

# **Choosing Between Multinomial Logit and Multinomial Probit Models for Analysis of Unordered Choice Data**

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# **Abstract**

## **Choosing Between Multinomial Logit and Multinomial Probit Models for Analysis of Unordered Choice Data**

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(Under the direction of George Rabinowitz.)

Political researchers are often confronted with unordered categorical variables, such as the vote-choice of a particular voter in a multiparty election. In such situations, researchers must choose an appropriate empirical model to analyze this data. The two most commonly used models are the multinomial logit (MNL) model and the multinomial probit (MNP) model. MNL is simpler, but also makes the often erroneous independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. MNP is computationally intensive, but does not assume IIA, and for this reason many researchers have assumed that MNP is a better model. Little evidence exists, however, which shows that MNP will provide more accurate results than MNL. In this paper, I conduct computer simulations and show that MNL nearly always provides more accurate results than MNP, even when the IIA assumption is severely violated. The results suggest that researchers in the field should reconsider use of MNP as the most reliable empirical model.

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## *Introduction*

Sometimes, researchers in political science have to deal with an unordered, categorical dependent variable. For example, in the study of elections, a dependent variable may be the vote-choice of a particular voter. This dependent variable is categorical rather than continuous: each choice or political party is another category. Furthermore, these categories have no numerical label or natural ordering. Unordered, categorical dependent variables appear in many other streams of political research, and more examples are not hard to imagine.

Empirically, such variables can be modeled by using a probabilistic choice model, an extension of a standard linear model, in which each choice is modeled with a separate equation including the predictors and an error. There are many specific probabilistic choice models, and two of the most widely used models are the multinomial logit (MNL) and multinomial probit (MNP) models. Technically, these models are very similar: they differ only in the distribution of the error terms. MNL has errors which are independent and identically distributed according to the type-1 extreme value distribution, which is also sometimes called the log Weibull distribution (see Greene (2000), p.858 for a more detailed discussion of this distribution). MNP has errors which are not necessarily independent, and are distributed by a multivariate normal distribution (Greene 2000, p.856).

This difference between MNL and MNP may seem rather minor, but in practice it has a big effect. The independent errors of MNL force an assumption called the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. Essentially, IIA requires that

an individual's evaluation of an alternative relative to another alternative should not change if a third (irrelevant) alternative is added or dropped to the analysis. So if I am twice as likely to vote for the Democratic Party than for the Republican Party, I should remain twice as likely to vote Democrat over Republican if a third party becomes a viable option. This assumption is not always a very good one in many situations. It is easy to imagine that the Green Party becomes a more attractive choice to voters over the Democrats if the Republicans drop out of the election, thus violating IIA. When IIA is violated, MNL is an incorrectly specified model, and MNL coefficient estimates are biased and inconsistent.

MNP does not assume IIA. In fact, an MNP model should estimate the error correlations along with the coefficients. To that end, it may appear that MNP is a better statistical model than MNL. Unfortunately, the situation is more complex.

A choice, or an alternative, is one category of the unordered, categorical dependent variable. In the context of maximum likelihood estimation, a choice probability is a formula to predict the probability that an individual chooses a certain alternative and the likelihood function for such models is the product of the choice probabilities for each individual. Choice probabilities in an MNL model are relatively simple, and computers can maximize the resulting likelihood function almost instantaneously, even for a large number of choices. For MNP, choice probabilities involve multiple integrals: as many integrals as one fewer than the number of choices. Computers can typically maximize likelihood functions with double or triple integrals, and may take a while to do so. But when computers must deal with quadruple integrals, quintuple integrals, or even more complicated integrals, MNP will often fail to converge or provide any useful estimation at all. MNL, therefore, is a much more stable model. Instability in a statistical model is a cause of concern.

Since MNP does not assume IIA it is often assumed to be more accurate than MNL. R. Michael Alvarez and Jonathan Nagler (1998) seem to make this assumption. They

strongly advocate the use of MNP as a less restrictive model, and focus their analysis on a review of computational advances that might make MNP a more feasible model for researchers. In the spirit of this argument, many researchers have used MNP to analyze their choice data without considering MNL (Alvarez et al 2000 and Schofield et al 1998, for example). Alvarez, Nagler, and Shaun Bowler (2000) justify MNP as a model that “enabled us to study voter choices for the three major parties . . . simultaneously and without restrictive and erroneous assumptions about the parties and the electorate” (p.146). But I am concerned that although MNP does not assume IIA, it loses accuracy at other points in its involved computation. The debate over whether to use MNL or MNP has been framed as a debate of accuracy versus computational ease: MNP provides more accurate results, but MNL converges much more quickly. There is very little evidence, however, that proves that MNP really is more accurate than MNL. Specifically, MNP may be an inefficient estimator, and there are situations in which a biased and inconsistent estimator will be more accurate than a highly inefficient estimator. Therefore, a direct comparison of MNL and MNP is in order.

Other researchers have already compared MNL and MNP models directly. Jay K. Dow and James W. Endersby (2004) run a multinomial logit and a multinomial probit model on data from U.S. and French presidential elections, and show that there is really very little difference between the predictions of each model. All things being equal, they conclude that MNL should be used over MNP. But Dow and Endersby only showed the near equivalency of the two models for two very specific cases, and their results should not be generalized. Kevin M. Quinn, Andrew D. Martin and Andrew B. Whitford (1999) present two competing formal theories of vote choice in the Netherlands and Britain and draw direct parallels to the competing MNL and MNP empirical models. They present theory which suggests that IIA is a better assumption for the British data, and they find that MNL is a better model for the British data while MNP should be a better model for the Dutch data. They conclude that the choice of empirical model should

“depend crucially on the data at hand” (p.1231). This article suggests that empirical models should be adjusted to correspond to the specifications of theoretical models. But again, these conclusions are based on results from two datasets, so generalization is problematic.

In order to be able to generalize results, MNP and MNL should be compared under laboratory conditions. Specifically, I conduct a simulation study in which I generate data while controlling the extent to which IIA holds or is violated. Such research was conducted, but not published, by Alvarez and Nagler (1994). The research presented here differs from their analysis in a few important ways: first, Alvarez and Nagler compare MNP to an independent probit model in which all the covariances are constrained to be zero. In this paper, I directly run MNL and MNP and compare the quality of the estimations. Second, I use the British Election Study from 1987 as one model for the data generating process (DGP). I also compare MNP and MNL in many more ways which are of direct interest to political scientists, and I benefit from 13 years of advances in computer processing power to perform simulations in many more cases.

I also consider the effect of strategic and sophisticated voting. In the simplest models of voting, voters are sincere. That is, each voter will vote for the option she prefers most. But these models are seldom effective at explaining or predicting what really happens in elections. A voter casts a vote strategically when she votes for an option other than her most preferred option in order to achieve a better outcome. Voters that may choose to vote strategically are called sophisticated voters. Such voting behavior can cause the IIA assumption to be violated. To demonstrate this fact, consider the simple example of the 2000 presidential election. Very liberal voters sincerely would have preferred to vote for Ralph Nader over Al Gore, and for Gore over George W. Bush. However, strategic considerations moved many of these voters to vote for Gore in hopes of preventing the election of Bush. For these voters, for strategic reasons, the probability of voting for Gore was much higher than the probability of voting for Nader. But if Bush, an “irrelevant”



alternative, is removed then they are much more likely to vote for Nader over Gore, thus violating the IIA assumption. When strategic voting is present, MNL should perform less accurately, but the effect on MNP is unclear. Many researchers have been interested simultaneously in multinomial choices and strategic voting (Kedar 2005, Lawrence 2005, Quinn and Martin 2002, Alvarez and Nagler 2000, Reed 1996, Abramson et al 1992), so it is worthwhile to examine the effect of strategic voting on the performance of MNL and MNP. Some of the simulations used for this project, described in section 3.3, are designed to model and account for strategic voting.

My goal is to provide guidance to political researchers who must choose between these two models. In this article, I report a surprising result: MNL gives more accurate point estimates of coefficients than MNP, and also reports the correct sign and significance level more frequently than MNP, even when the IIA assumption is severely violated. In all, MNL outperforms MNP in all but the most severe violations of IIA. In the simulations that model strategic voting, MNL always outperforms MNP. In the next section I will discuss some of the statistical theory behind these two models. In section 3, I describe the simulations in detail. In section 4, I provide the results and discuss the significance of these results. In section 5 I conclude, and offer some thoughts about the benefits and continuing disadvantages of MNL and other probabilistic choice models.

## *Statistical Theory*

### *Multinomial Logit*

The multinomial logit model has been the most commonly used model for analysis of discrete choice data<sup>1</sup>. MNL computes a different continuous latent variable for each choice, and these variables are like evaluation scores of each individual for each choice:

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<sup>1</sup> See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) or Greene (2000) for a more detailed discussion of the formulations of the multinomial logit and probit models.

the higher the score, the more likely that the individual chooses that alternative. So for each choice  $j$  and individual  $i$

$$U_{ij} = \beta_j x_i + \varepsilon_{ij}, \quad (1)$$

where  $\beta_j x_i$  is the inner-product of the predictors and their coefficients for choice  $j$ , and all of the  $\varepsilon_{ij}$  are independent and identically distributed by the type 1 extreme value distribution. In MNL, the predictors are fixed across choices, but the coefficients vary. By fixed across choices, I mean that the value of a variable is the same no matter which choice is being considered. Independent variables like age, gender, and income of a respondent fit this description well.

