



ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO REBUILD POLITICAL STABILITY IN PERU

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Rebuilding Political Stability in Peru

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Last year, the controversial removal of Former President Vizcarra, labeled by many as a coup, led to hundreds of riots in demand of a better democracy in Peru. Peru had three different president in the span of one week. Peru's sinking democracy issues out a call for help, and its institutions only grow exponentially weaker. It is absolutely imperative to help search for alternatives that will shape the future of Peru and prevent future governments undergo soft-coups or democratic breakdowns. Through this briefing, we look at the democratic breakdown of the 1990s under the Alberto Fujimori administration and examine the resulting new constitution, entrenched corruption, personalistic political parties, and institutional weakness. Drawing elements from our background examination, the current shape of Peru, and the upcoming elections, we will ultimately arrive with finalized policy recommendations. Our goal is to provide a guide that helps others understand the political instability of Peru. And our second goal is to help tackle the prevalent factors we find from our analysis through this guide. We want to help stop the repetitive constitutional crises that are an unfortunate but expected result of Peru's weak institutions, especially party systems.

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INTRODUCTION

“By the way, what do you think about Perú? It’s latin america, we have no hope.”
- a tweet from a Peruvian¹

Peru is experiencing notorious political instability, and it is in dire need of external help. Our objective here is to provide a briefing to the U.S. Embassy of Peru with policy recommendations to tackle political instability in Peru.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Fujimori and the Democratic Breakdown of the 1990’s

As a political outsider, the rise to power of Alberto Fujimori was an unexpected event achieved through democratic means.² The hyperinflation crisis and insurrectionary violence led to the first election of Fujimori in 1990.³ And Fujimori was able to sustain his first administration by “..rescue[ing] Peru from imminent collapse, restor[ing] economic stability, and defeat[ing] one of the most powerful and dangerous guerrilla movements in Latin American history.”⁴ However, at the moment of the presidential inauguration of Fujimori, the Peruvian Congress was dominated by opposition parties, and the Supreme Court was filled with appointees aligned with the legislature. The media overwhelmingly supported the bid of Mario Vargas Llosa for the presidency. And they branded Fujimori’s administration as untrustworthy.⁵ As a result, when he came to power, Fujimori had very few allies inside the Peruvian government, and he lacked support from the media.

A defining characteristic of the first weeks of Fujimori as an executive was his inability and unwillingness to compromise with his political rivals. As Levitsky and Ziblatt put it, “Fujimori not only lacked experience with the intricacies of legislative politics, but he also lacked the patience for it.” Thus, instead of negotiating with the legislature, he made an enemy out of them by lashing out at leaders of the opposition, calling opposition congressmen “unproductive charlatans.” To make his ideas into policy, he preferred to circumvent the legislature and govern by decree instead.⁶ And despite his harsh criticism of the economic shock tactics proposed by his conservative opponent Mario Vargas Llosa throughout the campaign trail, Fujimori began instituting severe austerity measures a mere two weeks after his presidential inauguration. The “Fujishock,” as it was called,

¹See “The Downfall of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski and the Future of Peru | The New Yorker.” Accessed March 23, 2021. <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-downfall-of-pedro-pablo-kuczynski-and-the-future-of-peru>.

²See Julio Carrión, *The Fujimori Legacy: The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru*, (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), 6, 14.

³Ibid, 14.

⁴Ibid, 14.

⁵See Smith, Peter H. *Latin America in Comparative Perspective: New Approaches to Methods and Analysis*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995.

⁶See Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, *How Democracies Die* (Crown, 2018).

accomplished its goal of controlling inflation but caused hardships among the working class and the poor.⁷ His divisive politics would escalate tensions with Congress, and his constant use of constitutional hardball⁸ prompted further attacks on his presidency from the opposition. And the attacks just made Fujimori double down on his aggressive politics, creating a vicious cycle of undermining democratic institutions as self-defense.⁹

The polarization in the Peruvian government reached its climax in 1992. In a move backed by the military, Alberto Fujimori declared a state of emergency, and in an “autogolpe” (self-coup), he dissolved Congress. At the same time, he also purged the judiciary and called for a new Constitution. The new constitution was approved by referendum in 1993. And despite it being anti-democratic, the decision was popular because the Peruvians disdained the corrupt elite political establishment of Peru and feared the Maoist guerrilla group Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path).¹⁰

As a result, the re-election of Fujimori under the new constitution gave him a semblance of legitimacy as a democratic leader, yet this was far from being the case. The new unicameral legislature was filled mostly with allies to the Fujimori government, which allowed him to rule the country virtually unopposed. The administration of Fujimori curtailed civil liberties. The phone lines of journalists were routinely tapped and harassed, and they exiled critics of the regime. Electoral institutions became heavily politicized and corrupt, as many of them grew full with supporters of Fujimori. Fujimori proclaimed the freedom of the press even though the military detained journalists and opposition politicians.¹¹ The result of this overt effort at undermining democracy was the long-term weakening of Peruvian institutions and pluralism. As Levitsky expressed, “in acceding to the destruction of republican institutions, Peruvians also surrendered their most effective means of taking it back.”¹²

Yet, many Peruvians do not forget the successes of Fujimori in ending Sendero Luminoso and the economic crisis and hyperinflation of the 1980s.¹³ So, the later uncovered means of Fujimori to defeat the Maoist guerrilla groups (and an unethical family planning policy that sterilized 215,227 women and 16,547¹⁴) also polarized the country for nearly two decades. Fujimori put an end to Sendero Luminoso through counterterrorism. In 2003, Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) revealed in a final report that, over the approximate amount of 60,000 people who died or forcibly disappeared in the 20-year civil war, a third of these deaths were attributed to Peruvian

⁷ See Gouge, Thomas. *Exodus from Capitalism: the End of Inflation and Debt*. Lincoln, NB: iUniverse, Inc., 2003.

⁸ See Tushnet, Mark V. “Constitutional Hardball.” *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2003. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.451960>.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “Freedom in the World 1999 - Peru.” *Refworld*. Accessed February 19, 2021.

¹¹ See Paul Alonso, “Peruvian Infotainment: From Fujimori’s Media Dictatorship to Democracy’s Satire.” *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 35, no. 2 (2016): 210-24.

¹² See Levitsky, Steven. “Latin America’s Imperiled Progress: Fujimori and Post-Party Politics in Peru.” *Journal of Democracy* 10, no. 3 (1999).

¹³ See Martín, Andres González. “Peru, Where the City Is Sleeping,” n.d., 17.

¹⁴ See “Mass Sterilisation Scandal Shocks Peru,” July 24, 2002. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2148793.stm>.

security forces.¹⁵ Only 642 of the 23,149 recorded victims died in actual combat.¹⁶

“On the night of November 3, 1991, the residents of the Jirón Huanta building at No. 840, Barrios Altos, were celebrating a barbeque when a convoy of police vans suddenly burst down the main road. Their neighborhood chicken roast had been identified as a Sendero Luminoso meeting. Uniformed members of Grupo Colina descended from the vehicles, ordered the revelers to the ground, and opened fire with submachine guns. 15 people including children were murdered... In the early morning hours of July 18, 1992, masked gunmen burst into the residences of the Enrique Guzmán y Valle National University, popularly known as La Cantuta... The death squad abducted nine students and professor Hugo Muñoz Sánchez. The victims were tortured, executed, incinerated and then buried in an unmarked mass grave” - The Center for Justice and Accountability

Fujimori used beyond legal means to defeat the Maoist guerrilla groups. Under the administration of Fujimori, military tribunals trialed guerrilla members in faceless courts.¹⁷ And Fujimori managed to avoid criminal charges through clandestine deals and legal maneuvers such as a blanket amnesty in 1995 to police and military officers after the defeat of Sendero Luminoso.¹⁸ It was only when the Peruvian media released a series of leaked videos on television called "Vladi-Videos" that Fujimori felt forced to flee Peru and fax his resignation from a hotel room. The Vladi-Videos were films made by Vladimir Montesinos, the security advisor of Fujimori, as part of a surveillance campaign. Through this leak, Montesinos was caught bribing multiple congressmen to switch to Fujimori's party. Congress impeached Fujimori rather than accepting his resignation, and they appointed Valentín Paniagua, as an interim replacement of Fujimori for the rest of his term until the 2001 election. Paniagua was opposed to Fujimori's anti-terrorism tactics, so his presidency permitted the retrial of many members of Sendero Luminoso.¹⁹ Paniagua also established the TRC that presented criminal cases from Fujimori's administration to state prosecutors in 2001 when the Inter-American Court of Human Rights annulled Fujimori's 1995 amnesty.²⁰ And when Fujimori publicly shared his intention to run for the 2006 election, he was arrested in Chile; in his attempts to make a comeback, security officials prevented his name from being placed on the 2006 ballot.²¹ However, Fujimori prevailed through his daughter and his thousands of loyal supporters.

¹⁵ See “‘I Governed From Hell, Not From the Palace’ – CJA.” Accessed March 21, 2021. <https://cja.org/i-governed-from-hell-not-from-the-palace/>.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

The Constitution of 1993

In practice and on paper, the new constitution of Peru leaves a high concentration of power in the hands of the executive, leaving a breeding ground for political turmoil and clashes between Congress and the President. Peru's constitution explicitly states the order of importance of government officials with the President of the Republic first, followed by Congress members and lastly Cabinet members.²²

Article 39

All public officials and civil servants are in the service of the Nation. The President of the Republic is the highest official in the service of the Nation, followed by, in this order of importance: Congressmen, members of the Cabinet, members of the Constitutional Court and the Council of the Magistracy, Justices of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General of the Nation and the Ombudsman, in the same category, and the representatives of the decentralized agencies and Mayors, in accordance with the law.

