#### **Attacks**

#### **Attacks**

- Motivations
- Target categories
- Attacking each target category

#### **Motivations**

- Money
- 2. Stealing of information
- 3. Disruption of operations

Money is by far the most frequent motivation

### How to obtain money (I)

- MANY (creative) ways
  - Banking credentials stolen and used
  - Credentials stolen and sold
  - Long term cookies stolen and sold

  - Remote Access Trojans (remotely controllable malware) installed and sold / rented
- Victim not aware of what happened

## How to obtain money (II-a)

- Many (very creative) ways

  - Steal data and ask ransom for not making it public
  - ☐ Encrypt data and ask ransom for decrypting it (ransomware)

# How to obtain money (II-b)

- Steal data and ask ransom for not making it public
- Encrypt data and ask ransom for decrypting it (ransomware)
- Huge societal problem
  - Attack cost relatively low
  - Potential ROI (Return on Investment) huge
  - ⇒ Lot of potential attackers
  - Anonymous payments worldwide
  - Data is crucial to "every organization"
  - Worldwide connectivity
  - ⇒ Every organization is a potential target

## **Target Categories (I)**

- 1. Organizations
- 2. Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
- 3. Single individuals

- Organization
- ICS

- = "wherever there are servers and data"
- = "sensors and actuators"

#### **Organization**

Organizations
 ("wherever there are servers and data")

- Any kind of organization
  - Hospitals
  - Administrative part of manufacturing companies

#### Organization vs ICS

- Administration
- Logistics
- Payroll
- Sales / Purchasing
- Warehouse
- Email / Web

"Sensors" and "Actuators"

Organization

("IT part of an industry")

**ICS** 

## **Target Categories (II)**

- You can make **lot of money** with one Organization / lot of Single individuals
- Making money by attacking an ICS is much more difficult


- □ Attacks to Organizations / Single individuals
   ⇒very frequent
- Attacks to ICS
  - ⇒ rare

### **Keep in mind**

- Attacks are a professional activity
- Huge gains justify huge investments

- search "conti diaries part 2"
  - Tens of people hierarchically structured
  - Work around the clock
  - □ Teams update malware every 4 hours (update time of Windows Defender)

#### "Conti Tech Start-up"



#### Our next steps

- Attacks against organizations
  - Lateral movement
- ...against single individuals
- ...against ICS

## **Attacking an Organization**

#### **Attacking an Organization**

- Several phases, each of several steps
- From minutes to months
- Several models for describing attack phases
  - □ Kill chain

(first widely used)

- MITRE ATT&CK

("the" model today)

## MITRE ATT&CK (I)

- Currently **the** reference framework
- Built upon observations of many real attacks
- 14 phases (called "Tactics")
- Several ways for executing each phase ("Techniques")

#### **MITRE ATT&CK Matrix**



### MITRE ATT&CK (II)

- Periodically **updated** to reflect more recent/accurate knowledge
  - October 2022: v12
  - ☐ April 2023: v13
  - October 2023: v14
- Three variants
  - Enterprise (may be specialized for Windows, Linux, Cloud,...)
  - Mobile (may be specialized for Android / iOS)
  - ICS
- Reports describe campaigns in terms of MITRE ATT&CK

#### **Example**

# Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network, Deploy Crypto Miner, Credential Harvester

Last Revised: November 25, 2022 Alert Code: AA22-320A

#### MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

See table 1 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory, as well as corresponding detection and/or mitigation recommendations. For additional mitigations, see the Mitigations section.

### "Gain foothold" (I-a)

Initial Access

The adversary is **trying to get into your network**.

Techniques that use various entry vectors to gain their **initial foothold** within a network.

## "Gain foothold" (I-b)

Initial Access

- Drive-by Compromise User visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Vulnerability exploitation.
- **Exploit Public-Facing Application** Vulnerability exploitation in an Internet-facing computer or program (e.g., web site)
- Phishing. Malicious attachments or links in emails
- Valid Accounts. Abuse of compromised credentials

(+5 Techniques) MITRE ATT&CK

# "Gain foothold" (II)


- Initial Access
- Execution
- Persistence

**Execution** techniques that result in **adversary-controlled** code running within the organization (12 techniques)

**Persistence** techniques for **keeping access** to systems **across restarts**, **changed credentials**, and other interruptions that could cut off their access. (19 techniques)

#### Scenario so far





# Command & Control (C&C)

- Initial Access
- Execution
- Persistence
- C&C (Command & Control)


Techniques that adversaries may use to **communicate with systems under their control** within a victim network.

