LH Advanced Financial Markets - Part B

Topic 1a: Review of Microeconomics and Optimization Theory

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Outline

1. Mathematical Preliminaries
   - Unconstrained Optimization
   - Constrained Optimization
2. Consumer Optimization
   - Graphical Analysis
   - Algebraic Analysis
   - The Time Dimension
   - The Risk Dimension
3. General Equilibrium
   - Optimal Allocations
   - Equilibrium Allocations

Mathematical Preliminaries

- Unconstrained Optimization

$$\max_x F(x)$$

- Constrained Optimization

$$\max_x F(x) \quad \text{subject to} \quad c \geq G(x)$$

- Examples?

Mathematical Preliminaries

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- Examples?

Unconstrained Optimization

To find the value of x that solves

$$\max_x F(x)$$

you can:

1. Try out every possible value of x.
2. Use calculus.

Since search could take forever, let's use calculus instead.

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Unconstrained Optimization

- Theorem If x^* solves

$$\max_x F(x),$$

then x^* is a critical point of F, that is,

$$F'(x^*) = 0 \tag{FOC}$$

- We say that $F'(x^*) = 0$ is a **necessary condition** for a maximum
- What does this mean?
  - If x^* is a solution to the maximization problem, then $F'(x^*) = 0$ must hold
  - But (FOC) is **not** a sufficient condition: if $F'(x^*) = 0$ holds, it does **not** follow automatically that x^* is a solution to the maximization problem.

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Unconstrained Optimization



$F(x)$ maximized at $x^* = 5$

Unconstrained Optimization



$F'(x) > 0$ when $x < 5$. $F(x)$ can be increased by increasing x.

Unconstrained Optimization



$F'(x) < 0$ when $x > 5$. $F(x)$ can be increased by decreasing x.

Unconstrained Optimization



$F'(x) = 0$ when $x = 5$. $F(x)$ is maximized.

Unconstrained Optimization

- Theorem If x^* solves

$$\max_x F(x),$$

then x^* is a critical point of F, that is,

$$F'(x^*) = 0$$

- Note that the same first-order necessary condition $F'(x^*) = 0$ also characterizes a value of x^* that minimizes $F(x)$.

Unconstrained Optimization



$F'(x) = 0$ when $x = 5$, but $F(x)$ is minimized, not maximized!

Unconstrained Optimization



$F'(x) = 0$ and $F''(x) < 0$ when $x = 5$. $F(x)$ is maximized.

Unconstrained Optimization



$F'(x) = 0$ and $F''(x) > 0$ when $x = 5$. $F(x)$ is minimized.

- Theorem If x^* solves

$$\max_x F(x),$$

then x^* is a critical point of F, that is,

$$F'(x^*) = 0.$$

- Theorem **Local Maximum**. If

$$F'(x^*) = 0 \text{ and } F''(x^*) < 0$$

then x^* solves

$$\max_x F(x)$$

(at least locally).

- The first-order condition $F'(x^*) = 0$ and the second-order condition $F''(x^*) < 0$ are sufficient conditions for the value of x that (locally) maximizes $F(x)$.

Unconstrained Optimization



$F'(x^{**}) = 0$ and $F''(x^{**}) < 0$ at the local maximizer x^{**} and $F'(x^{*}) = 0$ and $F''(x^{*}) < 0$ at the global maximizer x^{*}.

Unconstrained Optimization



$F'(x^{**}) = 0$ and $F''(x^{**}) < 0$ at the local maximizer x^{**} and $F'(x^{*}) = 0$ and $F''(x^{*}) < 0$ at the global maximizer x^{*}, but $F''(x) > 0$ in between x^{*} and x^{**}.

- Theorem **Global Maximum**. If

$$F'(x^*) = 0$$

and

$$F''(x) < 0 \text{ for all } x \in \mathbb{R}$$

then x^* solves

$$\max_x F(x).$$

Unconstrained Optimization



$F''(x) < 0$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R}$ and $F'(5) = 0$. $F(x)$ is maximized when $x = 5$.

Unconstrained Optimization and Concavity

- If $F''(x) < 0$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R}$, then the function F is concave.
- When F is concave, the first-order condition $F'(x^*) = 0$ is both necessary and sufficient for the value of x that maximizes $F(x)$.
- And, as we are about to see, concave functions arise frequently and naturally in economics and finance.

Minimization

- Sometimes you want to minimize a function, instead of maximizing (e.g. minimize the variance of a portfolio)
- Minimizing a function is the same as maximizing its negative. Let's see why
- Suppose you have a function $F(x)$ and you want to find the value x^* that minimizes $F(x)$ meaning

$$F(x^*) \leq F(x) \ \text{ for all } x$$

- Now, multiply both sides of this inequality by -1

$$-F(x^*) \geq -F(x) \ \text{ for all } x$$

- This tells you that x^* is the value that maximizes $-F(x)$

Unconstrained Optimization: Example 1

- Consider the problem

$$\min_x \ \frac{1}{2}(x-\tau)^2$$

where τ is a number ($\tau \in \mathbb{R}$) that we might call the "target."

- The first step is to convert this minimization problem to an **equivalent** maximization:

$$\max_x \left(-\frac{1}{2}\right)(x-\tau)^2$$

Unconstrained Optimization: Example 1

- Consider our equivalent maximization problem

$$\max_x \left(-\frac{1}{2}\right)(x-\tau)^2$$

- The first-order condition

$$-(x^* - \tau) = 0$$

leads us immediately to the solution: $x^* = \tau$.

Unconstrained Optimization: Example 2

- Consider maximizing a function of three variables:

$$\max_{x_1, x_2, x_3} F(x_1, x_2, x_3)$$

- Even if each variable can take on only 1,000 values, there are one billion possible combinations of (x_1, x_2, x_3) to search over!

- This is an example of what Richard Bellman (US, 1920-1984) called the *"curse of dimensionality."*

Unconstrained Optimization: Example 2

- Consider the problem:

$$\max_{x_1, x_2, x_3} \left(-\frac{1}{2}\right)(x_1 - \tau)^2 + \left(-\frac{1}{2}\right)(x_2 - x_1)^2 + \left(-\frac{1}{2}\right)(x_3 - x_2)^2$$

- Now the three first-order conditions

$$\begin{aligned} -(x_1^* - \tau) + (x_2^* - x_1^*) &= 0 \\ -(x_2^* - x_1^*) + (x_3^* - x_2^*) &= 0 \\ -(x_3^* - x_2^*) &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

lead us to the solution: $x_1^* = x_2^* = x_3^* = \tau$.