The sequence of power described in Article 39 has broiled many tensions between the two competing branches of government both in the daily exercise of their power and how they keep each other accountable. For example, the constitution outlines the obligation that civil servants have to turn over their income reports periodically and are barred from holding any other profession or position during the time that Congress.²³ However, given the various corruption scandals involving past Peruvian presidents and public servants, these constitutional accountability safeguards do not seem sufficient to prevent politicians from leveraging their political power for economic gain.

Both executive officials and congress members are equally made subject to impeachment with the Lower House bringing up the charges and the Senate trying the case.²⁴ And based on Article 81, if a congress member accepts a paid position from the President, he loses his seat. But unlike Mexico or Uruguay, they could accept a position as a minister of state or "Commissioner Extraordinary of International Character."²⁵ Lastly, the constitution outlines proceedings for Congress to decide whether or not to suspend officials from their duties but give no explicit indication for which behaviors should be reprimanded. This demonstrates the relative freedom that Congresspeople have.²⁶ This freedom makes Peru's institutions vulnerable to corruption.

Entrenched corruption in a mining-powered economy

Throughout the two decades following Fujimori's resignation, Odebrecht had a heavy influence on Peruvian politics.²⁷ The Brazilian construction company was involved in the construction work

²² See Constitution of Peru, Art. 39.

²³ See Constitution of Peru, Art. 40.

²⁴ See The Southwestern Political Science Quarterly, SEPTEMBER, 1921, Vol. 2, No. 2 (SEPTEMBER, 1921), pp. 161-181.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ See Constitution of Peru, Art. 100.

²⁷ See Engel, Eliot L, Brad Sherman, Gregory W Meeks, Albio Sires, Gerald E Connolly, Theodore E Deutch, Karen Bass, et al. "COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS," n.d., 55.

for numerous major projects including a part of the Trans-oceanic highway connecting Peru (the Pacific Ocean) with Brazil (the Atlantic Ocean), Section 2 of the Metro line in Lima, the Chagall Hydroelectric Power Plant, the Olmos and Chavimochic irrigation projects, the Vía de Evitamiento road project in Cusco, and the port in Matarani.^[28] And according to scholars, the Brazilian construction company influenced Peru's state decisions due to three factors: its timely delivery on projects, its web of corruption throughout the state, and (mainly) the institutional weaknesses of Peru.^[29]

During Alan Garcia's government (2006-2011), Odebrecht managed to solidly engage in corruption to secure the contract to build the Metro de Lima in Alan Garcia's government. Garcia had promised to deliver the Metro de Lima during his first term as president but failed. Embarrassed by the corruption engulfing his first attempt to complete the project, Garcia had to finish the Metro de Lima to prove himself. And his desperation allowed Odebrecht to start a web of corruption. As Garcia moved the project from the Municipalidad de Lima to the Ministerio de Transporte y Comunicaciones, Odebrecht's record-fast delivery times enticed Garcia.^[30]

And to monopolize the market, Odebrecht needed the key players to approve their projects.^[31] Because the opposition could cause issues for the company, they aimed to finance all campaigns of the people running for relevant positions even though some would not be elected.^[32] Financing all sides of the political spectrum, Odebrecht engulfed most of the key players in government. Specifically, the company would leverage their donations to ask for special meetings with high-ranking officials and set them up to get more contracts.^[33] And overall, Odebrecht secured several projects during the presidency of Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006), Alan Garcia (2006-2011), and Ollanta Humala (2011-2016).^[34] In 2017, the Brazilian construction company confessed to having paid around US\$ 29 million to officials in Peru between 2005 and 2014.^[35]

In the case of Odebrecht, certain laws such as Ley 30737 and Ley 28670 enabled Odebrecht's corruption.^[36] Ley 30737 supposedly assures the immediate payment of civil reparations to Peru when there is bribery, but it protects companies like Odebrecht through loopholes.^[37] The payments are divisible among all entities involved in the crime, and if one entity cannot pay their share, all other entities do not have to pay their share.^[38] Furthermore, Ley 28670 allows the labeling of several

²⁸See Gestión, Redacción. "TC Declara Constitucional Norma Que Otorga Beneficios De Pago y Tributarios a Odebrecht." Gestión. Gestión, December 28, 2020. <https://gestion.pe/peru/tribunal-constitucional-odebrecht-ley-30373-corrupcion-noticia/>.

²⁹See Martínez Encarnación, K. (2019). Dinero, poder y política: financiamiento electoral como clave en la influencia de Odebrecht en Perú y México. *Polite*, 10(18), 128-168. <https://doi.org/10.18800/politai.201901.005>.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹See Francisco Durand (2019) The Odebrecht Tsunami, *NACLA Report on the Americas*, 51:2, 146-152, DOI: 10.1080/10714839.2019.1617475. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2019.1617475>.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

³⁴See <https://search-proquest-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/docview/1936471694?accountid=11311&pq-origsite=primo>.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶See https://leyes.congreso.gob.pe/Documentos/2016_2021/Proyectos_de_Ley_y_de_Resoluciones_Legislativas/PL0109720170316.D.pdf

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid.




Figure 1. Layout of the web of corruption that Odebrecht managed to establish in Alan Garcia's government in his Metro de Lima project. Martinez Encarnación, K. (2019). *Dinero, poder y política: financiamiento electoral como clave en la influencia de Odebrecht en Perú y México*. *Polite*, 10(18), 128-168. <https://doi.org/10.18800/politai.201901.005>.

construction projects as public necessities or national interests, which permitted the questionable activity with Odebrecht to continue.³⁹

Personalistic Parties and Polarization

For more than the past two decades, the political parties in Peru have been incredibly young and revolved around a public figure rather than an institutionalized ideology. A clear example is Fuerza Popular. After Fujimori was sentenced for abuse of power and corruption in 2007 and for human rights violations in 2009, his daughter Keiko Fujimori launched the political party Fuerza Popular (Popular Force).⁴⁰ And in the 2011 elections, Ollanta Humala with Gana Peru (another recently formed party that revolved around the efforts of Ollanta to push back Fujimori) only won as a lesser evil.⁴¹ The deciding factor seemed to be whether the voter opposed or supported the legacy of Alberto Fujimori. And the newly formed party by Keiko, Fuerza Popular, managed to obtain 37 seats out of the 130 seats in Congress, the second largest amounts of seats per party after the political party of Ollanta Humala, Gana Peru, with 47 seats.⁴² In the election of 2016, Keiko Fujimori and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski tightly competed in the second electoral round. And even though Fuerza Popular lost with 36% of the vote, Fujimorists still held 73 out of 130 members of the unicameral

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰See "Alberto Fujimori Profile: Deeply Divisive Peruvian Leader." BBC News, February 20, 2018, sec. Latin America & Caribbean. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-16097439>

⁴¹See Burrón, Neil. "Ollanta Humala and the Peruvian Conjuncture: Democratic Expansion or "Inclusive" Neoliberal Redux?" *Latin American Perspectives* 39, no. 1 (2012): 137. Accessed March 22, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23238972>.

⁴²Ibid.

Congress of Peru.⁴³




Figure 2. Parliamentary electoral results per political party. The electoral method only gives parliamentary seats to the parties that meet the 5% cut-off. “Estadísticas de las elecciones generales 2016.” Jurado Nacional de Elecciones, 2016.

https://portal.jne.gob.pe/portal_documentos/files/0555507c-f982-4f51-b0ca-34e0fa17fc73.pdf.




Figure 3. Final distribution of parliamentary seats per political party. “Estadísticas de las elecciones generales 2016.” Jurado Nacional de Elecciones, 2016.

https://portal.jne.gob.pe/portal_documentos/files/0555507c-f982-4f51-b0ca-34e0fa17fc73.pdf.

According to John Carey and Steven Levitsky, the prevalence of Fujimorists in 2016 elected Congress was due to the proportional representation method of Peru, the D’Hondt method. Had Peru used another method such as the Droop Quota or the Sainte-Laguë, Fujimorists would not

⁴³Ibid.

have obtained a majority of seats in Congress.⁴⁴ Nonetheless, a majority in Congress implied that Kuczynski had to make deals with Fujimorists who were most likely to demand the pardon of Alberto Fujimori.⁴⁵ In 2017, Kuczynski pardoned Alberto because of health complications, and this was both celebrated and protested against by thousands.⁴⁶




Figure 4. *Categorized proportional representation methods, by Silvia Kotanidis through the European Parliamentary Research Service. Kotanidis, Silvia. “Understanding the d’Hondt method.” European Parliament, June, 2019.*

[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637966/EPRS_BRI\(2019\)637966_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637966/EPRS_BRI(2019)637966_EN.pdf).

