



HIST

MITMUNC 2014

Hello Delegates!

My name is Ali Nikish and I am the head chair for the Historical Crisis. I'm a sophomore studying biological engineering. I have been involved in model UN since my freshman year of high school in Pittsford NY. This will be my third time as a chair. Outside of MUN, I am involved in Greek life as well as a creative writing initiative for middle schoolers. I also work as a campus tour guide, and know a lot of random MIT trivia. I'm looking forward to meeting all of you!

I am Aoife, the vice-chair for this committee. I am a freshman thinking of majoring in Chemistry or Materials Science. I have not had any prior MUN experience, so if this is your first time attending a MUN, then we're in the same boat! I am also involved in the Educational Studies Program club at MIT.

As a crisis committee, we will be running things a little bit differently – so be prepared for a fast paced debate and a few historical tweaks throughout the conference! We also wanted to remind you that position papers can be emailed to us at Hist2014@mitmunc.org by . Unfortunately, if we do not receive a paper by this time, we will be unable to consider you for an award. Position papers should be 1 page for each topic, and include information about your country's policy relating to each crisis. Use the questions posed in the background guides for research inspiration, but don't limit yourself to just these questions. We're looking forward to meeting all of you and enjoying a creative and stimulating debate!

If you have any questions, please send us an email at hist2014@mitmunc.org

Sincerely,

Ali and Aoife

Chilean Coup

Statement of the Problem

The 1973 Chilean coup was an important event of the Cold War. The American-backed coup would end the socialist presidency of Salvador Allende and usher in an era of 17 years of military rule under Augusto Pinochet. The military junta was marked by resistance groups, opposition disappearances, and other human rights violations. The coup and the junta that followed prove to be an interesting example of Cold War policy, with issues of economic and political tensions and espionage. This session will focus on the aftermath of the coup and how the international community should respond to foreign involvement, human rights violations, and the new government of Chile.

History of Problem

South and Central American Policy

The Cold War was an extremely influential period of world history, with much of the focus being on the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. standoff. Globally, each nation tried to influence developing countries to choose democracy or communism. Though there was no direct fighting, a number of proxy wars and covert interference in international affairs occurred. In Latin America, Cuba stands out as the prime example of Cold War tensions.

A violent rebellion put Fidel Castro in power, and the US began to interfere with the intention of containing communism. In 1960, Eisenhower pledged over 6 billion USD, in terms of today's currency, towards

aiding Latin American countries. However, funding was largely wasted due to the lack of development in the area, and guerilla movements in Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, and Bolivia tried to bring communism to the region [1]. In your research, consider events like the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Korean War, and how these events influenced international actions regarding the 1973 coup. Also, consider the positions of surrounding Latin American countries and policies like détente and containment.

Election of 1970

Allende would rise to power in 1970 after his third attempt at the presidency. The 1970 race between three major candidates resulted in no candidate winning a majority. This sent the decision to congress and it was decided that Allende -- who received a plurality in the election -- would become president. Allende was a member of the Socialist Party and ran in 1970 under the Popular Unity party, and as president he recognized the sovereignty of Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and North Vietnam [2].

The American government is known to have supported Allende's opponents financially, while the CIA was also involved in the election. The CIA's "Track 1" plan involved preventing Allende from rising to power and attempted to influence the congressional decision. When this did not work, the "Track 2" plan was implemented. The "Track 2" plan involved providing arms to an opposition group with the intention of staging a coup. The main

plan consisted of kidnapping Army Commander Rene Schneider to prevent Allende's control of the military and thus the government. Schneider was later killed by a different opposition group, and though the CIA had encouraged this group to stage a coup, but had withdrawn support prior to the group's assassination of Schneider [3].

Allende's Policy

As a socialist, Allende kept the democratic form of government intact in Chile, but restructured much of the economy. Copper mining and agriculture were two of the largest industries in Chile at the time, and Allende's government bought a large portion of these sectors. Large estates became cooperative farms, and foreign copper mines and manufacturing companies were "expropriated without compensation." This caused some serious economic conflict with other nations, particularly the US. Allende also increased wages and froze prices in order to equalize the labor force [4].

Attempted Coup

As a result of Allende's reforms, his opposition staged a coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Roberto Souper of the Fatherland of Liberty group. On June 29, 1973 the group surrounded the presidential palace with tanks. The coup was ultimately unsuccessful as Allende still maintained control over part of the military [5]. However, the coup was an important part in setting up Pinochet's successful coup, which will be the focus of our discussion.