Unconstrained Optimization: Example 2

- Consider the problem:

$$\max_{x_1, x_2, x_3} \left(-\frac{1}{2}\right)(x_1 - \tau)^2 + \left(-\frac{1}{2}\right)(x_2 - x_1)^2 + \left(-\frac{1}{2}\right)(x_3 - x_2)^2$$

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lead us to the solution: $x_1^* = x_2^* = x_3^* = \tau$.

Constrained Optimization

- To find the value of x that solves

$$\max_x F(x) \text{ subject to } c \geq G(x)$$

  you can:

  1. Try out every possible value of x.
  2. Use calculus.

- Since search could take forever, let's use calculus instead.

Constrained Optimization

A method for solving constrained optimization problems like

$$\max_x F(x) \text{ subject to } c \geq G(x)$$

was developed by **Joseph-Louis Lagrange** (France/Italy, 1736-1813) and extended by **Harold Kuhn** (US, 1925-2014) and **Albert Tucker** (US, 1905-1995).

Constrained Optimization

- Associated with the problem:

$$\max_{x} F(x) \text{ subject to } c \geq G(x)$$

- Define the Lagrangian

$$L(x, \lambda) = F(x) + \lambda[c - G(x)]$$

where λ is the Lagrange multiplier.

Constrained Optimization

- Then, look for a critical point of the full Lagrangian

$$L(x, \lambda) = F(x) + \lambda[c - G(x)]$$

instead of just the objective function F by itself.

- That is, use the first order condition (FOC)

$$F'(x^*) - \lambda^* G'(x^*) = 0$$

Constrained Optimization

- Lagrangian function:

$$L(x,\lambda) = F(x) + \lambda[c - G(x)]$$

- Theorem (Kuhn-Tucker) Suppose that x^* maximizes $F(x)$ subject to $c \geq G(x)$ and that $G'(x^*) \neq 0$. Then there exists a value $\lambda^* \geq 0$ such that, together, x^* and λ^* satisfy the first-order condition

$$F'(x^*) - \lambda^* G'(x^*) = 0$$

and the complementary slackness condition

$$\lambda^* [c - G(x^*)] = 0.$$

Constrained Optimization

- In the case where $c > G(x^*)$, the constraint is non-binding.

- The complementary slackness condition (abbrev. CS)

$$\lambda^* [c - G(x^*)] = 0$$

requires that $\lambda^* = 0$.

- The first-order condition

$$F'(x^*) - \lambda^* G'(x^*) = 0$$

requires that $F'(x^*) = 0$.

- In the case where $c = G(x^*)$, the constraint is binding.
- The complementary slackness condition

$$\lambda^* [c - G(x^*)] = 0$$

puts no further restriction on $\lambda^* \geq 0$.

- Now the first-order condition

$$F'(x^*) - \lambda^* G'(x^*) = 0$$

requires that $F'(x^*) = \lambda^* G'(x^*)$.

Constrained Optimization: Example 1

For the problem

$$\max_x \left(-\frac{1}{2}\right)(x-5)^2 \text{ subject to } 7 \geq x$$

$F(x) = (-1/2)(x-5)^2, c = 7$, and $G(x) = x$. The Lagrangian is

$$L(x, \lambda) = \left(-\frac{1}{2}\right)(x-5)^2 + \lambda(7-x)$$

Constrained Optimization: Example 1

With

$$L(x, \lambda) = \left(-\frac{1}{2}\right)(x-5)^2 + \lambda(7-x)$$

the first-order condition

$$-(x^* - 5) - \lambda^* = 0$$

and the complementary slackness condition

$$\lambda^* (7 - x^*) = 0$$

are satisfied with $x^* = 5$, $F'(x^*) = 0$, $\lambda^* = 0$, and $7 > x^*$.

Constrained Optimization: Example 1



Here, the solution has $F'(x^*) = 0$ since the constraint is nonbinding.

Constrained Optimization: Example 2

For the problem

$$\max_{x} \left(-\frac{1}{2}\right)(x-5)^2 \text{ subject to } 4 \geq x$$

$F(x) = (-1/2)(x-5)^2$, $c = 4$, and $G(x) = x$. The Lagrangian is

$$L(x, \lambda) = \left(-\frac{1}{2}\right)(x-5)^2 + \lambda(4-x)$$

Constrained Optimization: Example 2

With

$$L(x, \lambda) = \left(-\frac{1}{2}\right)(x-5)^2 + \lambda(4-x)$$

the first-order condition

$$-(x^* - 5) - \lambda^* = 0$$

and the complementary slackness condition

$$\lambda^* (4 - x^*) = 0$$

are satisfied with $x^* = 4$ and $F'(x^*) = \lambda^* = 1 > 0$.

Constrained Optimization: Example 2



Here, the solution has $F'(x^*) = \lambda^* G'(x^*) > 0$ since the constraint is **binding**. $F'(x^*) > 0$ indicates that we'd like to increase the value of x, but the constraint won't let us.

Constrained Optimization: Example 2



With a binding constraint, $F'(x^*) \neq 0$ but $F'(x^*) - \lambda^* G'(x^*) = 0$. The value x^* that solves the problem is a critical point, not of the objective function $F(x)$, but instead of the entire Lagrangian $F(x) + \lambda[c - G(x)]$.

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Consumer Optimization: Graphical Analysis

- Consider a consumer who likes two goods: apples and bananas.

$$
\begin{aligned}
Y &= \text{income} \\
c_a &= \text{consumption of apples} \\
c_b &= \text{consumption of bananas} \\
p_a &= \text{price of an apple} \\
p_b &= \text{price of a banana}
\end{aligned}
$$

- The consumer's budget constraint is

$$Y \geq p_a c_a + p_b c_b$$

Consumer Optimization: Graphical Analysis

- So long as the consumer always prefers more to less, the budget constraint will always bind:

$$Y = p_a c_a + p_b c_b$$

or

$$c_b = \frac{Y}{p_b} - \left(\frac{p_a}{p_b}\right) c_a$$

- This shows that the graph of the budget constraint will be a straight line with slope $-(p_a/p_b)$ and (vertical) intercept Y/p_b.

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Consumer Optimization: Graphical Analysis



The budget constraint is a straight line with slope $-(p_a/p_b)$ and (vertical) intercept Y/p_b. Q: What is the horizontal intercept?

