

# REFRAINS AND EXISTENTIAL AFFECTS

'If I am afraid of robbers in my dreams, the robbers, to be sure, are imaginary, but the fear of them is real' noted Freud in *The Interpretation of Dreams*.<sup>1</sup> The content of an oneiric message can be transformed, faked, mutilated, but not its affective dimension, its thymic component. Affect sticks to subjectivity, it is glischroid in character, to borrow Minkowski's qualification for describing epilepsy. Except that it sticks as much to the subjectivity of its enunciator as to that of its addressee and, in so doing, it disqualifies the enunciative dichotomy: locutor-auditor. Spinoza had discerned this transitive character of affect perfectly 'from the fact that we imagine someone like us to be affected with an affect, we are affected with a like affect', from which resulted what he called 'an emulation of desire' and the unfolding of multipolar affective compositions. Thus the sadness that we feel through that of the other becomes commiseration, whilst it is 'impossible that we represent hatred towards us by those similar to us, without hating them in return; and this hatred cannot happen without a desire for destruction that is manifest in anger and cruelty'. Affect is thus essentially a pre-personal category, establishing itself 'before' the circumscription of identities, and manifesting itself by transfers that are as unlocalizable from the point of view of their origin as from that of their destination. Somewhere, there is hatred in the same way that, in animist societies, beneficent or harmful influences circulate through the spirits of ancestors, and, concurrently, totemic animals, or through the 'mana' of a sacred place, the power of a ritual tattoo, a ceremonial dance, the story of a myth, etc. A polyvocality, then, of components of semiotization which are nevertheless still in search of their existential consummation.

As much the colour of the human soul as of animal becomings and cosmic magics, affect remains fuzzy, atmospheric,<sup>2</sup> and yet is perfectly apprehendable, in so far as it is characterized by the existence of thresholds of passage and of reversals of polarity. The difficulty here resides in the delimitation not being discursive, that is to say, not being founded in

systems of distinctive oppositions that are set out in linear sequences of intelligibility or capitalized in informatic memories that are compatible with one another. Assimilable in this respect to Bergsonian duration, affect does not arise from categories that are extensional, susceptible of being numbered, but from intensive and intentional categories, corresponding to an existential auto-positioning. As soon as one seeks to quantify an affect, one immediately loses its qualitative dimensions and its potential for singularization, for heterogenesis, in other words the eventual compositions, the 'haecceities' that it promotes. That is what happened to Freud when he wanted to make affect the qualitative expression of the quantity of drive energy (libido) and its variations. Affect is the process of existential appropriation by the continuous creation of heterogeneous durations of being. For this reason, we would certainly be well advised to give up treating it under the aegis of scientific paradigms so as to turn deliberately towards ethico-aesthetic paradigms.

That, it seems to me, is what Mikhail Bakhtin invites us to do, when, in order to specify aesthetic enunciation in relation to ethical evaluation and objective knowledge, he places the accent on its character of 'encompassing by the outside of content', the 'feeling of value' and on the fact that it leads to experiencing oneself as creator of form.<sup>3</sup> By drawing affect towards the aesthetic object, what I would like to underline is that it is in no way the passive correlate of enunciation, but its motor. It is true that this is somewhat paradoxical, because affect is non-discursive, entailing no energetic expenditure, and this is what has led us to qualify it as deterritorialized machinism.

The finitude, the consummation, the existential singularization of the person in her relation to herself, as much as in the circumscription of her domain of alterity, do not go without saying, are not given either by rights or in fact, but result from complex processes of the production of subjectivity. And in very particular historical conditions, artistic creation represented an outgrowth and an extraordinary exacerbation of this production. Also, rather than reducing subjectivity to only being the result of signifying operations, as the structuralists wished (in this regard, one is still under the influence of the celebrated Lacanian formula according to which a signifier was supposed to represent the subject for another signifier) it will be preferable to map the diverse components of subjectivity in their fundamental heterogeneity. Even in the case of the composition of a literary form, which nevertheless seems entirely tributary to language, Bakhtin underlines how reductive it would be to restrict oneself to the raw material of the signifier to account for it. Opposing the creative personality, organized from the interior (to which he assimilates the contemplator of