The Constitutional Crisis from 2017 to 2020

In December 2017, Congress obtained evidence that Kuczynski was involved with Odebrecht through one of his companies, Westfield Capital.⁴⁷ Even though Kuczynski denied any claims of his relationship with the Brazilian construction company, evidence showed that his company worked with Odebrecht while Kuczynski served as prime minister and finance minister of a government that awarded contracts to them.⁴⁸ In light of this, Congress attempted to impeach Kuczynski out of office. With only 15 seats in Congress, Kuczynski survived the impeachment because nine members of Fuerza Popular abstained their vote; days later, however, Kuczynski pardoned Alberto Fujimori from prison, so it was clear that he had struck a deal with Keiko Fujimori to free her father.⁴⁹ Not long after this, Kuczynski lost his remaining political support due to popular lack of faith, and eventually

⁴⁴See Carey, John M., and Steven Levitsky. “Fujimori’s Party Already Controls Peru’s Congress. Here’s Why Observers Are Worried.” Washington Post. Accessed March 22, 2021. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/03/fujimoris-party-already-controls-perus-congress-heres-why-observers-are-worried/>.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶See “Alberto Fujimori Profile: Deeply Divisive Peruvian Leader.” BBC News, February 20, 2018, sec. Latin America & Caribbean. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-16097439>

⁴⁷See “The Short Unhappy Presidency of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski.” The Economist, March 22, 2018. <https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2018/03/22/the-short-unhappy-presidency-of-pedro-pablo-kuczynski>.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid.

resigned given that after people saw through this, he had no allies anywhere else.⁵⁰

Following Kuczynski's resignation from the presidency after the Odebrecht allegations, in March of 2018, Martin Vizcarra took office as the new president of Peru.⁵¹ And after back-to-back political scandals, Vizcarra simply wanted to build trust with voters with his anti-graft policies.⁵² Vizcarra maintained an anti-corruption platform and developed a power base off of the widespread anger felt amongst Peruvian citizens towards the corruption in Peruvian politics (especially following a scandal in July⁵³). And by late 2018, Vizcarra had proposed to ban private funding for political campaigns, to stop the military police from running more than one term, and to create an upper chamber of Parliament. And in December 2018, through a referendum, the first two of his proposals were approved.⁵⁴ However, corruption is the bread and butter of Peruvian politics.⁵⁵ And as a result, the intentions of Vizcarra and Congress were at war ever since Vizcarra assumed the vice-presidency.

Dissolution of Congress. After a year of battling with right-wing lawmakers over his anti-corruption campaign as president, Vizcarra managed to dissolve Congress and call new elections in September of 2019.⁵⁶

Peru's constitution allows the president to dissolve Congress after two votes of no confidence.⁵⁷ And Congress had already withdrawn confidence in 2017.⁵⁸ To end the power struggle between Congress and his government, Vizcarra called for a vote of confidence in September 2019 that would empower him to dismiss parliamentary officers if they vote with no confidence.⁵⁹ But because Congress appeared undeterred by his call, Vizcarra used Congress' appointment of members to the Tribunal Court as a second vote of no confidence.⁶⁰ At the time, the court had to decide the pre-trial jail term time for Keiko Fujimori, and the legislature re-appointed six out of seven members to the Tribunal Court even though the appointees had connections with judges under investigation for influence-peddling.⁶¹ One of the current judges of the Tribunal Court at the time even revealed that an individual, whose identity she concealed, offered to re-appoint her if she were to vote to free

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ See Quigley, John. "Vizcarra Set to Become Peru's New President Facing Daunting Challenges." Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg, March 21, 2018.

⁵² See Reuters Staff. "Peru's Vizcarra Calls for Vote of Confidence as Political Crisis Escalates." Reuters, September 27, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-peru-politics-idUSKBN1WC26H>.

⁵³ See Meddling in the criminal justice system and links between Peruvian political parties and organized crime were exposed through wiretapped phone calls between judges

⁵⁴ See Wheeldon, Tom. "Peru in Political Crisis amid Mass Protests over President's Impeachment," November 15, 2020. <https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20201115-peru-political-crisis-mass-protests-over-president-vizcarra-impeachment-by-merino>.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ See Reuters. "Peru's President Dissolves Congress to Push through Anti-Corruption Reforms." the Guardian, October 1, 2019.

⁵⁷ See Constitution of Peru, Art. 134.

⁵⁸ See "Peru's Leader Names New Prime Minister as He Reforms Cabinet," Associated Press News, September 17, 2017, <https://apnews.com/article/4af5ab6feaa04ddd84625394ee6b0d9c>.

⁵⁹ Same as footnote 52.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

Keiko Fujimori.⁶² As a result, the Tribunal Court would tip over the dispute between the executive and legislative branches towards the Fujimorist majority. So, Vizcarra used the graft in the described procedure as the second vote of no confidence, unilaterally eliminating the Fujimorist majority, Fuerza Popular, from Congress.⁶³

Soon after Vizcarra's call for new elections, the Fujimorist majority gathered for a meeting to find ways to save their prevalence in Congress while their party leader, Keiko Fujimori, was behind bars being investigated for money laundering.⁶⁴ Regardless, once the parliamentary members of Fuerza Popular stepped down, the end of the Fujimori prevalence in Peruvian politics was put to an end.⁶⁵ Fujimori had left a polarized Peru with a continuous prevalence in Congress through Fuerza Popular and his cherished daughter, Keiko Fujimori. However, after the back-to-back graft scandals including Keiko's involvement with Odebrecht, Peru's people grew tired of Fuerza Popular as well. Once they stepped down, their once hard-won positions in Congress were no longer possible to obtain; Peru hated them.⁶⁶ The combination of Vizcarra's antigraft incentives against a Fujimorist majority fueled by the Odebrecht continuous scandals enabled the end of Fujimori's prevalence in Peru. Even though Fujimorists faced ups and downs before, in the next election of January 2020, the amount of Fujimorists in Congress went from 36% to 7%.⁶⁷

The Impeachment of Vizcarra. Soon after Vizcarra dissolved congress, Congress voted to temporarily suspend Vizcarra and named the second vice-president of Peru, Mercedes Araoz as his interim replacement.⁶⁸ Accusing Vizcarra of being a dictator, parliamentary members refused to leave the chamber even as protests against them were igniting all over the country.⁶⁹ In September 2020, Congress attempted to impeach Vizcarra for the first time with allegations of influence-peddling. But Vizcarra survived this first attempt of impeachment.⁷⁰ However, in November, parliamentary members maneuvered the resulting socioeconomic crisis from the pandemic and bribery allegations to invoke the 19th century Constitution and removed him due to "moral incapacity".⁷¹ Specifically, Congress accused Vizcarra of taking \$630,000 in construction bribes during his time as governor in the Moquegua province⁷² and alleged that the socio economic crisis was single handedly due to his mishandling of the outbreak of COVID-19, which had then taken the lives of over 35,000 Peruvians,

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴See AP NEWS. "Dark Days for Peru's Political Dynasty after Congress Closes," October 4, 2019.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Same as footnote 54.

⁶⁸Same as footnote 54.

⁶⁹See Same as footnote 52.

⁷⁰See Al Jazeera English. Peru President Survives Congress Impeachment Vote, 2020. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SdELFfqAOyw>.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²See Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com), "Peruvian President Martin Vizcarra Ousted by Congress on Corruption Charges: DW: 10.11.2020," DW.COM, November 10, 2020.




Figure 5. The new distribution of parliamentary seats per political party in 2020 compared to the distribution of parliamentary seats from the 2016 elections. There are more parties in Congress formed in 2020, and Fuerza Popular is no longer the dominant party. “Elecciones Congresales Extraordinarias 2020.” Escuela de Gobierno y Políticas Públicas. Accessed March 22, 2021. <https://escuela.pucp.edu.pe/gobierno>.

giving Peru one of the world’s highest deaths per capita.⁷³

Lastly, Vizcarra’s immense popularity amongst the Peruvian people only exacerbated the turmoil and political instability of Peru. Vizcarra was popular among the people due to his anti-corruption initiatives. A survey by the Peruvian Studies Institute found that 84% of Peruvians support Vizcarra’s dissolution of the Congress.⁷⁴ And after Congress first attempted to remove Vizcarra from office, an Ipsos survey showed that 79% of Peruvians were in favor of Vizcarra finishing his first term.⁷⁵ Furthermore, Mario Vargas Llosa, a respected right-wing novelist, approved of Vizcarra because he worked within the law and had good credentials. However, he accurately predicted that if Vizcarra’s popularity were to increase, Vizcarra would face larger pushback from Fujimorists in congress.⁷⁶ Additionally, the multinational organization of American States expressed their concern the day Vizcarra was removed from office. His impeachment was heavily unpopular among the majority of Peru’s citizens. Vizcarra and his supporters denied the charges, calling the allegations “baseless” and “false.”⁷⁷ Specifically, Vizcarra was partly impeached due to his apparent mishandling of the

⁷³See Mark Katkov, “In Midst Of Pandemic Crisis, Peru’s Legislature Impeaches The Nation’s President,” NPR (NPR, November 10, 2020). <https://www.npr.org/2020/11/10/933334195/in-midst-of-pandemic-crisis-perus-legislature-impeaches-the-nations-president>.

⁷⁴See Margarita Felix, “Disolución Del Congreso: Martín Vizcarra: 84% De Peruanos Apoya La Disolución Del Congreso,” RPP, October 6, 2019. <https://rpp.pe/politica/actualidad/disolucion-del-congreso-martin-vizcarra-84-de-peruanos-apoya-la-disolucion-del-congreso-noticia-1223173>.

⁷⁵Same as footnote 54.

⁷⁶Same as footnote 54.

⁷⁷Same as footnote 72.

pandemic even though he was known for his strict policies after the first cases in Peru.⁷⁸ However, Peru's capacity to protect its people and its tremendous inefficiency in reaching the periphery and its people were lacking.

Parliamentary Immunity

In July of 2020, former President Martin Vizcarra and the Peruvian Congress began proposing different methods to remove or modify parliamentary immunity. The two ways to change the Constitution are either a referendum, where the general public votes, or where the legislators vote without public input. On the 3rd and 4th of July, the legislators who voted to remove parliamentary immunity failed to pass with the necessary amount to bypass a referendum. However, instead of letting it go to a referendum, on July 6th, Congress voted again to modify five articles of the Constitution.⁷⁹ And this was successful. The reform now permits ordinary criminal courts to try crimes committed by lawmakers before the beginning of their mandate and implies an end of the commission in charge of ruling over parliamentary immunity's withdrawals. However, this vote went beyond parliamentary immunity for legislators.⁸⁰ It also included eliminating any presidential immunity that left Vizcarra incredibly vulnerable to Congressional backlash. This could be a possible reason why Vizcarra's outing was so easily facilitated.