Consumer Optimization: Graphical Analysis

- The budget constraint describes the consumer's market opportunities.

- We use indifference curves to describe the consumer's preferences.

- Each indifference curve traces out a set of combinations of apples and bananas that give the consumer a given level of utility or satisfaction. Mathematically,

$$\{(c_a, c_b) \text{ such that } U(c_a, c_b) = \bar{U}\}$$

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Consumer Optimization: Graphical Analysis



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Consumer Optimization: Graphical Analysis



Each indifference curve slopes down, since the consumer requires more apples to compensate for a loss of bananas and more bananas to compensate for a loss of apples, if more is preferred to less.

Consumer Optimization: Graphical Analysis



Indifference curves farther away from the origin represent higher levels of utility, if more is preferred to less.

Consumer Optimization: Graphical Analysis



A and B yield the same level of utility, and B and C yield the same level of utility, but C is preferred to A if more is preferred to less. Indifference curves *cannot* intersect.

Consumer Optimization: Graphical Analysis



Indifference curves are convex to the origin if consumers have a preference for diversity.

Consumer Optimization: Graphical Analysis



A is suboptimal and C is infeasible. B is optimal.

Consumer Optimization: Graphical Analysis



At B, the optimal choice, the indifference curve is tangent to the budget constraint. Note: This tangency condition presumes an interior solution—that is, both goods are consumed in positive quantities ($c_a > 0$ and $c_b > 0$).

Consumer Optimization: Graphical Analysis

- Recall that the budget constraint

$$Y = p_a c_a + p_b c_b$$

or

$$c_b = \frac{Y}{p_b} - \left(\frac{p_a}{p_b}\right) c_a$$

has slope $-(p_a/p_b)$.

Consumer Optimization: Graphical Analysis

- Suppose that the consumer's preferences are also described by the utility function

$$U(c_a, c_b) = u(c_a) + \beta u(c_b)$$

- The function u is increasing, with $u'(c) > 0$, so that more is preferred to less, and concave, with $u''(c) < 0$, so that marginal utility falls as consumption rises.

- The parameter β measures how much more (if $\beta > 1$) or less (if $\beta < 1$) the consumer likes bananas compared to apples.

Consumer Optimization: Graphical Analysis

- Since an indifference curve traces out the set of (c_a, c_b) combinations that yield a given level of utility $\bar{U}$, the equation for an indifference curve is

$$u(c_a) + \beta u(c_b) = \bar{U}$$

- Use this equation to define a new (implicit) function, $c_b(c_a)$, describing the number of bananas needed, for each number of apples, to keep the consumer on this indifference curve:

$$u(c_a) + \beta u[c_b(c_a)] = \bar{U}$$

Consumer Optimization: Graphical Analysis



The function $c_b\left(c_a\right)$ satisfies $u\left(c_a\right)+\beta u\left[c_b\left(c_a\right)\right]=\bar{U}$.

Consumer Optimization: Graphical Analysis

- Differentiate both sides of

$$u(c_a) + \beta u[c_b(c_a)] = \bar{U}$$

to obtain

$$u'(c_a) + \beta u'[c_b(c_a)]\, c_b'(c_a) = 0$$

- Rearranging gives

$$c_b'(c_a) = -\frac{u'(c_a)}{\beta u'[c_b(c_a)]}$$

Consumer Optimization: Graphical Analysis

- This last equation,

$$c_b'(c_a) = -\frac{u'(c_a)}{\beta u'[c_b(c_a)]}$$

can be written more simply as

$$c_b'(c_a) = -\frac{u'(c_a)}{\beta u'(c_b)}$$

- It measures the **slope** of the indifference curve: the consumer's marginal rate of substitution

Consumer Optimization: Graphical Analysis

- Thus, the tangency of the budget constraint and indifference curve can be expressed mathematically as

$$\frac{u'(c_a)}{\beta u'(c_b)} = \frac{p_a}{p_b}$$

- In words: The marginal rate of substitution equals the relative prices.

Consumer Optimization: Graphical Analysis

- Returning to the more general expression

$$c_b'(c_a) = -\frac{u'(c_a)}{\beta u'[c_b(c_a)]},$$

we can see that $c_b'(c_a) < 0$, so that the indifference curve is downward-sloping, if the marginal utility is positive, i.e. $u' > 0$

- This holds true as long as the utility function u is strictly increasing, that is, more is preferred to less.

Consumer Optimization: Graphical Analysis

$$c_b'(c_a) = -\frac{u'(c_a)}{\beta u'[c_b(c_a)]}$$

- Differentiating again yields

$$c_b''(c_a) = -\frac{\beta u'[c_b(c_a)]\, u''(c_a) - u'(c_a)\, \beta u''[c_b(c_a)]\, c_b'(c_a)}{\{\beta u'[c_b(c_a)]\}^2}$$

  which is **positive** if u is **strictly increasing** (more is preferred to less, i.e. $u' > 0$) and **concave** (diminishing marginal utility, i.e. $u'' < 0$).

- In this case, the indifference curve will be convex. Again, we see how concave functions have mathematical properties and economic implications that we like.

Consumer Optimization: Graphical Analysis

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Consumer Optimization: Algebraic Analysis

- Graphical analysis works fine with two goods.
- But what about three or more goods? Graphical analysis becomes impractical or even impossible
- Once again, the tools of constrained optimization (Lagrangian) that we have reviewed makes it easier!

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Consumer Optimization: Algebraic Analysis

- Consider a consumer who likes three goods:

$$\begin{aligned} Y &= \text{ income} \\ c_i &= \text{ consumption of goods } i = 0, 1, 2 \\ p_i &= \text{ price of goods } i = 0, 1, 2 \end{aligned}$$

- Suppose the consumer's utility function is

$$u(c_0) + \alpha u(c_1) + \beta u(c_2)$$

where α and β are weights on goods 1 and 2 relative to good 0

Consumer Optimization: Algebraic Analysis

- The consumer chooses c_0, c_1, and c_2 to maximize the utility function

$$u(c_0) + \alpha u(c_1) + \beta u(c_2)$$

subject to the budget constraint

$$Y \geq p_0 c_0 + p_1 c_1 + p_2 c_2$$

- The Lagrangian for this problem is

$$L = u(c_0) + \alpha u(c_1) + \beta u(c_2) + \lambda (Y - p_0 c_0 - p_1 c_1 - p_2 c_2)$$

