



DISEC

MITMUNC 2014

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to MITMUNC VI! We will be your chairs in DISEC this year. Though we have quite a few years of Model UN experience between the two of us, this will be our first time at MITMUNC, and we hope you're as excited as we are.

The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC), the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international security regime. Dealing with the most important issues of international security, the decisions and resolutions you make here will have a powerful global impact and the potential to save countless lives. We have tried to choose topics that are both pressing and controversial, bringing up difficult questions of state sovereignty and global security.

In this committee, your solutions have great potential, but first they must stand the fire-test of debate. We are very excited and look forward to seeing you all in committee!

A little background about us:

Kaustav

I was born in the United States, but moved to India in 2004. I love acting and visiting foreign countries just to try their food. Along with the sciences, I'm also interested in philosophy and international relations. I love doing MUN because it allows people like us to try to solve the problems faced by millions around the world, and because it's a real kick when you push forward your ideas and defend them from attack in a good debate!

Jack

I'm a freshman here at MIT, where I play on the varsity men's lacrosse team. I hope to study mechanical engineering, possibly with a minor in economics or political science. I participated in Model UN in high school for three years as a delegate, and this will be my first time chairing a committee. Among my favorite MUN experiences in high school were a bilingual committee in the Organization of American States, and a joint-crisis committee on a historical simulation of the Spanish American War (America won, again).

Sincerely,

Kaustav Gopinathan

and

Jack Spira

Acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction by Non-State Actors

“Weapons of mass destruction remain among the gravest security threats facing the world community — including the risk that these destructive weapons may be acquired and used by non-state actors.”

- Secretary General of the United Nations
Ban-Ki Moon (April 2013)

Violent Non-State Actors and Terrorism

The U.N. is based on the Westphalian principle of the sovereign equality of all its member states. Each member state claims a “monopoly on the legitimate use of violence” within its territory. In the 21st century, the Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs) have increasingly challenged the monopoly of the states over the use of violence. However, this use of violence by the VSNA is illegitimate and illegal.

While all groups using illegal violence—including youth gangs, drug-trafficking organizations, and transnational criminal organizations—are classified as VSNAs, the VSNAs more likely to have an interest in the weapons of mass destruction include warlords, militias, insurgents (most of which are nationally based), and importantly, the terrorist organizations (many of which have a global transnational presence).

A 2004 UN report describes terrorism as any act “intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any

act.”[1] Since inflicting violence against civilian targets to generate terror is central to their strategy, there is a growing interest among certain terrorists groups in acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

It has been argued that VNSAs tend to gain strength in states that have low legitimacy, where stability is maintained by coercion rather than consent. Weak states that do not have the capacity to provide good governance with sound economic management are also likely to foster VNSAs. Non-inclusive states where certain groups are excluded from seeking political influence or receiving a fair share of resources and services because of their identity are also likely to foster VNSAs.

Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

While there is no [treaty](#) or customary [international law](#) that contains an authoritative definition, the term “weapon of mass destruction” usually refers to “chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties.”[2]

Experts point out that chemical and biological weapons are easier and less expensive to produce than nuclear ones, and the technology and know-how are widely available. But fortunately, it is very difficult to build effective, reliable delivery means for large-scale lethal doses of such agents. For many years analysts believed that technical complexities and expense reduced the likelihood that most terrorist groups

could construct a nuclear explosive device. A more likely threat from a terrorist organization, it was believed would be a radiological one involving the dispersal of radioactive substances to contaminate the air or water, or to render a particular area or facility unusable.

However, in early 2004, with the exposure of the illicit nuclear trading network of Pakistani Scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan came the shocking realization that a new era had already begun in the history of nuclear proliferation. The world has discovered that a secret network, originally created to supply Pakistan's nuclear program, had been converted by A.Q Khan into a multinational business that provided an entire range of nuclear technologies to any willing buyer in the international market[3]. The more prominent among the countries that A.Q Khan was found to have provided materials and information related to uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons development were Libya, North Korea, and Iran[4]. The extent to which this material had fallen into the hands of VNSAs was unclear.