Adversaries commonly attempt to **mimic normal**, expected traffic to **avoid detection**.


**Location** of the adversary must be **obfuscated**.

(16 Techniques)


# Example (outline): DNS Tunneling (I)



# Example (outline): DNS Tunneling (II)



#### Scenario so far



#### "Look around"

- Initial Access
- Execution
- Persistence
- C&C (Command & Control)
- Discovery

Techniques to **gain knowledge** about the internal environment and decide how to act

- Networks, Hosts, Devices
- Applications
- Users, Groups, Access Rights (29 Techniques)

#### Example: nmap

- Nmap ("Network Mapper") is an open source tool for network exploration and security auditing.
- It was designed to rapidly scan large networks, although it works fine against single hosts.
- Nmap uses raw IP packets in novel ways to determine
  - what hosts are available on the network,
  - what services (application name and version) those hosts are offering,
  - what operating systems (and OS versions) they are running,
  - what type of packet filters/firewalls are in use,
  - and dozens of other characteristics.

Usually quite noisy...

#### "Walk around"


- Initial Access
- Execution
- Persistence
- C&C (Command & Control)
- Discovery
- Lateral movement

Techniques to **enter** and **control** remote systems

(9 Techniques)

We will discuss this phase later

#### **Lateral Movement**



https://bartoli.inginf.units.it

# **Privilege Escalation (I)**

- Initial Access
- Execution
- Persistence
- C&C (Command & Control)
- Discovery
- Lateral movement
- Privilege escalation

Techniques for **gaining higher-level permissions** on a system or network

(13 Techniques)

### **Privilege Escalation (II-a)**

#### Privilege Escalation

13 techniques

- Exploitation for privilege escalation
   Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges.
- Valid Accounts

Adversaries may obtain and abuse **credentials of existing accounts**. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

## **Privilege Escalation (II-b)**


### Privilege Escalation

13 techniques


- Domain policy modification
  - Adversaries may **modify the configuration** settings of a domain to escalate privileges in domain environments... Since domain configuration settings control many of the interactions within the Active Directory (AD) environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this abuse.
- \_\_\_\_\_

(+10 more techniques)

# Lateral Movement after Privilege Escalation (I)



# Lateral Movement after Privilege Escalation (II)



**Total Catastrophe** 


#### **Exfiltrate**

- Initial Access
- Execution
- Persistence
- C&C (Command & Control)
- Discovery
- Lateral movement
- Privilege escalation
- Exfiltration


- Steal data
- Transferring it over their C&C channel or an alternate channel
- Compression, Encryption, Size limits

(9 Techniques)

### Example: HTran (I)




### Example: HTran (II-a)



"By using HTran in this way, the threat actor... several months without being detected."

### Example: HTran (II-b)




"By using HTran in this way, the threat actor... several months without being detected."

## One sequence does not fit all

- □ ...
  □ Exfiltration Impact
- Impact Manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your systems and data (≈secrecy, availability, integrity)
- Examples: ransomware, web defacement, disk wiping, ...

(13 techniques)

#### REMIND



#### **Before Initial Access**

- Resource Development Establish resources for supporting future operations
- Create, purchase, steal resources (software, infrastructure, accounts, capabilities) (7 techniques)

- Initial Access
- Execution
- Persistence
- C&C
- Discovery
- Lateral movement
- Exfiltration

#### Even before...

- Reconnaissance Gather information for planning future operations
   (10 techniques)
- Resource Development Establish resources for supporting future operations
- Create, purchase, steal resources (software, infrastructure, accounts, capabilities) (7 techniques)

- Initial Access
- Execution
- Persistence
- C&C
- Discovery
- Lateral movement
- Exfiltration

## Defense: A Few Key Remarks

## Defense: A Few Key Remarks (I)

- Insisting on complete prevention of Initial Access is usually meaningless (perimeter just too large)
- Attacks never consist of one single step



- Defensive budget should be distributed acrossall attack phases
- A strong defense on a few techniques may suffice to disrupt the attack ("kill chain")

## Defense: A Few Key Remarks (II)

- Defensive budget should be distributed across
   all attack phases
- Defense must consist of:
  - Mitigation
    - "Prevent a technique from being successfully executed"make attacks more difficult
  - Detection
  - Remediation
    - Backups

## Defense: A Few Key Remarks (III)



- Our job is very difficult
  - Real complexity (not an ATT&CK artifact)
  - It is unlikely that we really understand all the techniques
- We need systematic methods for:
  - Understanding the scope of defensive mechanisms
  - Prioritizing techniques
  - Understanding the (potential) scope of data sources

## **Understanding MITRE ATT&CK**

#### Attack vs MITRE ATT&CK?

- 14 phases (called "Tactics")
- ☐ Several ways for executing each phase ("**Techniques**")
- Given a specific attack
- How is it mapped on Tactics and Techniques?




