Problem 2 - Update

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Here is the updated solution with the calculations shown.

a)
$$BR_1(\theta_2), \theta_2 = (1/6, 1/3, 1/2) = \{U\}$$

$$u(U, \theta_2) = \frac{1}{6} \cdot 2 + \frac{1}{3} \cdot 0 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 4 = 2.\overline{3}$$

$$u(M, \theta_2) = \frac{1}{6} \cdot 3 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 0 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 1 = 1$$

$$u(D, \theta_2) = \frac{1}{6} \cdot 1 + \frac{1}{3} \cdot 3 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 2 = 2.1\overline{6}$$

 $u(U, \theta_2)$ is largest so U is best response

b)
$$BR_2(\theta_1), \theta_1 = (1/6, 1/3, 1/2) = \{R\}$$

$$u(\theta_1, L) = \frac{1}{6} \cdot 6 + \frac{1}{3} \cdot 6 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 4 = 2.5$$

$$u(\theta_1, C) = \frac{1}{6} \cdot 3 + \frac{1}{3} \cdot 0 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 5 = 3.1\overline{6}$$

$$u(\theta_1, R) = \frac{1}{6} \cdot 1 + \frac{1}{3} \cdot 5 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 3 = 3.8\overline{3}$$

 $u(\theta_1, R)$ is largest so R is best response

c)
$$BR_1(\theta_2), \theta_2 = (1/4, 1/8, 5/8) = \{U\}$$

$$u(U, \theta_2) = \frac{1}{4} \cdot 2 + \frac{1}{8} \cdot 0 + \frac{5}{8} \cdot 4 = 10.5$$

$$u(M, \theta_2) = \frac{1}{4} \cdot 3 + \frac{1}{8} \cdot 0 + \frac{5}{8} \cdot 1 = 3.25$$

$$u(D, \theta_2) = \frac{1}{4} \cdot 1 + \frac{1}{8} \cdot 3 + \frac{5}{8} \cdot 2 = 5.625$$

 $u(U, \theta_2)$ is largest so U is best response

d)
$$BR_1(\theta_2), \theta_2 = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) = \{U, D\}$$

$$u(U, \theta_2) = \frac{1}{3} \cdot 2 + \frac{1}{3} \cdot 0 + \frac{1}{3} \cdot 4 = 2$$

$$u(M, \theta_2) = \frac{1}{3} \cdot 3 + \frac{1}{3} \cdot 0 + \frac{1}{3} \cdot 1 = 1.\overline{3}$$

$$u(D, \theta_2) = \frac{1}{3} \cdot 1 + \frac{1}{3} \cdot 3 + \frac{1}{3} \cdot 2 = 2$$

 $u(U, \theta_2) \& u(D, \theta_2)$ are largest so U, D is best response

e)
$$BR_2(\theta_1), \theta_1 = (1/2, 1/2, 0) = \{L, R\}$$

$$u(\theta_1, L) = \frac{1}{2} \cdot 6 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 6 + 0 \cdot 4 = 4.5$$

$$u(\theta_1, C) = \frac{1}{2} \cdot 3 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 0 + 0 \cdot 5 = 2$$

$$u(\theta_1, R) = \frac{1}{2} \cdot 1 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 5 + 0 \cdot 3 = 4.5$$

