



# TRIUMVIRATE 2012 BACKGROUND GUIDE



2012



## LETTER FROM THE DAIS

Dear Delegates,

You have chosen to participate in the most innovative and experimental committee in MITMUNC's short history. The Triumvirate is a crisis council composed of three bodies tasked with enacting a solution to the many problems that continue to beleaguer Sudan. Two of these bodies represent the ministerial cabinets of North Sudan and South Sudan, its newly-independent neighbor. The third body is composed of representatives from major international players--countries, unions, NGOs, and United Nations committees that each have a stake in the result of any negotiations on the troubled Sudan region.

A listing of all delegate positions may be found in Appendix C. This guide is structured with common Background and History sections, followed by modules specific to each committee. It is our recommendation that all delegates read every module so as to understand the positions of the other Triumvirate bodies. A note on terminology: Though the former Sudan is officially still named The Republic of Sudan, this guide (and debate during committee) will refer to this country as North Sudan. "South Sudan" will refer to the seceded state, and the unmodified "Sudan" will refer to the region as a whole.

The three constituent committees of the Triumvirate must work together to

produce a guideline for the resolution of the major issues that currently hinder development and peace in both North and South Sudan. They must also address, in concert, various crises that will arise during the committee sessions. The three bodies may agree on some proposals, and they may be at odds on others. They may interact with each other both through communiqués as well as through direct representation. For the sake of example, the North Sudanese cabinet may choose to send a message to South Sudan in writing, or they may choose to send their Minister of Foreign Affairs to the South Sudanese cabinet to give a speech or answer questions, if the South Sudanese committee is willing to entertain the intrusion. All other MITMUNC parliamentary rules will apply, with the discretion of our chairs.

In a departure from standard Model United Nations procedure, the chairs themselves will represent individuals with vested interest in the debate. The cabinet committees will be headed by chairs who are themselves acting as the president (or assistant to the president) of their respective countries, though they will have limited power to direct the substance of debate. Only the chairs of the International Representatives Council will be truly neutral. The chairing staff consists of the following MITMUNC devotees:

### *South Sudanese Ministerial Cabinet*

- **Whitney Loo, Chair and President Salva Kiir Mayardit:**  
"Hello delegates and welcome to MITMUNC! My name is Whitney

Loo and I will be serving as the head chair as well as the President of South Sudan Mr. Salva Kiir Mayardit for Triumvirate 1. I am a freshman here at MIT hoping to study Course 10 (or chemical engineering). I'm also on the varsity swimming team and a sister of the Zeta Phi chapter of the Alpha Phi sorority here on campus. I love MIT and am so happy to call it my home! I look forward to meeting all of you in February and can't wait for some lively debate around the crisis in Sudan!"

- **Ronald Chan, Assistant to the President:**

"I am a freshman likely to pursue a course in Mechanical Engineering. I have a strong interest in current affairs, especially matters concerning China and the Middle East, and I have participated in a THIMUN-styled MUN while studying in high school in Singapore. I believe MITMUNC will be an exciting learning experience for both myself and the participants, and I look forward to meeting the delegates in MITMUNC 2012."

#### *North Sudanese Ministerial Cabinet*

- **Jenny Hu, Chair and President Omar al-Bashir:**

"I am currently a sophomore studying Economics and Chemical Engineering. I hail from a tiny suburb outside of Philadelphia and was involved in Model UN all throughout high school. I love baking and squash and orcas."

- **Noor Alsharif, Assistant to the President:**

"I am a junior from Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, studying computer science and engineering and possibly minoring in applied international studies."

#### *Council of International Representatives*

- **Ahmed Hussain, Chair and Triumvirate President:**

"I'm a senior majoring in Brain and Cognitive Sciences with a minor in African and African Diaspora Studies. With the possible (okay, definite) exception of Albert Wang, I am the person that MITMUNC is most sick of. I chaired the WTO at MITMUNC 2010, and then served as Secretary-General for MITMUNC 2011. I'm happy to be back at the 2012 conference as the head of an innovative group of committees in my final year at MIT."

- **Pranav Ramkrishnan, Vice Chair:**

"While pursuing a major in Computer Science and Management Science here at MIT, I share a keen interest in politics and international affairs. I was born and brought up in Bombay, India and went to the United World College of the Atlantic in the UK before heading over to the US. I have been fortunate to have been involved with MITMUNC since I came to MIT; I was the Under Secretary General and chaired the WTO (with Ahmed Hussain) at MITMUNC 2010, and chaired a special committee (with Eyas

Sharaiha) at MITMUNC 2011. I am really looking forward to meeting you this coming Feb.”