The recent Constitutional change caused some alarm in academic circles. Professor of Political Science at la Universidad Catolica del Peru, Eduardo Dargent, notes that the diverse interests and political opinions could create a dangerous situation for the power balance between the legislature and the executive branch.⁸¹ And the misleading changes passed by Congress fuel this danger. First, the changes eliminated parliamentary immunity except "any misdeed carried out in the course of congressional duties would remain safe from prosecution."⁸² This change would still not prosecute previous crimes of corruption like the bribery received by legislators. Second, the amendments did not strip parliamentary immunity only from the legislature but also the president, judges, and the "defensor del pueblo." To be more specific, the constitutional amendments are:⁸³

1. Article 93 eliminates parliamentary immunity

⁷⁸Same as footnote 72.

⁷⁹See Romero, Cesar. "Preguntas y respuestas para entender la nueva crisis entre Poder Ejecutivo y Legislativo." La República, July 8, 2020. <https://larepublica.pe/politica/2020/07/08/congreso-inmunidad-parlamentaria-preguntas-y-respuestas-para-entender-la-nueva-crisis-entre-poder-ejecutivo-y-legislativo/?ref=lr>.

⁸⁰See Quispe, Diego. "Congreso inmunidad parlamentaria: Martín Vizcarra dice no temer perder la inmunidad presidencial." La República, July 7, 2020. <https://larepublica.pe/politica/2020/07/07/congreso-inmunidad-parlamentaria-martin-vizcarra-dice-no-temer-perder-la-inmunidad-presidencial/>.

⁸¹See Patriau, Enrique. "Eduardo Dargent: 'Nos encaminamos hacia una elección muy fragmentada en donde hay muchos incentivos para correr solos,'" July 12, 2020. <https://larepublica.pe/politica/2020/07/12/eduardo-dargent-nos-encaminamos-hacia-una-eleccion-muy-fragmentada-en-donde-hay-muchos-incentivos-para-correr-solos/>.

⁸²See Tegel, Simeon. "In Peru, Congress' Move Against Immunity Isn't What It Seems." Americas Quarterly (blog), July 20, 2020. <https://americasquarterly.org/article/in-peru-congress-move-against-immunity-isnt-what-it-seems/>.

⁸³See "Congreso Inmunidad Parlamentaria | Preguntas y respuestas para entender la nueva crisis entre Poder Ejecutivo y Legislativo," July 8, 2020. <https://larepublica.pe/politica/2020/07/08/congreso-inmunidad-parlamentaria-preguntas-y-respuestas-para-entender-la-nueva-crisis-entre-poder-ejecutivo-y-legislativo/>.

2. Article 99 — cabinet ministers will no longer have the right to a political pre-trial in Congress nor any immunity (this includes on-the-job decisions and actions)
3. Article 117 establishes that the President of the Republic may be charged for crimes against public administration, committed before or during his mandate, while in office
4. Article 161 proposes that the People’s Ombudsman be elected and removed by Congress with two-thirds of the legal vote.
5. Article 201 amends the election procedures for magistrates of the Constitutional Court.

Another major red flag for this situation is that Omar Chehade, the Constitution Commission president, made these amendments alone, and these passed with little to no debate or analysis.

The changes to the Constitution were officially approved in early February of 2021, and the Supreme Court will be allowed to prosecute common crimes committed by congressmen in office, not requiring Congress’s approval.^[84]

Pre-Pandemic Economy

Peru had one of the fastest-growing economies between 2002 and 2013, as it experienced an average GDP growth rate of 6.1% per year. This was due, in large part, to the rise in international commodity prices sparked by the increasing demand from emerging economies like China.^[85] This decade of strong economic performance caused a significant growth in employment during this time, and the poverty rate was reduced from 52.2% in 2005 to 26.1% in 2013 — lifting 64. million Peruvians out of poverty.^[86] However, Peru’s over-reliance on mineral commodity exports, which consists mainly of copper exports, created trouble after international commodity prices fell in the first half of the 2010’s. Between 2014 and 2019, GDP growth slowed to an annual average rate of 3.1%, which slowed down the impressive socioeconomic progress that the country had strode toward.^[87]

Peru suffers from harsh inequality. The country has a Gini Index of 43.3 in 2017, making it the 39th most unequal country in the world.^[88] This is an issue that affects especially those who live in rural Peru, as half of rural residents live in poverty.^[89] Furthermore, 20% of those that live in the Sierras — most of whom are indigenous peoples — live off less than \$1.90 a day.^[90]

⁸⁴See Romero, Cesar. “Preguntas y respuestas para entender la nueva crisis entre Poder Ejecutivo y Legislativo,” La República, July 8, 2020. <https://larepublica.pe/politica/2020/07/08/congreso-inmunidad-parlamentaria-preguntas-y-respuestas-para-entender-la-nueva-crisis-entre-poder-ejecutivo-y-legislativo/?ref=lr>.

⁸⁵See World Bank. “The World Bank in Peru.” Text/HTML, October 9, 2020. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/peru/overview>.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸See Index Mundi. “Countries Ranked by GINI Index (World Bank Estimate).” <https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/SI.POV.GINI/rankings>.

⁸⁹See CHOICE Humanitarian. “Peru,” n.d. <https://www.choicehumanitarian.org/peru>.

⁹⁰Ibid.

Before the pandemic, about 62% of Peruvians did not have a bank account, and one of the goals of Vizcarra was that all Peruvians could have access to creating a bank account by the end of 2021. Hindered by the pandemic, only 40% held a bank account by August of 2020.⁹¹

Corruption and COVID-19

In a population of 32M people, Peru has been one of the worst-hit countries in the region (and once, it had the highest rate of death per capita in the world).⁹² As of March 16, 1.41M have been infected with coronavirus, and there have been 49,000 deaths.⁹³

By February 15, it was made public that 487 people among Martin Vizcarra were secretly vaccinated against COVID-19 as part of the clinical trials but long before the vaccines were available to the public.⁹⁴ This political scandal was popularized and labeled as "Vacuna-Gate." And specifically, Vizcarra received two doses of the Sinopharm vaccine in October 2020.⁹⁵ And besides, the inoculated included senior officials and their family members, such as in Vizcarra's case, his wife and brother were vaccinated as well.⁹⁶ Furthermore, some officials of the Health Ministry and Chancellery also received the vaccine.⁹⁷ And the current president Francisco Sagasti enunciated how "indignant" and "furious" he felt about this news along with the rest of the country.

The vaccines didn't arrive until the beginning of September, and there were 12,000 volunteers.⁹⁸ Vizcarra said that he was volunteering in the third phase of the clinical trials of the Sinopharm vaccine.⁹⁹ However, the researchers leading the trial denied Vizcarra's claim, and the lead researcher, Germán Málaga, said that Vizcarra explicitly requested the vaccine with the active component knowing that what he received wasn't a placebo.¹⁰⁰

Elections of 2021

About 25 million Peruvians voted in the elections of 2021, and they had to choose from 20 different political parties.¹⁰¹ On national website meant to compare the political parties running for the 2021

⁹¹ Same as footnote 54

⁹² See Long, Gideon. "Peru's Political Elite Ensnared in 'Vacuna-Gate' Scandal," February 18, 2021. <https://www.ft.com/content/06f34f5a-d196-468f-8802-8a508552e13c>.

⁹³ See "Monitoreo COVID-19 En Perú." Accessed March 16, 2021. <https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/f90a7a87af2548699d6e7bb72f5547c2>.

⁹⁴ See "Cuatro claves para entender el escándalo de las vacunas contra el coronavirus que causa indignación en Perú." BBC News Mundo. Accessed March 16, 2021. <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-56101527>.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ See Escuela de Gobierno y Políticas Públicas. "Elecciones Congresales Extraordinarias 2020." Accessed March 22, 2021. <https://escuela.pucp.edu.pe/gobierno>.

elections, the parties are differentiated by parameters such as the age, income, education, debt, and criminal history.¹⁰²

Peru has compulsory voting and a two round electoral process. And after back-to-back political scandals since the 2000s, personalistic parties only bolster the mistrust Peruvians have for their government. 90% of Peruvians have acknowledged their disapproval of Congress.¹⁰³ Peru's dissatisfaction and fragmented electoral candidates express themselves in last year's election, where more than 30% of the votes were not counted because the elected parties did not meet the 5% cut-off.¹⁰⁴ Currently, the party of Francisco Sagasti, Partido Morado, only has nine members of Congress, and even though this fragmentation is about to come to an end, for this year's elections, 23 nominees for the presidency were approved.¹⁰⁵ With less than a month to the elections, more than a third of voters are still undecided for whom they will vote.¹⁰⁶ As of March 21st, Yohny Lescano (10,8%); George Forsyth (9,2%); Keiko Fujimori (7,1%) y Verónica Mendoza (6,9%) lead the polls.¹⁰⁷

- Yohny Lescano (Center-left, Accion Popular): has had four terms as Congressman, has led multiple commissions, and he wants a new Constitution.¹⁰⁸
- Verónica Mendoza (Left, Juntos por el Peru): she did not have the time to register her party, so she joined "Juntos por el Peru" and has served one term as Congresswoman.¹⁰⁹
- George Forsyth (Victoria Nacional): He used to be a football player, entered politics as a mayor, was not associated with a party until Forsyth is an early frontrunner.¹¹⁰
- Keiko Fujimori (Fuerza Popular): daughter of Alberto Fujimori. She has been a congresswoman, and this is her third time trying to be president. She has been investigated multiple times including for her involvement in the Odebrecht scandal and has gone to prison.¹¹¹ And she has been one of the least favorite candidates with 54% saying that they would not vote for her as of March 5th.¹¹²

¹⁰² See DecidebienPe. "Decidebien Es Una Iniciativa Ciudadana Para Mejorar Nuestra Representación Política." Accessed March 22, 2021. <https://decidebien.pe>.