Themes of Debate

Chilean Economy

Allende's reforms included a large restructuring of the Chilean economy. The mining and manufacturing sectors were bought out, forcing foreign countries out of Chile economically. However, foreign nations were not compensated or not compensated properly for their property [4]. For example, the U.S. was not compensated for the purchase of International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) and Kennecott Copper [2]. This led to economic isolation, and the line of credit between Chile and the U.S., as well as Western Europe, ran out. Allende increased wages and froze prices with the intention of creating more equal economic standing among citizens without driving up inflation rates. However, Allende also began printing money in order to lower the federal deficit incurred from purchasing the industrial sector, and inflation increased.

Increased inflation led to stagnant industry and decreased exports and investments. By 1972, widespread strikes, food shortages, and unrest over the economy contributed to wavering support for Allende from non-leftists. This economic hardship would be a large contributing factor in the eventual coup by General Pinochet [4]. In your research, be aware of the economic climate of your nation, as well as other nations.

Successful Coup

On September 11, 1973, a coup was staged on

the presidential palace. The coup was led by four military men, with General Augusto Pinochet as the head. The coup was supported by many Chileans, especially the middle and upper classes, due to the

economic turmoil. Many thought that if the coup were successful, Chile would transition and return to the economic status prior to Allende [6]. Pinochet succeeded, and during the coup Allende committed suicide. However, the suicide was unconfirmed until a forensic report in 2011, when Allende's body was exhumed and his death became a point of contention in the years to follow [1].

U.S. and Soviet Involvement

Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union would become involved in Chile around the time of the coup. The U.S. began interference long before even the election of 1970 and had supported non-socialist candidates for years in Latin America. The United States even aided in other coups, such as the 1954 coup in Guatemala orchestrated by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) [7].

The CIA's support of non-communist parties and candidates in Chile also dates back to the late 1950's. The CIA recognizes that it knew of the military's plan for a coup in 1973, though denies any financial assistance occurred. Covert agents were also placed in Chile before the coup to gather intelligence and maintain contacts with military officials and coup plotters. After Pinochet came to power, the U.S. aided propaganda programs that supported the military junta. The U.S. also supported the idea that Allende's constituents had a "Plan Z" to overthrow Pinochet, though it was never confirmed that the plan actually existed. Additionally, the U.S. was aware of "Operation Condor," a program started in 1975 between several South American nations to track and sometimes kill political opponents [3].

The U.S.S.R. was also involved in Chile during Allende's presidency. Soviet

involvement was largely economic, providing an estimated \$183 million to \$340 million. Chile received the second largest aid program from the Soviets in Latin America, after Cuba. The U.S.S.R. also sent engineers and specialists to help the Allende government set up socialist systems for the fishing and copper industries, among others. However, relations between Chile and Russia remained delicate, largely due to the policy of détente and fragile U.S.-Russia relations [8].

Human Rights Violations

After Pinochet came to power, he began restructuring the economy of Chile again. To do so, Pinochet committed large-scale human rights abuses. These abuses were recognized by the U.S., and several CIA members are known to have been in close contact with the violators [3].

One of Pinochet's main objectives after the coup was to restructure the agricultural sector by dismantling communes. Those who were supportive of Pinochet were given about 40 percent of the farmland, some was returned to its previous owners, and the rest was sold to industrial and logging companies. Allende's supporters suffered under Pinochet, and Manuel Riesco of the International Labor Review describes these human rights violations:

"[There were] massive expulsions of farmers from their land in the wake of the 1973 military coup. Once in power, the junta summarily evicted all peasants suspected of having backed the agrarian reform. Tens of thousands were thus expelled from their lands. Several hundreds were murdered within days of the coup; their names make up most of the list engraved on the memorial

honouring executed or "disappeared" detainees in Santiago's General Cemetery" [9].

Others subjected to abuse were those who had sought political asylum during Allende's regime, members of the Socialist Party or Popular Unity Party, and members of the Allende government. It is known that 3,216 people were killed or are still missing, 40,000 were tortured, and thousands more were exiled during Pinochet's junta [10].