***Crisis Director***

- **Eyas Sharaiha:**

“I am a junior studying Computer Science and Engineering. Originally from Amman, Jordan, in the Middle East, I am quite interested in international relations, global conflicts, and reconciliation. I have been involved with Model UN since high school, and was active in MITMUNC since 2010. I have co-chaired UNSC in 2010, chaired the Advisory Panel on the Question of Darfur in 2011, and now looking forward to head the crisis from the Triumvirate for MITMUNC 2012!”

On behalf of all of the chairing staff, we wish you good luck in preparation. We look forward to hearing your innovative ideas and we can't wait to see how you cope with the crises we have in store.

Sincerely,

*Ahmed Hussain*

The Most (Self-)Righteous Ahmed  
Hussain, Esq.,  
Triumvirate President  
MITMUNC IV 2012  
[triumvirate2012@mitmunc.org](mailto:triumvirate2012@mitmunc.org)

## INTRODUCTION

*"We congratulate our brothers in the South for the establishment of their new state. We share their joy and celebration. The will of the people of the South has to be respected."*

- Sudan President Omar al-Bashir, 9 July 2011

Religious differences, localized wealth, and government corruption and disorder have sparked conflict in Sudan since before the turn of the century. In the summer of 2002, the government of Sudan and the rebel group SPLM/A (Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army) reached a monumental peace agreement on the status of the state and religion, giving the nation a hope for respite. However, enforcing this agreement was difficult, as talks continued for years to come in hope of establishing self-determination of religion. Through the efforts of the United Nations and the international community, the Naivasha Agreement was ratified in 2005 and the first Sudanese elections were held in 2010. This comprehensive peace agreement also included a mandatory referendum for the people of South Sudan to vote for "unity within Sudan or separation, and that a parallel referendum be held for the people of Abyei",<sup>1</sup> a region whose borders have long been under contention. Thus, in January 2011, a week-long referendum for the secession of the South was held, and in early February, the results were announced. More than 98% of the citizens of South Sudan voted to secede. The government of Sudan (also

referred to as North Sudan) agreed to respect the results of the vote and thus, complying with the agreement, peacefully separated from the South and officially recognized its new neighboring nation. The implications of this secession were global -- the United Nations officially recognized South Sudan in July 2011.

Despite the peaceful secession of South Sudan from Sudan on July 9, 2011, the situation in the region remains volatile. Both Sudan and South Sudan face numerous challenges as separate nations. The uneasy peace between the continues to be strained due to border conflicts and economic and political disputes. Sudan has already lodged two complaints against South Sudan to the United Nations Security Council, accusing South Sudan of "providing (rebels) with anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles as well as with ammunition, landmines and mortars" in the two northern border states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Many players in Juba, Khartoum and around the world all have a great impact on the post-referendum issues of border security, oil management, citizenship, debt, and wealth that still exist in the Sudanese region.

## HISTORY OF THE REGION

*"If your intention is to take back the South to the pre-1972 period... then the people of the South will not stand aloof to see their legitimate and constitutional rights tampered with. We deem it our duty to defend the existence and identity of the South by all means and at any cost. The South will seek political, moral, and material support and call upon the people of other regions of Sudan to terminate the so-called central government of the*

<sup>1</sup>Source:

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm#history>

*minority interests*" - A letter from South Sudanese students to Gaafar El-Nimeiri, President of Sudan 1969-1985<sup>2</sup>

Prior to granting Sudan's independence on January 1, 1956, Britain inadvertently favored a North Sudanese presence in the new Sudanese administration. The composition of the new leadership caused the ire of South Sudan, and eventually led to the breakout of the First Sudanese Civil War by the Anyanya separatist group on August 18, 1955. During the civil war, Sudan witnessed the rise to power of Gaafar El-Nimeiri through a military coup in 1969. The civil war ended in 1972 when the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement was signed, granting South Sudan partial self-governance under a North Sudanese administration. The secular constitution that came from Addis Ababa displeased the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, of whom El-Nimeiri was a strong proponent. His anti-secularist approaches and support to the Muslim Brotherhood, however, became evident after a failed assassination attempt in 1976 that rendered him more religious. He proceeded by giving influential political positions and supremacy to religious rulers, including the leader of National Islamic Front (NIF), Turabi el Hassan.

The Islamization policies under El-Nimeiri created tensions between the increasingly Muslim government in the North and the predominantly Christian and animist South. The 1978 discovery of oil reserves in Bentiu, in South Sudan, further deteriorated the relations as the control of

the valuable natural resource became a central objective to both sides. In February of 1980, El-Nimeiri enforced the Regional Government Act and other decrees to subdivide the South and move the oil-rich area of Bentiu from Southern to Northern jurisdiction. On October 5<sup>th</sup> 1981, El-Nimeiri dissolved the Southern Regional Legislative Assembly, thereby violating the self-Governance act of the 1972 peace agreement and further weakening the Southern semi-autonomous government.