¹⁰³ See Martín, Andres González. "Peru, Where the City Is Sleeping,," n.d., 17.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ See Galindo, Jorge. "La indecisión gana en Perú, según las encuestas." EL PAÍS, March 21, 2021. <https://elpais.com/internacional/2021-03-21/la-indecision-gana-en-peru-segun-las-encuestas.html>.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ See Terry, Fernando Belaúnde. "El Peru Como Doctrina." *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 2, no. 2 (April 1960): 159–69. <https://doi.org/10.2307/164879>.

¹⁰⁹ See "Elecciones 2021: Conoce El Perfil de Verónica Mendoza, Candidata de Juntos Por El Perú, Noticias, Agencia Peruana de Noticias Andina." Accessed March 16, 2021. <https://andina.pe/agencia/noticia-elecciones-2021-conoce-perfil-veronika-mendoza-candidata-juntos-por-peru-831527.aspx>.

¹¹⁰ See "Peru's Presidential Election Likely Headed for Second Round, Poll Shows. Reuters." Accessed March 16, 2021.



Image 1: Photo of a man walking in the midst of political campaign posters in Lima, Peru.
Photographer: Paolo Aguilar/ EFE. Source: EL PAÍS, same as footnote 99.

As of April 25th, the elections have "gone off the rails". With two polarized populist qualifying candidates in the second electoral round, voters find themselves "trapped between extremes".¹¹³

The two remaining candidates for Presidency are Keiko Fujimori and Pedro Castillo. As of April 27th, the polls seem to predict that Pedro Castillo will be the winner of the 2021 presidential election.¹¹⁴ Pedro Castillo led the first round with 18% of the vote. Nonetheless, both candidates publicly stand for extremist values, and given the electoral results from the first round, this election is parallel to Ollanta Humala against Keiko Fujimori. Many Peruvians will treat their vote as choosing the lesser of two evils. Without a bench in Congress, the feuds between the executive and legislative branch will most likely continue similarly to while Vizcarra and Kuczynski were in office.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-peru-election-poll-idUSKBN2AE0OR>.

¹¹¹ Same as footnote 54

¹¹² See AS Perú. "Elecciones Perú 2021: cuál ha sido el resultado de la encuesta del IEP, favoritos y candidatos rechazados," March 5, 2021. <https://peru.as.com/peru/2021/03/05/actualidad/1614959570389458>.

¹¹³ See Bosworth, James, and Francisco Toro. "Opinion | Peru's Democracy Has Gone off the Rails, Leaving Voters Trapped between Extremes." Washington Post. Accessed April 30, 2021. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/04/28/peru-elections-pedro-castillo-keiko-fujimori-broken-democracy/>.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Note that the enumerated policy recommendations are in no particular order.

Boosting the Peruvian Economy

To build a stronger democracy, Peruvians across the periphery need to become able to engage politically, and to do this, they need to be able to look beyond their essential needs to survive. As briefed in the Economic Situation of Peru, most Peruvians do not even hold a bank account.

How can Peru boost its economy?

1. **Focus on quality goods for export, invest in research and development:** Due to Peru's higher labor costs, competing against cheap exports from Asia and Africa has become substantially harder – especially in the textiles industry.¹¹⁵ Therefore, in order to obtain a stronger competitive advantage in the international market, Peru's export strategy should shift from the manufacturing of cheap commodities to the production of innovative and high-value-added goods. This would allow Peru to shift from the generic exports market toward products of higher quality and therefore be better able to compete internationally.
2. **Invest in infrastructure and construction:** Peru is affected by a gap in infrastructure that makes it unfavorably compared to other countries in the region.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, structural development is mostly concentrated in the big cities like Lima, while the most secluded rural regions are behind in terms of infrastructure. According to the International Monetary Fund, “investment is particularly needed in transportation, sanitation, health, telecommunications, and water”.¹¹⁷ This means that there is a significant potential for the construction sector to create thousands of jobs and expand economic output. This potential is demonstrated by the relative success of Peru's cement industry, which is characterized by the “stable prices and cost-cutting measures” of the industry and the surge in foreign investment toward the sector.¹¹⁸
3. **Improve Citizen Income Security:** In order for capital to move through the Peruvian economy, the government needs to ensure that every citizen has the sufficient funds to actively participate in the trade of goods. With a poverty rate of 20% – which particularly affects those living in the rural regions – many Peruvians are unable to participate in the free market beyond the purchase

¹¹⁵See “Peru Government Initiatives to Diversify Local Industry.” Oxford Business Group. Accessed April 8, 2021. <https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/variety-show-government-initiatives-seek-diversify-local-economy>.

¹¹⁶See IMF. “Six Things to Know About Peru's Economy in 2020.” Accessed March 19, 2021. <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/01/14/NA011420-Six-Things-to-Know-About-Peru-Economy-in-2020>.

¹¹⁷Ibid.

¹¹⁸See “Peru Government Initiatives to Diversify Local Industry.” Oxford Business Group. Accessed April 8, 2021. <https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/variety-show-government-initiatives-seek-diversify-local-economy>.

of basic necessities.¹¹⁹ By establishing better safety-net programs, such a robust minimum guaranteed income to lift Peruvians above the poverty line, more citizens will be able to invest in local commerce and purchase durable goods.¹²⁰ This could galvanize many sectors of the economy, such as the domestic appliance sector which is already growing rapidly.¹²¹

Economic growth and political stability go hand-in-hand. If Peru is to strengthen its democracy in the long term, it needs to ensure that Peruvians have real prospects for social mobility and a higher quality of life. As shown by the economic boom of the 2000s, as an emerging economy with vast natural resources, Peru has great potential for economic growth. The challenge, however, is to make such economic growth much more predictable and less susceptible to shocks in the international market. Moreover, the government must ensure that the wealth generated from economic growth actually reflects on the living standards of ordinary Peruvians. By diversifying exports, shifting away from the generic products market, and focusing on infrastructure, Peru could galvanize macroeconomic growth and make markets less volatile. In addition, by establishing efficient systems of income security and cash transfers, the government can ensure that all Peruvian citizens have a piece of the newly expanded economic pie.

Welfare Initiatives

Peru's welfare system has transformed tremendously since the start of the 21st century. According to the World Bank, Peru's poverty rate was a staggering 58.7% in 2004, but in 2019, that number had decreased to 20.2%.¹²² This is due in part to Peru's steady economic growth during this time period. According to the World Bank, Peru's GDP nearly quadrupled from 66.77 billion USD in 2004 to 226.9 billion USD in 2019.¹²³ Evidently, Peru has made great strides in expanding its economy, and the effect of this accrued wealth is evident. However, given that poverty remains high and depends highly by region, it would seem that part of the poverty puzzle is left unsolved.

One of the challenges with addressing poverty in Peru is that it varies greatly by region. For example, in the region of Lima, the poverty rate stands at 12%, whereas in the region of Huancavelica, the poverty rate stands at 54.5%.¹²⁴ Evidently, there are some overwhelming disparities across Peru's districts, and even within them. In fact, most of the poverty in Lima is concentrated in the outskirts of the city where the shantytowns are located. Efforts to identify the areas in Peru with the highest poverty rates have been mostly successful, nonetheless.

JUNTOS: Peru's Conditional Cash Transfer Program:

¹¹⁹ Same as footnote 86

¹²⁰ See Cruz-Saco, Maria Amparo. "A Basic Income Policy for Peru: Can It Work?," n.d., 30.

¹²¹ See "Peru Government Initiatives to Diversify Local Industry." Oxford Business Group. Accessed April 8, 2021. <https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/variety-show-government-initiatives-look-to-diversify-local-economy>.

¹²² See "Poverty Headcount Ratio at National Poverty Lines (% of Population) - Peru | Data."

¹²³ Same as footnote 85.

¹²⁴ See "Perfil de la Pobreza por Dominios Geográficos 2004-2012."

In 2005, Peru began its conditional cash transfer program (CCT) that distributed transfers to households living under the poverty line and was contingent upon their “investments into the education and health care of their children.”¹²⁵ This meant that in order to receive this government assistance, families would have to make sure that their children were enrolled in school and went to the doctor more regularly. Although this was not the main focus of the program, the assumption was that higher rates of schooling for children would translate to higher levels of social mobility for their families.

Benefits of the JUNTOS Program:

1. The program has helped to reduce child poverty, increase educational attainment, increase vaccination rates, and it has even had a positive effect on more long-term economic stability for families.
 - (a) While some of these effects were intentional, some of the benefits that have arisen from this program largely arose because of individual household choices. While families were greatly encouraged to spend their money on food, there were other choices that families could make that would also positively impact their household.
 - (b) Choices like purchasing animals, fixing their homes, and readjusting household gender norms were all left up to the individual households to make. These choices were made in the absence of other social services that would help reduce child poverty, malnutrition and would increase educational attainment.
2. JUNTOS has been relatively free of corruption because the distribution of funds goes directly from the government to families, making the system less susceptible to clientelism.

Critiques of the JUNTOS Program: JUNTOS seems to be a substitute for other more substantial and permanent social services.

1. The existence of CCTs may prevent the development of more transformative welfare programs that would address poverty at a deeper level. they as merely substitutes for building sustainable social spending programs.
2. For example, in some districts, the increase in demand for health services led to an overworked health sector and a decrease in the quality of services.¹²⁶ This demonstrates that while the Juntos program may have some important benefits in the lives of poor households in Peru, they are insufficient at addressing the need for the development of high-quality social services and a more comprehensive transformation of educational systems available to poor children.

¹²⁵See Gaentsch, “Do Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) Raise Educational Attainment?”