### Attack vs MITRE ATT&CK (I)

- 14 phases (called "Tactics")
- ☐ Several ways for executing each phase ("**Techniques**")
- NO:
  - Touching all the Tactics
- **YES**:
  - One or more Tactics may be absent (or not observed)

### Attack vs MITRE ATT&CK (II)

- 14 phases (called "Tactics")
- ☐ Several ways for executing each phase ("**Techniques**")
- NO:
  - ☐ Each Technique is used for a specific Tactic
- YES:
  - ■A Technique may be used for multiple Tactics

### **Example**



# Attack vs MITRE ATT&CK (III)


- 14 phases (called "Tactics")
- ☐ Several ways for executing each phase ("**Techniques**")
- NO:
  - Single flow of Tactics, left to right
- **YES**:
  - Multiple flows/loops of Tactics, back and forth

### Example (I)

- Discovery
- Lateral movement
- **U** ...

- Machine M1 entered and controlled
- Executing Discovery **again** usually provides further information...which may enable discovering M2
- Machine M2 entered and controlled
- Executing Discovery **again** usually provides further information...which may enable discovering M3
- And in M2 / M3 you might need to execute Persistence again

### Example (II)



- This Campaign has used these techniques
- Order **not** apparent from the mapping

# Attack vs MITRE ATT&CK (IV)

- **14** phases (called "**Tactics**")
- ☐ Several ways for executing each phase ("**Techniques**")
- NO:
  - Every attack step clearly corresponds to **one** specific Technique
- YES:
  - Every attack step may correspond to one or more Techniques (even in different Tactics)

#### **Example**



Campaign that used multiple techniques for Initial Access

# What MITRE ATT&CK is (and is NOT)

## What MITRE ATT&CK is NOT (I)

- ☐ For any given **technique**, we do **not** have any clue about:
  - Frequency / Probability of usage


- There are statistics
- But in cybersecurity we never know their coverage
  - How many incidents missing from the statistics?
- ...nor their bias
  - ☐ Is the sample really relevant for "our" environment?

## What MITRE ATT&CK is NOT (II)

- ☐ For any given **technique**, we do **not** have any clue about:
  - □ Frequency / Probability of usage
  - Whether it is absolutely essential for a given attacker
    - Stopping this technique stops the attack?

#### What MITRE ATT&CK is


Database (with "links and navigation") for associating tactics / techniques with:



Coverage obviously incomplete

### **Example: Mitigations**

- Which **techniques** are covered by a certain **mitigation**?
- Which mitigations exist for a certain technique?




# Example: Data Sources (≈"log")

Data sources represent the various subjects/topics of information that can be collected by sensors/logs. Data sources also include data components, which identify specific properties/values of a data source relevant to detecting a given ATT&CK technique or sub-technique.

ID ∨	Name ∨	Domain ▼	Description
DS0026	Active Directory	Enterprise	A database and set of services that allows administrators to manage permissions, access to network resources, and stored data objects (user, group, application, or devices)
DS0015	Application Log	Enterprise ICS	Events collected by third-party services such as mail servers, web applications, or other appliances (not by the native OS or platform)

- Which **techniques** could be detected by a certain **data source**?
- Which data source could enable detecting a certain technique?




### **Example: Software (I)**

#### CrackMapExec

CrackMapExec, or CME, is a post-exploitation tool developed in Python and designed for penetration testing against networks. CrackMapExec collects Active Directory information to conduct lateral movement through targeted networks. [1]

#### ≈20 techniques



### **Example: Software (II)**

Identify all machines in an IP address range cme smb IP-range

**Discovery** 

Attempt credentials on all machines

Lateral

```
cme smb IP-range -u username -p password
                      (-H password-hash)
```


**Extract password hashes** from all machines where local admin

**Credential** Access


```
cme smb IP-range
                  -u username -p password
                  -M mimikatz
```

### **Example: Navigator**

- Which techniques are covered by my mitigations?
- Which techniques are used by a certain threat group?
- Which techniques am I missing w.r.t. to a certain threat group?