the work of art), to the passive personality of the character, the object of literary vision, organized from the exterior,<sup>4</sup> he is led to distinguish five 'aspects' of linguistic material, so as to draw out an ultimate level of verbal affect assuming the feeling of engendering at the same time: sound, meaning, syntagmatic links, the phatic valorization of an emotional and volitional order.<sup>5</sup> The verbal activity of engendering a signifying sound thus correlates with an appropriation of rhythm, of intonation, of the motor elements of mimicry, the articulatory tension, the internal gesticulations of the narration (creative of movement), the figurative activity of metaphor and the whole internal élan of the person 'actively assumes through utterances a certain value-and-meaning position.'<sup>6</sup> But Bakhtin is keen to make it very clear that this feeling cannot be reduced to that of a brute organic movement, engendering the physical reality of the word, but that it is also the engendering of the sense of appreciation:

a feeling of generating both meaning and evaluation, that is, a feeling of moving and assuming a position as a whole human being – of a movement into which both the organism and the meaning-directed activity are drawn, because both the flesh and the spirit of the word are generated together in their concrete unity.<sup>7</sup>

Whilst being non-discursive, this active power of affect is nonetheless complex and I would even characterize it as hyper-complex, wanting to indicate thereby that it is an instance of the engendering of complex, processuality in the nascent state, the locus of the proliferation of mutating becomings. With affect, the question is henceforth posed of a dis-position of enunciation on the basis of the modular components of proto-enunciation. The affect speaks to me, or at least it speaks through me. The dark red of my curtain enters into an existential Constellation with the dusk, when darkness is falling, to engender an uncanny Affect which devalues the clarities and urgencies which imposed themselves on me several instants earlier and it makes the world sink into a void which seems irremediable. On the other hand, other scenes, other Existential Territories, can become the support for highly differentiated Affects. For example, the leitmotifs of *Das Rheingold* will induce innumerable sentimental, mythical, historical, social references in me. Or the evocation of a humanitarian problem will set off a complex feeling of repulsion, of revolt and compassion. Whilst continuing to have a confined existence for themselves, from the moment that such scenic dis-positions, or dis-positions of territorialization, start to overflow my immediate environment and engage procedures of memory and cognition, I find myself tributary to an Assemblage of enunciation with

multiple heads. The individuated subjectification in me that is authorized to speak in the first person is no longer anything more than the fluctuating intersection, the conscious 'terminal' of these diverse components of temporalization. With the curtain and the late hour, the affect – which could be called sensible – was given as immediately there, whilst with problematic objects, its spatio-temporal congruence dissolves and its procedures of elucidation threaten to flee in all directions.

However, my idea is that problematic affects are the basis of sensible affects and not the other way round. Here the complex ceases to be based on the simple (as in those conceptions prevailing in scientific paradigms), so as to organize synchronic distributions and diachronic becomings as its own economy allows.

Let's take up these two aspects one at a time.

As the precarious result of a composition of heterogenous modules of semiotization, its identity permanently compromised by the proliferation of Phyla of problematization that work it, in its 'rich' version, Affect is constantly questing to re-capture itself. Besides, it is essentially from this ontological flight 'backwards', consecutive to an infinite movement of fractal virtualization<sup>8</sup> that its power of existential self-affirmation results. On a phenomenological plane, this question of the crossing of a threshold by Affect, with a view to attaining sufficient consistency, is posed by most psychopathological syndromes. On this side of such a threshold, it is the sphere of 'pathic time' – according to the felicitous expression of von Gebattel<sup>9</sup> – that finds itself threatened. Equally, one may recall Binswanger's incisive chiasm regarding autism, which is characterized less by an empty time – boredom, typically – than by a void of time.<sup>10</sup> Psychopathological syndromes reveal, without doubt better than any other Assemblage, what I would call the inchoate dimensions inherent to Affect, some of which literally set to work on their own count. This doesn't in the least signify that normality ought to be characterized by a harmonious equilibrium between the modular components of temporalization. Normality can be just as 'disordered' as other [mental] tableaux. Some phenomenologists have even reported a syndrome of hyper-normality in melancholy.<sup>11</sup> The discordance between the different ways of beating time – what I will call its setting into refrains [ritornellisations] – is not specific to abnormal subjectivity. Instead, what characterizes the latter is that one mode of temporalization gets the upper hand over all the others, temporarily or definitively. The normal psyche, on the other hand, is more or less in a position to pass from one mode to another, as Robert Musil has Ulrich say magnificently: 'the sane person is full of countless insanities and the insane person is possessed only by one.'<sup>12</sup> The exploration of the