Consumer Optimization: Algebraic Analysis

- Lagrangian:

$$L = u(c_0) + \alpha u(c_1) + \beta u(c_2) + \lambda (Y - p_0 c_0 - p_1 c_1 - p_2 c_2)$$

- First-order conditions:

$$\begin{aligned} u'(c_0^*) - \lambda^* p_0 &= 0 \\ \alpha u'(c_1^*) - \lambda^* p_1 &= 0 \\ \beta u'(c_2^*) - \lambda^* p_2 &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

Consumer Optimization: Algebraic Analysis

- The first-order conditions

$$u'(c_0^*) - \lambda^* p_0 = 0$$
$$\alpha u'(c_1^*) - \lambda^* p_1 = 0$$
$$\beta u'(c_2^*) - \lambda^* p_2 = 0$$

imply

$$\frac{u'(c_0^*)}{\alpha u'(c_1^*)} = \frac{p_0}{p_1} \text{ and } \frac{u'(c_0^*)}{\beta u'(c_2^*)} = \frac{p_0}{p_2} \text{ and } \frac{\alpha u'(c_1^*)}{\beta u'(c_2^*)} = \frac{p_1}{p_2}$$

- The **marginal rate of substitution** equals the **relative prices**

Exercise

- Let's "solve" the consumer's maximization problem described above
- This means finding c_0^*, c_1^*, and c_2^* as functions of prices and income
- Additionally, we may find also the Lagrangian multiplier $\lambda^* \geq 0$
- To proceed, suppose $u(c) = \log(c)$, with $u'(c) = 1/c$
- Make sure you are able to obtain:

$$c_0^* = \frac{Y}{p_0}\frac{1}{1+\alpha+\beta}; \;\; c_1^* = \frac{Y}{p_1}\frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha+\beta}; \;\; c_2^* = \frac{Y}{p_2}\frac{\beta}{1+\alpha+\beta}$$

and

$$\lambda^* = \frac{1+\alpha+\beta}{Y}$$

Consumer Optimization: The Time Dimension

Irving Fisher (US, 1867-1947) was the first to recognize that the basic theory of consumer decision-making could be used to understand how to optimally allocate spending intertemporally, that is, over time, as well as how to optimally allocate spending across different goods in a static, or point-in-time, analysis.

Consumer Optimization: The Time Dimension

- Following Fisher, return to the case of two goods, but reinterpret:

$$c_0 = \text{ consumption today}$$
$$c_1 = \text{ consumption next year}$$

- Suppose that the consumer's utility function is

$$u(c_0) + \beta u(c_1)$$

where β now has a more specific interpretation, as the discount factor, a measure of patience.

Consumer Optimization: The Time Dimension



A concave utility function implies that indifference curves are convex, so that the consumer has a **preference for a smoothness** in consumption.

Consumer Optimization: The Time Dimension

- Next, let

$$Y_0 = \text{ income today}$$
$$Y_1 = \text{ income next year}$$
$$s = \text{ amount saved (or borrowed if negative) today}$$
$$r = \text{ interest rate}$$

Consumer Optimization: The Time Dimension

- Today, the consumer divides his or her income up into an amount to be consumed and an amount to be saved:

$$Y_0 \geq c_0 + s$$

- Next year, the consumer simply spends his or her income, including interest earnings if s is positive or net of interest expenses if s is negative:

$$Y_1 + (1 + r)s \geq c_1$$

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Consumer Optimization: The Time Dimension

- Divide both sides of next year's budget constraint by $1 + r$ to get

$$\frac{Y_1}{1+r} + s \geq \frac{c_1}{1+r}$$

- Now combine this inequality with this year's budget constraint

$$Y_0 \geq c_0 + s$$

to get

$$Y_0 + \frac{Y_1}{1+r} \geq c_0 + \frac{c_1}{1+r}$$

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Consumer Optimization: The Time Dimension

- The **"lifetime" budget constraint**

$$Y_0 + \frac{Y_1}{1+r} \geq c_0 + \frac{c_1}{1+r}$$

says that the present value of income must be sufficient to cover the present value of consumption over the two periods.

- It also shows that the "price" of consumption today relative to the "price" of consumption next year is related to the interest rate via

$$\frac{p_0}{p_1} = 1 + r$$

Consumer Optimization: The Time Dimension



The slope of the intertemporal budget constraint is $-(1 + r)$.

Consumer Optimization: The Time Dimension



At the optimum, the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution equals the slope of the intertemporal budget constraint.

Consumer Optimization: The Time Dimension

- We now know the answer ahead of time: if we take an algebraic approach to solve the consumer's problem, we will find that the IMRS equals the slope of the intertemporal budget constraint:

$$\frac{u'(c_0)}{\beta u'(c_1)} = 1 + r$$

- But let's use calculus to derive the same result.

Consumer Optimization: The Time Dimension

- The problem is to choose c_0 and c_1 to maximize utility

$$u(c_0) + \beta u(c_1)$$

subject to the budget constraint

$$Y_0 + \frac{Y_1}{1+r} \geq c_0 + \frac{c_1}{1+r}$$

- The Lagrangian is

$$L = u(c_0) + \beta u(c_1) + \lambda \left(Y_0 + \frac{Y_1}{1+r} - c_0 - \frac{c_1}{1+r} \right)$$

Consumer Optimization: The Time Dimension

$$L = u(c_0) + \beta u(c_1) + \lambda \left(Y_0 + \frac{Y_1}{1+r} - c_0 - \frac{c_1}{1+r} \right).$$

- The first-order conditions are:

$$u'(c_0^*) - \lambda^* = 0$$

$$\beta u'(c_1^*) - \lambda^* \left(\frac{1}{1+r} \right) = 0$$

- Eliminating the multiplier, we get again the condition "IMRS equal to relative price"

$$\frac{u'(c_0^*)}{\beta u'(c_1^*)} = 1 + r.$$

Consumer Optimization: The Time Dimension

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$$\frac{u'(c_0^*)}{\beta u'(c_1^*)} = 1 + r.$$

Consumer Optimization: The Time Dimension

- Unrealistic assumptions?

- At first glance, Fisher's model seems unrealistic, especially in its assumption that the consumer can borrow at the same interest rate r that he or she receives on his or her savings.

- A **reinterpretation of saving and borrowing** in this framework, however, can make it more applicable, at least for some consumers.