# Ukraine – Power Grid 2016 Campaign



#### **WARNING**

- □ <u>ATT&CK® Navigator (mitre-attack.github.io)</u>
  (the software)
- □ Matrix Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®
   (the official database)
- Not aligned perfectly

### **Common Usage**

- Framework for:
  - Describing attack campaigns
  - Reasoning about attacks and attack campaigns


Very powerful (conceptual) tool

### My suggestions


For each topic covered in the course, always try to understand which Tactic (≈phase) it relates to

- Keep in mind that such a mapping may be complex and not intuitive
  - One topic may relate to multiple **Techniques** in different **Tactics**


# Example: "phishing"



# Example: "ntlm"




# Example: "vulnerability"



### Warning

- Keep in mind that such a mapping may be complex and not intuitive
  - One topic may relate to multiple **Techniques** in different **Tactics**
  - ☐ Relation topic-might **not** be encoded in ATT&CK
  - ...or it may follow criteria different from ours
    - Personal assessment often necessary

# **Example: Vulnerability**



#### Why not highlighted?

# Attacking an ICS

# **Target Categories: ICS**

- 1. Organizations
- 2. Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
- 3. Single individuals
- Administration
- Logistics
- Payroll
- ☐ Sales / Purchasing
- Warehouse
- ☐ Email / Web

Organization ("IT part of an industry")

#### OT (Operational Technology)

"Sensors" and "Actuators"

ICS

# **Air Gap: Theory**

- IT part connected to the Internet
- □ ICS part fully disconnected from the IT part and from the Internet


IT part of an industry



Delivery / Exploration / Lateral movement **not** possible

### **Air Gap: Practice**

- Support engineers occasionaly connect their notebooks on the ICS
- □ ICS permanently accessible from (selected locations of) IT part for remote control / monitoring
  - ...sometimes even from the Internet



Delivery / Exploration / Lateral movement become possible

#### **MITRE ATT&CK Matrix**

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Evasion	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Inhibit Response Function	Impair Process Control	Impact
12 techniques	9 techniques	6 techniques	2 techniques	6 techniques	5 techniques	7 techniques	11 techniques	3 techniques	14 techniques	5 techniques	12 techniques
Drive-by Compromise	Change Operating Mode	Hardcoded Credentials	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Change Operating Mode	Network Connection Enumeration	Default Credentials	Adversary-in-the- Middle	Commonly Used Port	Activate Firmware Update Mode	Brute Force I/O  Modify Parameter	Damage to Property
Exploit Public- Facing Application	Command-Line Interface	Modify Program	Hooking	Exploitation for Evasion	Network Sniffing	Exploitation of Remote Services	Automated Collection	Connection Prox	Alarm Suppression	- Module Firmware	Denial of Control
Exploitation of Remote Services	Execution through API	Module Firmware		Indicator Removal	Remote System	Hardcoded	Data from Information Repositories Data from Local System Detect Operating Mode	Standard Application Laye Protocol	Block Command Message	Spoof Reporting Message Unauthorized Command	Denial of View
		Project File Infection			Discovery	Credentials			Block Reporting		Loss of Availabili
External Remote Services	Graphical User Interface	System Firmware	re	Masquerading	Remote System Information Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer  Program Download			Message		Loss of Control
Internet Accessible	Modify Controller	Valid Accounts		Rootkit					Block Serial COM	Message	Loss of Productivity and Revenue
Device				Spoof Reporting Message	Wireless Sniffing				Change Credential	-	
Remote Services  Replication Through Removable Media	Tasking					Remote Services	I/O Image		Data Destruction		Loss of Protection
	Native API					Valid Accounts	Monitor Process		Denial of Service		Loss of Safety Loss of View
Rogue Master	Scripting						State		Device Restart/Shutdown		
Spearphishing Attachment	User Execution						Point & Tag Identification		Manipulate I/O Image		Manipulation of Control
Supply Chain							Program Upload		Modify Alarm Settings		Manipulation of View
Compromise							Screen Capture		Rootkit		Theft of
Transient Cyber Asset							Wireless Sniffing		Service Stop		Operational Information
Wireless									System Firmware		mormation

- In a nutshell:
  - "General" tactics more or less the same
  - ☐ Two more tactics: Inhibit Response, Impair Process Control
  - Much less techniques

# **Target Category: Organization**

- Many similarities between Organizations
- A given set of skills, tools and knowledge is highly effective on many different organizations
- Standard, highly effective procedures for obtaining money