While Pakistan denied knowledge about AQ Khan's illicit international network, it raised numerous questions about the security of nuclear materials and technology and the culpability of member states in monitoring such illicit activities engaged in by individuals or terrorist groups on their territories. The unearthing of A.Q. Khan's network was instrumental in the unanimous adoption of UNSC Resolution 1540 in 2004. R. 1540 establishes legally binding obligations on all UN Member States to have and enforce appropriate and effective measures against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (WMD), their delivery

systems, and related materials. It seeks to close gaps in nonproliferation treaties and conventions to help prevent terrorists and criminal organizations from obtaining the world's most dangerous weapons[5].

However, the Pakistan case points to the significant role domestic politics plays in the willingness of a UN member state to institute measures to prevent the VNSAs from acquiring WMDs. Since 2004 US has worked with Pakistan to improve its export controls and monitor its nuclear personnel. However Pakistan's main security challenges for its nuclear arsenal, i.e. keeping the integrity of the command structure, ensuring physical security, and preventing illicit proliferation from insiders continue to remain areas of concern.

Previous UN Actions

Ever since the inception of the UN after the Second World War, member states have been concerned about the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and there have been numerous resolutions and treaties regarding the same. However, only recently has attention been given specifically to the protection and security of WMDs from the hands of terrorist organizations and other violent NSAs.

Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Of the many policies and resolutions regarding the non-proliferation of WMDs (particularly nuclear weapons) since the creation of the IAEA in 1957, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that entered into force in 1970 is one of the first and most important. This treaty

outlined three important conceptual pillars that shaped many UN policies that followed: (1) Non-proliferation, (2) disarmament, and (3) the right to use peaceful nuclear technology[6]. Since 1970, 189 states have signed or acceded to the treaty. There are four non-signatories: India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Sudan, with North Korea withdrawing in 2003. Of these, India, Pakistan, and North Korea are confirmed nuclear powers, and Israel has been deliberately ambiguous about its nuclear capabilities. India justifies its status by arguing that the treaty was “flawed”, giving too much control to states that tested nuclear weapons before 1967[7]. Because of its otherwise clean non-proliferation record, India is frequently an exception in nuclear trade policies that are otherwise restricted to members of the NPT. North Korea and Pakistan on the other hand, do not enjoy such benefits, and the political and economic statuses of these countries coupled with their nuclear capabilities have placed them under heavy scrutiny by the international community regarding nuclear security. Following the NPT was the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), both based on the Geneva Protocol established in 1928. The BWC completely prohibited the development, production, and stockpiling of biological agents (in large quantities) and biological weapons of any sort[8]. This treaty has not been ratified by 26 UN members, including Israel, Syria, and Egypt, and has faced criticism for being too ambiguous about its conditions for stockpiling, as well as for the absence of any scheme to ensure compliance. The CWC came into force in 1997 under auspices of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical

Weapons (OPCW)[9], which won the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize. Similar to the BWC, the CWC prohibits the development and production of chemical weapons, and outlines the destruction of existing chemical weapons. As of September 2013, over 81% of the world’s declared stockpiles of chemical agents have been destroyed by the OPCW[10]. Almost all UN member-states have ratified the treaty, with the important exceptions being Israel, North Korea, and Egypt[11]. In September 2013, Syria declared its accession to the CWC under intense pressure from the international community after the UN confirmed the use of chemical weapons during the Syrian Civil War[12]. Other ancillary and complementary measures that have controlled the proliferation of WMDs include the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and ongoing negotiations with the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). The IAEA has also been an important policy maker, putting stringent restrictions on the trade of nuclear material and nuclear technologies. Many nuclear-capable countries also have their own requirements and policies regarding the distribution of their own nuclear technology and material. The relative abundance of nuclear weapons related policies following the Cold War (when compared to the treaties for chemical and biological weapons) is primarily due to the dual nature of nuclear technology as both a powerful weapon and a means to fuel growing energy-hungry economies (such as the BRICS). This double-edged sword must be taken into account when debating and drawing up resolutions in the committee.