Sometimes researchers find that interesting predictors vary across choices. For example, the number of friends a voter has who are members of each party is not fixed across choices. The conditional logit model was developed to account for such variables. This model is similar to MNL, but the linear structure for the latent variable of choice  $j$  takes the form

$$U_{ij} = \gamma z_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}. \quad (2)$$

Here,  $z_{ij}$  is an independent variable that varies across choices, and  $\gamma$  is the coefficient for this predictor. Note that  $\gamma$  is itself fixed across choices. The logic here is that variables that are different for each choice have the same effect across choices. So if the ideological distance between an individual and each party is an important predictor of that individual's vote-choice, then distance is an equally important consideration whether the Democrats, Republicans, or Greens are being considered. In an MNL model, a predictor like religion is fixed across the choices, but the effect of the predictor is different for each choice. So religion may be an important consideration of an individual when they evaluate the Republican party, but may be less important when they evaluate the Democrats or Greens.

In order to consider both types of independent variables at once, statisticians have

developed a hybrid logit model. Under a hybrid model the latent variables take the form

$$U_{ij} = \beta_j x_i + \gamma z_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}. \quad (3)$$

In other words, a hybrid model simply combines MNL and conditional logit by adding the two together in the deterministic part of the model.

For all of these models, the dependent variable takes the form:

$$y_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \max(U_{i1}, U_{i2}, \dots, U_{im}) = U_{i1}, \\ 2 & \text{if } \max(U_{i1}, U_{i2}, \dots, U_{im}) = U_{i2}, \\ \vdots & \\ m & \text{if } \max(U_{i1}, U_{i2}, \dots, U_{im}) = U_{im}. \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

So a voter chooses the alternative that they evaluate most highly.

Remember that in binary logit models all the coefficients describe the relative probability of the positive outcome (choice 1) to the negative outcome (choice 0). Here, choice 0 acts as a base for the coefficients. In MNL, MNP, and in multinomial models with choice-fixed predictors in general, the coefficients do the same thing: they describe the relative probability of a choice to a base-choice. Therefore, if there are  $M$  choices, MNL and MNP will provide  $M - 1$  sets of coefficients, setting the coefficients for the base-choice all equal to zero. This base is chosen arbitrarily, and can easily be changed in a statistical package such as Stata. For conditional logit, this normalization of coefficients is unnecessary because conditional logit only estimates one set of coefficients. For the hybrid model, only the coefficients which vary across choices (the MNL part) need to be set to zero for the base-case.

Odds ratios in MNL are calculated in the exact same way as in binary logit: treating

choice 1 as the base, the odds ratio for any other choice  $j$  is

$$\frac{P(y_i = j)}{P(y_i = 1)} = e^{\beta_j x_i}. \quad (5)$$

The choice probability for the base is:

$$P(y_i = 1) = \frac{1}{1 + \sum_{j=2}^N e^{\beta_j x_i}}, \quad (6)$$

and the choice probability for any other choice  $k$  is:

$$P(y_i = k) = \frac{e^{\beta_k x_i}}{1 + \sum_{j=2}^N e^{\beta_j x_i}}. \quad (7)$$

Technically, IIA assumes independence of the errors in the evaluation functions, but an important effect of this assumption is that the odds ratios are fixed when other choices are added or dropped. Notice one important thing about the odds ratio for MNL: equation 5 only depends on the coefficients for choice  $j$ . No change to any other choice's coefficients will change this ratio. This feature of MNL is the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption (IIA) in action. Although the odds ratios for the conditional logit and hybrid models take slightly different forms, these models assume IIA as well. So the relative probability that I choose choice  $a$  over choice  $b$  should not be affected if choice  $c$  is no longer an option. There are many cases in which IIA is simply not true. When IIA is a false assumption, the estimations of these logit models are biased and inconsistent: serious problems.

It can be shown that the choice probabilities for MNL described in equation 7 are closed-form precisely because the errors are independent. Therefore the definition of IIA as error independence is exactly equivalent to the definition as odds ratios being fixed to additions and deletions of other choices.

In my comparison of MNL and MNP, I choose the most general formulations of each

model. So I compare the hybrid model to the probit equivalent of the hybrid model. I generate data with both choice-fixed and choice-specific predictors. So from this point onward, when I refer to the MNL model, I am referring to the hybrid logit model and when I refer to the MNP model I am referring to the probit equivalent to the hybrid logit model.

### *Multinomial Probit*

The advantage of MNP over MNL is that MNP does not assume IIA. The obvious disadvantage is that MNP is far more computationally intensive. For each choice  $j$  the evaluation functions are

$$U_{ij} = \beta_j x_i + \gamma z_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}, \quad (8)$$

which are analogous to the evaluation functions for the hybrid logit model. But here, the errors  $\varepsilon_{i1}, \dots, \varepsilon_{iM}$  are distributed by a multivariate normal distribution in which each error has a mean of zero and the errors are allowed to be correlated. The choice probabilities using MNP are very, very complex. Let  $V_{ij}$  represent the deterministic part of  $U_{ij}$  for each choice  $j$ , so that  $U_{ij} = V_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$ . Consider the simple case of three choices. For notational ease, let  $\eta_{i2} = \varepsilon_{i2} - \varepsilon_{i1}$  and  $\eta_{i3} = \varepsilon_{i3} - \varepsilon_{i1}$ . The probability of choosing alternative 1 is the probability that  $U_{i1}$  is the highest evaluation<sup>2</sup> :

$$P(y_i = 1) = P(U_{i1} > U_{i2} \text{ and } U_{i1} > U_{i3}) \quad (9)$$

$$= P(V_{i1} + \varepsilon_{i1} > V_{i2} + \varepsilon_{i2} \text{ and } V_{i1} + \varepsilon_{i1} > V_{i3} + \varepsilon_{i3}) \quad (10)$$

$$= P(\eta_{i2} < V_{i1} - V_{i2} \text{ and } \eta_{i3} < V_{i1} - V_{i3}) \quad (11)$$

$$= \int_{-\infty}^{V_{i1}-V_{i2}} \int_{-\infty}^{V_{i1}-V_{i3}} f(\eta_{i2}, \eta_{i3}) d\eta_{i3} d\eta_{i2}, \quad (12)$$

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<sup>2</sup> I owe a debt to Marco Steenbergen for this formulation of the MNP model, which I first saw in his class notes for a graduate seminar on maximum likelihood estimation in the Spring of 2006.

where  $f(\eta_{i2}, \eta_{i3})$  is the joint probability density function (PDF) of  $\eta_{i2}$  and  $\eta_{i3}$ . In this case, the PDF is a multivariate normal distribution, a notoriously difficult function to integrate. In general, computers have a difficult time computing or estimating multiple integrals. But choice probability formulas in MNP with  $N$  alternatives involve  $(N - 1)$ tuple integrals.

Binary probit models are under-specified in that we cannot simultaneously estimate the coefficients and the variance of the errors. Therefore, we assume that the error variance is 1 and estimate the coefficients using this normalization. In effect, we are dividing all the coefficients by the standard deviation of the errors. But then we are really estimating  $\frac{\beta}{\sigma}$  rather than  $\beta$ , so we cannot trust the direct point estimates from a binary probit model. Multinomial probit models make a similar normalization: they constrain one of the variances in the differenced variance-covariance matrix<sup>3</sup>. So, in the choice probability described above, the variance-covariance matrix of  $\eta_2 = \varepsilon_2 - \varepsilon_1$  and  $\eta_3 = \varepsilon_3 - \varepsilon_1$  is

$$\begin{bmatrix} \sigma_{\eta_2}^2 & . \\ \sigma_{\eta_2, \eta_3} & \sigma_{\eta_3}^2 \end{bmatrix}, \quad (13)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma_{\eta_2}^2 &= V(\varepsilon_2 - \varepsilon_1) = V(\varepsilon_2) + V(\varepsilon_1) - Cov(\varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_1) \\ &= \sigma_{\varepsilon_1}^2 + \sigma_{\varepsilon_2}^2 - \rho_{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2} \sigma_{\varepsilon_1} \sigma_{\varepsilon_2}. \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

Similarly,

$$\sigma_{\eta_3}^2 = \sigma_{\varepsilon_1}^2 + \sigma_{\varepsilon_3}^2 - \rho_{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_3} \sigma_{\varepsilon_1} \sigma_{\varepsilon_3}. \quad (15)$$

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<sup>3</sup> See Bolduc (1999) for a more detailed description of variance normalization and simulated maximum likelihood for the MNP model.

And the covariance is

$$\sigma_{\eta_2, \eta_3} = E \left[ (\eta_2 - E(\eta_2)) (\eta_3 - E(\eta_3)) \right] = E(\eta_2 \eta_3) \quad (16)$$

$$= E[(\varepsilon_2 - \varepsilon_1)(\varepsilon_3 - \varepsilon_1)] \quad (17)$$

$$= E(\varepsilon_2 \varepsilon_3) - E(\varepsilon_2 \varepsilon_1) - E(\varepsilon_3 \varepsilon_1) + E(\varepsilon_1^2) \quad (18)$$

$$= \rho_{\varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_3} \sigma_{\varepsilon_2} \sigma_{\varepsilon_3} - \rho_{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2} \sigma_{\varepsilon_1} \sigma_{\varepsilon_2} - \rho_{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_3} \sigma_{\varepsilon_1} \sigma_{\varepsilon_3} + \sigma_{\varepsilon_1}^2. \quad (19)$$

MNP only requires that one variance in the differenced variance-covariance matrix in equation 13 be constrained to some constant value. The “asmprobit” routine in Stata makes normalizations which are more restrictive<sup>4</sup>. In order to ensure that  $\sigma_{\eta_2}^2$  is constrained to be constant, “asmprobit” constrains the variance of both the first and second choice to be 1, and every correlation involving the first choice to be zero (Statacorp 2007):

$$\sigma_{\varepsilon_1}^2 = 1, \quad \sigma_{\varepsilon_2}^2 = 1, \quad (20)$$

$$\rho_{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2} = 0, \quad \rho_{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_3} = 0, \quad (21)$$

which implies that

$$\sigma_{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2} = \rho_{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2} \sigma_{\varepsilon_1} \sigma_{\varepsilon_2} = 0, \quad (22)$$

$$\sigma_{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_3} = \rho_{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_3} \sigma_{\varepsilon_1} \sigma_{\varepsilon_3} = 0, \quad (23)$$

$$\sigma_{\varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_3} = \rho_{\varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_3} \sigma_{\varepsilon_2} \sigma_{\varepsilon_3} = \rho_{\varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_3} \sigma_{\varepsilon_3}. \quad (24)$$

Then the variance-covariance matrix of  $(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_3)'$  used by the “asmprobit” command

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<sup>4</sup> The “asmprobit” command estimates an MNP model while estimating some of the variance-covariance elements. The “mprobit” command in Stata assumes all error correlations to be zero (Statacorp 2007). Therefore the “mprobit” model in Stata assumes IIA, and adds nothing over MNL. For all intents and purposes, “asmprobit” is the only useful MNP model offered by Stata.

is

$$\begin{bmatrix} \sigma_{\varepsilon_1}^2 & \cdot & \cdot \\ \sigma_{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2} & \sigma_{\varepsilon_2}^2 & \cdot \\ \sigma_{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_3} & \sigma_{\varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_3} & \sigma_{\varepsilon_3}^2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & \cdot & \cdot \\ 0 & 1 & \cdot \\ 0 & \rho_{\varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_3} \sigma_{\varepsilon_3} & \sigma_{\varepsilon_3}^2 \end{bmatrix}, \quad (25)$$

so the variance-covariance matrix of  $(\eta_2, \eta_3)'$  becomes

$$\begin{bmatrix} 2 & \cdot \\ \rho_{\varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_3} \sigma_{\varepsilon_3} + 1 & 1 + \sigma_{\varepsilon_3}^2 \end{bmatrix}. \quad (26)$$

Therefore, in the three choice case, the only elements of the error covariance structure estimated by the “asmprobit” command are the variance of the third choice ( $\sigma_{\varepsilon_3}^2$ ) and the correlation between the second and third choices ( $\rho_{\varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_3}$ ). These two parameters are estimated along with the coefficients. Unfortunately, as is shown later in this paper, these estimates are rarely very accurate or useful.

The likelihood functions for multinomial logit and multinomial probit differ only in the formulation of the choice probabilities. Let

$$\lambda_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } y_i = j, \\ 0 & \text{if } y_i \neq j. \end{cases} \quad (27)$$

Then the likelihood function is

$$L = \prod_{i=1}^N \prod_{j=1}^M P(y_i = j)^{\lambda_{ij}}, \quad (28)$$

which is maximized with respect to the coefficients, and in the case of MNP, the unconstrained variances and covariances. For the logit models, the choice probability inside the double-product is straight forward, so these models are computed quickly. But for MNP this function is extremely complex. There are simulation methods to approximate the maximum likelihood values for MNP, but even these take time. Whatever variation



of MNP is used, a powerful computer and patience are both necessary.

For MNP, standard maximum likelihood estimation of the likelihood function will fail to converge. Stata and other statistical packages use instead *simulated* maximum likelihood techniques. In essence, the choice probabilities on the MNP model are estimated using a technique involving random draws and monte carlo estimation. The most common simulated maximum likelihood technique is the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) algorithm (Geweke 1991, Keane 1990, Keane 1994, Hajivassiliou and McFadden 1998, Hajivassiliou, McFadden and Ruud 1996), which is the algorithm used by the Stata “asmprobit” command (Statacorp 2007). I suspect that MNP loses some efficiency in the simulated maximum likelihood estimation. In this paper, I test whether this computational disadvantage of MNP causes MNP to be less accurate than biased MNL, even when IIA is a highly erroneous assumption. I do not delve into the exact specifications of the GHK algorithm to find its deficiencies; instead I compare the final results of the two models since few researchers in political science are concerned with the details of GHK estimation, but many are concerned with the performance of MNP generally. Identifying the precise areas in which GHK may lose accuracy and fixing those deficiencies is an agenda for future research.

As the number of alternatives increases, the complexity of the choice probabilities in MNP increases drastically. Therefore, we can expect that MNP is more efficient when there are fewer choices. But I find that MNL outperforms MNP even in the simple three-alternative case, which should raise serious concerns about the utility of MNP models for political science research in general.

## *Methodology*

Suppose we knew the true values of the parameters to be estimated by MNL and MNP. Then, it would be quite simple to compare the two models based on how accurately

they return point estimates of the coefficients<sup>5</sup>. But such a methodology is working backwards: typically we use a model to estimate the truth; here, we use the truth to evaluate the model.

### *The Data Generating Process*

If we start with the true values of the parameters, then it may not matter what values these parameters take. The important point is how well each model returns these values. The means through which the “true” data is obtained is called a data generating process (DGP). Often, some stochastic algorithm is used. Alvarez and Nagler (1994), for example, generate independent variables using a uniform number generator, and multiply each predictor by an arbitrarily chosen coefficient. Here, I choose to model the DGP in two ways: one after data from the 1987 British Election Study and one in the style of Alvarez and Nagler. I call the models that use the British data to model the DGP the “British” models, and I call the models that generate the data uniformly the “basic” models. The basic models are simpler, but the data do not resemble any real political data that researchers in the field may encounter. In contrast, the 1987 British election survey dataset has been used in a number of important papers on multinomial choice methodology (Whitten and Palmer 1996, Alvarez and Nagler 1998, Quinn, Martin and Whitford 1999, for example). Using real data to model the DGP places the comparison within the realm of very real current research, so the results should be more immediately useful for researchers in the field.

Theoretically, the latent variables in a probabilistic choice model represent the utility an individual has for each alternative. I model these latent equations in each DGP. The latent variables are the sum of two parts: the deterministic part derived from the variables and their coefficients, and a stochastic error. Data is arranged in the form of a person-choice matrix, in which one observation is identified by the voter and the choice

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<sup>5</sup> After accounting for the normalization of the variance in the probit model.

(Conservative, Labour, or Alliance) being considered. In each multinomial model, one choice must be designated as the base choice. Both MNL and MNP make the same standardization; they essentially set the coefficients on the choice-fixed predictors all equal to zero for the base choice. For the choice-fixed variables, the coefficients describe the effect of the variable on a voter’s evaluation of choices 2 and 3 (Labour and the Alliance) relative to their evaluation of choice 1 (Conservative).

### *Basic Models*

In the basic models, the coefficients and the data are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution. One randomly generated independent variable is allowed to vary across choices, and another independent variable and a constant are fixed across choices. Since the data generated here are completely artificial, I refer to the alternatives simply as choice 1, choice 2, and choice 3. I set choice 1 as the base choice.

The choice-variant data,  $z$ , are independently drawn from a uniform distribution from 0 to 1.  $x$  is also drawn from a uniform distribution from 0 to 1, but  $x$  is held constant for different alternatives within the observations for each individual. The errors,  $\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2$ , and  $\varepsilon_3$  are randomly drawn from a trivariate normal distribution with means 0:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{i,1} \\ \varepsilon_{i,2} \\ \varepsilon_{i,3} \end{bmatrix} \sim N\left(\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}', \Sigma\right). \quad (29)$$

The different structures of the variance-covariance matrix of these errors, denoted by  $\Sigma$ , are crucial to the theoretical goals of the simulations. I discuss the error structures more thoroughly in section 3.2. In these basic models, the variances of the choice errors are all set at one, but the covariances vary as an experimental control. The errors must be drawn independently for each individual, but jointly across the alternatives for each individual.

Five coefficients ( $\lambda$ ,  $\beta_{2,0}$ ,  $\beta_{2,1}$ ,  $\beta_{3,0}$ , and  $\beta_{3,1}$ ) are independently drawn from a uniform distribution from  $-1$  to  $1$  before each iteration of MNL and MNP estimation. MNL and MNP will provide estimates of these five randomly generated coefficients. The variable  $U$  contains the latent utilities of each individual for each choice. The simulated vote choice of each individual is the alternative with the highest value of  $U$ . For the basic DGP, the evaluation of individual  $i$  of choice 1 is

$$U_{i,1} = \lambda z_{i,1} + \varepsilon_{i,1}. \quad (30)$$

The evaluation of choice 2 is

$$U_{i,2} = \lambda z_{i,2} + \beta_{2,1}x_i + \beta_{2,0} + \varepsilon_{i,2}, \quad (31)$$

and the evaluation of choice 3 is

$$U_{i,3} = \lambda z_{i,3} + \beta_{3,1}x_i + \beta_{3,0} + \varepsilon_{i,3}. \quad (32)$$

As an example, the generated dataset may look like the data in the table 1. We can

*Table 1: Example Data from the Basic DGP.*

Individual	Alternative	Vote	$U$	$z$	$x$	$\varepsilon_1$	$\varepsilon_2$	$\varepsilon_3$
1	1	0	0.34	0.12	0.14	0.27	.	.
1	2	0	0.59	0.41	0.14	.	0.30	.
1	3	1	1.54	0.72	0.14	.	.	1.13
2	1	1	1.00	0.87	0.64	0.48	.	.
2	2	0	-1.08	0.46	0.64	.	-1.55	.
2	3	0	-0.53	0.42	0.64	.	.	-0.66
3	1	0	-0.70	0.89	0.56	-1.23	.	.
3	2	1	0.34	0.06	0.56	.	0.14	.
3	3	0	-1.41	0.68	0.56	.	.	-1.70

run a hybrid multinomial logit model on the data by entering the following command

into Stata:

```
xi: clogit vote z i.alternative i.alternative|x, group(individual)
```

The “clogit” command runs a conditional logit model which considers independent variables like  $z$  that vary across alternatives. The “xi” and “i.” commands instruct Stata to break the categorical variable “alternative” into dummy variables for each category. Choice 1 is omitted as the base alternative. This model provides a coefficient estimate on  $z$  which will be compared to the known, true coefficient  $\lambda$ . The model also provides coefficient estimates on dummy variables for choice 2 and choice 3, comparable to the true coefficients  $\beta_{2,0}$  and  $\beta_{3,0}$ , and on these dummy variables interacted with  $x$ , comparable to the true coefficients  $\beta_{2,1}$  and  $\beta_{3,1}$ .

To run a multinomial probit model, we enter the following command:

```
asmprobit vote z, case(individual) alternatives(alternative)  
casevars(x)
```

In order to run a multinomial probit model, we must specify the cases, individuals in this case, and the alternatives, contained in the variable named “alternative.” Variables like  $x$  that are fixed across alternatives must be specified within the “casevars” option. The multinomial probit model provides estimates of the same coefficients that the hybrid multinomial logit model does.

We must account for the normalization that is made for the probit estimates that is not made for the logit estimates. The way I account for the standardized coefficients is described in section 3.5. After fixing the coefficients, they are comparable to the true parameters in exactly the same way, and we can directly see which model returned the coefficients more accurately.

### British Models

To obtain realistic coefficients for the British DGP, I run a regression on affect, or the affinity a person has for each party, using the 1987 election data. For this regression, the data is set up in the same way as in the basic model. Here, however, we estimate a greater number of parameters. In this setup, the dependent variable is the affect of an individual for each party. Choice-specific variables such as ideological distance are treated as regular regressors. Choice-fixed variables such as the respondent's age and gender are multiplied by dummy variables for each (non-base) choice so that the effect of that variable on the affect for each choice can be derived. Below I present the results from this regression<sup>6</sup>. For the British models I use the data from a sample of real British voters consisting of 2440 respondents after dropping observations with missing values, and the corresponding coefficients from the regression in table 2<sup>7</sup>. Conservative is the base choice. For the choice-fixed variables, the coefficients describe the effect of the variable on a voter's evaluation of Labour or the Alliance relative to their evaluation of the Conservative party.

For individual  $i$ , the evaluation of the Conservative party is

$$U_{i,C} = \sum_{k=1}^7 \lambda_k z_{i,k,C} + \varepsilon_{i,C}, \quad (33)$$

---

<sup>6</sup> The coding of these variables is as follows: affect is v13a when the choice is Conservative, v13b when the choice is Labour, and the average of v13c and v13d when the choice is Alliance. Labour and Alliance are dummy variables that equal 1 when v8a=2 and 3 respectively. Defense distance through welfare distance are squared differences between the individual's self placement on the issue (v23a, v28a, v29a, v34a, v35a, v39a, v40a) and the means over all respondents for the party position on each issue (parts b, c, and d of the same question). Union is a dummy that equals 1 if v49c=1 or 2, and 0 if v49c=0. Gender is v58b, age is v58c, and income is v64. The regional variables south through scotland are dummy variables derived from v48. Homeowner is a dummy that equals 1 if v60ab=02, and 0 otherwise.

<sup>7</sup> Please refer to table 2 to see the labels for the coefficients and covariates. For the ideological distances, the observations referring to the Conservative party are labeled with the subscript  $C$ , the observations referring to Labour are labeled with the subscript  $L$ , and the observations referring to the alliance are labeled with the subscript  $A$ .

Table 2: Regression on Party Affect, Britain 1987.

Affect	Coeff.	S.E.	Var. Label	Coeff. Label
Defense	-.012***	.001	$z_{1,C}, z_{1,L}, z_{1,A}$	$\lambda_1$
Unemployment/Inflation	-.004***	.001	$z_{2,C}, z_{2,L}, z_{2,A}$	$\lambda_2$
Taxation	-.004***	.001	$z_{3,C}, z_{3,L}, z_{3,A}$	$\lambda_3$
Nationalization	-.014***	.001	$z_{4,C}, z_{4,L}, z_{4,A}$	$\lambda_4$
Redistribution	-.009***	.001	$z_{5,C}, z_{5,L}, z_{5,A}$	$\lambda_5$
Crime	.006***	.001	$z_{6,C}, z_{6,L}, z_{6,A}$	$\lambda_6$
Welfare	-.010***	.000	$z_{7,C}, z_{7,L}, z_{7,A}$	$\lambda_7$
Constant	3.407***	.159	$x_1$	
Labour	1.603***	.222		$\beta_{1,L}$
Alliance	-.567**	.220		$\beta_{1,A}$
Union	-.266***	.046	$x_2$	
Union x Labour	.451***	.066		$\beta_{2,L}$
Union x Alliance	.294***	.065		$\beta_{2,A}$
Gender	.075*	.041	$x_2$	
Gender x Labour	-.194***	.058		$\beta_{3,L}$
Gender x Alliance	.083	.058		$\beta_{3,A}$
Age	.008***	.001	$x_4$	
Age x Labour	-.016***	.002		$\beta_{4,L}$
Age x Alliance	-.005**	.002		$\beta_{4,A}$
Income	.042***	.008	$x_5$	
Income x Labour	-.122***	.011		$\beta_{5,L}$
Income x Alliance	-.041***	.011		$\beta_{5,A}$
South	-.113	.112	$x_6$	
South x Labour	-.442***	.158		$\beta_{6,L}$
South x Alliance	.411***	.158		$\beta_{6,A}$
Midlands	-.039	.110	$x_7$	
Midlands x Labour	-.461***	.155		$\beta_{7,L}$
Midlands x Alliance	.251	.155		$\beta_{7,A}$
North	-.227**	.109	$x_8$	
North x Labour	.127	.154		$\beta_{8,L}$
North x Alliance	.369**	.154		$\beta_{8,A}$
Wales	-.473***	.133	$x_9$	
Wales x Labour	.666***	.188		$\beta_{9,L}$
Wales x Alliance	.702***	.188		$\beta_{9,A}$
Scotland	-.285**	.122	$x_{10}$	
Scotland x Labour	.091	.172		$\beta_{10,L}$
Scotland x Alliance	.419**	.172		$\beta_{10,A}$
Homeowner	.179***	.048	$x_{11}$	
Homeowner x Labour	-.553***	.068		$\beta_{11,L}$
Homeowner x Alliance	-.120*	.068		$\beta_{11,A}$

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , R-squared=.3600, Adj. R-squared=.3565

for the Labour party

$$U_{i,L} = \sum_{k=1}^7 \lambda_k z_{i,k,L} + \sum_{j=1}^{11} \beta_{j,L} x_{i,j} + \varepsilon_{i,L}, \quad (34)$$

and for the Alliance

$$U_{i,A} = \sum_{k=1}^7 \lambda_k z_{i,k,A} + \sum_{j=1}^{11} \beta_{j,A} x_{i,j} + \varepsilon_{i,A}. \quad (35)$$

Once again,  $\varepsilon_{i,C}$ ,  $\varepsilon_{i,L}$ , and  $\varepsilon_{i,A}$  are randomly generated from a trivariate normal distribution with means equal to zero and a predefined variance-covariance structure. The variances of the errors are not equal to zero in the British models. Instead, the value of each variance is derived from the data. Again, that process is described in detail in section 3.2. The correlations, however, vary in the same way as in the basic models. Unless strategic voting is being considered (section 3.3), the simulated vote-choice of individual  $i$  is simply the alternative with the highest associated utility. For the British models:

$$\tilde{y}_i = \begin{cases} \text{Conservative if } \max(U_{i,C}, U_{i,L}, U_{i,A}) = U_{i,C}, \\ \text{Labour if } \max(U_{i,C}, U_{i,L}, U_{i,A}) = U_{i,L}, \\ \text{Alliance if } \max(U_{i,C}, U_{i,L}, U_{i,A}) = U_{i,A}. \end{cases} \quad (36)$$

In other words, if individual  $i$  is voting sincerely, then she chooses to vote for the party she evaluates most highly. With a known error variance structure, I have now generated a dependent variable which can be analyzed using MNL and MNP. The results from MNL and MNP can now be directly compared to the true values of the parameters listed in table 2.



### *Error Correlation Structures and the IIA Assumption*

IIA holds precisely when there is no covariance between the errors in  $\Sigma$ . Here I choose formulations of  $\Sigma$  to consider in the simulations. I consider cases that span the spectrum of the validity of IIA: in one case IIA holds perfectly, but in others IIA becomes an increasingly bad assumption.

In the regression presented in table 2, the “natural” variance-covariance and correlation matrices for  $\varepsilon_{i,C}$ ,  $\varepsilon_{i,L}$ , and  $\varepsilon_{i,A}$  can be derived. Recall that the data is in the form of a person-choice matrix, in which each observation is uniquely defined by the individual and the choice being considered by that individual. So individual  $i$  receives three observations in the data: one where individual  $i$  considers the Conservative party, one where Labour is considered, and one where the Alliance is considered. Predicted residuals are calculated and are separated into three new variables: one for each of the three choices. The natural variance-covariance matrix is the variance-covariance matrix of these three parts of the predicted residuals. Specifically:

$$\Sigma_{\text{natural}} = \begin{bmatrix} 1.133 & . & . \\ -0.406 & 1.127 & . \\ -0.083 & -0.039 & 0.604 \end{bmatrix}, \quad (37)$$

where 1.133 is the variance of the residuals of observations in which voters consider the Conservative party, 1.127 is the variance of the residuals of observations in which voters consider the Labour party, and 0.604 is the variance of the residuals of observations in which voters consider the Alliance.  $\Sigma_{\text{natural}}$  yields the correlation matrix

$$\chi_{\text{natural}} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & . & . \\ -0.359 & 1 & . \\ -0.100 & -0.047 & 1 \end{bmatrix}. \quad (38)$$

So the unobserved predictors of affect on the Conservative and Labour parties are strongly and negatively correlated. The unobserved predictors of affect on the Conservative party and the Liberal-Social Democrat Alliance are negatively but more modestly correlated, and Labour and the Alliance are nearly independent.

In order to model the simulated data as closely as possible after the 1987 British election, I use these natural variances in each experimental variance-covariance matrix in the models described below. So for each experimental case in the British models

$$\Sigma = \begin{bmatrix} 1.133 & . & . \\ \sigma_{C,L} & 1.127 & . \\ \sigma_{C,A} & \sigma_{L,A} & 0.604 \end{bmatrix}. \quad (39)$$

For the basic models, we use

$$\Sigma = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & . & . \\ \sigma_{1,2} & 1 & . \\ \sigma_{1,3} & \sigma_{2,3} & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad (40)$$

where for each model, for choices  $a$  and  $b$ ,

$$\sigma_{a,b} = \rho_{a,b} \sqrt{\sigma_a^2} \sqrt{\sigma_b^2}. \quad (41)$$

Here, the variances  $\sigma_a^2$  and  $\sigma_b^2$  are the known constants listed above which are specific to each DGP, and  $\rho_{a,b}$  is the correlation between errors for choices  $a$  and  $b$ . So, for the British models

$$\sigma_{C,L} = \rho_{C,L} \times \sqrt{1.133} \times \sqrt{1.127} = 1.13\rho_{C,L}, \quad (42)$$

$$\sigma_{C,A} = \rho_{C,A} \times \sqrt{1.133} \times \sqrt{0.604} = 0.83\rho_{C,A}, \quad (43)$$

$$\sigma_{L,A} = \rho_{L,A} \times \sqrt{1.127} \times \sqrt{0.604} = 0.83\rho_{L,A}, \quad (44)$$

and for the basic models

$$\sigma_{1,2} = \rho_{1,2} \times \sqrt{1} \times \sqrt{1} = \rho_{1,2}, \quad (45)$$

$$\sigma_{1,3} = \rho_{1,3} \times \sqrt{1} \times \sqrt{1} = \rho_{1,3}, \quad (46)$$

$$\sigma_{2,3} = \rho_{2,3} \times \sqrt{1} \times \sqrt{1} = \rho_{2,3}. \quad (47)$$

The correlations are directly indicative of the validity of the IIA assumption, so I only need to alter these correlations  $\rho_{a,b}$ . I consider 11 models, which I call models *A* through *K*:

$$\chi_A = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & . & . \\ 0 & 1 & . \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \chi_B = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & . & . \\ .10 & 1 & . \\ .10 & .10 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad (48)$$

$$\chi_C = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & . & . \\ .25 & 1 & . \\ .25 & .25 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \chi_D = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & . & . \\ .50 & 1 & . \\ .50 & .50 & 1 \end{bmatrix},$$

$$\chi_E = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & . & . \\ .75 & 1 & . \\ .75 & .75 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \chi_F = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & . & . \\ 0 & 1 & . \\ .80 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix},$$

$$\chi_G = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & . & . \\ 0 & 1 & . \\ -.80 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \chi_H = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & . & . \\ 0 & 1 & . \\ .50 & .80 & 1 \end{bmatrix},$$

$$\chi_I = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & . & . \\ 0 & 1 & . \\ -.50 & .80 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \chi_J = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & . & . \\ -.20 & 1 & . \\ -.50 & .80 & 1 \end{bmatrix},$$

$$\chi_K = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & . & . \\ -0.359 & 1 & . \\ -0.100 & -0.047 & 1 \end{bmatrix}.$$

Models  $A$ ,  $F$ ,  $G$ ,  $H$ ,  $I$ , and  $J$  were considered by Alvarez and Nagler (1994). Models  $E$  through  $J$  probably set the correlations at levels higher than anything researchers are likely to see in reality, but it is important to observe the behavior of the multinomial choice models in the case of extreme violation of IIA. Notice that the correlation matrix for model  $K$  is precisely the same as the natural correlation matrix presented above. Since these variances come directly from real data, the results for model  $K$  are probably the most directly applicable to applied research.

In order to generate the simulated data, I first use a random number generator to draw  $\varepsilon_{i,1}$ ,  $\varepsilon_{i,2}$ , and  $\varepsilon_{i,3}$  ( or  $\varepsilon_{i,C}$ ,  $\varepsilon_{i,L}$ , and  $\varepsilon_{i,A}$ ) for each observation. The random number generator draws from a trivariate normal distribution as defined above, with means 0 and variance-covariance matrix  $\Sigma$  specified by one of the models  $A$  through  $K$ . Therefore, the correlations are defined *first*, and the correlated errors are then passed to the DGP.

### *Strategic Voting*

As discussed earlier, one reason why IIA may be an inappropriate assumption for many elections is the presence of strategic voting. MNL and MNP work the same way in considering strategic voting. For MNL and MNP the evaluation equations  $U_{i,C}$ ,  $U_{i,L}$ , and  $U_{i,A}$  have two parts: a deterministic part composed of the predictors and their coefficients, and the stochastic errors which represent the unexplained variance. Neither MNL or MNP necessarily accounts for deterministic components which may depend on

the other choices<sup>8</sup>. A voter's evaluation of the Ralph Nader and the Green Party in the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election, for example, probably depended on the strength of the two major parties and their candidates in the voter's state. In close elections, very liberal voters were often compelled to vote for the Democratic Party over the Green Party, against their sincere preferences, in order to help defeat the Republican Party. But predictors in these MNL and MNP models depend only on the voter and the choice and not on other choices. Therefore, violations of IIA and strategic voting cannot be accounted for by the deterministic parts of these models. MNL assumes independence of the errors, so there is no way whatsoever to model strategy in an MNL model. MNP may reflect strategy in the unexplained variance of the model. Therefore, theoretically, the presence of strategic voting should improve the performance of MNP relative to MNL.

In the data from the 1987 British election, voters were asked why they voted the way they did. Many of the voters gave answers which reflected strategic considerations<sup>9</sup>. These respondents were then asked which party they really preferred<sup>10</sup>. I generate a binary indicator variable which equals one when a respondent votes for a party other than her most preferred one. This indicator is not a particularly exact measure of strategic voting in and of itself, but it does provide a useful way to gage the performance of MNL and MNP when voters do not vote for their first choice. I run a binary logistic model on the indicator for a strategic vote. I use a number of predictors which seem to make

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<sup>8</sup> Theoretically, the model can account for strategic voting by controlling for it as a predictive variable. Whether or not a person votes strategically, however, is not typically observable. Survey respondents will not always admit to voting strategically, and proxies for strategic voting are not likely to be exact. In fact, most multinomial models of vote choice make no attempt to account for strategic voting in the deterministic part of the model. For example, none of the articles listed above which use the 1987 British election data consider strategy. Failing to include strategic voting in the model specification leaves only the stochastic components to account for the variance generated by strategic voting.

<sup>9</sup> Variable v9a gives voter responses to the question "which comes closest to the main reason you voted the way you did?" 211 respondents answered "preferred party had no chance of winning," 18 answered "voted against party(ies) or candidate," and 6 responded "tactical voting."

<sup>10</sup> Variables v9b and v9c.

some sense<sup>11</sup>. My intention is to create a measure for each respondent of the probability of a strategic vote in the British models. Since these probabilities will be used to alter artificial data, I am not overly concerned with the correct theoretical specification of this model. I report the results of this binary logistic regression in table 3 below.

Table 3: Logistic Regression on Strategic Voting, Britian 1987.

Strategic	Coefficient	Standard Error
Labour	-.061	.159
Alliance	1.014***	.130
Conservative79	-.052	.147
Labour79	.107	.141
Liberal79	-.522***	.197
Conservative83	-.863***	.154
Labour83	-.362**	.156
Alliance83	-.608***	.161
Gender	.075	.087
Age	.003	.003
Income	-.024	.017
Affect	.021	.036
Education age	.007	.019
Children	.102**	.043
Mother agree	-.230	.164
Father agree	.111	.168
Constant	-2.461***	.426

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ,

Pseudo R-squared=.0526.

Again, this model is not a particularly good one by most standards. Many of the predictors fail to be significant. But the model will provide a rudimentary measure of the probability of a strategic vote for the purposes of the simulation. This variable, which I denote  $\pi$ , is summarized in table 4 below. On average, a voter will vote strategically 8.6 percent of the time. Of 2440 voters then, we expect about 210 strategic votes. Certainly

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<sup>11</sup> I use Labour, Alliance, gender, age, affect and income as predictors which I also used in the regression on affect in table 1. I also use dummy variables for agreement with the political preferences of the respondent's parents (v46a and v46b), whether the respondent has any children (v54a1), the respondent's age when they completed their education (v55), and dummy variables for a vote in the 1983 and 1979 general elections for each of the three main parties (v65a and v65b).

this change is enough to affect the estimations of MNL and MNP.

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Predicted Probability of Strategic Voting.

	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
$\pi$	7230	.086	.053	.018	.371

In the British model simulations, I generate a variable  $\delta$  that contains random numbers generated from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. For an individual, if  $\delta < \pi$ , the voter chooses their second highest evaluation instead. Mathematically,

$$(\tilde{y}_i | \delta < \pi) = \begin{cases} \max_{(L,A)} (U_{i,L}, U_{i,A}) & \text{if } \max (U_{i,C}, U_{i,L}, U_{i,A}) = U_{i,C}, \\ \max_{(C,A)} (U_{i,C}, U_{i,A}) & \text{if } \max (U_{i,C}, U_{i,L}, U_{i,A}) = U_{i,L}, \\ \max_{(C,L)} (U_{i,C}, U_{i,L}) & \text{if } \max (U_{i,C}, U_{i,L}, U_{i,A}) = U_{i,A}. \end{cases} \quad (49)$$

In the case where an individual evaluates two parties equally higher than the other party, one of the parties is randomly selected as the first choice and the other is the second choice. For the British DGP models, each simulation for error models  $A$  through  $K$  is run twice, once without strategic considerations where the dependent variable is defined as in equation 36, and once with strategic considerations where the dependent variable is defined as in equation 49. I also run simulations for models  $A$  through  $K$  with a basic DGP model. I run 33 simulations in all.

### Monte Carlo Simulations

Each simulation consists of 100 iterations of the same procedure. I run each of these simulations on Stata Version 10.0, Special Edition<sup>12</sup>. Below I summarize the simulation process, step by step:

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<sup>12</sup> The Stata code for these simulations is available upon request.

- The data are generated:
  - For the British DGP models, the coefficients and covariates are saved from the regression on party affect in table 2 and are therefore the same from iteration to iteration throughout the simulation. For the basic models, the coefficients and covariates are all drawn from uniform distributions before each iteration<sup>13</sup>.
  - New errors are generated during each iteration. The errors are random numbers drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with means zero and a variance-covariance structure defined by one of the models  $A$  through  $K$ <sup>14</sup>.
  - The latent evaluation variables for each choice are generated from the formulas described in equations 30, 31, and 32 for the basic models and 33, 34, and 35 for the British models. Because the errors are stochastic, the simulated vote-choice should be slightly different from iteration to iteration.
  - The British models are each run once with strategic considerations and once without them. If strategic voting is not being considered, then the simulated vote-choice is the highest evaluation of the three latent variables defined in equations 33, 34, and 35. If strategic voting is being considered, a voter still votes for their highest evaluated party unless they are selected as strategic, in which case they vote for their second-highest evaluated party. Because the

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<sup>13</sup> The random number generator in Stata is really a *quasi* random number generator. Given a number as a seed, Stata will use an algorithm to produce a string of numbers from that seed that resemble random numbers. But Stata uses a default seed which produces the same “random” numbers whenever Stata is launched. At first I was generating the same exact numbers from simulation to simulation, which was severely biasing my results. It is important to change the random seed from simulation to simulation when doing Monte Carlo work in Stata. I suggest generating a string of random numbers and setting the new random seed to the next number in that list for each simulation. The Stata manual (Statacorp. 2007) provides a detailed discussion of this quasi-random number generator.

<sup>14</sup> I use the “drawnorm” command in Stata to generate these errors. Since the data is in the form of a person-choice matrix, be sure that all of the choice errors for each individual are drawn together, otherwise the errors will be independent since each draw is independent from other draws. In other words, make sure that the errors are fixed across choices as in table 1.



strategic draws are stochastic, the voters who are selected as strategic should vary from iteration to iteration.

- An MNL and MNP model is run on the simulated data. The simulated vote-choice is the dependent variable.
- The coefficient point estimates and p-values from these models are saved as well as the estimates from MNP of the unconstrained elements of the variance-covariance matrix.

### *Evaluative Measures*

The estimates from MNL and MNP are then evaluated for their accuracy compared to the true model. One problem, described in section 2.2, is that probit models standardize the base variances, so coefficients are all scaled by a normalized variance parameter. If the true parameter to be estimated is  $\beta$ , then MNL provides a direct estimate of  $\beta$ , but MNP provides a scaled coefficient estimate that takes the form  $\frac{\beta}{\sigma}$ . In order to directly compare MNL and MNP point estimates I divide each coefficient estimate from MNL, MNP, and the true model by the mean of the absolute values of the coefficient estimates from that model. I use the absolute values in order to preserve signs. Suppose there are  $M$  coefficients returned by the models, then for MNP

$$\frac{\beta_1}{\sigma} \bigg/ \frac{\sum_{j=1}^M (|\frac{\beta_j}{\sigma}|)}{M} \tag{50}$$

$$= \frac{\beta_1}{\sigma} \bigg/ \frac{\frac{1}{\sigma} \sum_{j=1}^M (|\beta_j|)}{M} \tag{51}$$

$$= \frac{\beta_1}{\sigma} \bigg/ \frac{\sum_{j=1}^M (|\beta_j|)}{M} \frac{1}{\sigma} \tag{52}$$

$$= \beta_1 \bigg/ \frac{\sum_{j=1}^M (|\beta_j|)}{M}, \tag{53}$$

which can be directly compared to corresponding measures from MNL and the true model since the variances from probit have been canceled out.

I use three measures to compare MNL and MNP.

- **Measure 1.** The scaled coefficients for MNL and MNP are compared against the scaled, true coefficient values. Accuracy is assessed for each model using a mean squared error measurement. The lower this measurement, the closer a model returns the true coefficient estimates.
- **Measure 2.** Coefficients in multinomial choice models are usually interpreted for their signs and not their magnitudes. Estimates that switch the sign are therefore very poor estimates. MNL and MNP are compared using the percent of successful returns of coefficient signs. In the British models, the percent itself is reported. There are only five coefficients to estimate in the basic models, so the average number correct out of five is reported.
- **Measure 3.** For the British models, the regression coefficients in table 2 are either significant at the .1 level or are insignificant at that level. Likewise, MNL and MNP coefficient estimates are either significant or insignificant at the .1 level. I say that the MNL or MNP coefficient estimate returns the correct significance level if it is significant when the corresponding true coefficient is significant, or insignificant when the corresponding true coefficient is insignificant. For the British models only, MNL and MNP are compared using the percent of correct statistical inferences. In the basic models, the randomly generated coefficients have no standard errors. Therefore, there is no baseline of significance against which to compare MNL and MNP, so this third measure is omitted for the basic models.

For each of these three measures, I report the means for each of the 33 simulations over the 100 iterations. I perform t-tests on the equality of the means of these measures for

MNL and MNP for each simulation. The results are reported below. I also saved the unconstrained MNP estimates for the parameters in the variance-covariance matrix.

## *Results and Discussion*

The simulations, which each performed 100 iterations of data generation and MNL and MNP estimation, varied widely in their running times<sup>15</sup>. These simulation times are listed in table 5. The basic models ran more quickly because they involved the estimation of fewer parameters than the British models.

*Table 5: Simulation times.*

	Time to Complete (Days, Hours, Minutes)							
Model	Basic		Britain		Strategy			
A	2hr,	22m		14hr,	19m	13hr,	19m	
B	7hr,	56m		13hr,	39m	15hr,	24m	
C	2hr,	22m		16hr,	30m	15hr,	18m	
D	2hr,	20m	1d,	8hr,	40m	15hr,	24m	
E	2hr,	43m	2d,	5hr,	32m	1d,	9hr,	47m
F	2hr,	56m		14hr,	35m	13hr,	54m	
G	3hr,	32m	1d,	2hr,	37m	14hr,	35m	
H	3hr,	19m	3d,	23hr,	20m	2d,	3hr,	31m
I	2hr,	34m	3d,	9hr,	31m	3d,	18hr,	17m
J	2hr,	54m	3d,	3hr,	03m	1d,	18hr,	30m
K	2hr,	17m		14hr,	56m	14hr,	19m	

---

<sup>15</sup> The simulations were run on Stata 10, Special Edition, on a remote research computing server. According to the UNC help and support webpage, the server is a “cluster of dual-CPU hosts running Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3.0 for use by the research community at UNC-Chapel Hill. The compute nodes include both AMD Athlon nodes (1.6 GHz) and Intel Xeon IBM BladeCenter nodes (2.4, 2.8, and 3.2 GHz). Communication is through a Gigabit Ethernet network. Job management is handled by . . . LSF (Load Sharing Facility). The /netscr (Net Scratch) NFS-mounted file system provides scratch disk space for temporary work files” (Research Computing 2007).

## Comparing MNL and MNP

The results of the simulations are presented in table 6 for the British models, in table 7 for the British models with strategy, and in table 8 for the basic models. In table 8, sign is the average number coefficient signs correctly estimated out of 5. For each error correlation model  $A$  through  $K$ , the reported evaluative measures are the means over 100 iterations. The columns labeled  $\Delta$  are the values for MNP subtracted from the values for MNL. For point accuracy, lower values are better, so negative values of the difference indicated that MNL performs better than MNP, and positive values indicate that MNP performs better than MNL. For sign and significance accuracy higher values are better, so positive differences are good for MNL and negative differences are good for MNP. Each difference is tested for equality to zero. Differences that are significantly different from zero indicate that either MNP performs significantly better than MNP, or vice versa. The winning model should be clear from the sign of the difference.

Table 6: Mean Evaluative Measures for MNL and MNP, Britain 1987 Model.

Model	Point Accuracy			Sign			Significance		
	MNL	MNP	$\Delta$	MNL	MNP	$\Delta$	MNL	MNP	$\Delta$
A	1.77	2.24	-0.47***	90.1	88.55	1.55***	67.55	64.45	3.1***
B	1.65	2.09	-0.44***	90.9	90.17	0.73**	67.52	64.55	2.97***
C	1.81	2.24	-0.43***	90.93	90.21	0.72**	69.24	65.48	3.76***
D	3.28	3.23	0.05	92.79	91.17	1.62***	70.17	64.55	5.62***
E	5.39	4.6	0.79***	92.48	91.14	1.34***	70.1	48.21	21.89***
F	1.67	1.9	-0.23***	92.69	92.31	0.38	73.55	74.07	-0.52
G	2.24	2.51	-0.27***	87.76	86.72	1.04**	62.38	57.83	4.55***
H	6.68	5.8	0.88***	89.66	89.34	0.32	65.62	50.38	15.24***
I	7.44	6.35	1.09***	86.31	84.52	1.79***	54.55	38.14	16.41***
J	7.28	6.17	1.11***	85.76	84.69	1.07	54.93	34.66	20.27***
K	1.82	2.28	-0.46***	90.21	88.38	1.83***	64.48	61.1	3.38***

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , two tailed t-tests.

The simplest way to interpret the results is to determine when one multinomial model performs significantly better than the other, and to count the “wins” for each model this

Table 7: Mean Evaluative Measures for MNL and MNP, Britain 1987 Model with Strategic Voting.

Model	Point Accuracy			Sign			Significance		
	MNL	MNP	$\Delta$	MNL	MNP	$\Delta$	MNL	MNP	$\Delta$
A	1.89	2.33	-0.44***	89.76	89	0.76**	63.83	60.9	2.93***
B	2.06	2.61	-0.55***	88.24	87.83	0.41	63.31	60.66	2.65***
C	1.95	2.45	-0.50***	88.93	88	0.93**	65.76	62.38	3.38***
D	2.04	2.42	-0.38***	89.76	88.97	0.79**	68.03	65.17	2.86***
E	2.38	2.69	-0.31***	90.52	89.69	0.83**	69.07	65.76	3.31***
F	1.74	2.02	-0.28***	91.48	90.17	1.31***	71.41	70.66	0.75*
G	2.12	2.72	-0.60***	86.83	85.03	1.80***	58.21	54.03	4.18***
H	3.41	4.41	-1.00***	86.83	86.14	0.69**	64.97	61.93	3.04***
I	4.04	5.65	-1.61***	83.55	81.93	1.62***	54.97	48.55	6.42***
J	4.05	5.64	-1.59***	82.66	81.52	1.14	55.14	50.55	4.59***
K	2.04	2.61	-0.57***	87.93	86.83	1.10***	60.97	58.21	2.76***

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , two tailed t-tests.

way. The wins for each model are summarized in table 9. It is immediately clear that MNL has a whole lot more wins than MNP.

For the British models, MNL provides more accurate point estimates for models *A*, *B*, *C*, *F*, *G*, and most importantly *K*. MNP is more accurate for models *E*, *H*, *I*, and *J*. Model *D* is indeterminate. For the basic models, MNP returns more accurate point estimates for models *H* (marginally so), *I*, and *J*. Models *D* and *E* side with MNL here. In regards to the sign predictions, MNL predicts the correct sign of the coefficients for the British models more often than MNP for every correlation structure, and significantly so for every model except *F*, *H*, and *J*. The basic results for correct signs are nearly identical, except MNP wins model *I*, insignificantly. Finally, for the British models, MNL returns the correct significance levels more often than MNP for every model except *F*. For the strategic British models, MNL always outperforms MNP for all three measures.

Model *K* contains the “natural” variance-covariance structure from the residuals produced by the regression in table 2. Model *K* is also the closest model to a real world

Table 8: Mean Evaluative Measures for MNL and MNP, Basic Model.

Model	Point Accuracy			Sign		
	MNL	MNP	$\Delta$	MNL	MNP	$\Delta$
A	0.112	0.514	-0.40***	4.53	4.4	0.13**
B	0.14	0.463	-0.32***	4.71	4.45	0.26***
C	0.123	0.45	-0.33***	4.69	4.45	0.24***
D	0.109	0.391	-0.28***	4.75	4.57	0.18***
E	0.086	0.267	-0.18***	4.77	4.64	0.13**
F	0.358	0.544	-0.19**	4.46	4.44	0.02
G	0.251	0.721	-0.47***	4.47	4.24	0.23***
H	0.691	0.536	0.15*	4.57	4.51	0.06
I	0.839	0.558	0.28***	4.38	4.43	-0.05
J	0.656	0.578	0.08	4.47	4.36	0.11
K	0.175	0.603	-0.43***	4.63	4.36	0.27***

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , two tailed t-tests.

situation. MNL outperforms MNP at a highly significant level for all three measures of model  $K$  in the British, basic, and strategic models. This fact suggests that MNL is far and away a better option than MNP for researchers of the British election. But in this regard I am only confirming the results of Quinn, Martin, and Whitford (1999) who suggest that MNL is theoretically more appropriate for Britain and show it empirically.

The results not only confirm what has already been shown for the case of Britain in 1987, but they demonstrate something about the performance of MNL and MNP in general. Consider models  $E$ ,  $H$ ,  $I$ , and  $J$ , the models in which MNP provided more

Table 9: Summary of the Results.

DGP	MNL significantly better			MNP significantly better		
	Point	Sign	Significance	Point	Sign	Significance
British	$A, B,$ $C, F,$ $G, K$	$A, B, C,$ $D, E, G$ $I, K$	$A, B, C, D,$ $E, G, H,$ $I, J, K$	$E, H, I, J$	none	none
Strategy	all models	$A, B, C, D,$ $E, F, G,$ $H, I, K$	all models	none	none	none
Basic	$A, B, C,$ $D, E, F,$ $G, K$	$A, B, C,$ $D, E,$ $G, K$	N/A	$H, I$	none	N/A

accurate point estimates in the British case, and model  $D$  which was indeterminate:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \chi_E &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & . & . \\ .75 & 1 & . \\ .75 & .75 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, & \chi_H &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & . & . \\ 0 & 1 & . \\ .50 & .80 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \\
 \chi_I &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & . & . \\ 0 & 1 & . \\ -.50 & .80 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, & \chi_J &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & . & . \\ -.20 & 1 & . \\ -.50 & .80 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \\
 \chi_D &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & . & . \\ .50 & 1 & . \\ .50 & .50 & 1 \end{bmatrix}.
 \end{aligned} \tag{54}$$

In each of these models, *more* than one pair of choices are correlated at a level of magnitude greater than or equal to .5. One pair of choices correlated this highly is not good enough, as demonstrated by models  $F$  and  $G$ , in which one pair of choices are correlated with magnitude .8 but all other pairs are independent. Furthermore, more than one pair of choices correlated at a magnitude less than .5 is not good enough for MNP to be a better model, as demonstrated by models  $B$  and  $C$ , in which all the

choices were correlated at .1 and .25 respectively, and by model *K*. So perhaps we can say that MNP should be used over MNL only when more than one pair of choices is correlated at .5 or higher. But this condition seems much too restrictive to be of much use in political science research. I do not have the empirical data for three-party systems worldwide, but it seems unlikely that two parties can be associated that closely by voters while retaining their political independence from one another. Adding the condition that more than one pair of parties must be highly correlated and it does not appear as though any real world situation will ever meet the conditions that would make MNP a better model than MNL. From a practical standpoint therefore, the results suggest that MNL should nearly always be used over MNP.

The claim that MNP should be used over MNL when more than one pair of choices are correlated at .5 or higher is restrictive, but it is also tenuous for a number of reasons:

- First, notice MNL, not MNP, returned more accurate point estimates for models *D* and *E* in the basic simulations. MNP still wins model *I* at a highly significant level, but MNP wins model *H* with marginal significance and model *J* with no significance.
- Second, in the British models, even as MNP returns more accurate point estimates for models *E* and *I*, MNL significantly does better with signs and significance levels. In fact, for every model in which MNP returns more accurate point estimates, MNL returns more accurate significance levels. In defense of MNP, although MNL wins model *F* in point estimates, the sign and significance measures are indeterminate. Only for model *I* in the basic case does MNP win both point estimation and sign, although sign is not significant.
- Finally, and most importantly, when the dependent variable is permuted in a modest way as in the case of the strategic models, MNL always outperforms MNP. It is probably always the case that for any model of an election, there exists some



influence, strategic or otherwise, on the evaluation of each choice which depends on the other choices and is not modeled. Therefore, of the three kinds of models considered, the strategic ones are the most realistic. Since MNL is clearly a better model in these strategic cases, the results suggest that researches should never use MNP over MNL.

One puzzle is brought to light by these results. Theoretically, I expected MNP to perform better where strategic voting is present because of the relationship between strategic voting and violations of the IIA assumption. If voters are strategic, they consider the other choices in evaluating each choice. Therefore, correlation between the unobserved variances of the choice evaluations should increase, IIA becomes a worse assumption, and MNL becomes a less appropriate model. MNP should have been unaffected as MNL got worse. But instead, in some situations, the performance of both models was actually *improved* when strategic voting was considered. MNL becomes dominant over MNP not because MNP performs drastically worse in the strategic models, but because MNL becomes much more accurate for point estimation precisely for the models in which MNP had previously been more accurate. Specifically, the mean squared error score for MNL is reduced from 3.28 to 2.04 for model *D*, from 5.39 to 2.38 for model *E*, from 6.68 to 3.41 for model *H*, from 7.44 to 4.04 for model *I* and from 7.28 to 4.15 for model *J*. There is little effect of strategy on MNL point accuracy for all the other models. It is almost as if the strategy models aim to “fix” MNL, although that was certainly not my aim. Strategy also causes MNP to become more accurate for precisely the same models, although the magnitude of these improvements are not as large as those for MNL. The result is that MNL becomes a significantly better model for point estimation across all error correlation structures. As expected, strategy weakens both models in regards to sign. Strategy also reduces the significance accuracy of MNL, but MNP significance improves in several models with strategy. I have no explanation currently for why this manipulation of the dependent variable affects the results in these

ways, and further analysis of these models is something I intend to undertake in the future.

### *MNP Variance Estimation*

MNP also provides estimates of the variance of the latent utility error for choice 3 (the Alliance in the British models) and the correlation between the latent utility errors for choices 2 and 3 (Labour and the Alliance). All other elements of the variance-covariance matrix of the choice errors are constrained by the “asmprobit” routine in Stata. These results are reported in the appendix in tables 12, 13, and 14. Avg.  $\hat{\sigma}^2$  is the mean over 100 iterations of MNP estimation of the variance of the choice error for the Alliance. The true value of this variance is .6 in the DGP for the British models, and 1 for the basic models. A “blowup” is defined as a prediction of variance greater than 100. True values of the correlation,  $\rho$ , are compared to values of  $\hat{\rho}$ , which are means over 100 iterations of MNP estimation of the correlation between the choice errors for Labour and the Alliance. These estimates were highly inefficient, typically producing bounds on the 95 percent confidence interval close to  $-1$  and  $1$ . Since correlations take on values between  $-1$  and  $1$  by definition, such estimates are worthless. It is quite clear that these estimates of the variance-covariance elements are very poor. Here, I confirm a finding by Alvarez and Nagler, who report a similar result regarding these estimates in their 1994 research. The weakness of MNP in recovering the error correlations is perhaps one reason why MNP may be a less accurate model than MNL, as the results suggest.

For the most part, variance estimates from each model were reasonable. But, now and then, convergence would break down and the variance of choice 3 would become inflated to ridiculous levels. For example, for basic model A, the variance of choice 3 is once estimated to be 4,820,122. Once again, the true variance is 1 for the basic models. Clearly this is a ludicrous estimate, which is indicative of convergence problems for the “asmprobit” routine. The MNP output for this iteration is:

```
Iteration 0:   log simulated-likelihood = -1047.9418
```

Iteration 1: log simulated-likelihood = -1047.9283 (backed up)

(output omitted)

Iteration 88: log simulated-likelihood = -692.83672

Alternative-specific multinomial probit      Number of obs      =      3000

Case variable: individual      Number of cases      =      1000

Alternative variable: options      Alts per case: min =      3

avg =      3.0

max =      3

Integration sequence:      Hammersley

Integration points:      150      Wald chi2(3)      =      0.03

Log simulated-likelihood = -692.83672      Prob > chi2      =      0.9983

simchoice		Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
-----+-----							
options							
	z	-34.72438	217.3633	-0.16	0.873	-460.7485	391.2998
-----+-----							
options1		(base alternative)					
-----+-----							
options2							
	x	-28.00072	611.3696	-0.05	0.963	-1226.263	1170.262
	_cons	11.20021	349.468	0.03	0.974	-673.7445	696.1449
-----+-----							
options3							
	x	14.75721	403.1468	0.04	0.971	-775.3959	804.9104
	_cons	-22.59297	251.6882	-0.09	0.928	-515.8929	470.7069
-----+-----							
	/lnl2_2	-7.675696	6377200	-0.00	1.000	-1.25e+07	1.25e+07
-----+-----							
	/l2_1	-2195.478	.	.	.	.	.

---

(options=1 is the alternative normalizing location)  
(options=2 is the alternative normalizing scale)

Since the true values of the coefficients are between 0 and 1, these estimates are poor estimates. But, after normalizing the coefficient estimates they do appear comparable. The mean of the absolute values of the estimates is 22.2551. After dividing by this mean, the estimates are much closer to the correct range. Here, my methodology does not capture useful characteristics of the data: researchers will see these results and quickly dismiss them as artifacts of failed convergence. My comparisons, however, do not dismiss the results. Note, however, that the standard errors of these estimates are astronomical. Therefore, MNP should not be able to return the correct significance levels on estimates when the variance of choice 3 blows up. For the basic models we have no measure of significance, but for the British models we do in fact see that the average percent of correct predictions of significance is much lower for models *E*, *H*, *I*, and *J*, the four models for which blow-ups of the variance were observed. These results paint an even bleaker picture for MNP: not only are the situations in which MNP provides more accurate results than MNL highly constrained, but researchers must worry about the possibility of blown-up variances that take MNP estimates to new levels of inefficiency.

For the British models, the incidences of blown-up variance estimates coincide precisely with the models in which MNP returns more accurate point estimates than MNL. But MNP's victories here are not simply artifacts of the inflated variances. To see that MNP really does return better point estimates for the models in question, I tested the equality of the measures in tables 6 and 8 only for iterations in which the variance does not blow up. The results are reported in tables 10 and 11.

The results from tables 10 and 11 reflect the results from 6 and 8, and MNP does no worse in either the British or basic models when the outlying variances are omitted. In fact, for the basic models, MNP does better without the blown-up variances: model *F*

Table 10: Mean Evaluative Measures for MNL and MNP, British Models, Omitting Large Variance Estimates.

Model (Obs.)	Point Accuracy			Sign			Significance		
	MNL	MNP	$\Delta$	MNL	MNP	$\Delta$	MNL	MNP	$\Delta$
E(85)	5.38	4.84	0.54**	92.41	90.75	1.66***	70.18	50.79	19.39***
H(91)	6.67	6.01	0.65***	89.47	89.47	0.00	65.82	52.14	13.68***
I(88)	7.46	6.75	0.71***	86.52	84.29	2.23***	54.90	39.38	15.52***
J(96)	7.30	6.34	0.97***	85.70	84.55	1.15	54.81	34.73	20.08***

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , two tailed t-tests.

Table 11: Mean Evaluative Measures for MNL and MNP, Basic Models, Omitting Large Variance Estimates.

Model (Obs.)	Point Accuracy			Sign		
	MNL	MNP	$\Delta$	MNL	MNP	$\Delta$
A(97)	0.11	0.45	-0.34***	4.56	4.43	0.12**
B(98)	0.14	0.43	-0.29***	4.70	4.45	0.26***
C(95)	0.12	0.38	-0.27***	4.71	4.46	0.24***
D(96)	0.09	0.37	-0.28***	4.77	4.61	0.16**
E(97)	0.08	0.19	-0.11***	4.79	4.67	0.12**
F(84)	0.35	0.36	-0.01	4.50	4.52	-0.02
G(90)	0.25	0.58	-0.34***	4.50	4.31	0.19**
H(92)	0.70	0.42	0.28***	4.57	4.57	0.00
I(92)	0.87	0.49	0.37***	4.39	4.49	-0.10
J(84)	0.67	0.39	0.29***	4.45	4.43	0.02
K(97)	0.17	0.56	-0.38***	4.64	4.38	0.26***

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , two tailed t-tests.

changes from a win for MNL to indeterminate, and model  $J$  changes from indeterminate to a win for MNP. Therefore, MNP's victories in these simulations are not a result of convergence problems.

Why is the variance sometimes estimated at such high values? The answer probably lies in the simulated maximum likelihood convergence algorithm used by the “asmprobit” command. The algorithm is probably identifying some bizarre local maximum or an asymptote in the likelihood function. But, again, identifying the specific reasons why the model behaves the way it does is a project for future research. In the meantime,

there are three important conclusions to be drawn from these results:

- First, MNP estimates of the unconstrained elements of the variance-covariance matrix of the choice errors are very poor estimates and should not be trusted.
- Second, MNP will fail to fully converge from time to time, estimating a blown-up variance and highly inflated coefficient point estimates with astronomical standard errors.
- And third, these problems of MNP in estimating the variance-covariance matrix does not in and of itself mean that MNP will not provide accurate results in certain situations.

So the failure of MNP to accurately estimate the unconstrained variance and correlation should not scare researchers away from using MNP. Rather, the fact that MNP will rarely provide better results than MNL should scare researchers from away using MNP.

## *Conclusion*

There may be very little reason for researchers in the field to employ MNP to their data. However, that is not to say that MNL is a particularly good choice either. MNL may outperform MNP, but MNL still suffers from model misspecification whenever IIA is violated. MNP is not a reliable alternative in its current manifestation, but there may be other discrete choice models that perform better than either MNL or MNP. We should not restrict ourselves to a choice between these two models alone.

The empirical models most commonly used by political scientists have rarely been developed by political scientists. Many models come from econometrics, some from biostatistics, and others from fields such as civil engineering and operations research and other social sciences such as psychology and sociology. Therefore we should not be

surprised if these empirical models make assumptions which, like IIA, are inappropriate for many situations analyzed by political scientists. Researchers need to place greater emphasis on the development of empirical methods that use base assumptions derived from our own theories in political science. To that end, the work by Curtis S. Signorino (1999, 2003) is very promising. Signorino suggests a method for combining empirical modeling with formal theory to create models with appropriate assumptions for political science. If we believe that strategic voting is present, we should be able to model that behavior formally. We may then be able to embed an empirical model within this game to do a better job of accounting for strategic voting than either MNL or MNP can provide. In this way, I will focus future work on the development of better multinomial choice models for political science.

## *Appendix*

*Table 12: MNP Predictions for Alliance Variance and Correlation with Labour, Britain 1987 Models.*

Model	Avg. $\hat{\sigma}^2$	No. of blowups	Avg. $\hat{\sigma}^2$ without outliers	$\rho$	Avg. $\hat{\rho}$
A	1.424	0	1.424	0	.56
B	1.588	0	1.588	.1	.49
C	1.688	0	1.688	.25	.49
D	1.968	0	1.968	.5	.49
E	4496	15	5.499	.75	.32
F	.3452	0	.3452	0	.47
G	2.694	0	2.694	0	.59
H	2097	9	2.322	.8	.62
I	5548	12	5.113	.8	.69
J	8460	4	4.468	.8	.63
K	1.179	0	1.179	-.05	.60

Table 13: MNP Predictions for Alliance Variance and Correlation with Labour, Britain 1987  
Models with Strategy.

Model	Avg. $\hat{\sigma}^2$	No. of blowups	Avg. $\hat{\sigma}^2$ without outliers	$\rho$	Avg. $\hat{\rho}$
A	2.046	0	2.046	0	.43
B	2.210	0	2.210	.1	.40
C	2.164	0	2.164	.25	.44
D	2.579	0	2.579	.5	.43
E	3.147	0	3.147	.75	.45
F	.6258	0	.6258	0	.74
G	3.536	0	3.536	0	.45
H	1.214	0	1.214	.8	.40
I	2.106	0	2.106	.8	.18
J	2.001	0	2.001	.8	.18
K	1.788	0	1.788	-.05	.40

Table 14: MNP Predictions for Alliance Variance and Correlation with Labour, Basic Models.

Model	Avg. $\hat{\sigma}^2$	No. of blowups	Avg. $\hat{\sigma}^2$ without outliers	$\rho$	Avg. $\hat{\rho}$
A	48325	3	2.680	0	.46
B	4101	2	2.980	.1	.44
C	7427	5	3.570	.25	.44
D	35044	4	3.679	.5	.47
E	14344	3	3.107	.75	.48
F	14293	16	1.781	0	.02
G	18577	10	3.237	0	.56
H	2385	8	1.670	.8	.73
I	801	8	3.957	.8	.84
J	1986	16	4.331	.8	.84
K	1576	3	3.457	-.05	.57



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