Investment Strategies and Cash Flows

Investment Strategy	Cash Flow at $t = 0$	Cash Flow at $t = 1$
Saving	-1	$+(1 + r)$
Buying a bond (long position in bonds)	-1	$+(1 + r)$

Investment Strategies and Cash Flows

Investment Strategy	Cash Flow at $t = 0$	Cash Flow at $t = 1$
Borrowing	$+1$	$-(1 + r)$
Issuing a bond	$+1$	$-(1 + r)$
Short selling a bond (long position in bonds)	$+1$	$-(1 + r)$
Selling a bond (out of inventory)	$+1$	$-(1 + r)$

Investment Strategies and Cash Flows

Investment Strategy	Cash Flow at $t = 0$	Cash Flow at $t = 1$
Buying a stock (long position in stocks)	$-P_0^s$	$+P_1^s$
Short selling a stock (short position in stocks)	$+P_0^s$	$-P_1^s$
Selling a stock (out of inventory)	$+P_0^s$	$-P_1^s$

Consumer Optimization: The Time Dimension

- Someone who already owns bonds can "borrow" by selling a bond out of inventory.

- In fact, theories like Fisher's work are better applied to consumers who *already* own stocks and bonds.

- Suggested reading:
  - **Greg Mankiw** and **Stephen Zeldes**, "The Consumption of Stockholders and Nonstockholders," Journal of Finance, 1991.

  - **Annette Vissing-Jorgensen**, "Limited Asset Market Participation and the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution," Journal of Political Economy, 2002.

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

In the 1950s and 1960s, **Kenneth Arrow** (US, 1921-2017, Nobel Prize 1972) and **Gerard Debreu** (France, 1921-2004, Nobel Prize 1983) extended consumer theory to accommodate risk and uncertainty.

To do so, they drew on earlier ideas developed by others, but added important insights of their own.

Building Blocks of Arrow-Debreu Theory

1. Fisher's (1930) intertemporal model of consumer decision-making.
2. From probability theory: uncertainty described with reference to "states of the world."
3. Expected utility theory (**John von Neumann** and **Oskar Morgenstern**, 1947).
4. Contingent claims - stylized financial assets - a powerful analytical device.

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Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- To be more specific about the source of risk, let's suppose that there are two possible outcomes for income next year, good and bad:

$$
\begin{aligned}
Y_0 &= \text{ income today} \\
Y_1^G &= \text{ income next year in the "good" state} \\
Y_1^B &= \text{ income next year in the "bad" state}
\end{aligned}
$$

- Assumption $Y_1^G > Y_1^B$ makes the "good" state good and where

$$
\begin{aligned}
\pi &= \text{probability of the good state} \\
1 - \pi &= \text{probability of the bad state}
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Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension



An event tree highlights randomness in income as the source of risk.

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- Arrow and Debreu used the probabilistic idea of **states of the world** to extend Irving Fisher's work
- They recognized that under these circumstances, the consumer chooses between three goods:

$$
\begin{aligned}
c_0 &= \text{consumption today} \\
c_1^G &= \text{consumption next year in the good state} \\
c_1^B &= \text{consumption next year in the bad state}
\end{aligned}
$$

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension



Under uncertainty, the consumer chooses consumption today and consumption in both states next year.

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension



Uncertainty about future income "induces" randomness in future consumption as well.

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- Suppose that the consumer's utility function is

$$u(c_0) + \beta\pi u\left(c_1^G\right) + \beta(1-\pi)u\left(c_1^B\right)$$

- The terms involving next year's consumption are weighted by the probability that each state will occur as well as by the discount factor β.

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

In probability theory, if a random variable X can take on n possible values, $X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_n$, with probabilities $\pi_1, \pi_2, \ldots, \pi_n$, then the expected value of X is

$$E(X) = \pi_1 X_1 + \pi_2 X_2 + \ldots + \pi_n X_n$$

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- By assuming that the consumer's utility function is

$$u\left(c_0\right) + \beta\pi u\left(c_1^G\right) + \beta(1-\pi)u\left(c_1^B\right)$$

we are assuming that the consumer's seeks to maximize expected utility

$$u\left(c_0\right) + \beta E\left[u\left(c_1\right)\right]$$

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

But by writing out all three terms,

$$u\left(c_0\right) + \beta\pi u\left(c_1^G\right) + \beta(1-\pi)u\left(c_1^B\right)$$

The function u is concave:

- In the standard microeconomic case (apples vs oranges), concavity represents a preference for diversity.
- Here, concavity represents a preference for **smoothness in consumption** over time and across states in the future.
  $\rightarrow$ The consumer is risk averse in the sense that he or she does not want consumption in the bad state to be too much different from consumption in the good state.

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- To implement these state-contingent consumption plans, Arrow and Debreu imagined that the consumer would trade **contingent claims** for both future states

- A contingent claim for the **good** state
  - costs q^G today
  - delivers one unit of consumption in the good state and zero units of consumption in the bad state next year

- A contingent claim for the **bad** state
  - costs q^B today
  - delivers zero units of consumption in the good state and one unit of consumption in the bad state next year

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension



Payoffs for the contingent claim for the **good** state (a long position).

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension



Payoffs for the contingent claim for the **bad** state (a long position).

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension



Payoffs for a short position in the contingent claim for the **good** state.

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension



Payoffs for a short position in the contingent claim for the **bad** state.

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

Trading Strategy	Claim	Cash Flow at $t = 0$	Cash Flow in Good State at $t = 1$	Cash Flow in Bad State at $t = 1$
Long	Good	$-q^G$	$+1$	0
Long	Bad	$-q^B$	0	$+1$
Short	Good	$+q^G$	-1	0
Short	Bad	$+q^B$	0	-1

Like a sophisticated form of saving and borrowing, where the investor can "fine-tune" the future state in which payments are received or made.

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- Today, the consumer divides his or her income Y_0 up into an amount to be consumed, c_0, and amounts used to purchase the two contingent claims:

  $$Y_0 \geq c_0 + q^G s^G + q^B s^B$$

  where s^G and s^B denote the number of each contingent claim purchased or sold short.

- If either s^G or s^B is negative, the consumer is taking a short position in that claim.

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- Next year, the consumer simply spends his or her income, including payoffs on contingent claims:

  $$Y_1^G + s^G \geq c_1^G$$

  in the good state and

  $$Y_1^B + s^B \geq c_1^B$$

  in the bad state.