Country Blocs

United States, France, United Kingdom

The U.S., France, and U.K. are part of the five permanent members of the Security Council. It is important to consider the Cold War policies of each country. Regarding the U.S., consider the policies of containment and the belief in the domino theory. Think about Nixon's policies as president, as well as Kissinger's role as National Security Advisor and his involvement in the CIA.

Russia (U.S.S.R.), China

As the other two permanent members of the Security Council, Russia and China would form a powerful bloc. Consider the communist governments of each nation, as well as relations with other nations. Russia provided aid to Chile after Allende's election, in addition to trading with Chile. Relations remained delicate, as Russia did not want to be seen as disturbing the balance with the US. China also provided aid and traded with Chile under Allende.⁸ Russia's policy of détente under Brezhnev and the Nixon visit

to China are also important to remember regarding potential resolutions.

Chile, Cuba

While Chile and Cuba came to communism under different means, the relationship between the two countries was very important. After Allende rose to power, Castro spent a month in Chile [1]. Chile and Cuba maintained friendly relations under Allende's rule. Similarly, Cubans provided Pinochet's opposition with arms after the coup.

Conclusions/Questions to Consider

The aftermath of Pinochet's coup will be the focus of debate. Remember that sessions will be run as the Security Council. As chairs, we want you to gain a new understanding of Cold War politics and policies, and how these policies influence international relations, the economy, and the ability of the international community to resolve issues. It is important to consider and research the following questions, especially as a crisis committee:

- What are your nation's policies regarding the Cold War?
- How does your nation view Latin American policies during the 1970's?
- What is your nation's economic situation? What is your country's stance on economic sanctions? Consider inflation, shortages, unemployment, and the main industrial and service sectors of your nation's economy at the time.
- How would your country consider the foreign involvement in Chile? In what ways does your nation view the intelligence agencies involved in the coup?

- How would your nation react to the human rights violations under Pinochet? How does your country view issues of asylum?
- What steps, if any, would your country be in favor of taking regarding human rights violations in Chile?
- What forces kept Pinochet and the military junta in power? How does your country view martial law? What steps regarding martial law, if any, would your nation consider in a resolution?
- Which groups opposed Pinochet? How would your nation react to such opposition groups?

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Racak Massacre

Statement of the Problem

The Račak Massacre is considered to be one of the pivotal points of the Kosovo War, which was a civil war rooted in racial tensions between the Serbs and the Albanians. The massacre sparked an international outcry and was what prompted the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to draft the Rambouillet Accords, and to later go on to deploy military force without approval from the U.N. Security Council (UNSC).

This MUN session will simulate the situation immediately after the Račak Massacre. The UNSC must address several pertinent issues with regards to how the international community should respond to the massacre as well as to the war in general.

History of Ethnic Tensions

Kosovo is a region in Serbia (then part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or FRY) with an ethnic Albanian majority. Throughout the 20th century, ethnic tensions have simmered between the Albanian and Serbian communities, which both claimed to be native to the region. These ethnic tensions were temporarily suppressed after World War II, under the communist regime of Tito.

In 1974, under the Constitution of Yugoslavia, the region of Kosovo was granted greater autonomy, being allowed to have its own administration, assembly and judiciary, and holding veto power in the Yugoslav parliament [1]. This further escalated tensions between the Albanian and Serbian communities in Kosovo, as the Serbians felt that they were no longer under Serbian

jurisdiction since the local administration was that of an ethnic Albanian majority.

The death of Tito in 1980 gave rise to increased Albanian nationalism in Kosovo: in March and April 1981, Kosovar Albanian students organized demonstrations demanding a separate Albanian republic within Yugoslavia [2]. Serbia reacted with a wish to reduce the power of Albanians in Kosovo, claiming that Serbians in the region were being marginalized and pushed out by the increasing Albanian population [3].

Milosevic's government and Peaceful Protests

It is against this backdrop of simmering ethnic tensions that Serbian Slobodan Milošević rose to power. In 1988, he started a campaign known as the anti-bureaucratic revolution which claimed that Serbs in Kosovo were being harassed by Albanians and suppressed by the Kosovo provincial government, and that it was necessary for there to be a thorough revision of the federal constitution and an enhancement of Serbian control over its provinces [4]. The Serbian constitution was then amended to greatly decrease the autonomy of Kosovo, such as the renaming of Kosovo as the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija [5], and the closing of the Kosovo Assembly [6]. Serbia also took over Albanian media in Kosovo, preventing their broadcasts [7]. Most of these measures were met with protests and strikes from the Albanian population of Kosovo.