expressive levels of pathic temporalization has not yet been seriously undertaken. It seems to me that the repercussions that might be expected from it would largely exceed the strict field of psychopathology and would be particularly significant in the linguistic domain. I imagine that the analysis of the modal and aspectual consequences of the obsessive or melancholic holding back of time could lead to the formulation of a more general function of the inhibition of enunciation, and, symmetrically, that of its mad, manic acceleration (*Ideenfluss*) to a function of liquefaction. ('The maniac is continually seized by an infinite range of references, always actual, fleeting and interchangeable. His temporalization is "reduced to an absolute momentalization" (that) ignores all duration and disappears like melancholic temporalization.')<sup>13</sup> I can also imagine the use that semioticians could make of a study, that would, without a doubt, be much more arduous, of the gap between the mute expression of the catatonic and the fantastic 'interior gesticulation' – to borrow an expression from Bakhtin – for which it is the mask. In a more general fashion, one will have to admit that the disordering of rhythms of enunciation and the semiotic discordances that result from it cannot be grasped in a homogeneous register of meaning production. They always refer to power takeovers by extralinguistic components: somatic, ethological, mythographic, institutional, economic, aesthetic, etc. The affair is less visible with the 'normal' exercise of speech, by virtue of the fact that existential affects are more disciplined in it, subjected to a law of homogenization and generalized equivalence.

Under the generic term 'refrain', I will group reiterated discursive sequences, closed on themselves, having as their function an extrinsic catalysis of existential affects. Refrains can take rhythmic or plastic form, be prosodic segments, faciality traits, emblems of recognition, leitmotifs, signatures, proper names or their invocational equivalents; equally they can be established transversally between different substances – this is the case with Proust's 'refrains of lost time', which constantly enter into correspondence with each other.<sup>14</sup> They can be of a sensible order (the madeleine dipped in tea, the disjointed paving of the courtyard of the Hotel de Guermantes; Vinteuil's little phrase, the plastic compositions around the bell-tower of Martinville...); or a problematic order (the ambience in the Verdurin's salon); just as much as of the order of faciality (Odette's face). To situate their position as the junction between the sensible and problematic dimensions of enunciation, I propose to 'enframe' the relation of signification (f(sign)) (that is to say, the relation of reciprocal presupposition or of solidarity between the form of Expression and the form of Content, in Hjelmslev's terms) of four semiotic functions relating to the Referent and to Enunciation. We will thus have:

- 1 a denotational function,  $f(\text{den})$ , corresponding to the relations between form of Content and Referent;
- 2 a diagrammatic function,  $f(\text{diag})$ , corresponding to the relations between matter of Expression and Referent;
- 3 a function of sensible affect (refrain), corresponding to the relations between Enunciation and form of Expression;
- 4 a function of problematic Affects (abstract machine), corresponding to the relations between Enunciation and the form of Content.

Let's note that in so far as one can conceivably keep the signification, denotational and diagrammatic functions within the traditional semantic and syntactic domains, it is not a question here of enclosing the two functions of existential affect in a third drawer that would be labelled 'pragmatic'. As Hjelmslev forcefully underlined, linguistics doesn't arise from an autonomous axiomatization (any more so than any other semiotic system).<sup>15</sup> And it is from the side of the concatenation of these partial enunciative Territories that a generalized flight of systems of expression from the side of the social, the 'pre-personal', the ethical and the aesthetic operates.