- Note: we have two time periods ($t = 0, 1$), but three budget constraints, because in $t = 1$ there are two possible states of the world

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

$$Y_0 \geq c_0 + q^G s^G + q^B s^B$$
$$Y_1^G + s^G \geq c_1^G$$
$$Y_1^B + s^B \geq c_1^B$$

- Solve the second equation for s^G and the third equation for s^B
- Then substitute s^G and s^B into the first equation to obtain the lifetime budget constraint (or intertemporal budget constraint):

$$Y_0 + q^G Y_1^G + q^B Y_1^B \geq c_0 + q^G c_1^G + q^B c_1^B$$

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- The problem is to choose c_0, c_1^G, and c_1^B to maximize expected utility

$$u\left(c_0\right) + \beta\pi u\left(c_1^G\right) + \beta(1-\pi)u\left(c_1^B\right)$$

subject to the budget constraint

$$Y_0 + q^G Y_1^G + q^B Y_1^B \geq c_0 + q^G c_1^G + q^B c_1^B.$$

- This was Arrow and Debreu's key insight: that finance is like grocery shopping.
- Mathematically, making decisions over time and under uncertainty is no different from choosing apples, bananas, and pears!

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

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Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- The Lagrangian is

$$\begin{aligned} L =& u\left(c_0\right) + \beta\pi u\left(c_1^G\right) + \beta(1-\pi)u\left(c_1^B\right) \\ & + \lambda\left(Y_0 + q^G Y_1^G + q^B Y_1^B - c_0 - q^G c_1^G - q^B c_1^B\right) \end{aligned}$$

- First-order conditions:

$$\begin{aligned} u'\left(c_0^*\right) - \lambda^* = 0 \\ \beta\pi u'\left(c_1^{G*}\right) - \lambda^* q^G = 0 \\ \beta(1-\pi)u'\left(c_1^{B*}\right) - \lambda^* q^B = 0 \end{aligned}$$

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

The first-order conditions

$$u'\left(c_0^*\right) = \lambda^*$$
$$\beta\pi u'\left(c_1^{G*}\right) = \lambda^* q^G$$
$$\beta(1-\pi)u'\left(c_1^{B*}\right) = \lambda^* q^B$$

imply that marginal rates of substitution equal relative prices:

$$\frac{u'\left(c_0^*\right)}{\beta\pi u'\left(c_1^{G*}\right)} = \frac{1}{q^G} \text{ and } \frac{u'\left(c_0^*\right)}{\beta(1-\pi)u'\left(c_1^{B*}\right)} = \frac{1}{q^B}$$

$$\text{and } \frac{\pi u'\left(c_1^{G*}\right)}{(1-\pi)u'\left(c_1^{B*}\right)} = \frac{q^G}{q^B}.$$

Example

- Consider an economy where $\beta = 1$, $\pi = 1/2$, $Y_0 = Y_1^G = 1$, $Y_1^B = 0$, $u(c) = \log(c)$

- Consumer solves

$$\max_{\{c_0, c_1^G, c_1^B\}} \log(c_0) + \frac{1}{2}\log\left(c_1^G\right) + \frac{1}{2}\log\left(c_1^B\right)$$

subject to intertemporal budget constraint

$$1 + q^G \geq c_0 + q^G c_1^G + q^B c_1^B$$

- Show that if $q^G = q^B = 1$, then $c_0^* = 1$ and $c_1^{G^*} = c_1^{B^*} = \frac{1}{2}$
- Find s^{G^*} and s^{B^*}. Discuss economic intuition

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- Do we really observe consumers trading in contingent claims?
- Yes, if we think of financial assets as "bundles" of contingent claims.
- This insight is also Arrow and Debreu's.
- Note: contigent claims are also called “Arrow-Debreu” securities or simply A-D securities

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- A "stock" is a risky asset that pays dividend d^G next year in the good state and d^B next year in the bad state.
- These payoffs can be replicated by buying d^G contingent claims for the good state and d^B contingent claims for the bad state.
- Using matrix algebra,

$$\begin{bmatrix} d^G \\ d^B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} d^G + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} d^B$$

The payoff vector of the stock can be written as a linear combination of the contingent claims with appropriate weights

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Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension



Payoffs for the stock.

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- A "bond" is a safe asset that pays off one next year in the good state and one next year in the bad state.
- These payoffs can be replicated by buying one contingent claim for the good state and one contingent claim for the bad state.
- Using matrix algebra,

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

(The weights of the linear combination are just one and one)

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

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Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension



Payoffs for the bond.

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- If we know the contingent claims prices q^G and q^B, then we can infer that the stock must sell today for

$$q^{\text{stock}} = q^G d^G + q^B d^B$$

- No-arbitrage pricing:
  - If the stock cost more than the equivalent bundle of contingent claims, traders could make profits for sure by short selling the stock and buying the contingent claims;
  - if the stock cost less than the equivalent bundle of contingent claims, traders could make profits for sure by buying the stock and selling the contingent claims.

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- Consider the first case
- If $q^{stock} > q^G d^G + q^B d^B$ then traders could make profits for sure (arbitrage!) by short selling the stock and buying the contingent claims

	$t = 0$	$t = 1$, Good	$t = 1$, Bad
Short sell stock	q^{stock}	$-d^G$	$-d^B$
Buy d^G cont. claims	$-q^G d^G$	d^G	0
Buy d^B cont. claims	$-q^B d^B$	0	d^B
Total	$+$	0	0

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension



"Pricing" the stock.

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- Likewise, if we know the contingent claims prices q^G and q^B, then we can infer that the bond must sell today for

$$q^{\text{bond}} = q^G + q^B$$

- Since the bond pays off one for sure next year, the interest rate, defined as the return on the risk-free bond, is

$$1 + r = \frac{1}{q^{\text{bond}}} = \frac{1}{q^G + q^B}$$

- The bond price relates to the interest rate via

$$q^{bond} = \frac{1}{1 + r}$$

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension



Pricing the bond.