# **Target Category:** ICS

- Very few similarities between ICSs
- □ A given set of skills, tools and knowledge is highly effective on very few ICSs
- You need to invent some highly specific way for obtaining money

- Attacks to ICS are much less frequent than attacks to Organizations:
  - Much more costly
  - Much more difficult to get money

# **Important Remark 1**

- Attacks to ICS are much less frequent than attacks to organizations
  - Much more costly
  - Much more difficult to get money

- Attacks on ICS may have strategic / intelligence motivations
  - ☐ High budget
  - Objective is Data stealing / Disruption (not Money)



SECURITY MAR 3, 2016 7:00 AM



# Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine's Power Grid

The hack on Ukraine's power grid was a first-of-its-kind attack that sets an ominous precedent for the security of power grids everywhere.

- ...about 30 substations offline...two other power distribution centers at the same time...leaving more than 230,000 residents in the dark.
- They also disabled backup power supplies...leaving operators themselves stumbling in the dark.
- Spear phishing then many months of extensive reconnaissance...
- Each company used a different distribution management system for its grid, and during the reconnaissance phase, the attackers studied each of them carefully.

#### Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014



- ☐ Targeted attack on a **steel mill** in Germany (pg. 31)
- There were frequent failures of individual control components or entire systems.
- ...a blast furnace was not regulated, it could be shut down and get in an undefined state...
- As a consequence there was massive damage to the facility.

#### Alert (AA22-083A)

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted State-Sponsored Russian Cyber Actors Targeting the Energy Sector



Original release date: March 24, 2022

Multiple intrusion campaigns conducted by state-sponsored Russian cyber actors from 2011 to 2018 and targeted U.S. and international Energy Sector

Description with MITRE ATT&CK framework

https://bartoli-alberto.blogspot.com/search?q=querra

# **Important Remark 2**

- Attacks to ICS are much less frequent than attacks to organizations
  - Much more costly
  - ☐ Much more difficult to get money

An attack on the "IT part" may disrupt industrial operations

# Cyberattack Forces a Shutdown of a Top U.S. Pipeline

The New Hork Times

The operator, Colonial Pipeline, said it had halted systems for its 5,500 miles of pipeline after being hit by a ransomware attack.

- One of the nation's largest pipelines, which carries refined gasoline and jet fuel from Texas up the East Coast to New York, was forced to shut down after being hit by ransomware...
- Colonial Pipeline...had shut down its 5,500 miles of pipeline, which it says carries 45 percent of the East Coast's fuel supplies, in an effort to contain the breach.

# Toyota halts operations at all Japan plants due to cyberattack NIKKEI Asia

February 28, 2022

□ Toyota Motor on Tuesday halted operations at all of its plants in Japan after a major supplier was hit by a cyberattack, disrupting the automaker's parts supply management system.

# NonPetya ransomware forced Maersk to reinstall 4000 servers, 45000 PCs

The shipping giant has suffered millions of dollars in damage due to the ransomware attack. January 26, 2018

- Maersk has revealed that a devastating ransomware attack which struck businesses across Europe in 2017 required close to a "complete infrastructure" overhaul and the reinstallation of thousands of machines.
- ☐ The firm, with offices in 130 countries and a workforce of close to 90,000,
- "Imagine a company where a ship with 10 to 20 thousand containers is entering a port every 15 minutes, and for 10 days, you have no IT," Hagemann commented. "It's almost impossible to even imagine."

### **Key remarks**

- Computer attacks no longer affect only "data"
- They may affect the "physical world"
- ☐ They may **disrupt** "**non IT** orgs"

# Attacking Single Individuals

# Target Categories: Single Individuals

- 1. Organizations
- 2. Industrial systems (ICS)
- 3. Single individuals

- Initial Access
- Execution
- Persistence
- C&C
- Discovery
- Lateral movement
- Impact

#### **Motivations**

- Money
- 2. Stealing of information
- 3. Disruption of operations
- Money is by far the most frequent motivation
- Look at "How to obtain money"

### **Key Remark**

- Human operators execute all the steps
- Automated tool executes all the steps

- Actions can be **tailored** to the **specific** environment

- Actions cannot be tailored to the **specific** environment
- Investment can be amortized over many targets
- **Automation is much more frequent** 
  - Can be made very effective (unlike attacks to organizations)
  - Only way for justifying **small gain** per successful target (attacks to organization have large gain per successful target)

Costly