Under the leadership of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) led by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, most Albanian Kosovars adopted a

non-violent resistance against Milošević's government. For instance, the LDK held an unofficial referendum in September 1991 which resulted in a decisive majority of Albanians voting for the independence of Kosovo from Serbia [8]. However, the non-violent nature of the resistance caused the Kosovo problem to be marginalized in international negotiations on Yugoslavia, such as in the Dayton Accords of November 1995. The Accord lifted most sanctions on Serbia so as to obtain Belgrade's support for the peace agreement in Bosnia, despite a lack of resolution of the Kosovo problem, and only left minor sanctions in place, to be lifted when Serbia 'improved its human rights record in Kosovo' [9]. This led to great disillusionment in the general Kosovar Albanian populace with Rugova's nonviolent methods.

The Kosovo Liberation Army

In February 1996, a previously unheard of organization, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), launched attacks on police stations and Yugoslav officials, seeking to achieve the separation of Kosovo from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The KLA claimed their motivation for attacking the security forces to be because the Yugoslav government had killed Albanian civilians as part of an ethnic cleansing campaign [10].

The KLA was believed to have been sponsored by the Kosovo Albanian diaspora [11], who had after the Dayton Accords been convinced that a violent resistance was the only way to attract international attention. The KLA was denounced by the Yugoslav government, as well as many other organizations such as the U.N. (in Resolution 1160), as a terrorist group. Over the next few

years, attacks by the KLA on the Yugoslav security forces intensified, centering on the Drenica valley. The Serbian police responded to the KLA attacks, leading to the beginnings of civil war.

Response by the Serbian military forces and the refugee situation

The armed attacks of the KLA eventually provoked a response from the Serbian police, who massacred over 50 members of the Jashari family in the village of Prekaz in March 1998 [12]. This resulted in global condemnation from the western capitals and marked the beginning of the civil war.

The open conflicts between the KLA and the Serbian police forces in 1998 resulted in the deaths of over 1500 Kosovar Albanians and displaced hundreds of thousands of refugees, with estimates running between 250,000 to 400,000. While some refugees fled to neighboring countries such as Albania, the FYROM and Montenegro, most of the refugees were internally displaced within Kosovo and trying to survive in the open. Some also fled to other parts of Yugoslavia such as Serbia and Montenegro, but these regions quickly decided to deny entry to additional refugees to prevent the KLA from using refugee camps as bases [13].

The great numbers of refugees posed a significant problem, as it had the potential to disturb the carefully balanced ethnic ratios in the neighboring states and lead to increased ethnic tension in these regions. In addition, many of the houses were destroyed in the conflict (between 15,000 and 40,000); this makes it difficult to restore refugees back to their original homes. [14]

NATO's Response

In June 1998, Rugova met with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, requesting UN/NATO intervention [15]. NATO responded with Operation Determined Falcon, an air show of 85 NATO warplanes flying over the Balkan region [16].

As the situation in Kosovo deteriorated and more offensive strikes were executed by both the Serbian military and the KLA, the NATO Defense Ministers gave NATO's Supreme Commander permission to issue an activation warning, and later on authorized the issuing of activation orders in October 1998, although they put the activation order on hold after UNSC issued Resolution 1199, the call for a ceasefire [17].

Racak Massacre

The village of Račak is an Albanian village that the KLA was highly active in and almost certainly had a base there [18]. In January 1999, the Serbian security forces retaliated against the KLA attack on four policemen with the horrific massacre of 45 Kosovar Albanians from the village [19], although the Yugoslavian government denied that a massacre took place [20]. The bodies were found by foreign journalists and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe monitors [21]. All the bodies were shot and a few were reportedly decapitated [22].

However, the forensic reports of the bodies in the massacre presented conflicting views. While the forensic facts remained largely consistent [23], the Belorussian and Yugoslav forensic teams reported that the bodies showed no sign of being executed and were possibly mutilated posthumously [24]. Additionally, the teams supported the theory

that those killed were KLA fighters whose bodies were changed into civilian clothing, while the E.U. forensics team reported that the bodies were that of unarmed civilians that were killed where they were found [25].

Generally, international communities tended to believe the conclusion of the E.U. forensics team, dismissing the forensics report by the Belorussian and Yugoslav teams as propaganda. The massacre was one of the major turning points of the civil war, factoring heavily into NATO's decision to employ military force against Yugoslavia later on [26].