What can one expect from our bifaced refrain-abstract machine? Essentially a locating and deciphering of the existential praxial operators that are established at the junction of Expression and Content. A junction where, I insist, nothing is played out in advance in a perfect structuralist synchrony, but where everything is always an affair of contingent Assemblages, of heterogenesis, of irreversibilization, of singularization. With Hjelmslev, we have learned of the fundamental reversibility between form of Expression and form of Content overhanging the heterogeneity of substances and matters that are their support. But, with Bakhtin, we have learned to read the layering of enunciation, its polyphony and its multicentring. How do we reconcile the existence of this intersection formally unifying Expression and Content with that of the multivalence-multifluence of Enunciation? How, for example, do we understand that the heterogeneous voices of delirium or of creation can combine in the Assemblage of productions of sense outside commonsense? Productions that, far from being established in the position of a deficit from a cognitive point of view, sometimes allow access to highly enriching existential truths? Linguists have long refused to consider enunciation head-on, they only wanted to take its incursions into the structural framework of syntactico-semantic processes into account. In fact, enunciation is not at

all a distant suburb of language. It constitutes the active core of linguistic and semiotic creativity. And if linguists were really inclined to take on board its function of singularization, it seems to me that they would be well advised, if not to substitute proper names for the categorial symbols that dominate the syntagmatic and semantic trees that they have inherited from the Chomskyans and post-Chomskyans, then at least to propagate the Rhizomes that cling to these proper names. We must learn again the games of the refrains that fix the existential ordering of the sensible environment and support the meta-modelling scenes of the most abstract problematic Affects. Let us get an overview of some examples.

Marcel Duchamp's bottle-rack functions as the trigger for a Constellation of Universes of reference that sets off intimate reminiscences – the cellar of the house, beams of light on the cobwebs, adolescent solitude – as much as it does connotations of a cultural and economic order – the epoch in which bottles were still washed using a brush...The Benjaminian aura<sup>16</sup> or Barthes's punctum<sup>17</sup> also arise from this kind of singular refrain-making. Again, it is this refrain-making which confers a sense of scale on architectural Assemblages;<sup>18</sup> what sometimes miniscule details does the perception of a child walking down the dismal passageways of a social housing estate fasten on to? How, starting from a distressing seriality, does he succeed in consummating his discovery of a world of magical haloes? Without this aura, without this refrain-making of the sensible world – which in any case is established in the deterritorialized prolonging of ethological<sup>19</sup> and archaic<sup>20</sup> refrains, the objects that surround us would lose their 'air' of familiarity and would topple into an anguishing strangeness.

Refrains of Expression are of prime importance in sensible Affects: for example, the intonation of an actor will fix the melodramatic turn of an act, or the 'serious voice' of a father will trigger the wrath of the Superego (American researchers have even managed to demonstrate that the most tight-lipped of smiles entails, in the manner of Pavlovian reflexes, anti-depressive biosomatic effects!). On the other hand, the prevalence of refrains of Content, or abstract machines, is affirmed with problematic Affects, which operate as much in the direction of individualization as of social serialization. (Besides, the two procedures are not antagonistic: existential options are not mutually exclusive in this register but entertain relations of segmentarity, substitution and agglomeration.) For example, an icon from the Orthodox Church does not have as its primary finality the representation of a Saint, but the opening of a territory of enunciation to a believer, making her enter into direct communication with the saint.<sup>21</sup> The facial refrain draws its intensity from the way that it intervenes as a shifter – in the sense of a 'change of decor' – at the heart of a palimpsest

superposing the Existential Territories of the body and those of personological, conjugal, domestic, ethnic, etc. identities. In a completely different register, a signature appended to a banking document also functions as a refrain of capitalist normalization: what is behind this scrawl? Not simply the person that it denotes but also the assonances of power that it triggers amongst people in high places.