Security of Weapons of Mass Destruction

While the afore mentioned policies date from the Geneva Protocol in 1928 and outline the control of nuclear weapons between governments, only relatively recently have specific measures been put into place to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of non-state actors.

With the reveal of the A. Q. Khan network in the early 2000s and the proliferation of nuclear secrets and technologies to Pakistan, North Korea, and possibly Libya, in 2004 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1540, which was the first resolution to specifically address the proliferation of WMDs from non-state actors. This resolution established binding obligations on all States to[13]:

- 1) Refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors – This includes attempts to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use weapons of mass destruction.
- 2) Adopt legislation establishing prohibitions – This forces States to implement national laws that prohibits any forms of assistance to these non-state actors, whether it is financial or scientific.
- 3) Establish domestic controls – This includes the creation of measures to account for, protect, and tabulate these technologies. This also involves the establishment of border controls to prevent trafficking and brokering.

Importantly, the council was aware that ‘no size fits all’ and did not establish a set of laws that were to be enforced universally[14]. They acknowledged that the institutional implementation of the resolution will vary from one state to the other, and allowed the states to develop their own sovereign framework.

To ensure that the policies of the resolution were upheld, R. 1540 established the 1540 Committee, a subsidiary body of the Security Council that facilitates the implementation of R. 1540[15]. All states under R. 1540 were required to submit a first report with details on the implementation of R. 1540 in their country and then encouraged to complete a National Action Plan. So far, 7 member states have submitted their National Action Plans[16]. The 1540 Committee also promotes collaboration and transparency between states implementing R. 1540. The Committee also works closely with other counter-terrorism UN committees, such as the 1373 and 1267/1989 committees, as well as the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). More information on R. 1540 and the 1540 Committee can be found at

<http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/index.shtml>.

Following Resolution 1540 from the Security Council, several other resolutions have addressed the problem of WMDs falling into the hands of non-state actors. The 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism gave guidelines on how to best protect against nuclear terrorism by identifying specific target areas (such as nuclear reactors). Besides expanding upon the principles of transparency and cooperation established in R. 1540, it created a simple framework for how to deal with crisis and post-crisis situations involving Nuclear Terrorism[17]. Unfortunately, several key states have not ratified this treaty.

Numerous other policies have also been put into place to secure and regulate nuclear material, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (amended in 2005) from the IAEA, and the

non-UN affiliated Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) founded by the US and Russia in 2006. While there has been considerable international legislation on the security of Nuclear Weapons, there has been little on other forms of WMDs. Only in July 2013 has the Secretary-General compiled a country-wise summary of measures taken to prevent terrorists from acquiring all forms of WMDs (not simply nuclear)[18]. This is one of the provisional agenda topics to be discussed at the GA's 68th session in November 2013. At the time of writing, the results of this session have not been published.

Areas of Interest

Pakistan

On May 2nd 2011, Osama Bin Laden, the world's most wanted terrorist, was shot dead by the US Navy SEALs in a covert operation on Pakistani territory, 1.3 km from the Pakistan Military Academy, and about 75 km (driving distance) from Islamabad[19]. Immediately following the death of Osama bin Laden, on May 23rd, terrorists attacked the naval aviation base at PNS Mehran in Karachi, located 15 miles from the suspected nuclear weapons storage facility near Masroor[20]. This once again focused the world's attention on the question of the security of nuclear weapons in Pakistan and what international organizations could do to help the Pakistan government in ensuring peace and security.

A recent report on the Pakistani Taliban states that although "[the Pakistanis] didn't think that when the Taliban and al-Qaeda came into the tribal areas that they would target the Pakistani state," Pakistan now finds itself "in the midst of a civil war against many

of these same forces." [21] Pakistan, observers claim, is becoming increasingly ungovernable with almost 11 per cent of landmass being ceded to the Taliban in the areas adjoining Afghanistan[22].