¹²⁶See Jones, Vargas, and Villar, “Cash Transfers to Tackle Childhood Poverty and Vulnerability.”

Building on some of the successes of the JUNTOS program, the US should recommend that Peru build more sustainable social services. Since the JUNTOS program has already established methods to identify the most vulnerable households and populations, this data can be used to allocate funds more efficiently and target the neediest communities. To prevent instances of corruption, the funds to build new social services should be allocated by an independent agency free of Congressional influence.

Rebuilding Trust in the Government

There is a large distrust in the Peruvian government by the citizens of Peru. Some of the factors identified in this report-such as the long history of corruption in the Peruvian government and the dangerous environment for journalists that impede on the freedom of the press and spread of information to the public-have contributed to vilification of the Peruvian government by its people. After the Odebrecht scandal, Peru implemented a comprehensive framework of anti-corruption policies. Yet, according to the 2019 Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer Latin America/ Caribbean Report, 65% of citizens in Peru believed corruption had increased in their country in the prior 12 months.¹²⁷

1. **Increasing Accountability Measures for Existing Agencies:** The Public Integrity Model currently in place in Peru seeks to increase transparency and trust in government. This model was implemented as part of a 2018-2021 effort to fight against corruption.¹²⁸ We recommend following up on the measurable results of this implementation and public opinion of the outcomes, demonstrating the government's commitment to truly decreasing corruption in the country.
2. **Implementing Stronger Measures for Transparency:** The creation of an online portal similar to govtrack.us could provide greater transparency through more easy-to-understand information on government procedures. Most information about government procedures can be found on www.gob.pe, Peru's only official website for government information. However, the online tool is still in the process of being developed and adding new information, yet this information may be more accessible to all citizens if the media was comfortable providing a more general summary of government actions. Helping strengthen this technology would be an approachable and effective way to increase transparency in Peru.
3. **Safety Measures to Protect the Press:** Currently, defamation laws and threats to journalists keep the media from being able to freely report on certain topics. Journalists in Peru can

¹²⁷ See Bring, Coralie, and Jon Vrush. "Global Corruption Barometer Latin America & The Caribbean 2019 Citizens' Views and Experiences of Corruption." Berlin: Transparency International, 2019.

¹²⁸ See "Modelo De Integridad." Gobierno del Perú, March 24, 2021. <https://www.gob.pe/institucion/minsa/pages/11430-modelo-de-integridad>.

face charges for insult, libel, calumny, and defamation.^[129] We recommend encouraging the review of laws that inhibit journalists from safely reporting on all topics following guidelines such as those outlined in the *UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity*.^[130] Additionally, we recommend investigating into potential procedures that could protect the press beyond the Peruvian law.

Government Accountability

The three main divisions of the Peruvian government are the Executive, Judicial, and the Legislative. Many threats to democracy and democratic processes have occurred as an almost direct result of a lack of horizontal accountability between these branches. Since 2016, Congress has abused the Peruvian constitution's "moral incapacity"^[131] offence with virtually no oversight. In fact, this dynamic is precisely how Martin Vizcarra came to office in 2018, and Manuel Merino (the interim president that followed Vizcarra) took advantage of the same dynamic against Vizcarra,^[132] a leader that garnered significant support from the Peruvian people. Over the two years prior to his impeachment, Vizcarra undertook a series of anti-corruption reforms that included Reducing parliamentary immunity and banning Congressional re-election; these initiatives angered Congress. Vizcarra demanded that Congress grant him a vote of confidence on a mandate to reform the selection process for the country's top court judges. However, when Congress refused, Vizcarra utilized a different procedural rule to legally dissolve Congress and call for new Congressional elections in January 2020, but this had unanticipated consequences. The ongoing battles between Peru's executive and legislative branch have frustrated and exhausted Peruvian citizens, who desire for the state to improve its provision of adequate public services and to improve its efforts to eliminate inequality. And this frustration can even be seen in the results of the January 2020 election, in which Peruvians overwhelmingly chose newcomers rather than established parties, who they believed had failed to deliver social justice, greater security, and less inequality.^[133]

How can international forces keep track of different actions in parliament in terms of corruption and the electoral process?

¹²⁹See "Critics Are Not Criminals Comparative Study of Criminal Defamation Laws in the Americas." New York, NY: Committee to Protect Journalists, n.d.

¹³⁰See UNESCO. *UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity*. Paris, France: UNESCO, 2016. <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000246014>.

¹³¹When Alberto Fujimori fled to Japan in 2000 and resigned from the presidency following allegations of corruption and other crimes, Congress decided not to accept it and declared him absent due to "moral incapacity." Under Peru's Constitution, immorality is not an impeachable offense. However, Congress has reinterpreted moral incapacity to mean literal immorality (instead of the traditional "mental disability" that was meant to resolve a once-in-a-lifetime crisis), in order to make it suitable for impeachment purposes. See Gurmendi Dunkelberg, Alonso. "What Just Happened in Peru? Understanding Vizcarra's Sudden Impeachment." *Americas Quarterly* (blog), November 10, 2020. <https://americasquarterly.org/article/what-just-happened-in-peru-understanding-vizcarras-sudden-impeachment/>.

¹³²In May of 2020, Congress again rediscovered the "moral incapacity" clause for removal of presidents from office, and Merino initiated an effort to impeach Vizcarra due to a scandal involving the payment of \$50,000 to a singer hired to offer workshops at the culture ministry. Ibid.

¹³³See Gurmendi Dunkelberg, Alonso. "What Just Happened in Peru? Understanding Vizcarra's Sudden Impeachment." *Americas Quarterly* (blog), November 10, 2020. <https://americasquarterly.org/article/what-just-happened-in-peru-understanding-vizcarras-sudden-impeachment/>.

1. **The creation of an institute to commission reports on backsliding in democracy:**¹³⁴ This would bring an international spotlight (and therefore international publicity) on existing and persisting issues. It would provide encouragement and benchmarks for governments that are undertaking democratic reforms. And it would serve as an early warning mechanism for the Inter-American system.¹³⁵
2. **Willingness (on the part of the Organization of American States)**¹³⁶ **to invoke Resolution 1080 in response to events that constitute sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government of a member state:**¹³⁷ This would allow for an immediate convocation of a meeting of the permanent Council, in which they would examine the situation and decide on/convene an ad hoc meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (or special session of the general assembly). In this meeting (or session), they would look into the events collectively and adopt any decisions that were deemed to be appropriate. Then, they would instruct the Permanent Council to devise a set of proposals that would serve as incentives to preserve and strengthen democratic systems (based on international solidarity and cooperation).
3. **Regular in loco visits by IACHR to conduct an in-depth analysis of the preservation of the rule of law and respect for human rights:** The IACHR “rejects all acts of corruption because they affect the enjoyment and exercise of human rights” and has expressed its concerns regarding Martin Vizcarra’s removal from office.¹³⁸ Regular visits could ensure maintenance of regular contact and the development of Human Rights reports and recommendations for the member states on measures they can take to address instances of corruption and/or violation of democratic processes and institutions.
4. **Specification of whether the February 2021 lift reform to parliamentary immunity will allow for the Fiscalía (the autonomous entity and prosecutors office of Peru) to carry out prosecutions without needing the approval of Congress:** As of February 2021, the Supreme Court will be allowed to prosecute crimes committed by members of Congress without the need for congressional approval. In addition to this, the reform allows for ordinary criminal courts to try crimes committed by lawmakers. Considering the autonomous nature

¹³⁴See Cameron, Maxwell A. “Strengthening Checks and Balances: Democracy Defence and Promotion in the Americas.” *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 10, no. 3 (January 2003): 101–16. <https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2003.9673346>.

¹³⁵A regional human rights system that monitors, promotes, and protects human rights in the 35 countries that are members of the OAS (Organization of American States). See “Inter-American Human Rights System – International Justice Resource Center.” Accessed April 21, 2021. <https://ijrcenter.org/regional/inter-american-system/>.

¹³⁶See OAS. “OAS - Organization of American States: Democracy for Peace, Security, and Development.” Text, August 1, 2009. <https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/agres1080.html>.

¹³⁷See OAS. “OAS - Organization of American States: Democracy for Peace, Security, and Development.” Text, August 1, 2009. https://www.oas.org/en/member_states/default.asp.

¹³⁸See OAS. “OAS - Organization of American States: Democracy for Peace, Security, and Development.” Text, August 1, 2009. https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2020/270.asp.

of the Fiscalía, would this fail to also be applicable to them? Or would this undo the prior limitations set upon the Fiscalía in regards to prosecution of government officials involved in corruption?

5. **Greater willingness on the part of OAS member states (e.g. Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, etc.) to be critical of anti-democratic/corrupt practices in Peru when they occur:** When the Permanent Council met in December 2002 to debate the situation occurring with the Chavez government, there was an unwillingness on the part of the assembled ambassadors to apply the Democratic Charter (despite the actions of the Chavez government being considered an “unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the democratic order”). This resulted in there being very few external checks on the centralization of power (in the hands of Chavez) that was taking place.

All in all, these measures are recommended with the intention of recognizing and respecting the sovereignty of the Peruvian government and its people while also utilizing positive incentives to encourage Peruvian officials to honor democratic institutions and processes in order to ensure that the needs of the Peruvian people do not continue to be undermined (and even worsened) as a result of the corrupt practices or overreaches of power on the part of any one sector of government. Implementing (and bolstering) multifaceted approaches to international oversight, international identification of corrupt practices, and general government accountability will ultimately help to facilitate and strengthen democratic processes and, in due course, restore faith in the state and the institutions and individuals that comprise it.

