System Security Exploits

Solution

October 12, 2022

1 Manual Exploit

1. The OWASP Top 10 "represents a broad consensus about the most critical security risks to web applications". It is a very popular list of vulnerable patterns for web security. Consult the 2017 list here: https://owasp.org/www-pdf-archive/OWASP_Top_10-2017_(en).pdf.pdf.

Check the source code of our vulnerable website. Do you see any potential vulnerability that allows us to read any arbitrary file on the remote filesystem? For example, a value controlled by the user that is used without checks from a function that reads files. What OWASP Top 10 category would you classify it as?

Solution:

Looking at the source code we see that variable *comic* can be arbitrarily set by the user through GET method. Said variable is then used without checks by function file_get_contents to retrieve the content of a file at the indicated location. An attacker can exploit such a vulnerability modifying *comic* in such a way to obtain the relative path to sensitive files (e.g. /etc/passwd).

The vulnerability described above is classified by OWASP as A5: Broken Access Control, and it clearly resembles the first attack scenario mentioned as example in the document.

2. Try to read some filesystem files that you are not supposed to. How do you get them exfiltrated thanks to the previous vulnerability?

Let's get some interesting files. How many users are there in the system? How can you tell by just being able to read files? How many users can log in into the system?

Solution:

By performing path traversal attack we can induce file_get_contents to ask for the content of sensitive files. Such content is not displayed on the webpage, not being an image, but we can retrieve its base64 encoding by inspecting the html code of the response page. It is then sufficient to decode the string to retrieve the content of the file.

In particular, by setting https://172.17.0.2/?comic=../../../etc/passwd in URL bar, we can exploit said vulnerability to access /etc/passwd, a file containing information regarding users, passwords (in this case shadowed), ids, shell. We can then gather some interesting information. Specifically, there are 22 users, out of which 20 may log in into the system (syslog shell is set to /bin/false while sshd shell is set to /usr/bin/nologin, which corresponds to polite non login). It is relevant to notice that, as we will see later, in /etc/shadow file most of the passwords are set to *: from the manpage, while those users will not be able to use a unix password to login, they may log in the system by other means.

3. Let's try to get the target file. Does it work? Why not? Can we discover who we are running as? (Hint: some files in /proc/self might help you - consult the proc documentation by checking its manpages).

Solution:

As before, we can try to set https://172.17.0.2/comic=../../../usr/lib/ssl/private/secret.crt, but this time no file content is retrieved. This is due to lack of permission either to access private folder or to read the file itself (or both).

From /proc/self/status file we may discover the id of the user we are running as (Uid: 33 33 33). By cross checking with /etc/passwd previously retrieved we may infer that we are running as user www-data.

4. There is a big misconfiguration in the server that allows us to get the (hashed) Unix user passwords. What is this misconfiguration? How many users have a password?

Let's crack the user password: use the tool *John The Ripper* to crack it. To use John, you need a *dictionary* of passwords that it can try to hash and compare to the target hash. You can start with an English dictionary of words, for example https://raw.githubusercontent.com/dwyl/english-words/master/words_alpha.txt, otherwise, you can use popular password leaks such as *rockyou.txt*, or other dictionaries. What is the user's password?

Solution:

As said before from file /etc/passwd we discover that passwords are shadowed (since set to x). The big misconfiguration of the system though is that the file /etc/shadow containing those passwords is not protected (it should be accessible only by the root user). We are indeed able, thanks to the same vulnerability as before, to get the content of said file. While the password of most users is set to *, we are still able to get the password for gullible user, the only one with UNIX hashed password.

From the format (password field begins with \$6\$) we may infer that SHA-512 is used to hash the password. We can then use a tool such as *John the Ripper* to crack it, by issuing the command john -wordlist=wordlist passwordfile where wordlist is the dictionary employed (in this case words_alpha.txt, found at the suggested

link) and *passwordfile* is a text file containing the (decoded) content of /etc/shadow. Finally, we discover that the password for user gullible is *invulnerable*.

5. Let's see if we can use our new knowledge: use nmap to see how many open ports the server has. What command do you have to issue? What is the other exposed service, besides the webserver?

Solution:

By issuing command nmap 172.17.0.2 we see that the server has 3 open ports. In particular we see that there is another exposed service: 22/tcp open ssh which can allow for remote access to the system.

We can then try to login as user gullible, for which we just got the password, by issuing the command ssh gullible@172.17.0.2.

6. Login as the user in the system. Can you get the target file? What groups are you part of – is there any interesting group? You should be able to get the target file – and control the full system! What is the SSL certificate of the server?