The human sciences – psychoanalysis in particular – have long accustomed us to thinking affect in terms of an elementary entity. But there also exist complex affects, inaugurating irreversible diachronic ruptures that should be called: Christ-affect, Debussy-affect, Lenin-affect. It is in this way that for decades a Constellation of existential refrains has given access to a ‘Leninist-language’ engaging specific procedures as much of the rhetorical and lexical order as of the phonological, prosodic or facial orders, etc. The crossing of a threshold – or initiation – that legitimates a relation of full existential belonging to a group subject depends on a certain concatenation and taking on of consistency of these components, thus put into refrain. Some time ago I tried to show, for example, that Leon Trotsky never really succeeded in crossing the threshold of consistency of the collective Assemblage of the Bolshevik Party.<sup>22</sup>

Enunciation is like the conductor who sometimes accepts his loss of control of the members of the orchestra: at certain moments, it is the pleasure of articulation or rhythm, if not an inflated style, which sets out to play a solo and to impose it on others. Let’s emphasize that if an Assemblage of enunciation can include multiple social voices, it equally takes on pre-personal voices, capable of bringing about an aesthetic ecstasis, a mystic effusion or an ethological panic – an agoraphobic syndrome, for example – as much as an ethical imperative. One can see that all forms of concerted emancipation are conceivable. A good conductor will not attempt despotically to overcode all the parts on the score, but will be looking for the collective crossing of the threshold at which the aesthetic object designated by the name at the top of the score is attained. ‘That’s it! You’ve got it!’ Tempo, accents, phrasing, the balancing of parts, harmonies, rhythms and timbres: everything conspires in the reinvention of the work and its propulsion towards new orbits of deterritorialized sensibility...

Affect is not, then, a state that is passively submitted to, as its ordinary representation amongst the ‘psy’ disciplines would have it. It is a complex subjective territoriality of proto-enunciation, the locus of a labour, of a potential praxis, bearing on two conjoint dimensions:

- 1 A process of extrinsic dissymetrization, which polarizes an intentionality towards fields of non-discursive value (or Universes



of reference). This sort of ethicization of subjectivity is correlative of a historicization and of a singularization of its existential trajectory;

- 2 A process of intrinsic symmetrization, evoking not only the aesthetic attainment of Bakhtin but also the fractalization of Benoît Mandelbrot,<sup>23</sup> which confers the consistency of a deterritorialized object and a grasping of auto-existentializing enunciative autonomy on affect.

Let's listen once again to Bakhtin:

through its own strength, the word transposes the consummating form into content. Thus, a request in the lyric – an aesthetically organized request – begins to be sufficient unto itself and does not need satisfaction (it is satisfied, as it were, by the very form of its expression); a prayer ceases to need assistance; repentance ceases to need forgiveness, and so on. Making use of the material alone, form brings any event and ethical tension to the fullness of completion. With the help of the material alone, the author assumes a creative, productive position with regard to content, that is, with regard to cognitive and ethical values. The author enters, as it were, the isolated event and becomes the creator in it, without becoming a participant.<sup>24</sup>

This function of consummation as the disjunction of content – in the sense that an electricity meter can malfunction –, this self-generation of enunciation seems entirely satisfactory to me. But the other traits by which Bakhtin characterizes signifying aesthetic form, to wit: unification, individuation, totalization and isolation,<sup>25</sup> seem to me to call for some development. Isolation: yes but active isolation, moving in the direction of what I have elsewhere called a processual setting into a-signifiante. Unification, individuation and totalization: certainly, but 'multiplicating'. It is here that I would like to introduce this other idea of a fractal taking on of consistency. In reality, the unity of the object is only the movement of subjectification. Nothing is given in itself. Consistency is only gained by a perpetual headlong flight of the for-itself, which conquers an existential Territory at the very same time as it loses it, nevertheless seeking to retain a stroboscopic memory of it. Reference here is no longer anything other than the support for a reiterative refrain. What matters is the break, the gap, which will make it turn around on itself and which will engender not only a sentiment of being – a sensible Affect – but also an active way of being – a problematic Affect.