The Rambouillet Accords

On January 30th, NATO issued a statement that the North Atlantic Council had agreed that "the NATO Secretary General may authorize air strikes against targets on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's territory" to achieve "compliance with the demands of the international community and a political settlement" [27].

On the same day, the Contact Group (U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Italy, Russia) issued a set of "non-negotiable principles" that effectively called for the restoration of Kosovo's autonomy to the level under the 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia and the introduction of democracy, supervised by international organizations. In addition, they also called for a peace conference to be held at Château de Rambouillet in February.

Possible Country Blocs and Positions

NATO Countries (Mainly led by the U.S.)

It is in the interest of NATO to stop all military offensives in the Kosovo region and to station an international military presence there for peacekeeping and to ensure the safe return of the refugees back to their homes [28]. Many NATO countries also believe that the only way this may be achieved is through military intervention [29]. This is because many of the NATO countries agreed with the U.S.'s stance that the FRY was carrying out "an ethnic cleansing and deportation campaign against non-combatant citizens" [30], and that military intervention would "avert what would otherwise be a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo" [31]. It should also be noted that the U.S. later cultivated diplomatic relationships with the KLA leaders, despite initially denouncing them as terrorists [32].

China

China supports the Serbian government's actions to preserve the FRY's territorial integrity [33] and opposes military action in the region [34]. This is because there are also regions within China such as Tibet or Xinjiang that are ethnically distinct from the majority Han population which are vying for independence, and PRC officials fear that military intervention in the Kosovo region may set a precedence for future intervention in China should these regions stage an uprising [35].

Russian Federation

Russia supports the Serbian government for similar reasons as China. In addition, Russia did not wish for the "emergence of a unipolar system dominated by the U.S." in the realm of international affairs, and

occasionally may exercise her veto power in various international committees to "frustrate any concept of a settlement which might appear to have been imposed on the FRY and which would have been enforced by the NATO" [36]. Russia wishes to retain a controlling role in the management of the crisis, since the Balkan region is geographically linked with Russia.

France and Italy/other E.U. Countries

France also wishes to preserve its role as a leading international power, instead of letting the U.S. dominate the resolution of the problem. In addition, the European powers, such as Italy, feel a general need to maintain a strong role in resolving the Kosovo crisis to demonstrate an ability to "sort out their own backyard" [37]. Hence, France would generally oppose any attempt by the U.S. to move the handling of the Kosovo situation away from the UNSC to NATO.

Serbia (Yugoslavia)

The main interest of the FRY would be to prevent the disintegration of the Republic and reject any foreign intervention. A national referendum held in early April of 1998 resulted in a decisive vote against external interference in the crisis by Serbian voters. Hence, Serbia does not wish appropriate greater autonomy to the province of Kosovo or allow the entry of NATO troops into the region. In addition, as the Yugoslav government views the actions of the KLA to be that of a terrorist organization, they view what the Yugoslav security forces to be doing to be a response against a

potential terrorist threat rather than “ethnic cleansing”.

Albania

The main governing party in Albania in the early 1990s, Sali Berisha's Democratic Party, had re-introduced an idea of a “Greater Albania”, in particular that of a union with Kosovo. This has been demonstrated in actions taken by the Albanian government, such as remodeling the concept of Albanian citizenship to include all ethnic Albanians regardless of country of residence [38]. However, around the time of the Kosovo crisis, Albania was experiencing significant internal turmoil with the collapse of the pyramid investment schemes, which was blamed largely on the government. As a result, the 1997 elections resulted in significant changes in the Albanian government. The incoming government is cautious to not be too deeply involved in the Kosovo crisis so as to not lose western support in rebuilding the Albanian society.[39] Hence, despite the visions of a “Greater Albania” reintroduced by the former government, Albania's stance on the Kosovo crisis will be more nuanced due to her internal problems.

Questions a Resolution Should Address

- What is your country's stance on external military intervention in the Kosovo War?
 - If military intervention is necessary, how long should peaceful negotiations be allowed to continue before military intervention is executed?
 - Are the attacks by the KLA acts of terror?
 - Is the Serbian government conducting genocide/ethnic cleansing on the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo?
 - What is your country's stance on an independent Kosovo?
 - What actions should be taken to alleviate the refugee situation?
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