With a weak and divided political system in the South, and a government with a weakening grip in the North, El-Nimeiri enacted in September of 1983 a system of Shari'a law as the basis of the Sudanese constitution and penal code. This new system was engineered by el Hasson and became known as the September Laws. The enforcement of Shari'a law represented a desperate attempt by El-Nimeiri to retain control of his government and gain legitimacy. Defying the 1972 Agreement yet again, this move sparked the formation of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (and its military arm, the Sudan People's Liberation Army) in 1983. The organization is both a political party and a paramilitary rebel group that fought for autonomy for South Sudan. Thus began the Second Sudanese Civil War.

In 1985 El-Nimeiri was removed from the presidency. Four years later, Field Marshal Omar al-Bashir, the current president of Sudan, assumed control through a military coup over the unstable civilian government of Sadiq al Mahdi. Al-Bashir

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<sup>2</sup>Source: Jenida, 1999.



was no different from El-Nimeiri in marginalizing South Sudan representatives in the government. Under his guidance, the Sudanese government enacted policies of Arab expansion and Islamization, especially in the region of Darfur, that increased the disenfranchisement of the South.

The second civil war lasted two decades. The Naivasha Agreement (also known as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA) ended this war in 2005. The CPA paved the way for the referendum of the self-determination of South Sudan and the region of Abyei. North Sudanese troops left southern Sudan on January 8, 2005, and a referendum on independence for the South took place in January 2011. 98.83% of the voters were in favor of independence, and South Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011.

## THE SOUTH SUDAN MINISTERIAL CABINET

South Sudan has many improvements to make in terms of economic development, and will have to pursue its plans without encroaching upon Khartoum's interests. The region is currently one of the world's least developed areas: less than two percent of South Sudanese children complete their primary education, only twenty-seven percent of the people are literate, and more than ten percent of infants do not survive past their first year. The referendum was a great achievement for the sovereignty and autonomy of South Sudan, but it created a nation not completely equipped for independent governance.

### *Border conflict*

The border between the two nations remains disputed in five areas: Abyei, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, Unity State and Upper Nile. Troop build-ups and aerial bombardments have been reported with increasing frequency in these disputed areas, and leaders of both nations have threatened all-out war.

In particular, despite a troop withdrawal agreement whose deadline lapsed in October 2011, Sudanese and South Sudanese military presence remains in the volatile region of Abyei, whose borders are still under dispute. The borders were defined in 2009 by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague through arbitration, and although both sides accepted the arbitration decision, conflict continues. Both parties are still working to ensure that the CPA of 2005 is implemented. However, because two separate ethnic groups (the Messiria of the North and the Ngok Dinka of the South) claim the region, this issue is more than a simple land-grab dispute. The ethnic conflict creates tension between North and South Sudan. The Ngok Dinka of the South were prominent members of the SPLA/M and fought for their independence. However, Khartoum used groups of Messiria of the North as a proxy army during the war.<sup>3</sup> Thus, both parties have strong roots in Abyei. A referendum was supposed to take place in Abyei as prescribed by the CPA of 2005, but has

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<sup>3</sup>Source:  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13502845>

been delayed indefinitely due to issues on the voter eligibility of the nomadic Messiria.

This border conflict is a point of contention between the two states. In November 2011, a refugee camp in the Unity State of South Sudan was bombed. The South Sudanese government believes that this was the work of the North Sudanese government in retaliation to border arguments around oilfields in Unity State and the Upper Nile. Although there was a peaceful secession, rebel groups on both sides of the border continue to fight for their respective governments.<sup>4</sup> Landmines are common and effective tools for these militias and thus much turmoil remains in poorly developed South Sudan. Thousands of landmines remain in South Sudan and threaten the lives of its people. Removing these landmines is a pressing issue: one that requires money, manpower, and technology that South Sudan does not have.<sup>5</sup> Because of the threat of these landmines as well as constant Northern retaliation, the Southern government fears that President Omar al-Bashir will use violence to resolve the border issues. However the South Sudanese, led by their President Salva Kiir Mayardit, are wary of continuing violence in a region beset by decades of civil war.

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<sup>4</sup>Source:

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15728191>

<sup>5</sup>Source:

<http://allafrica.com/stories/201111031034.html>

Border and Conflict Resolution Advisor Mr. Abdel Bagi Ayei Akol must work with the Northern government to ensure that the Southern people are protected and safe. He and Mr. Ismail Kony, the Peace and Reconciliation Advisor, must attempt to coerce the North to attend peace talks and summits if these conflicts are to be resolved in a nonviolent manner. Neutral third party members, as well as important citizens of the disputed regions, may be able to serve as crucial observers and advisers. Working with the Minister of Regional Cooperation, Mr. Oyai Deng Ajak, and the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Gier Chuang Aluong, South Sudan hopes to resolve the border conflict by gaining the Abyei territory, while at the same time reducing the tension with its neighbor to the north.