This deterritorializing reiteration is equally effectuated along two synchronic and diachronic axes, no longer separated this time into autonomous extrinsic coordinates but woven together in intensive ordinates:

- 1 Intentional ordinates in accordance with which each affective territory is the object of a fractalization. This can be illustrated by the symmetrical internal relations developed in the so-called baker transformation in mathematics.<sup>26</sup> I understand by this that it is by an inchoate tension, a permanent 'work in progress', that the 'taking on of being' of affect is renewed, acquires consistency. None of its partitions [scores], even if they are infinitesimal, escape from procedures of existential homothety deployed – outside the registers of discursive extensity – by sensible and problematic refrains. Not only are all the spatio-temporal angles of approach explored and subsumed but the set (or the integral) of points of view of scale (to come back once again to this fundamental category of architecturology) are so too.
- 2 A trans-monadic axis, or axis of transversality, which confers a transitive character on enunciation, making it drift constantly from one existential Territory to another, generating singularizing dates and durations from it (once again the privileged example here is that of the Proustian refrains).

Subjectification is an intersecting of actual and virtual enunciative points of view. It wants to be everything without division and is in fact nothing, or nearly nothing, because it is irremediably fragmentary, perpetually shifting, spaced out. Finitude, existential consummation, result from the crossing of a threshold which is in no way a demarcation, a circumscription. Self and other agglomerate at the heart of an ethical intentionality and the aesthetic promotion of an end. What completely falsifies the reading of psychoanalytic authors when they deal with the Ego, is that one literally doesn't know what they are talking about: because they haven't given themselves the means of understanding that the Ego is not a discursive set entertaining Gestalt relations with a referent. Also, one cannot reasonably accept the articulations of it that they propose. Certainly, it is always possible to turn it into a 'displaced' representation, to construct a meta-modelling scene with regard to it and to decree that it is identified with this scene. In a way, we have hardly any other means for speaking about it, for sketching or writing something about it. It nonetheless remains the case that the Ego is the whole world, I am everything! Like the cosmos, I don't recognize any limits to myself. If, perchance, it was different, if I was to fall back on my

body, then there would be a difficulty. The Ego arises from a logic of all or nothing. There always exists a part of me that finds it difficult to tolerate that someone can decree that there is no me beyond this territory. No! It is still me beyond, even if another territory endeavours to force itself on me – unless the question of the Ego stops being posed and all possibility of auto-enunciation abolished. A frightful and unnameable perspective that we prefer not to look in the face, and which generally leads us to talk about something else...

It is because Affect is not a massive elementary energy, but the deterritorialized matter of enunciation, a highly differentiated integral of insight and 'outsight' that one can have something to do with it, that it can be worked on. Not in the style of traditional psychoanalysts, that is to say, through modelling identifications and symbolic integrations, but by deploying its ethico-aesthetic dimensions through the mediation of refrains. (On this point I agree with Emmanuel Levinas when he makes an intrinsic link between faciality and ethics.)<sup>27</sup> Consider, for example, the symptomatic refrains populating the psychological automatisms of Pierre Janet, the experiences of primary delirium of Karl Jaspers or the fantasmatic unconscious of Freud. Two attitudes are possible: that which makes of them a fixed state of fact and that which starts from the idea that nothing is played out in advance, that analytico-aesthetic and ethico-social practices are able to open such refrains up to new fields of possibility. Originally, Freudianism created a veritable mutation in an Assemblage of enunciation. Its techniques of interpretation, its interventions into oneiric and psychopathological refrains only had a bearing on semantic contents – the illusory revelation of a 'latent content' – in appearance. In fact its entire art consisted in making its refrains play out on novel scenes of affect: free association, suggestion, the transference...so many new ways of saying and seeing things! But what psychoanalysis missed, in the course of its historical development, is the heterogenesis of the semiotic components of its enunciation. Originally, the Freudian unconscious still took into account two matters of expression, the linguistic and the iconic, but with its structuralization, psychoanalysis pretended to reduce everything to the signifier, even to the 'matheme'. Everything leads me to think that, on the contrary, it would be preferable for psychoanalysis to multiply and to differentiate the expressive components that it puts into play, as much as possible. And for its own Assemblages of enunciation not to be arranged next to the couch, such that the dialectic of the gaze is radically foreclosed. Analysis has everything to gain from enlarging its means of intervention; it can work with speech, but equally with modelling clay (like Gisela Pankow), or with video, cinema, theatre, institutional structures, family interactions, etc. In

short, everything that allows the a-signifying facets of the refrains that it encounters to be stimulated, in such a way that it is better able to set off their catalytic functions of crystallizing new Universes of reference (the fractalizing function). In these conditions, analysis no longer rests on the interpretation of fantasms and the displacement of affects but endeavours to render both operative, to score them with a new range (in the musical sense). Its basic work consists in detecting encysted singularities – what turns around on itself, what insists in the void, what obstinately refuses the dominant [self] evidence, what puts itself in a position contrary to the sense of manifest interests... – and to explore their pragmatic virtualities.

What is the reductionist bent of the signifier – on which psychoanalytic affect (with its increasingly empty transference, its more and more stereotypical and aseptic exchanges) hasn't stopped slipping – supported by? To my mind it is inseparable from the much more general curvature of capitalistic Universes in the direction of the entropy of the equivalence of significations. A world where one thing is worth no more than another; where every existential singularity is methodologically devalued; where in particular, the affects of contingency, relative to old age, illness, madness, are emptied of their existential stigmata and become mere abstract parameters, managed by a network of welfare support services – everything bathed in an ineffable but omnipresent atmosphere of anxiety and unconscious guilt.<sup>28</sup> Weberian disenchantment, the correlative, it will be recalled, of a devaluing, of a 'sacramental anti-magic'<sup>29</sup> or of an all-out re-enchantment of productions of subjectivity by the depolarization of collective Universes of reference against the values of generalized equivalence and to the benefit of an infinite multiplication of existential *captures of value*? Although the current inflation of computational and communicational logics hardly seems to lead in this direction, it seems to me that it is indeed on the promotion of social and aesthetic analytic practices preparing the advent of just such a postmedia era that our future, at whatever level it is considered, depends.

# Refrains and existential affects

- 1 Sigmund Freud *The Interpretation of Dreams* op. cit. p.460. The phrase Guattari refers to is itself a quotation from Salomon Stricker's *Studien über das Bewusstsein* [TN].
- 2 With regard to schizophrenic alienation, phenomenological psychiatry advocates a diagnosis based on praecox feeling (Rumke), feeling (Binswanger), intuition (*Weitbrecht*). Tellenbach envisages a 'diagnostic atmosphere' as acknowledgement of the dissonance between the atmospheres proper to the two 'partners' [in the diagnosis], without seeking to amass isolated symptoms. Cf. Arthur Tatossian *Phénoménologie des psychoses* op. cit.
- 3 'All syntactic verbal connections, in order to become compositional connections that realize form in the artistic object, must be permeated by the unity of the feeling of connecting activity which is directed toward the unity (realized through compositional components) of object-related and meaning-related connections of a cognitive or ethical character, that is, by the unity of the feeling of tension and form-giving encompassing from the outside of cognitive content' Mikhail Bakhtin 'The Problem of Content' in *Art and Answerability* op. cit. p.313.
- 4 Ibid. p.316.
- 5 Ibid. pp.308–9.
- 6 Ibid. pp.306, 309.
- 7 Ibid. p.309.
- 8 Here virtuality is correlated with a fractal deterritorialization, which has an infinite speed on a temporal plane and generates infinitesimal intervals on a spatial plane (cf. Chapter 3 'The Cycle of Assemblages').
- 9 Quoted by Tatossian op. cit. p.169.
- 10 Ibid. p.117.
- 11 Ibid. p.103.
- 12 Robert Musil *The Man without Qualities* v.III trans. E. Wilkins and E. Kaiser, London, Pan, 1973, pp.421–2.
- 13 Tatossian op. cit. p.186.
- 14 See the chapter 'Refrains of Lost Time' in my book *The Machinic Unconscious* op. cit.
- 15 Louis Hjelmslev *Nouveaux essais* op. cit. pp.74–5.