Solution:

Still, even as gullible user we are not able to directly retrieve the target file, as we lack permission to access private directory. But by issuing command id we discover that user gullible is part of sudo group, which means we are able to open an interactive shell as sudo user, navigate through private folder to finally get secret.crt target file, which contains the following private key and certificate:

---BEGIN PRIVATE KEY---

MIIEogIBAAKCAQEA3FknF1R+zm3sPWZgD07cdn6AEwDYFh8uepErGw5Gp/lGNhME rPkQjjL+W07Nf7yjkXi4bkdqrh8YueqM6Z5Xf0ZpOn07scMvvJ3jyWiJRZTu/9Sc JtmKEunRwBDSunfKNW1TzHSyO1pHaV9gf4V6A0Yc+geH7jNIkIa+nVMk/+o468Ku ZVGZNFbEYuYEnZx1gFwIIIQ22UryqaGkD9/ufKsLH11bvlsjbtILbU7uauFH2hDR eIcymoB180SVHjYgnEW7QX6FNXHs0+ZH04eHtDW/7XGSmgbCFRsb+y3v8FeipJ58 zfdUqi2NFKUdE/9eQPY1PRYPW6EP5TEY5nxjvQIDAQABAoIBAHg+3qpInfqg2e6X O4wHCSBQ4Ct+pm1MDtOsIO3ceIpp6frQXhjWwkYXZd8GHfa7Rre4HU1xA7KJncC3 UraahjvOsVYNyWmOjnRr5UagGWkzYUmTCLPauxKfLquVgqnnfR2yz6wfcrQZDCdg uRReDruCo4V+XpuKuOrF3XeVS/erIrP3nSGiDh8ax3Y3Jwxk6FXylL4k13SW+BXx Coe8IJNRDM6uc/x8scCeVmjbC73xZaT1sMOL1NPvErriHmBYDo31AqTMp2QG0bCh J7RKau0YYsseMrkzL/1xpNZtTNvHbElvA4sOMTCZXwlKieBAQ9zkdXPgdJVG+G98 6RDFKbECgYEA7iTMxvxjRcvhLRVr95nbyXa1nd1L4XjwMRTMd2io4C8eoHCZeuoi CY/hwv5vDDd9wKWuD21r6PEVf5mTdpEoP612t6C8VBEbMR31Vh+iR9hDS6+4b6K4 hHHOe95ei94bKwJg/5w/6uPwE7djtEVsHQqxxsAsyhZ3ygydob+EWQcCgYEA7N7E E36VKsV0k193uPuJF4CYgl2biE1/STSQ0Y+Lv146unQpEuK0v0xIvA4zttg3RAue T03XHKdbZV8u5C5ZrQZAxA043u8nMHSXH2r7neP/ZYcZq8ZUu1PxUx7F00qVDgDu g7x01YEakviS2F30dxbiSYbcjfvAaN/IHbGBABsCgYBkb7DN23Qi47G8SeSXMJS5 iw9d3Q87sL3cdWEmm0VeB4Fr0RIB/000C1iz3IsJI/4tWbLnXsa8H7Fpd2PyBZZs

AxTGrUvASNanCHOINx9CHbuEGEA5F0+tLEJoW4iUhMAAi6hNJaDvd+Kw7g9m4ECQ nwoLQNGjCYbL+DYjGZq/0QKBgBZhNcVhwFY6LiJecsFXgqxlygMHNRq7t7sC7F2D 4oBCNupG71qJcOpiGrOp2lj8NLyJHHvIPPrIFSqOw69rca2XWacsWKM3lUxOt7iQ MxXH5OmCyjogkwDf/XOM+zWO5mZcUCzCMYGuoQQh2D35HvjBgL/RriT8FEHUYuPr UXThAoGALS7JYPwbTIMWnTtBrucK35GqLwEzhOyhbZgYRABirn99bVnL3YA14+5o 2z3auU9bKjvZsG+sA892WWK3oLVVDzfo9zmD9FPy9By/NGHvY7B111vSwdGRLjth SHOjAdbyi+onLsq6oJRMm7fuJw3kIA92zaSLvnROlGQOnoYoa9Y=

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---END PRIVATE KEY---
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---BEGIN CERTIFICATE---
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---END CERTIFICATE---

2 Metasploit

We will now get to the same result using a shorter route. Instead of manual exploitation and code auditing, we will observe how once a big vulnerability is public domain, then anybody can exploit it. Hopefully, you will see why timely patching of software is important.

We will use a popular penetration testing framework: *Metasploit*. Metasploit provides pre-made modules that allow testing and exploitation of popular vulnerabilities and misconfigurations. It is already installed in the VM, and its CLI can be accessed by typing msfconsole in a terminal.

You can learn how to use the metasploit framework at http://www.metasploit.com/. Here are a few useful commands:

- "search application-name" will give you all possible exploits available for a given application. Try and understand which of them best suit your requirements. There is plenty of help out there on the Internet!
- "show actions" lists the possible actions for the loaded module, while "show options" lists the information required for the exploit (e.g., target machine, port, etc.). You can then set acchansu without and options with the set command.

Our target server is running a very old and unpatched Ubuntu GNU/Linux distribution from 2013. In particular, the OpenSSL version is OpenSSL 1.0.1c 10 May 2012. Check the known vulnerabilities of this version of OpenSSL, for example on the Common Vulnerabilities and Exploits (CVE) database. The CVE database provides a method of tracking all publicly known exploits and security issues of software, down to every version and release of software. Is there a very famous vulnerability known for this version of OpenSSL? Find the Metasploit module that can exploit it, and use it to get the private key. Is it the same key we leaked with the previous exploit? If not, why?

