marginal cost = 3 | | | | | 0.183 (1.418) | 0.871 (1.755) | -1.246 (2.823) | -0.552 (4.359) |
| (Marginal cost = 2) * Number of districts | | | | | 0.965 (0.708) | 0.874 (0.896) | 0.390 (1.473) | 2.755 (1.695) |
| (Marginal cost = 3) * Number of districts | | | | | -0.564 (0.759) | -1.075 (0.936) | 0.406 (1.536) | 0.222 (2.359) |
| Constant | 57.258*** (1.653) | 55.705*** (2.096) | 58.280*** (3.214) | 62.647*** (4.682) | 58.499*** (1.089) | 57.483*** (1.371) | 57.478*** (2.201) | 66.128*** (2.566) |
| Subject Fixed Effects | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Number of observations (subject-rating) | 5,894 | 3,596 | 1,566 | 732 | 5,894 | 3,596 | 1,566 | 732 |
| Number of subjects | 950 | 494 | 290 | 166 | 950 | 494 | 290 | 166 |
| R-squared | 0.460 | 0.436 | 0.441 | 0.597 | 0.460 | 0.437 | 0.441 | 0.600 |

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses.