

# POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF NEWS DIETS: EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S.

Julia Cagé  
Sciences Po

Guilhem Cassan  
University of Namur

Eric Melander  
University of Birmingham

James M. Snyder  
Harvard University

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# THE BIG PICTURE: NEWS DIETS

The **media matters**: political information/analysis/opinion affects

- ▶ Electoral outcomes (Gentzkow, 2006; DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Gentzkow, Shapiro and Sinkinson, 2011; Durante and Knight, 2012; Cagé, 2020)
- ▶ Policy and distributional patterns (Strömberg, 2004; Knight, 2008; Snyder and Strömberg, 2011; Gavazza, Nardotto and Valletti, 2019)
- ▶ Salience of issues (Iyengar, 1994; Dunaway, 2008; Branton and Dunaway, 2009)

But what determines which media is available for citizens to consume?

- ▶ And, therefore, their ultimate **news diets**?

# FACTORS SHAPING NEWS DIETS

News diets **depend on many factors**

- ▶ Entry and exit of outlets and their audience size (Gentzkow, Shapiro and Sinkinson, 2014; Angelucci and Cagé, 2019)
- ▶ Informational content (George and Waldfogel, 2006; Martin and McCrain, 2019)
- ▶ Slant (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010; Petrova, 2011; Agirdas, 2015)

Studies of these factors often focus on **economic drivers**

- ▶ Such as impacts of negative shocks (e.g., a competing platform)
- ▶ Or media owners' profit maximisation

Less is known about the **political determinants of news diets**

- ▶ Difficult to study: news outlets themselves influence political environment

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Less is known about the **political determinants of news diets**

- ▶ Difficult to study: news outlets themselves influence political environment
- ▶ **This is where we come in**

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- ▶ U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 1962: reapportionment justiciable
- ▶ Consequence: a “reapportionment revolution” of legislative districts
- ▶ By 1967: from severe malapportionment to “one person, one vote”
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**Novel county-year panel data on U.S. newspapers, 1950–1980**

- ▶ Entry and exit; circulation and editorial board compositions; prices
- ▶ Content (coverage of local politics and legislators)



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**Event-study difference-in-differences** empirical strategy

- ▶ Staggered treatment as states redistrict
- ▶ Compare counties (within same state) that gained vs. lost importance

# WHAT WE FIND

Following redistricting, gaining counties:

1. Do not see differential entry or exit
2. See increases in newspaper circulation per capita
  - ▶ With no change in nominal prices
3. See changes in editorial board composition
  - ▶ Shift to coverage of state-level politics (cf. very local politics)
4. See increase in political content
  - ▶ Surnames of legislators see an “officeholder premium” in coverage
  - ▶ Particularly pronounced in gaining counties, post-redistricting

# BACKGROUND: BAKER V. CARR

March 1962: Supreme Court rules that **reapportionment is justiciable**

- ▶ Federal courts could now hear redistricting cases
- ▶ Overturned precedent from *Colgrove v. Green* (1946)

No immediate impact, but **set important, new precedent**

- ▶ By 1964: additional rulings required congressional and state legislative districts to have **equal population**  $\implies$  “**one person, one vote**”
- ▶ By 1967: all states had redrawn districts to comply with new standard

Before redistricting, many state legislatures were **badly malapportioned**

- ▶ Extreme case: Connecticut House of Representatives – population of largest district was 422 times that of the smallest district

Due to *Baker v. Carr* and its aftermath, **these imbalances were equalised**

- ▶ With implications for policy (e.g. Ansolabehere, Gerber and Snyder, 2002)

# RIGHT-TO-VOTE INDEX

**Right-to-vote (RTV) index:** legislators per adult, cf. rest of state


- ▶ With equal representation:  $\text{RTV} = 100$  for all counties
- ▶  $\text{RTV} < 100 \implies$  county is under-represented  
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
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
**Lower House**




**Upper House**



# BAKER V. CARR – LOWER HOUSE



# BAKER V. CARR – UPPER HOUSE



# “CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK”

Reapportionment **shocks newspaper market equilibrium** in several ways

## Shock to **newspaper supply**

- ▶ Newspaper owners may be politically motivated (Duggan and Martinelli, 2011; Anderson and MacLaren, 2012; Prat, 2018)
- ▶ Effect on volume of newspapers (extensive and intensive margin)
- ▶ Effect on content (higher volume, more political, more biased, ...)

## Shock to **newspaper demand**

- ▶ Politically relevant electorate wants to be informed (Chan and Suen, 2008)

Shock to supply of **political events** / demand for **political advertising**

This equilibrium determines **citizens' ultimate news diets**

- ▶ We do not (yet) try to fully tease out supply and demand forces



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(but see Cagé, Cassan and Jensenius (2023) on India)

# DATA: CIRCULATION, EDITORS AND CONTENT

We build a **novel county-year panel dataset** from two main sources

## 1. Editor & Publisher International Yearbook [Example page](#)

- ▶ Encyclopaedia of the newspaper industry (2,300+ unique U.S. papers)
- ▶ We collect information on: circulation, prices and editorial boards  
(combined with pre-1964 data of Angelucci, Cagé & Sinkinson (2021))

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
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
## 2. Newspaper Archive Example hit Example false positive

- ▶ Online archive of digitised newspaper content
- ▶ We gather mentions of state legislators, focus on lower house
  - ▶ Identify officeholders in any given year for each state (ICPSR 34297 and Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2008)
  - ▶ Systematic search for each officeholder in all newspapers in the state (Search all newspapers in a state for mention of surname of officeholder, 1950–1980; must appear together with the name of the chamber)
  - ▶ In total: 17m+ hits for 22,000+ legislators