- 16 Walter Benjamin *Illuminations* New York, Harcourt Brace and World, 1968.
- 17 Roland Barthes *Camera Lucida* New York, Farrar Strauss and Giroux, 1981.
- 18 Christian Girard *Architecture et concepts nomades* Brussels, Mardaga, 1986. In *La ville de Richelieu* Paris, AREA, 1972, Philippe Boudon distinguished 20 types of scale considered as space of reference for architectural thinking: technical, functional, symbolic, formal, model-dimensional, semantic, socio-cultural, of neighbourhood, of visibility, optic, of division, geographical, of extension, human, global, economic. One can think of other classifications and groupings but what matters here is the respect for the heterogeneity of viewpoints.
- 19 See the chapter entitled 'The Ethology of Sonorous, Visual and Behavioural Refrains in the Animal World' in *The Machinic Unconscious* op. cit.
- 20 Marcel Granet shows the complementarity between refrains of social demarcation in ancient China and the affects, or virtues, as he calls them, borne by names, written forms, emblems, etc: 'the specific virtue of a stately race is expressed in the chant (with an animal or vegetable motif) of a dance. Without doubt it is appropriate to see a sort of musical emblem in ancient family names – an emblem that is translated graphically into a sort of heraldic form – all the effectiveness of the dance and of the chants inhabiting as much the graphic as the vocal emblem' Marcel Granet *La pensée chinoise* Paris, Albin Michel, 1950, pp.50–1.
- 21 This is only true for the icons whose manufacture was spread out between the eleventh and sixteenth centuries, centred on a mysterious, quasi-sacramental faciality. Subsequently, icons were overloaded with details of clothing, personae multiplied and were given metal coverings (oklad). Cf. the article 'Icône' by Jean Blankoff and Olivier Clement in *Encyclopaedia Universalis* IX, 1984, pp.739–42.
- 22 'La coupure leniniste' in Guattari *Psychanalyse et transversalité* op. cit. pp.183–94.
- 23 Benoît Mandelbrot *Les objets fractals* 2nd edn Paris, Flammarion, 1984; 'Les fractals' in *Encyclopaedia Universalis* [no edition or volume], pp. 319–23.
- 24 Mikhail Bakhtin 'The Problem of Content' op. cit. p.308.
- 25 Ibid. p.281 [Bakhtin refers to 'concretisation', not 'totalisation', as Guattari suggests].

- 26 Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers *Order from Chaos. Man's Dialogue with Nature* New York, Bantam, 1984; Ivan Ekelard *Le calcul, l'imprévu* op. cit.
- 27 Emmanuel Levinas: 'I think rather that access to the face is straightaway ethical...' *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo* Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1985, p.85. 'The signification of the face is not a species for which indication or symbolism would be the genre' *Heidegger ou la question de Dieu* Paris, Grasset, 1981, p.243. 'Responsibility for the other is not an accident occurring to the subject, but precedes the subject's Essence, its engagement for the other' *Humanisme de l'autre homme* Paris, Livre de Poche, 1987.
- 28 Cf. Jean Delumeau *Le péché et la peur. La culpabilisation en Occident* Paris, Fayard, 1983.
- 29 Max Weber associated the idea of the disenchantment (*Entzau berung*) of the world with a devaluing (*Entwertung*) of the sacraments as a message of salvation and with a loss of sacramental magic, consecutive to the growth of capitalist subjectivity. Max Weber *The Protestant Ethic and 'The Spirit of Capitalism'* London, Penguin, 2002.

## Genet regained

- 1 Jean Genet *Prisoner of Love* translated by B. Bray New York, New York Review of Books, 2003 p.429.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Ibid. pp.166, 381.
- 4 Ibid. p.364.
- 5 Ibid. p.5.
- 6 Ibid. p.358.
- 7 Ibid. p.381, translation modified.
- 8 Jean-Paul Sartre *Saint Genet. Comedian and Martyr* trans. Bernard Frechtman, London, W. H. Allen, 1964, especially the chapter 'On the Fine Arts Considered as Murder'.
- 9 Ibid. p.423.
- 10 Ibid. p.535.
- 11 Ibid. p.568