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- We've already seen how contingent claims can be used to replicate the stock and the bond
  - Prices of the contingent claims $\Longrightarrow$ prices of stock and bond
- Now let's see how the stock and the bond can be used to replicate the contingent claims
  - Prices of stock and bond $\Longrightarrow$ prices of the contingent claims

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- Consider buying s shares of stock and b bonds, in order to replicate the contingent claim for the good state.
- In the good state, the payoffs should be

$$sd^G + b = 1$$

- In the bad state, the payoffs should be

$$sd^B + b = 0$$

since the contingent claim pays off one in the good state and zero in the bad state

Using Matrix Algebra

- To replicate the contingent claim for the good state:

$$sd^G + b = 1$$
$$sd^B + b = 0$$

- In matrix notation,

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} = \overbrace{\begin{bmatrix} d^G & 1 \\ d^B & 1 \end{bmatrix}}^{=R} \begin{bmatrix} s \\ b \end{bmatrix}$$

- R is a 2×2 matrix where the first column is the payoff vector of the stock and the second column is the payoff vector of the bond
- We can solve the equations above for s and b if and only if the matrix R has full rank (i.e. if the columns of R are linearly independent, which happens iff $d^G \neq d^B$)

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- To replicate the contingent claim for the good state:

$$sd^G + b = 1$$

$$sd^B + b = 0 \Rightarrow b = -sd^B$$

- Substitute the second equation into the first to solve for

$$s = \frac{1}{d^G - d^B} \text{ and } b = \frac{-d^B}{d^G - d^B}$$

- Note that the solution exists iff $d^G \neq d^B$: this condition makes sure that the stock and the bond have linearly independent payoff vectors
- Since s and b are of opposite sign, this requires going "long" one asset and "short" the other.

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- To replicate the contingent claim for the good state:

$$s = \frac{1}{d^G - d^B} \text{ and } b = \frac{-d^B}{d^G - d^B}$$

- If we know the prices q^{stock} and q^{bond} of the stock and bond, we can infer that in the absence of arbitrage, the claim for the good state would have price

$$q^G = q^{\text{stock}} s + q^{\text{bond}} b = \frac{q^{\text{stock}} - d^B q^{\text{bond}}}{d^G - d^B}.$$

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- Consider buying s shares of stock and b bonds, in order to replicate the contingent claim for the bad state.

- In the good state, the payoffs should be

$$sd^G + b = 0$$

- In the bad state, the payoffs should be

$$sd^B + b = 1$$

since the contingent claim pays off one in the bad state and zero in the good state.

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- To replicate the contingent claim for the bad state:

$$sd^G + b = 0 \Rightarrow b = -sd^G$$
$$sd^B + b = 1$$

- Substitute the first equation into the second to solve for

$$s = \frac{-1}{d^G - d^B} \text{ and } b = \frac{d^G}{d^G - d^B}$$

- Once again, this requires going long one asset and short the other.

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- To replicate the contingent claim for the bad state:

$$s = \frac{-1}{d^G - d^B} \text{ and } b = \frac{d^G}{d^G - d^B}$$

- Once again, if we know the prices q^{stock} and q^{bond} of the stock and bond, we can infer that in the absence of arbitrage, the claim for the bad state would have price

$$q^B = q^{\text{stock}} s + q^{\text{bond}} b = \frac{d^G q^{\text{bond}} - q^{\text{stock}}}{d^G - d^B}.$$

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- What makes it possible to go back and forth between traded assets, like stocks and bonds, and contingent claims?
- There are the **same number** of traded assets as there are possible states of the world next year.
- More generally, asset markets are complete if there are as many assets (with linearly independent payoffs) as there are states next year.

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- Complete markets: with **two** states of the world, I need **two** assets with **linearly independent** payoffs (here, the stock and the bond)
- If markets are complete, I can replicate any asset using the stock and the bond
- Suppose the asset has a generic payoff $\left[r^G, r^B\right]^T$
- Then, if markets are complete, I can always find a (unique) solution $[s, b]^T$ to the linear system:

$$\begin{bmatrix} r^G \\ r^B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} d^G & 1 \\ d^B & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} s \\ b \end{bmatrix}$$

and then write the price of this asset as

$$q^{\text{new asset}} = q^{\text{stock}} \ s + q^{\text{bond}} \ b$$

Consumer Optimization: The Risk Dimension

- If asset markets are complete, then we can use the prices of traded assets to infer the prices of contingent claims.

- Then we can use the contingent claims prices to infer the price of any newly-introduced asset.

Outline

1. Mathematical Preliminaries
   - Unconstrained Optimization
   - Constrained Optimization
2. Consumer Optimization
   - Graphical Analysis
   - Algebraic Analysis
   - The Time Dimension
   - The Risk Dimension
3. General Equilibrium
   - Optimal Allocations
   - Equilibrium Allocations

General Equilibrium

An allocation of resources is Pareto optimal if it is impossible to reallocate those resources without making at least one consumer worse off.

A competitive equilibrium is an allocation of resources and a set of prices such that, at those prices:

1. each consumer is maximizing utility subject to his or her budget constraint, and
2. the supply of each good equal the demand for each good

The two welfare theorems of economics link optimal and equilibrium allocations.

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The two welfare theorems of economics link optimal and equilibrium allocations.

Optimal Allocations

In an economy with two consumers, 1 and 2, and two goods, a and b, the key properties of Pareto optimal allocations can be illustrated using an Edgeworth box.

$$
\begin{aligned}
c_a^1 &= \text{1's consumption of good } a \\
c_b^1 &= \text{1's consumption of good } b \\
c_a^2 &= \text{2's consumption of good } a \\
c_b^2 &= \text{2's consumption of good } b
\end{aligned}
$$



The Edgeworth box contains the entire set of feasible allocations.

Optimal Allocations



Both consumers prefer allocations in the green region to A.

Optimal Allocations



Both consumers prefer B to A, but still there are allocations that are even more strongly preferred.

Optimal Allocations



At C, there is no way to make one consumer better off without making the other worse off $\Longrightarrow$ C is Pareto optimal.

Optimal Allocations



There are many Pareto optimal allocations, but each is characterized by the tangency of the two consumers' indifference curves.

- Note that Pareto optimality is a welfare criterion that accounts for efficiency but not equity:
    - An allocation may be Pareto optimal even though it provides most of the goods to one consumer

- Since the slope of the indifference curves is measured by the marginal rate of substitution, the mathematical condition associated with *all* Pareto optimal allocations is

$$MRS^1_{a,b} = MRS^2_{a,b} \tag{PO}$$

Optimal Allocations

- Suppose that consumer 1 has utility function

$$u\left(c_a^1\right) + \alpha u\left(c_b^1\right)$$

and consumer 2 has utility function

$$v\left(c_a^2\right) + \beta v\left(c_b^2\right)$$

Optimal Allocations

- Consider a benevolent "social planner," who divides Y_a units of good a and Y_b units of good b up between the two consumers, subject to the resource constraints

$$Y_a \geq c_a^1 + c_a^2$$

and

$$Y_b \geq c_b^1 + c_b^2,$$

- The social planner seeks to maximize a weighted average of consumers' utilities:

$$\theta \left[u\left(c_a^1\right) + \alpha u\left(c_b^1\right) \right] + (1-\theta)\left[v\left(c_a^2\right) + \beta v\left(c_b^2\right) \right],$$

where $1 > \theta > 0$.