Solution:

OpenSSL 1.0.1a through 1.0.1f is subject to a well known and very serious vulnerability, *Heartbleed*, which can be exploited to leak information from memory cells we are not supposed to access, by means of so called heartbeats

Metasploit module auxiliary/scanner/ssl/openssl_heartbleed, by setting the appropriate RHOSTS and ACTION parameters (in particular, the latter must be set to KEYS, while the former is to be set to the IP address of the web server), can exploit said vulnerability to leak the target private RSA key. Such a key may often appear initially different from the one we managed to get by manual exploit:

---BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY---

MIIEowIBAAKCAQEA3FknF1R+zm3sPWZgD07cdn6AEwDYFh8uepErGw5Gp/lGNhME rPkQjjL+W07Nf7yjkXi4bkdqrh8YueqM6Z5Xf0ZpOn07scMvvJ3jyWiJRZTu/9Sc JtmKEunRwBDSunfKNW1TzHSyO1pHaV9gf4V6AOYc+geH7jNIkIa+nVMk/+o468Ku ZVGZNFbEYuYEnZx1gFwIIIQ22UryqaGkD9/ufKsLH11bvlsjbtILbU7uauFH2hDR eIcymoB180SVHjYgnEW7QX6FNXHs0+ZH04eHtDW/7XGSmgbCFRsb+y3v8FeipJ58 zfdUqi2NFKUdE/9eQPY1PRYPW6EP5TEY5nxjvQIDAQABAoIBAHg+3qpInfqg2e6X 04wHCSBQ4Ct+pm1MDt0sI03ceIpp6frQXhjWwkYXZd8GHfa7Rre4HU1xA7KJncC3 UraahjvOsVYNyWmOjnRr5UagGWkzYUmTCLPauxKfLquVgqnnfR2yz6wfcrQZDCdg uRReDruCo4V+XpuKuOrF3XeVS/erIrP3nSGiDh8ax3Y3Jwxk6FXylL4k13SW+BXx Coe8IJNRDM6uc/x8scCeVmjbC73xZaT1sMOL1NPvErriHmBYDo3lAqTMp2QG0bCh J7RKau0YYsseMrkzL/1xpNZtTNvHbElvA4sOMTCZXwlKieBAQ9zkdXPgdJVG+G98 6RDFKbECgYEA7N7EE36VKsV0k193uPuJF4CYgl2biE1/STSQ0Y+Lv146unQpEuK0 v0xIvA4zttg3RAueT03XHKdbZV8u5C5ZrQZAxA043u8nMHSXH2r7neP/ZYcZq8ZU u1PxUx7F00qVDgDug7x01YEakviS2F30dxbiSYbcjfvAaN/IHbGBABsCgYEA7iTM xvxjRcvhLRVr95nbyXa1nd1L4XjwMRTMd2io4C8eoHCZeuoiCY/hwv5vDDd9wKWu D21r6PEVf5mTdpEoP612t6C8VBEbMR31Vh+iR9hDS6+4b6K4hHH0e95ei94bKwJg /5w/6uPwE7djtEVsHQqxxsAsyhZ3ygydob+EWQcCgYAWYTXFYcBW0i4iXnLBV4Ks ZcoDBzUau7e7Auxdg+KAQjbqRu9aiXDqYhq9KdpY/DS8iRx7yDz6yBUqjsOva3Gt 11mnLFijN5VMTre4kDMVx+Tpgso6IJMA3/19DPs1juZmXFAswjGBrqEEIdg9+R74 wYC/Oa4k/BRB1GLj61F04QKBgGRvsM3bdCLjsbxJ5JcwlLmLD13dDzuwvdx1YSab RV4HgWs5EgH87Q4LWLPciwkj/i1ZsudexrwfsWl3Y/IFlmwDFMatS8BI1qcIc4g3 ${\tt HOIdu4QYQDkU760sQmhbiJSEwACLqE0lo0934rDuD2bgQJCfCgtA0aMJhsv4NiMZ} \\$ mr/RAoGBAL/t113Djd8s/aWezmy0jV/RT7rCLMaY7cACE9Del3ClRokMyNb6xLQj jnzRA8t/OtZ6jbmQivhG5algHSFn3zcdVtfWEMmtKyOWjld4pnnUOTf5z6OmHQRc K38Y6HS/5o4izQ7rZ921qV7uqSJkaH/4QMv4TNjwNk2Qg8ietat0

---END RSA PRIVATE KEY---

After some research, we can conclude that the two keys are actually the same, just in different formats. Looking at the heading, we may see that the previous key follows stan-

dard syntax PKCS#8, while the one we got through Metasploit follows syntax PKCS#1. I would also like to highlight the fact that, out of a number of tests performed, the key retrieved through Metasploit was actually in the same format as the one in the target file on two occasions.