### *Oil*

Conflicts concerning borders can stem from disputes over oil. After the secession of South Sudan, North Sudan's oil capacity stands at twenty-five percent of its original production, leaving the North struggling to maintain its flow of income. To offset this loss of income, Sudan enacted a tax on South Sudan's use of a pipeline that runs through the North to the Red Sea. This route is one of the major pathways that South Sudan uses to bring its oil to the international market.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>See:

[http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/50682000/gif/\\_50682980\\_sudan\\_pipeline\\_464map.gif](http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/50682000/gif/_50682980_sudan_pipeline_464map.gif)



Although the South agreed to split revenue from its oil with the North to maintain stability, they were unaware of the costs associated with transportation of it through existing pipelines. Thus, they have begun to look at other options to export through the South to avoid taxes.<sup>7</sup> The only refineries in the nation are located along the pipelines in the North, and the South might also be charged to utilize these facilities as well. Without pipelines or refineries, direct oil export cannot take place. This leaves South Sudan with two options: to build its own infrastructure to enable direct exports, or to work with the North to develop a joint energy industry. North-South peace hinges on the balance adopted between economic profit and political acumen.

In November 2011, South Sudan offered the African Union a plan to make compromises with Khartoum on “all outstanding levels”. They hope that by offering “packages” of financial assistance, they will be able to ease the tension over the oil transportation conflict.<sup>8</sup> Sudan is saddled by almost \$40 billion of external debt and has sanctions imposed on it by the United States. The Southern state hopes monetary aid will relieve anxiety between the nations in order to ensure that oil production remains steady to

create revenue for both nations. However, South Sudan is facing a shortage of skilled workers. Hence, their oil production has dropped in the Unity State since the split with the North. Many skilled technicians returned to the North after the secession, resulting in a lack of qualified laborers to operate, manage, and maintain oil rigs. Due to a new rebellion instigated by the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA), it has become increasingly difficult to access the oilfields in the state. Because revenue from the oil fields accounts for approximately 98% of the GDP of the nation, the conflict over the oil fields must be resolved quickly if violence and economic turmoil are to be avoided.

Securities Affairs Advisor Mr. John Kong Nyoun and Minister of Petroleum and Mining Mr. John Luk Juk must decide which measures to take to secure their oil and the revenues from it. They must work with Development Advisor Mr. Abdalla Albert and Minister of Rural Development and Co-Operatives Mr. Peter Abdel-Rahman Sule to determine whether South Sudan will compromise with the North to utilize their facilities at significant cost, or if the South will develop their own pipelines and refineries within their borders. Minister of Finance and Economic Planning Mr. David Deng Athorbei should be prepared to offer a cost-benefit analysis of starting such a large project in the South as opposed to paying tribute in the form of taxes to the Northern government.

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<sup>7</sup>Source:

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-23/south-sudan-may-agree-to-cede-30-of-oil-revenue-wakoson-says.html>

<sup>8</sup>Source:

<http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/South-Sudan-Offers-Khartoum-Package-Over-Oil-Shipments.html>

## Current State of the Issues

The government of South Sudan is thankful for the mostly-peaceful separation from its northern neighbor, but continues to feel oppressed by Khartoum despite the secession. With rising fees to transport its oil through the North, South Sudan is looking at other means to refine and ship its major export. The secession left the North lacking three quarters of its former oil revenue. Does the removal of this large source of income bestow upon the South a financial obligation to the North? While this political question remains to be resolved, the South hopes to expand its infrastructure within its own boundaries to improve its current economic state. South Sudan is looking to resolve the border conflicts with the North by offering financial aid in return for the disputed territory of Abyei.

The South views the constant attacks on her people, such as the bombing in November 2011, as a return to the violence of the Sudanese Civil Wars. The government believes that the North is sponsoring the rebel groups that are reigning terror in the South. The South is looking to continue to work with the North to reduce violence along the border and to ensure that a referendum in Abyei is held. It looks towards international agencies to help it climb out of the poverty that was created during the war when much of their infrastructure was destroyed. Currently, the wealth from the oil and natural resources is not well-spread throughout the nation, and so its relatively high GDP does not clearly reflect the state

of the nation.<sup>9</sup> The South must utilize the wealth from exports more efficiently in order to rebuild infrastructure and provide a strong foundation for the new nation.