Institutionalizing a Non-Personalistic Party System

The institutionalization of Peru’s party system is imperative to rescuing its democracy. The four policy recommendations provided below are aimed at combating party system weakness and motivating party system institutionalization. The first policy recommendation is based on increasing grassroots party building which is a vital component to strong party systems—this can be achieved by increasing the party legalization requirements from those established in the 2001 reform. The second policy recommendation aims to abolish the personalistic approach to party creation. This would require a ban of private firm financial support for personalistic parties to motivate grassroots party building. De-institutionalizing personalistic candidacies and party use is the third policy recommendation that is possible to attain through a policy that would require each party and party candidate to clearly state their platform and what they stand for, potentially deinstitutionalizing transfuguismo. The last policy recommendation is to foster collaboration amongst parties that would require the decision of who joins the cabinet and who is to be the prime minister to fall not on the parties instead of the president. It is important to note that although the recommended changes are of immediate urgency, the institutionalization of the party system will not be an overnight miracle, but rather a long and arduous process.

How to help institutionalize political parties and eventually institutionalize a non-personalistic

party system?

1. **Grassroot Party Building:** The weak and unhealthy party creation system of Peru could be abolished through a reform that aims to strengthen a structure of required organizational resources for party legalization—increasing requirements from those established in the 2001 reform. This could potentially prevent personalistic party creation that has no incentive to become institutionalized and also motivate grassroots party building. We recommend that the current requirements for party legalization of 135,000 signatures be increased, as well as the minimum requirement of sixty-seven provincial branches.¹³⁹
2. **Abolishing personalistic approach to party creation:** The personalistic approach to party building has led private firms to become party substitutes and campaign organizations.¹⁴⁰ We recommend a ban of private firm financial support for personalistic parties, as to motivate grassroots party building. We also recommend that an international public sector or governmental reform builds a set of requirements to mark a party as personalistic. The set of requirements can facilitate the identification of these parties and oblige said parties to strengthen their infrastructure and eventually lead to more grassroots party building that would result in the institutionalization of the party.
3. **Deinstitutionalizing personalistic candidacy and party use:** The institutionalized practice of transfuguismo, which allows for personalistic and money-driven selection of candidates by parties, has created volatile short-term commitments that are widely accepted by the current party system.¹⁴¹ We recommend the creation of an inter-party policy that would require that each party clearly state their platform and what they stand for. In addition, the candidates antecedents, plans, and proposals must show congruence with the party's platform. And both the party and the candidate must be required to present long-term proposals. These requirements will help create a party system infrastructure founded on “future predictability.”¹⁴² This policy could potentially lead to a party—not individual candidate—coalition between those parties with similar platforms and long-term goals.
4. **Incentivize collaboration amongst parties:** Fostering collaboration between parties is imperative to the institutionalization of party systems because the current system of independent and personalistic coalitions have lessened the vitality of parties.¹⁴³ We recommend a reform that would assimilate a practice of the parliamentary party system that would require the

¹³⁹ See Steven Levitsky, “Peru: The Institutionalization of Politics without Parties,” in Mainwaring ed., *Party Systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, Decay, and Collapse*, pg. 340.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, pg. 340.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, pg. 342.

¹⁴² See Scott Mainwaring ed., *Party Systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, Decay, and Collapse* (Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp.17-23 (with Fernando Bizzarro and Ana Petrova); 57-63; 71-101.

¹⁴³ See “Critics Are Not Criminals Comparative Study of Criminal Defamation Laws in the Americas.” New York, NY: Committee to Protect Journalists, n.d. pg. 355.

decision of who joins the cabinet and who is to be the prime minister to fall on the parties instead of the president. This could oblige parties to collaborate and aim to maintain a strong and less volatile government.¹⁴⁴

Through the making of this report, one of the popular ideas brainstormed through the making of this report is to develop incentives that could help foster collaboration among the many parties of Peru. Currently, the antagonistic relationship between the Executive and Legislative branch is fueled by the difference in ideology and political agenda by every party. Every political party, personalistic or not, has some sort of political agenda, corrupt or not, and the number of parties in Peru not only makes the bureaucratic process in Congress incredibly ineffective, but it makes the political party to which the elected president belongs a minority amidst a numerous diverse set of personalistic political parties. In an immediate form of action, helping foster collaboration could help begin the institutionalization of political parties to have these revolve around ideals that go beyond the political agenda of Peruvian legislators.

Political Party Fragmentation

Political instability in Latin America can largely be attributed to political party fragmentation. Party breakdown is defined as an electoral defeat of a previously established political party during one election cycle. The combination of two scenarios has empirically proven to breakdown party systems. A party brand can be defined as the extent to which a voter can identify with a political party. When a party brand dilutes due to changing ideology or policies implemented, voters feel less attached and parties begin to lose their base. However, party brand dilution is not enough to explain extreme collapse of parties. The second scenario is poor performance of the political parties when they are in elected office. For example, a party that consistently cannot provide the level of healthcare that was promised discourages its once strong voter base. Thus, the combination of diluted party brand and poor performance leads to a party breakdown.¹⁴⁵

Peru is not an exception to party fragmentation. Since the restoration of democracy, Peru has seen high levels of electoral volatility. New parties, like Peru Posible, Peruanos Por el Kambio (PPK), or Si Cumple, are constantly emerging and shifting the political landscape of Peru. Lack of political consolidation has led to tensions between Congress and the Executive.¹⁴⁶ In 2020, the impeachment of Martin Vizcarra shocked the Peruvian people and showed an explosive ending to a Congressional-Executive stand off. President Vizcarra had been previously aggressive towards Congress and dissolved the Congress in 2019. Since then, it had been difficult for Vizcarra to work with the Congress. Vizcarra's lack of allies in the Congress facilitated his impeachment because

¹⁴⁴ See Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination," *Comparative Political Studies* 26, no. 2 (1993), pg. 200.

¹⁴⁵ See Lupu, Noam. "Brand Dilution and the Breakdown of Political Parties in Latin America." *World Politics*, vol. 66 no. 4, 2014, p. 561-602. Project MUSE muse.jhu.edu/article/555353.

¹⁴⁶ See Levitsky, Steven, et al., editors. *Challenges of Party-Building in Latin America*. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Congress simply needed a majority to prove “moral incapacity”.¹⁴⁷ In other states, it is more difficult to impeach the President with strong legislative backing. The most recent example is that of President Trump whose Republican base made it difficult to impeach and convict the former president.

The 2021 election is another example of the degree of political party fragmentation. The election had 21 different parties in competition: Avanza Pais, Fuerza Popular, Accion Popular, Somos Peru, and many more.¹⁴⁸ There are some like Fuerza Popular or APRA that have a relatively established base but not a significant majority to guarantee an election. The parties themselves do not indicate a specific ideologic or programmatic backing beyond the general empowerment of Peru. This makes it difficult for voters to differentiate between candidates and their platforms which further cements political fragmentation.

How can the U.S. help redistribute functions and powers within the Peruvian government to strengthen the democratic and electoral procedures in Peru?

1. **U.S. investment in social services:** A major factoring causing political instability is that the Peruvian people have lost faith in the government. Around 40 percent of ballots submitted during elections are left blank or null. Since Peru does require compulsory ballots, this indicates a severe cynicism throughout the country. A large part can be attributed to the state’s inability to meet social service needs like healthcare, public education, and protecting individual rights. In terms of USAID, there are already broad programs that are centered around food insecurity, hygiene, economic assistance, and various other necessities.¹⁴⁹ This work should continue but there should be attempts to allow the Peruvian government to take credit for the continuation and strengthening of social services. This can mostly be done through media coverage with a strong depiction of the Peruvian state.
2. **Increased diplomacy with elected Presidents:** As previously noted, the lack of political platform has allowed Peruvian politicians to skirt many questions about policy implementation or ideological alignment. The U.S. should make an attempt to hold interviews, conversations, or general dialogue with the President to discover political alignments. To be clear, this should not be an attempt to discredit Presidents but to incentivize the promotion of programmatic party systems instead of personalistic ones.
3. **Support for elected Presidents:** The upcoming election process gives the U.S. the perfect opportunity to support whichever Peruvian candidate is elected. The U.S.- Peru liaisons should work with the incoming government to determine which foreign policy agenda is best suited i.e. would the President prefer to maintain close ties to the U.S. or not. If close ties are

¹⁴⁷ See “El Congreso de Perú destituye al presidente Vizcarra.” BBC News Mundo. <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-54882941>.

¹⁴⁸ See Comercio, El. “Elecciones 2021: conoce a los candidatos de los partidos | El Comercio Perú.” El Comercio.pe. <https://especiales.elcomercio.pe/?q=especiales/elecciones-2021-conoce-candidatos-partidos-politicos-nndd-ecvisual-ecpm/index.html>

¹⁴⁹ See “Humanitarian Assistance, Peru.” U.S. Agency for International Development. April 8, 2021. <https://www.usaid.gov/humanitarian-assistance/peru>.

desired, this could act as a deterrence mechanism for Congress should it decide to impeach the incoming president.

Political party fragmentation is directly tied to political instability. A party system that does not have definite actors makes the political landscape hard to define and navigate. This makes it difficult to sustain a political party that maintains a solid platform. However, the lack of a party system is not the root cause of political instability. The greater concern is the sentiments Peruvian voters have for the government. Collaboration between the U.S. and Peruvian government is essential to signal to the Peruvian people that the government is a necessary and useful institution.

Diplomacy

There are many instances in which the US has intervened to help a country with its democratic processes. The United States has an economic interest in Peruvian stability. Peru receives \$13.7B of US exports and is the US' 15th largest supplier of agricultural imports giving the US an opportunity to promote policies in Peru that can help stabilize its democracy.