Pakistan has made efforts to strengthen its export control laws and enforcement. For instance, Pakistan has enacted legislation aimed at ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, such as the Export Control Act on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Means in 2004. The act called for the establishment of an oversight board to administer export control guidelines, licensing of controlled goods, and enforcement[23]. However, implementation proceeded slowly. Pakistan established the oversight board only in 2007. Not until 2009 did Pakistan establish the rules and regulations called for in the 2004 legislation. The growing instability in Pakistan has led observers to ask to what extent and for how long these reforms would in fact be effective. According to Prof. Shaun Gregory, there are three real concerns regarding the security of nuclear weapons in Pakistan[24]:

- a) The physical security of nuclear weapons may not be robust enough to withstand determined terrorist assault
- b) Among the estimated 70,000 people with access to the nuclear weapons cycle, some may be willing to collude in various ways with terrorists
- c) The threat extends beyond terrorists gaining access to complete and viable nuclear weapons, and includes the immense political and security implications of terrorists gaining access to fissile material, nuclear weapons components, or penetrating nuclear weapons facilities.

Syria

On September 16th 2013, the UN confirmed the use of chemical weapons outside Damascus in the ongoing Syrian Civil War but did not ascertain which group was responsible for the attack[25]. The use of chemical weapons while in the midst of a political upheaval has led to a complicated situation: is this an instance where the Assad Regime deliberately used WMDs; or this a case where the perpetrators were non-state actors? With the balance of power rapidly shifting in the country, what is the 'state' and what is it accountable for? The United States, backed by the UK and France have pointed the finger at the Assad regime, while Russia, supported by China, has blamed the opposition forces[26]. The use of chemical weapons is considered a war crime by the Geneva Protocol, so one of the groups must be accountable.

According to a recent report from the US from the Congressional Research Service, Syria has had a "long-standing chemical warfare program" with stockpiles accumulating since 1972 and continuing through the 1980s with the help of the Soviet Union[27]. According to a French intelligence document from September 2013, Syria has more than 1000 tons of weaponized chemicals including Sarin, Mustard Gas, and VX[28]. Two days after Damascus signed the CWC on September 12th, the US and Russia agreed upon a plan to extract and dismantle the chemical weapons program of the Assad Regime. The Assad Regime still denies responsibility for the chemical weapons attacks and warns that the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons will take over a year, and will cost around one billion dollars[29].

The ongoing crisis in Syria highlights several flaws in the current international policy around the use of WMDs by non-state actors. Firstly, despite the stringent codes of the CTC and domestic border control policies, Syria received support for its chemical weapon program from other states and private industries. It was given several chemical weapons by Egypt before the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. Its weapons program was scientifically supported by the Soviet Union in the 1980s and supplied with chemicals from eastern European industries. Even as recently as in 2011, the US claimed that Syria was dependent on foreign states for its chemical weapons program.[30] Secondly, although the CWC sets down clear roles and responsibilities for state governments with regards to chemical weapons, it is difficult for these policies to apply in situations where the government is unstable and in turmoil. It can be very difficult to assign blame and force the states to pay for their crimes. In areas of long-standing conflict, it is difficult to even recognize a single stable government. Thirdly, the crisis highlights once again the role of private industry in the development of WMDs. Many of the chemical agents Syria used in their chemical weapons were imported from eastern European industries. This is not the first time private companies have been involved in the manufacturing of weapons of mass destruction. During the A. Q. Khan activities of 1976, two Dutch firms supplied the Pakistani nuclear program with parts for uranium centrifuges[31]. In 2004, the US seized a shipload of nuclear equipment, including thousands of centrifuge parts from a German freighter destined for Libya, which further suggested the involvement of overseas private

industries[32]. There is currently little international legislation besides domestic border laws controlling the support of nuclear programs by private companies.

Selected Bloc Positions

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO fully supports the NPT and the implementation of SC Resolution 1540. They also endorse the NATO Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism, designed to increase awareness of the threat, mobilize capabilities to counter it, and engage with other states and international organizations. They also appeal to all states to strengthen the security of nuclear materials, particularly calling upon Iran and North Korea to comply with their international obligations.