## THE NORTH SUDAN MINISTERIAL CABINET

Sudan (also referred to as North Sudan) has been working to restructure many facets of its society, government, economy, and infrastructure after the departure of nearly twenty percent of its population following the secession of South Sudan. President Omar al-Bashir promises that the North Sudan will have stricter Shari'a law and a leaner, reorganized government. However, the kind of new societal structure, economy, and political atmosphere that ultimately develops in North Sudan remains to be seen.

### *Border Conflict*

Governmental agriculture projects and Arab expansion ambitions by the government of Sudan before the secession of the South, along with the North-South Civil War, led to the displacement of many people from their native lands. In addition, the seasonal migrations of both Northern and Southern nomadic communities created a problem of ill-defined geographical boundaries. Lines on a map simply cannot encompass areas of homogeneous ethnicity if those ethnicities are in constant flux. The recent secession

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<sup>9</sup>Source:

<http://blogs.worldbank.org/african/south-sudan-launches-its-first-gdp-estimate>

of South Sudan led to different peoples claiming the same land, giving political weight to the status of the nomadic communities and the question of both displaced and settled peoples.

*The Abilang believe nomadic tribes from the North were for decades part of deliberate government schemes to drive this border further to the South, thereby gaining access to valuable grazing areas, arable land, oil reserves and local tax revenues. Dinka Abilang elders cite periodic raids, during which their people were killed and settlements burned, that accompanied a series of southward border shifts from Rabak to Khor Ayuel, to Jabalain, to the current location near Wonthau. As a result, Southern resentment of Arab expansion and Islamisation is particularly acute among some groups in this region.<sup>10</sup>*

As the civil war in Sudan came to an end, the heavily armed populations of both countries have moved their war to the border between the states. In the years of the civil war, these areas witnessed excessive armament as different ethnic groups were mobilized to the sides of the two rivals. After the secession of the South, these areas, placed on both sides of the political boundaries, remain volatile. They constitute fertile grounds for armed conflict. These regions are bordering the counties and states of oil-producing South Kordofan, Blue Nile, Upper Nile, White

Nile, Unity State and the Helig area (with their productive oil fields), and the region of Abyei.

#### *Issues after the Secession*

1. Cross-border movement through natural migration routes.
2. Ethnic and tribal claims to territory.
3. Land ownership versus the right to access land; residents and voters' rights, as referendums to self-determination of regions are being held.

#### *Abyei*

The Abyei is home to two large ethnic groups, the Ngok Dinka and the Messiria Arabs. The occupying Sudan Armed Forces are restricting the movement of local Southerners and hindering the return of displaced locals, most of whom left to cast their votes in South Sudan for the January secession referendum. The 2005 PCA stipulated the holding of a referendum specific to the residents of the Abyei region for self-determination, to be held concurrently with the South Sudanese referendum. However, failure to create a referendum commission in the Abyei region remains an impediment to the stability of the disputed area, as the issue of voters' rights has come to the fore. As with the South Sudan referendum, voter eligibility – who is or is not a resident – is controversial, particularly with regard to the status of Messiria.

<sup>10</sup>Source:

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/B75%20Sudan%20Defining%20the%20North-South%20Border.ashx>

On October 29, 2011 the Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) offered Sudan the exchange of Abyei for money and discounted oil sales. This offer was refused by the National Congress Party (NCP) that is currently governing Sudan. As the North is refusing to withdraw from the region, unconfirmed reports to UN officials proclaim that the Messiria nomadic Arabs, who take part in seasonal migration in that area, are mobilizing to form a permanent presence in northern Abyei. The reports also reveal that the Messiria are objecting to their status as holders of right to this land.

### *Heglig*

The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague excluded Heglig from the region defined as Abyei in its 2009 press release regarding the status of Abyei. This decision was rejected by the Sudanese People Liberation Movement (SPLM), which stands firm in their belief that Heglig's oil fields are part of the Southern Sudanese state of Unity. The town of Heglig is a controversial one not only because of its oil fields, which exacerbated the problem, but because of its claim to be a historically native land to the tribes of Dinka and Nuer:

*Those who believe it is in the South cite Dinka and Nuer tribes now residing in Pariang, Abiemnhom, Rubkona and Mayom counties in Northern Unity state, whose claim to traditional tribal lands historically extended further north west. Beginning in the mid-1960s, those communities were displaced from present-day Southern Kordofan, including Heglig,*

*and much of the area has since been settled by Messiria. As in other tense border areas, these communities hope to see their traditional territories returned to them as part of the new South.<sup>11</sup>*

### *Oil*

The current economic situation in North Sudan is strenuous at best and cataclysmic at worst. Since oil continues to be the greatest contributor to North Sudan's GDP, the secession of the South on July 9, 2011 caused the North to lose nearly \$7.8 billion in oil assets and created a roughly 30% budget deficit. However, 90% of pan-Sudanese pipeline mileage exists within North Sudan's borders. Currently,  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the over 500,000 barrels of oil produced in the former Sudan come from South Sudan's oil reserves. In order to reach the exporting locations along the Red Sea, almost all of South Sudan's production must pass through the pipelines in the North. This dynamic has created a very tense situation between the two countries, with North Sudan putting much pressure on the nascent neighbor both economically and militarily.