 $u(\theta_1, L) \& u(\theta_1, R)$ are largest so L, R is best response

23/02/2021 problem2.js

```
1 /* eslint-disable default-case */
 2
 3 // the game in normal form, a n dimensional matrix of payoff vectors.
 4 // - it is indexed by the strategies to make the code clearer
 5 const game = {
     U: { L: [2, 6], C: [0, 4], R: [4, 4] },
 6
 7
     M: { L: [3, 3], C: [0, 0], R: [1, 5] },
     D: { L: [1, 1], C: [3, 5], R: [2, 3] },
 8
 9 }
10
11 // these are the parameters for each part of the question
12 // - player = the player for which to calculate best response
13 // - strategy = the probabilities in the other player's mixed strategy
14 const questionParts = {
15
     a: { player: 1, strategy: [ 1/6, 1/3, 1/2 ] },
16
     b: { player: 2, strategy: [ 1/6, 1/3, 1/2 ] },
17
     c: { player: 1, strategy: [ 1/4, 1/8, 5/2 ] },
     d: { player: 1, strategy: [ 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 ] },
18
19
     e: { player: 2, strategy: [ 1/2, 1/2, 0/1 ] },
20 }
21
22 // This function calculates the best response
23 function bestResponse({ game, strategy, player }) {
     // part of the code used to keep track of which strategies are best
24
25
     var brSet = []
26
     var maxPayoff = -99999
     function updateBR({ payoff, s }) {
27
28
       // add strategy to set of best responses if payoffs are equal:
29
       if (payoff === maxPayoff) brSet.push(s)
30
31
       // a new max payoff was found, the set of best responses is the current
   strategy:
32
       if (payoff > maxPayoff) {
                                                       Calculations
33
         maxPayoff = payoff;
34
         brSet = [s]
35
       }
                                                       Are Here
36
     }
37
38
     // This part of code calculates the payoffs
39
     switch (player) {
40
       case 1:
41
         // calculate player 1's payoff for each strategy s1 in S1
42
         const S1 = ['U', 'M', 'D']
43
         for (const s1 of S1) {
44
           const payoff =
45
             game[s1].L[0] * strategy[0] + // u1(s1,L) * probability s2 = L
             game[s1].C[0] * strategy[1] + // u1(s1,C) * probability s2 = C
46
             game[s1].R[0] * strategy[2] // u1(s1,R) * probability s2 = R
47
48
49
           console.log(`u(${s1}, theta_2) = ${payoff}`) // log the payoff
50
51
           // keep track of which responses 's' are best
52
           updateBR({ payoff, s: s1 })
53
         }
54
         break
55
56
       // calculate player 2's payoff for reach strategy s2 in S2
57
58
         const S2 = ['L', 'C', 'R']
         for (const s2 of S2) {
```

```
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                                           problem2.js
 60
            const payoff =
 61
              game.U[s2][1] * strategy[0] + // u2(U,s2) * probability s1 = U
              game.M[s2][1] * strategy[1] + // u2(M,s2) * probability s1 = M
 62
              game.D[s2][1] * strategy[2] // u2(D,s2) * probability s1 = D
 63
 64
 65
            console.log(`u(theta_1, ${s2}) = ${payoff}`) // log the payoff
 66
            updateBR({ payoff, s: s2 })
 67
 68
          }
 69
          break
 70
      }
 71
      return brSet
 72 }
 73
 74 // execute the code for each part of the problem
 75 for (const letter of Object.keys(questionParts)) {
      console.log(`${letter})`)
 76
      const br = bestResponse({ game, ...questionParts[letter] })
 77
 78
      console.log(`BR is {${br.join(',')}} \n`)
 79 }
 80
 81 /*
 82 * output:
 83
 84 a)
 86 u(M, theta_2) = 1
 87 \text{ u(D, theta_2)} = 2.166666666666667
 88 BR is {U}
 89
 90 b)
 91 u(theta_1, L) = 2.5
 92 u(theta_1, C) = 3.166666666666666
 93 u(theta_1, R) = 3.833333333333333
 94 BR is {R}
 95
 96 c)
 97 u(U, theta_2) = 10.5
 98 u(M, theta_2) = 3.25
 99 u(D, theta_2) = 5.625
100 BR is {U}
101
102 d)
103 u(U, theta_2) = 2
105 | u(D, theta_2) = 2
106 BR is {U,D}
107
108 e)
109 u(theta_1, L) = 4.5
110 | u(theta_1, C) = 2
111 u(theta_1, R) = 4.5
112 BR is {L,R}
113
     */
114
```

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