African Union

The AU fully supports international non-proliferation and the implementation of SC Resolution 1540. In 2004 they adopted the Protocol to the Organization of African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which includes recommendations for states to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Although the AU fully supports the international policies surrounding non-proliferation, they are simultaneously facing “pressing and competing developmental priorities with limited financial and human resources,” so their ability to implement the international policies is hampered.

European Union

The EU has supported many resolution, treaties, and organizations working towards non-proliferation. It has also put in place several protocols to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including The European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy, the 2003 European Security Strategy and the European Union Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005) and the New Lines for Action by the European Union in Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Delivery Systems (2008). The EU has also been working steadily with the IAEA and other UN-affiliated organizations to implement UNSC R. 1540 and its action plan towards nuclear security.

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Political Conflict in the Korean Peninsula

"The danger posed by North Korea's threatening activities warrants further swift and credible action by the international community."

- United States President Barack Obama
(February 2013)

Introduction

The Korean peninsula has been a source of international tension from the early days of the Cold War. Though political conflict surrounding the containment of Communism has largely ceased, relations between the Republic of Korea, herein also referred to as South Korea, and its Communist neighbor to the North, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), herein also referred to as North Korea, continue to demonstrate diplomatic unease and occasional military conflict. North Korea's persistent development of its nuclear weapons program, despite profuse international opposition, has been the epicenter of concern for all nations involved. In the past year, tensions have significantly escalated as North Korea began to openly flex its nuclear muscles, performing a number of prohibited missile launches and nuclear tests, all the while threatening military retaliation at its enemies. Ongoing joint-military training exercises between the United States and South Korea, including other shows of military force from the two nations, further hinted at the potential threat of war.

Considering the broad scope and militant nature of such a conflict, not to mention the obvious issue of nuclear proliferation, it is within the responsibility of the Disarmament

and International Security Committee (DISEC) to address this crisis. The United Nations Security Council has taken action on the topic, but to no avail. It is therefore the prerogative of DISEC to recommend a course of action to the Security Council through the resolutions that you form in committee.

Background

Following the surrender of Japan in World War II, the 35 year Japanese reign over the Korean peninsula ended with the formation of two separate states: the communist, Soviet-occupied Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to the North, and the American-occupied Republic of Korea (ROK) to the South, both established in 1948 with a border at the 38th parallel. Attempts at reunification over the following years failed to reach fruition, and escalation of tensions at the border finally broke out into war in 1950 when Northern armies invaded South Korea. United Nations forces, comprised primarily of United States military, came to assistance of South Korea while China entered the conflict on the side of North Korea. The U.S.S.R. provided its communist cousins with material aid. The Korean War ended with the signing of an armistice agreement that provided for the creation of a Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) at the 38th parallel.

While the Republic of Korea has never possessed nuclear capabilities, the U.S. positioned nuclear weapons in the nation in 1958, which, though removed following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, prompted

North Korea to follow suit. In 1963 it requested the Soviet Union's assistance in establishing a nuclear weapons program. Though the proposal was denied, the U.S.S.R. agreed to help the nation begin a peaceful nuclear energy initiative, and oversaw the installation of a nuclear reactor at Yongbyon [1]. Over the next few decades, hundreds of North Korean nuclear scientists were educated and trained in the Soviet Union, and a second reactor was added in 1979. While the country ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, it failed to comply with safeguards and inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and subsequently withdrew from the NPT in 2003 [2]. The nation performed its first underground nuclear test (in violation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1996, though to which North Korea is not a signatory) on October 9, 2006, and a second on May 25, 2009. These acts were immediately condemned in U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, respectively, which also established the precedent for U.N. sanctions against the nation [3].