On November 28, 2011, the Sudanese State Minister of Oil - Ali Ahmed Osman - reported that South Sudan's oil exports through the North Sudanese pipelines had been halted as of November 17, 2011. Although some conflicting reports have arisen as to the extent of this disruption,

<sup>11</sup>Source:

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/B75%20Sudan%20Defining%20the%20North-South%20Border.ashx>

this action comes after months of conflict concerning the issue of oil transport fees placed on South Sudan's oil. The African Union began brokering a deal to resolve the oil conflict between the two ex-war foes in September 2011. However, a detailed settlement regarding transport fees and the splitting of oil proceeds beyond what was detailed in the 2005 peace deal has yet to be reached. The 2005 peace deal entitled both the North and the South an even split of the proceeds of former Sudan's oil production. After the official secession, Khartoum imposed a \$22.80 per barrel fee on South Sudan's oil, a price Juba declared to be "robbery in broad daylight". Since then, South Sudan's ministry of petroleum and mining has negotiated to pay much of the South Sudan's oil deals in arrears; Northern officials claim that South Sudan owes them more than \$767 million in arrears for the period between July 9 and October.

Despite extensive African Union-mediated talks, North Sudan ultimately chose to reject South Sudan's offering of a \$5.4 billion compensation package in exchange for a \$0.75/barrel transit fee. As of November 24, 2011, North Sudan is "demanding \$15 billion in compensation" and "prefers to engage in talks unmediated by the African Union", notes Pagam Amum, South Sudan's chief negotiators.

After the split, South Sudan exports nearly half a million barrels of oil through North Sudan. Some of this production has gone down in recent months due to the increased clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces and Sudan People's

Liberation Army in Sudan's southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State.

### **Current State of the Issues**

North Sudan respects the results of the January 2011 referendum. It has complied with the right to self-determination of the Southern Sudanese people and had its armed forces leave South Sudan. North Sudan is committed to establishing peace and stability in the border area between the two countries in hopes of normalizing economic relations.

The reduction of the Northern jurisdiction on oil fields after the secession is threatening to cripple economic relations with China; however, North Sudan's strategic location on the Red Sea and its control over the oil pipelines sustains its role as a major player in the Sudan oil industry.

### **THE COUNCIL OF INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES**

Sudan -- both North and South -- is a largely undeveloped region in Northern Africa. Sudan has been in perpetual turmoil since the end of British colonization. Beset by two civil wars, fought largely between North- and South-aligned factions, Sudan hardly appears to be of significant importance to the developed world. However, the discovery of oil in the 1970s launched the country onto the international scene. As a volatile region sitting on a wealth of petroleum, the situation in Sudan is being closely



followed by the members of the Council of International Representatives.

South Sudan and North Sudan produce a combined 500,000 barrels of oil a day, making the combined countries the 30th largest petroleum-exporting state in the world. Political strife within and between the two nations limits the potential oil production, so stability in the region will lead to an increase in Sudanese oil in international markets. The world's oil importers -- ie, most of the developed world (see Appendix A for more detail) -- is therefore highly interested in ensuring that this is the case. The best case scenario for these countries is the construction of a pipeline from oil-rich Sudan to the Red Sea that does not cross into North Sudan. The issue of taxes on oil passing through North Sudanese pipelines causes great political strife between the two countries, so the developed world would like to see a route to markets that does not pass through North Sudan.

Furthermore, terrorism has long been a problem in the region. The former unified Sudan was placed on the United States' list of countries suspected of harboring terrorists, and rebel groups continue to create violence even after the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. A peaceful Sudan is a Sudan which can export oil, so the security of the region is also of great importance to international players. Because violent groups often attack pipelines to achieve political goals, the reduction of conflict in the region is a grave concern for oil-importing nations.

Stability is also of vital importance to a number of other countries in a more direct way. Sudan's neighbors wish for a quick end to violence. The conflict in Sudan has created a refugee crisis, and many displaced Sudanese are currently living in camps in adjacent countries. Eritrea, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Egypt (along with the Arab League and the African Union at large) are all represented in the International Council, and all are hoping for a quick and lasting resolution to the issues that plague North and South Sudan. Ethiopia in particular has been proactive in the peace process. The country's capital, Addis Ababa, was host to the 1972 Sudanese peace accords.