1. **Economic Assistance:** The United States provided Peru with \$61M in 2020.¹⁵⁰ This is delivered mainly to the International Narcotics & Law Enforcement department. It would be preferable for a substantial share of the aid to be directed towards other sectors such as “Basic Health” and “Basic Education.” It would also be beneficial that the USAID works with the US Agency for International Development allowing Peru to invest in research and development. Lastly, it would be beneficial to increase U.S. financial assistance given that its decreasing from its \$183M average.¹⁵¹
2. **Accountability Measures:** The United States has the opportunity to hold democratic procedures accountable given that it is the 2nd country with which Peru trades the most, after the People’s Republic of China, and particularly when Peru’s agricultural exports to the United States are worth over \$2B. However, it’s also advisable that the U.S. invests in procedures to mitigate the risks of economic sanctions given that Peru can ultimately choose to trade primarily with China instead.
3. **Partnerships:** The United States could appeal to other supranational organizations like the UN and World Bank to help Peru to collaborate on agencies and international procedures to strengthen accountability measures and incentives. For example, the United States could call international courts to try congresspeople protected by parliamentary immunity, on issues ranging from Human Rights to Democratic Principles.

¹⁵⁰See “Humanitarian Assistance, Peru.” U.S. Agency for International Development. April 8, 2021. <https://www.usaid.gov/humanitarian-assistance/peru>.

¹⁵¹“U.S. Foreign Aid by Country.” <https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd>.

CONGRESSIONAL RESTRUCTURE AND FURTHER RESEARCH

On paper, Peru has a well-established democracy. It has three branches of government with designated checks and balances through the recent unicameral legislature. However, as members of the U.S. Embassy in Peru have described, Peru's checks and balances are a hybrid model making it one of the noticeable problems in Peru's incredibly vulnerable structure that are less than enough to guarantee any political stability.

A factor worthy of consideration in the checks and balances of Peru is its parliamentary structure. Factors such as stability of the law, the concentration of power, accountability, representation and responsiveness, quality of decision-making, efficiency, economy, and more play a prominent role in the stability of Peru.¹⁵² Therefore, the parliamentary structure of Peru plays an essential role in the factors that contribute to its stability. However, the merits of both unicameral and bicameral legislatures make determining the optimal route of Congressional structure difficult. Therefore, starting with a cross-case analysis with factors like those listed earlier is essential in making this impactful decision.

Remarkably, however, the historical context for the parliamentary structure of Peru should not go unnoticed. Given that New Zealand's unicameral model is seeing as one of the "best-designed" electoral systems in the world,¹⁵³ it's inferable that law faculty would claim that New Zealand's unicameral system is defying "conventional wisdom" or "making it work",¹⁵⁴ hinting at the idea that bicameral systems can be superior to unicameral legislatures. Therefore, we recommend including its historical context and political environment in a cross-case analysis of the current unicameral structure of Peru with the previous.

It is important to include personal motives, political culture, and pre-existing frameworks. For example, Alberto Fujimori established the Democratic Constitutional Congress with a single chamber of 130 members after he dissolved Congress in 1993.¹⁵⁵ Fujimori switched the bicameral Congress with a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies to the "Congreso de la República."¹⁵⁶ Unicameral legislatures can be more efficient procedurally.¹⁵⁷ This aligns with the attitude and prospects of Fujimori throughout his presidency since shock-economic tactics, counter-terrorism, and genocide accompanied his presidential terms or rather a dictatorship. Later, in 2001, under the interim presidency of Valentín Paniagua, individuals and scholars like Carlos Blanco Paniagua advocated for

¹⁵²See Bustamante, Carlos Blancas. "La Reforma Constitucional del Congreso." *Derecho & Sociedad*, no. 17 (2001): 123–30. <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=7792452>.

¹⁵³See Matthews, Dylan. "3 Reasons Why New Zealand Has the Best-Designed Government in the World." *Vox*, September 23, 2014. <https://www.vox.com/2014/9/23/6831777/new-zealand-electoral-system-constitution-mixed-member-unicameral>.

¹⁵⁴See Ganley, Marcus. "Making Unicameral Parliaments Work: The New Zealand Exception?" Victoria University of Wellington, 2002, 95. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/153553089.pdf>.

¹⁵⁵See Bustamante, Carlos Blancas. "La Reforma Constitucional del Congreso." *Derecho & Sociedad*, no. 17 (2001): 123–30. <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=7792452>.

¹⁵⁶See "Presidentes Del Congreso de 1951 al 2000." Accessed April 30, 2021. <http://www.congreso.gob.pe/participacion/museo/congreso/presidentes-1951-2000>.

¹⁵⁷See Todd, Tom. "Unicameral or Bicameral State Legislatures: The Policy Debate," 1999. <https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/unicam.pdf>

a bicameral Congress since Peru had never seen a unicameral Congress before.¹⁵⁸ Overall, Fujimori's historical example displays how personal motives play out concerning the specific political structure of Peru providing clues for potential future analysis on upcoming political decisions and behaviors.

In terms of stability and decision-making, policy-makers cannot mitigate risks with their ability to pass lower-quality policies that can grow unrespected. Peru's large problem roots in its lack of solidified institutions. A unicameral Congress can contribute to this issue through lower-quality decision-making because of the resulting futile policies vulnerable to instability. The recent decision by the JNE to prevent the re-election of elected officials in 2016 and 2019 is a clear example.¹⁵⁹ We recommend that Peru switches back to its previous system simply because the recently implemented no re-election policy (1) discourages candidates from pursuing a political career due to its unsteady political structure and (2) increases the election of novice legislators in crucial times for Peru.¹⁶⁰ Thus, we recommend that Peru considers choosing a term limit system instead of a no re-election policy. However, we recommend further policy reports that look into the mitigation of risks of discouraging politicians from pursuing politics and instead seek monetary gain. What would a Peruvian legislator do with only five years in Congress? For many Peru officials, the answer is self-evident given the poor economic situation of Peru. Some politicians even take the "farándula" route that is a Peruvian term for becoming socially elite. Keiko Fujimori seems to want the presidency to get parliamentary immunity.¹⁶¹ Therefore, the mitigation of risks is imperative before implementing or considering further political reforms.

However, our recommendations that involve switching back to previous systems rely on the fact that these recently implemented actions lacked substantial consideration of second-hand outcomes without any attempt of risk mitigation. It was only 16 days before the deadline to present political candidates by each party to the JNE for the 2021 election that the JNE changed the re-election policy so that legislative members elected in 2016 and 2019 would be barred from re-election in 2021.¹⁶² The easiness of policy-making incredibly outweighs the quality of the decisions. Ultimately, perhaps a bicameral system is the most imperative factor to consider in the short term.

Another factor to consider in further analyses is the constant fluctuation of Peruvian officials among political parties within and out of office. Peruvian elections tend to be convoluted and unpredictable. Some of the variables that come to play in this aspect of Peru's instability include personal motives, a personalistic party system, and unsteady governmental frameworks.

Additionally, switching bicameral legislature would increase statistical diversity through different proportional representation methods to improve the electoral representation in Peru. Peru's population

¹⁵⁸ See Bustamante, Carlos Blancas. "La Reforma Constitucional del Congreso." *Derecho & Sociedad*, no. 17 (2001): 123–30. <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=7792452>.

¹⁵⁹ See "JNE Declares No Re-Election of Members of Congress next Year." Peru Support Group (blog), October 18, 2020. <https://perusupportgroup.org.uk/2020/10/jne-declares-no-re-election-of-members-of-congress-next-year/>.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ See Bosworth, James, and Francisco Toro. "Opinion | Peru's Democracy Has Gone off the Rails, Leaving Voters Trapped between Extremes." *Washington Post*. Accessed April 30, 2021. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/04/28/peru-elections-pedro-castillo-keiko-fujimori-broken-democracy/>.

¹⁶² Ibid.

has exponentially grown, but the number of Congress legislators has remained at 130 members. As a result, in addition to parliamentary restructure, we recommend looking into an optimal amount of legislators to adjust for the population growth rate of Peru.

Lastly, Peru has reached an inflection point after these three decades. 2020 was a closing period for Peru. The new generation of voters is more politically involved, informed, and outspoken.

CONCLUSION

Peru's democratic issues revolve around different convoluted factors including entrenched corruption, its checks and balances, and weak political parties. On paper, Peru is doing well about handling corruption such as with Odebrecht, or its democracy is well-established, and political parties continue to come and go. Politicians have crossed red lines that were never imagined to be crossed. One of the most recent examples include using the two votes of no confidence to dissolve Congress or using "permanent moral incapacity" to impeach the President. One of the older examples is the action of Fujimori to switch to a unicameral congress which has contributed to the facilitation of democratic vulnerability. A recent example of the great vulnerability of Peru is the no re-election policy that not only the growth of political parties, but brightly displays the ability to implement policies with little to no diligence.

There is little to no evidence to predict how Peru's new generation will handle its democracy or the relationship with the Peruvian government and its people. However, these trends might be helpful in the perspective of the U.S. Peru could and should still address many important gaps such as honoring their own rule of law, increase levels of representation in Congress, switching their unicameral congress to a bicameral different proportional representation methods, or getting rid of their no re-election policy and changing their current trade deal policies with foreign companies. Peru trades with China, US, Brazil, India, South Korea, Japan and Mexico. The US is Peru's 2nd most traded country. So looking into ways that the US currently supports Peru and their current relationships and policies with foreign companies will be useful to address the question of how can US the redistribute their current economic support goals to create positive incentives (rather than negative ones) to create political change revolving on the issues pointed out in our report.

The US is "the world's most powerful democracy with unrivaled global reach and capabilities,"¹⁶³ and it has the power to help Peru stay democratic and ensure freedom for the people of Peru. The maintenance and promotion of democracy around the world is of strong interest in the United States.

¹⁶³See A review of Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends 1992-2002, Edited by Robert G. Herman and Theodore J. Piccone.

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