# WINNERS/LOSERS: NUMBER OF NEWSPAPERS




# WINNERS/LOSERS: CIRCULATION PER CAPITA




# WINNERS/LOSERS: NUMBER OF EDITORS



# WINNERS/LOSERS: STATE EDITORS



# WINNERS/LOSERS: COVERAGE OF LEGISLATORS





# EMPIRICAL STRATEGY: STAGGERED EVENT STUDY


$$y_{ct} = \sum_{t=-10}^{10} \delta_t \times \mathbb{1}\{\text{Increase}\}_{ct} + \mathbf{X}'_{ct}\beta + \lambda_c + \gamma_{st} + \epsilon_{cst}$$

$y_{ct}$	outcome in county $c$ in year $t$
$\mathbb{1}\{\text{Increase}\}_{ct}$	treatment dummy = 1 if county gained from redistricting
$\lambda_c$	county fixed effects
$\gamma_{st}$	state-by-year fixed effects
$\mathbf{X}_{ct}$	controls
Standard errors	clustered by county


Two sets of controls

- Baseline: 1960 population, urban share, black share  $\times$  year FE
- Additional: time-varying population, urban share, black share


# NO EFFECT ON NUMBER OF NEWSPAPERS




# BUT CIRCULATION PER CAPITA INCREASES



# EDITORIAL BOARDS DO NOT CHANGE SIZE




# BUT EDITORS FOCUS MORE ON STATE POLITICS




# DESPITE THIS: NOMINAL PRICES UNCHANGED

## Subscription Price



## Advertising Rate



# COVERAGE OF LEGISLATORS

## Are state legislators covered by the press?

- ▶ Use dataset of content to construct a surname-county-year panel
- ▶ Recall: we systematically gathered mentions of legislators' surnames for all newspapers in Newspaper Archive database

Test for differential **“officeholder premium”** in mentions of surname:

$$\text{Mentions}_{ncst} = \sum_{t=-10}^{10} \phi_t \mathbb{1}\{\text{Increase}\}_c \times \mathbb{1}\{\text{In office}\}_{nst} + \Pi_{nst} + \Omega_{ct} + \epsilon_{ncst}$$



$\text{Mentions}_{ncst}$	mentions of surname $n$ in county $c$ in state $s$ in year $t$
$\mathbb{1}\{\text{Increase}\}_c$	county treatment dummy = 1 if county gained from redistricting
$\mathbb{1}\{\text{In office}\}_{nst}$	surname treatment dummy = 1 once surname associated with officeholder
$\Pi_{nst}$	surname-state-year fixed effects
$\Omega_{ct}$	county-by-year fixed effects
Standard errors	clustered by county-year

# “OFFICEHOLDER PREMIUM” AND REDISTRICTING

Consider a state with two counties:

- ▶ County A gained (+) from redistricting
- ▶ County B lost (-)

... and consider legislator Smith: takes office in **pre-redistricting** period






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
- ▶ County A gained (+) from redistricting
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... now consider legislator Johnson: takes office in **post-redistricting** period

**County A (+)**




**County B (-)**



# “OFFICEHOLDER PREMIUM” AND REDISTRICTING

	Dependent variable: mentions of legislator surname			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-redist. × incr. rep.	0.334*** (0.059)			
In office	0.512*** (0.016)	0.508*** (0.016)		
In office × incr. rep.	0.557*** (0.047)	0.571*** (0.046)	0.251*** (0.036)	0.078*** (0.024)
In office × post-redist.	0.221*** (0.024)	0.243*** (0.024)		
In office × post-redist. × incr. rep.	0.569*** (0.091)	0.498*** (0.086)	0.512*** (0.081)	0.337*** (0.050)
County FE	✓			
State × year FE	✓	✓		
State × name × year FE			✓	✓
County × year FE		✓	✓	✓
County × name FE				✓
Observations	9,744,769	9,744,769	9,744,769	9,744,769
Outcome mean	1.592	1.592	1.592	1.592
Share treated	0.312	0.312	0.312	0.312
Share in office	0.260	0.260	0.260	0.260

# “OFFICEHOLDER PREMIUM” AND REDISTRICTING



# CONCLUDING REMARKS

Do political factors shape news diets?

We combine

- ▶ Natural experiment arising from *Baker v. Carr* redistricting
- ▶ Novel data on U.S. newspapers

And **provide an answer in the affirmative**; gainers from redistricting:

- ▶ See increased **circulation p.c.** and shift in **newsroom composition**
- ▶ Have particularly pronounced increase in **coverage of officeholders**

This has implications for thinking about **political inequalities**

- ▶ Can **affect policies** not only directly (via politicians' incentives)
- ▶ But also **indirectly** (through their impact on **citizens' news diets**)

# APPENDIX



THE MILFORD MAIL, DICKINSON COUNTY, IA – 3 NOVEMBER 1960

LONG BEACH INDEPENDENT, LONG BEACH, CA - 16 JUNE 1960

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# MORE RESULTS: NEWSPAPERS AND CIRCULATION

	Number of newspapers			Circulation per capita		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-redist. $\times$ incr.	0.041* (0.024)	0.012 (0.020)		0.009** (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)	
0-4 years post $\times$ incr.			0.003 (0.013)			0.002 (0.003)
5+ years post $\times$ incr.			0.014 (0.020)			0.010** (0.004)
County FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State $\times$ year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls		✓	✓		✓	✓
Observations	65,079	65,034	65,034	65,034	65,034	65,034
Counties	3,099	3,099	3,099	3,099	3,099	3,099
Outcome mean	0.504	0.505	0.505	0.108	0.108	0.108
Outcome sd	0.947	0.948	0.948	0.172	0.172	0.172
Share treated	0.211	0.211	0.211	0.211	0.211	0.211