International bodies also have a stake in the outcome of the North-South Sudan conflict. With this in mind, the UNMIS, WTO, and World Bank are all represented in this subcommittee. The United Nations Mission in Sudan is responsible for implementing the CPA as well as for ensuring that human rights are protected and that development is promoted. As such, the UNMIS will be keen to participate and advise the council on the best possible courses of action. In many ways, the UNMIS is the least biased and most neutral member of the Triumvirate.

The WTO is interested in keeping the economy of North and South Sudan open to international markets. The UN committee is also interested in ensuring that any trade that does occur between either nation and the rest of the world -- or between the two countries themselves - - occurs in a fair manner. As developing countries, the two Sudans qualify for



special provisions in trade that the WTO is tasked with drafting to ensure that no trade is done to the detriment of the North or the South.

willing to negotiate to ensure a solution that is acceptable to all.

Finally, the World Bank is an important institution whose involvement will be vital for the development of North and South Sudan. The World Bank has the ability to give loans to promote development. In the short term, these loans are extraordinarily helpful. The money can be used to bolster transportation infrastructure, health-care, and education as long as it falls into the right hands and is not squandered through corruption. The disadvantage is that the World Bank is not a charitable organization: its loans must be paid back. Thus, if North and South Sudan do choose to solicit loans from the World Bank, they must be careful to structure the repayment of debt in a sustainable manner. The World Bank serves to make a significant profit from the interest payments on any hypothetical loan, so negotiations must ensue to ensure that lending is done in a way that is amiable to both the Bank and the country. These negotiations will likely take place between the World Bank and the Finance Ministers of the respective nations.

It is clear that the international community has a vested interest in resolving the issues in North and South Sudan. The Council of International Representatives must act in the best interest of their respective organizations or countries. Conflict will arise from the fact that their best interests may not be in the best interest of the North or South, so all parties must be

## APPENDIX A: GUIDE TO SELECT POSITIONS

### United States

The United States has a tremendous stake in the Sudan area as a provider of humanitarian, political, and military force. The USA entered talks with North Sudan's President Bashir in 2008 to negotiate his cooperation with the secession of the South in exchange for a normalization of relations between the US and Sudan, increased US aid, and the enactment of such other political concessions as removing Sudan from the list of States sponsoring terror and possibly dropping Bashir's charges in the international criminal court.

### China

Although China has maintained a roughly neutral stance in terms of aid for the Sudanese region before and after the split, China has vowed to support South Sudan's secession and the economies of both countries. China recently urged both nations to cooperate to maintain Sudan's oil production. "We hope that North and South Sudan will exercise reason and restraint, and use a flexible and pragmatic approach to resolve their problems through friendly consultation," notes Hong Lei, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman. "We are confident that the two governments will abide by their promises, ensure the stability and continuity of oil cooperation, and protect the lawful rights of Chinese businesses and the safety of their personnel." As of

October 2011, China's purchases of Sudanese crude oil appeared little affected by the conflict, with imports in the first 10 months of this year up 5.5 percent at 11.12 million tons, or about 5 percent of China's total crude oil imports. Currently, the state-run China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has a substantial stake in the oil fields of Sudan.

### African Union

The African Union remains committed to peace between the two Sudans and the facilitation of agreement on all outstanding issues. In particular, the resumption of the Post Referendum Arrangements in November 2011 continued negotiations on transitional financial arrangements, oil, trade issues, assets and liabilities. The current African Union mediator, Thabo Mbeki, is in the process of setting forth a road map to settle these issues, and has remained firm on the issue of troop withdrawal in Abyei.

### Arab League

Sudan has been a member of the Arab League since 1956. A clause in the Charter of the Arab League guarantees South Sudanese membership, and the Arab League has been supportive of South Sudanese membership should they choose to join. (The Arab League has been keen on maintaining a presence in the region.) However, given its demography and pressure from hardliners, South Sudan has voluntarily declined membership.

## United Nations

In anticipation of South Sudanese secession on 9 July 2011, and acting on the recommendation of the United Nations Secretary-General, “the Security Council adopted resolution 1996 (2011) of 8 July 2011, establishing the United Nations Mission to the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) for an initial period of one year, from 9 July 2011, with the intention to renew for further periods as may be required. The mandate of the United Nations Mission to Sudan (UNMIS) ended on the same date.”

While the mandate of UNMISS is chiefly to promote development, the United Nations remains committed to social responsibility. On November 4, 2011, UNMISS stood by its mandate of protecting civilians after being accused by the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) of aiding South Sudan in their efforts against the SSLA; on November 17, 2011, UNMISS called for the release of child soldiers in the SPLA. As noted in resolution 1996 (2011), UNMISS remains committed to “peace consolidation” and “longer-term state-building and economic development.”

## APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL READINGS

The 1972 Addis Ababa agreement

The PCA July 2009 press release  
<http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Abyei%20Press%20Release%2022-07-09%20EN.pdf>

Sudan: Defining the North-South Border.  
 International Crisis Group  
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/B75%20Sudan%20Defining%20the%20North-South%20Border.ashx>

About Omar al-Bashir  
<http://www.plaidavenger.com/leaders/profile/omar-al-bashir/>

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*The Sudanese Conflict 1969 – 1983: The Role of the Leadership in the Resumption of Civil Conflict between the People of Southern Sudan and the Government of Sudan.*

By: Catherine Jenida

August 6, 1999

<http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.mit.edu/pqdweb?vinst=PROD&fmt=6&startpage=-1&vname=PQD&did=730311901&pmid=66569&scaling=FULL&vtype=PQD&rqt=309&TS=1322634172&clientId=5482>

Abyei conflict could derail Sudan's north-south peace process, UN warns

<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37754&Cr1>

The Crisis in Abyei – October 2011

Update

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures-abyei.php>

Potential for War in South Kordofan,  
Abyei and Darfur

<http://allafrica.com/stories/201106220167.html>

[http://www.wagingpeace.info/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=91&Itemid=24](http://www.wagingpeace.info/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=91&Itemid=24)

<http://news.sudanvisiondaily.com/details.html?rsnpid=202731>

## APPENDIX C: DELEGATE POSITIONS

### South Sudan

President (Chair): H.E Lt. General Salva  
Kiir Mayardit

1. Vice President: H.E Lt. General Dr Riek Machar Teny-Dourghon
2. Political Advisor: Mr Lual Diing Wol
3. Security Affairs Advisor: Mr John Kong Nyoun
4. Border and Conflict Resolution Advisor: Mr Abdel Bagi Ayei Akol
5. Peace and Reconciliation Advisor: Mr Ismail Kony
6. Ministry of Cabinet Affairs: Dr Luka Tombekana Manoja
7. Ministry of Regional Cooperation: Mr Oyai Deng Ajak
8. Diplomatic Affairs Advisor: Mr Lado Gore
9. Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs: Mr Martin Elia Lomuro
10. Ministry of Interior: Mr Gier Chuang Aluong
11. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning: Mr David Deng Athorbei
12. Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Investment: Dr Barnaba Marial Benjamin
13. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting: Paul Mayom Akec
14. Ministry of Health: Dr Joseph Monytuuiel Wiejang Akol
15. Ministry of Transport: Mr Anthony Lino Makana

16. Ministry of Higher Education,  
Science and Technology: Professor  
Job Dhoruai
17. Ministry of Petroleum and Mining:  
Mr John Luk Juk
18. Development Advisor: Mr Abdalla  
Albert
19. Ministry of Rural Development  
and Co-Operatives: Mr Peter  
Abdel-Rahman Sule
20. Ministry of Water Resources and  
Irrigation: Mr Joseph Duer Jakok

### North Sudan

***Note: Names to be updated after  
announcement of new leaders***

Chair: President of Sudan

1. Vice President
2. Assistant to the President
3. Minister of the Council of  
Ministers
4. Minister of Foreign Affairs
5. Minister of Foreign Trade
6. Minister of Investment
7. Minister of Education
8. Minister of Roads and Transport
9. Minister of Health
10. Minister of Humanitarian Affairs
11. Minister of Interior
12. Minister of Energy and Mining
13. Minister of Defence
14. Minister of Finance and National  
Economy
15. Minister of International  
Cooperation
16. Minister of Industry
17. Minister of Federal Government
18. Minister of Water Resources
19. Minister of Environment and  
Urban Development

20. Minister of Science and  
Technology

### Council of International Representatives

1. US: Secretary of State Hillary  
Clinton
2. UK: Secretary of State for Foreign  
and Commonwealth Affairs  
William Hague
3. China: Foreign Minister Yang  
Jiechi
4. Russia: Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Sergei Lavrov
5. Japan: Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Kōichirō Genba
6. African Union: Chairperson of the  
African Union Teodoro Obiang  
Nguema Mbasogo
7. UNMIS: Head Haile Menkarios
8. WTO: Director-General Pascal  
Lamy
9. Ethiopia: Minister of Foreign  
Affairs Haile Mariam Desalegne
10. Eritrea: Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Osman Saleh
11. Kenya: Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Moses Wetangula
12. World Bank: President Robert B.  
Zoellick
13. Egypt: Foreign Minister Mohamed  
Kamel Amr
14. Arab League: Secretary-General  
Amr Mousa
15. France: Minister of Foreign and  
European Affairs Alain Juppé