Optimal Allocations

- Since there are two constraints, the Lagrangian for the social planner's problem requires two Lagrange multipliers:

$$
\begin{aligned}
L =& \theta \left[u\left(c_a^1\right) + \alpha u\left(c_b^1\right) \right] + (1-\theta)\left[v\left(c_a^2\right) + \beta v\left(c_b^2\right) \right] \\
&+ \lambda_a \left(Y_a - c_a^1 - c_a^2\right) + \lambda_b \left(Y_b - c_b^1 - c_b^2\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

- The first-order conditions are:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\theta u'\left(c_a^1\right) - \lambda_a &= 0 \\
\theta \alpha u'\left(c_b^1\right) - \lambda_b &= 0 \\
(1-\theta) v'\left(c_a^2\right) - \lambda_a &= 0 \\
(1-\theta)\beta v'\left(c_b^2\right) - \lambda_b &= 0.
\end{aligned}
$$

Optimal Allocations

- The first-order conditions

$$\theta u'\left(c_a^1\right) - \lambda_a = 0$$
$$\theta\alpha u'\left(c_b^1\right) - \lambda_b = 0$$
$$(1-\theta)v'\left(c_a^2\right) - \lambda_a = 0$$
$$(1-\theta)\beta v'\left(c_b^2\right) - \lambda_b = 0.$$

imply that

$$\frac{u'\left(c_a^1\right)}{\alpha u'\left(c_b^1\right)} = \frac{\lambda_a}{\lambda_b} = \frac{v'\left(c_a^2\right)}{\beta v'\left(c_b^2\right)},$$

a restatement of (PO) that must hold for *any* value of θ.

Equilibrium Allocations

Now let's see what happens when markets, instead of a social planner, allocate resources:

$$\begin{aligned}
Y_a^1 &= \text{consumer 1's endowment of good } a \\
Y_b^1 &= \text{consumer 1's endowment of good } b \\
Y_a^2 &= \text{consumer 2's endowment of good } a \\
Y_b^2 &= \text{consumer 2's endowment of good } b \\
p_a &= \text{price of good } a \\
p_b &= \text{price of good } b
\end{aligned}$$

Equilibrium Allocations

- Consumer 1 chooses c_a^1 and c_b^1 to maximize utility

$$u\left(c_a^1\right) + \alpha u\left(c_b^1\right)$$

subject to the budget constraint

$$p_a Y_a^1 + p_b Y_b^1 \geq p_a c_a^1 + p_b c_b^1$$

taking the prices p_a and p_b as given.

Equilibrium Allocations

- The Lagrangian for consumer 1's problem is

$$L = u\left(c_a^1\right) + \alpha u\left(c_b^1\right) + \lambda^1\left(p_a Y_a^1 + p_b Y_b^1 - p_a c_a^1 - p_b c_b^1\right).$$

- The first-order conditions

$$u'\left(c_a^1\right) - \lambda^1 p_a = 0$$
$$\alpha u'\left(c_b^1\right) - \lambda^1 p_b = 0$$

imply that

$$\frac{u'\left(c_a^1\right)}{\alpha u'\left(c_b^1\right)} = \frac{p_a}{p_b}. \qquad \text{(CE-1)}$$

Equilibrium Allocations

- Similarly, consumer 2 chooses c_a^2 and c_b^2 to maximize utility

  $$v\left(c_a^2\right) + \beta v\left(c_b^2\right)$$

  subject to the budget constraint

  $$p_a Y_a^2 + p_b Y_b^2 \geq p_a c_a^2 + p_b c_b^2$$

  taking the prices p_a and p_b as given.

Equilibrium Allocations

- The Lagrangian for consumer 2's problem is

$$L = v\left(c_a^2\right) + \beta v\left(c_b^2\right) + \lambda^2\left(p_a Y_a^2 + p_b Y_b^2 - p_a c_a^2 - p_b c_b^2\right).$$

- The first-order conditions

$$v'\left(c_a^2\right) - \lambda^2 p_a = 0$$
$$\beta v'\left(c_b^2\right) - \lambda^2 p_b = 0$$

imply that

$$\frac{v'\left(c_a^2\right)}{\beta v'\left(c_b^2\right)} = \frac{p_a}{p_b}. \tag{CE-2}$$

Equilibrium Allocations

- Hence, in any competitive equilibrium

$$\frac{u'\left(c_a^1\right)}{\alpha u'\left(c_b^1\right)} = \frac{p_a}{p_b}. \tag{CE-1}$$

and

$$\frac{v'\left(c_a^2\right)}{\beta v'\left(c_b^2\right)} = \frac{p_a}{p_b} \tag{CE-2}$$

must hold, so that

$$\frac{u'\left(c_a^1\right)}{\alpha u'\left(c_b^1\right)} = \frac{p_a}{p_b} = \frac{v'\left(c_a^2\right)}{\beta v'\left(c_b^2\right)}$$

Equilibrium Allocations

There will be different equilibrium allocations associated with different patterns for the endowments Y_a^1, Y_b^1, Y_a^2, and Y_b^2.

In addition, different equilibrium allocations may require different prices p_a and p_b to equate the supply and demand of each good.

But *all* equilibrium allocations must satisfy

$$MRS^1_{a,b} = \frac{p_a}{p_b} = MRS^2_{a,b}. \tag{CE}$$

Equilibrium Allocations



The Pareto optimal allocation C is supported in a competitive equilibrium with prices p_a and p_b, and the equilibrium allocation C is Pareto optimal.

The coincidence between (PO) and (CE) underlies results that extend **Adam Smith**'s (Scotland, 1723-1790) notion of an "invisible hand" that guides self-interested individuals to choose resource allocations that are Pareto optimal.

First Welfare Theorem of Economics The resource allocation from a competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal.

Second Welfare Theorem of Economics A Pareto optimal resource allocation can be supported in a competitive equilibrium.