The 2013 Korean Crisis

On December 12, 2012, North Korea successfully launched the Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3 Unit 2 three-stage rocket, counter to UNSCR. 1695 (2006) which demanded that North Korea halt all development and testing of ballistic missiles, and to which the Security Council responded with UNSCR. 2087 on January 22, 2013, condemning the launch and augmenting existing sanctions.[4] The North Korean National Defense Commission answered with a statement threatening

further missile launches and nuclear tests, and moreover declaring the United States to be “the sworn enemy of the Korean people” [5]. On February 12, North Korea performed its third nuclear test—informing its close ally China that it intended to conduct a few more over the next year—which incited further disapproval from the Security Council in the form of UNSCR 2094 [6]. Meanwhile, the United States and South Korea were engaged in the annual Key Resolve/Foal Eagle joint-military training exercise, and twice the US dispatched B-52 bombers to fly over South Korea in order to reaffirm its “nuclear umbrella” over the region. In response, North Korea abrogated the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement and severed the North-South communication hotline [7]. South Korea, Japan, and the United States have accordingly increased the presence of missile-defense systems in the region.

While the threat of nuclear warfare predominated in the conflict, attacks took the form of more than military threats. South Korea suffered a cyber-attack on March 20 that was traced to the North Korean capital city of Pyongyang [8]. The international hacker group Anonymous also entered the conflict, hacking into the website of the DPRK's central news agency, and claimed to have stolen a number of high-security military documents from government networks [9]. Another significant event was the temporary closing of the Kaesŏng Industrial Park, a collaborative economic venture between North and South Korea, located just north of the DMZ. In April, North Korea cut off access to the park by South Koreans, and forced South Korean employees stationed there to leave [10].

Selected Bloc Positions

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The government of the DPRK, under the leadership of Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Un, continues to reaffirm its right to operate as a nuclear-weapon state, and maintains that all military actions taken up to this point have been in earnest response to international threats to its sovereignty, primarily by the U.S. and South Korea. North Korea seeks a non-aggression security pledge from the U.S., and has expressed its willingness to resume the Six Party Talks (begun in 2003 between the DPRK, the U.S., South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia) without preconditions.[11]

The U.S., Republic of Korea, and Japan

The U.S. has taken an uncompromising position on the question of North Korea's nuclear program, insisting on an end to the country's weapons development, and ultimately leading to total disarmament of the Korean peninsula. These views are shared by Japan, who fears the possibility of a strike due to the island nation's proximity to North Korea (a long-time political opponent), and South Korea, who recognizes denuclearization and economic resuscitation as a necessity for its ultimate goal of reunification of North and South.

The People's Republic of China

China has long been North Korea's closest ally and trade partner. Though it has voted in favor of Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087 and 2094, it has expressed

reservations over the effectiveness of such sanctions, especially the practice of inspecting cargo ships entering and exiting the DPRK.[12] Furthermore, as China is obligated by military pact to defend the nation in the event of a military conflict, it has specifically opposed invoking in any Security Council resolutions Chapter VII Article 42 of the UN Charter, which would authorize UN military intervention.[13] China is a vocal supporter of resuming the Six Party Talks.

Russian Federation

While Russia has also traditionally been uncomfortable with the implementation of harsh economic sanctions (in the case of Iran as well as North Korea), it has increasingly voiced concern over the DPRK's recent aggression, with President Vladimir Putin stating that given an escalation of the conflict to a nuclear confrontation, "Chernobyl... may seem like a child's fairy tale." [14] Russia has urged all parties involved to demonstrate restraint, and also supports a return to the Six Party Talks.

Conclusion

Facing an unprecedented escalation of the North Korean nuclear threat, and with the security of multiple nations at stake, it is imperative that we restore stability to the present situation on the Korean peninsula. Recall that while the U.N. usually prefers diplomatic negotiations to military intervention, you, as a delegate for DISEC, must decide what measures you believe to be necessary when you advise the Security Council on the topic. Below are some

questions to keep in mind as you construct your resolutions:

- As a committee dedicated to disarmament, how will DISEC bring about a mutually acceptable end to North Korea's nuclear program and commence the disarmament process?
- How can DISEC best ensure the compliance of North Korea (among other states) with Security Council resolutions, without infringing on national sovereignty?
- How can DISEC establish transparency and incentivize openness in diplomatic relations, and promote a willingness to abide by international safeguards and protocols?

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